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ABSTRACT 
A number of books in recent years have analysed the reasons behind R.B .Haldane's 
radical decision to create a home defence auxiliary designed to replace the Militia, 
Yeomanry and Rifle Volunteers . Rather than cover again material which has already 
been extensively examined, this study concentrates on the formation of the several 
auxiliary bodies which were intended to assist the new Territorial Force in its defence of 
mainland Britain . 
The thesis also looks at the dynamics which, in 1914, prompted the spontaneous 
emergence of another, unofficial auxiliary, the Volunteer Training Corps. Regarded with 
disdain and contempt by the War Office, the VTC, later the Volunteer Force, was used by 
the political authorities as a means by which the civilian population could , without 
excessive government expenditure, be encouraged to take an active part in the defence 
of its country. The Volunteer Force developed into a recognized body of part-time auxiliary 
soldiers which became, in time, intimately involved with the workings of the tribunal 
system and with the concepts of total war and universal sacrifice. In contrast to the 
military authorities' distrust of the Volunteers, the Government decided that political 
expediency demanded it partially support and eventually fund the movement. Although 
awarded a post-war certificate of appreciation, the Volunteers were denied any real 
official recognition of their patriotism and commitment. 
Research into Britain's auxiliary forces of the early twentieth century has largely 
ignored the contribution of the National Reserve, Corps of Guides, Royal Defence Corps 
and the Volunteer Force: their existence has occasionally been acknowledged but there 
has been no adequate study of the role of these bodies in the context of what some 
historians regard as a nation-in-arms. An examination of government documents, the 
papers of individuals closely involved in home defence and , in particular, the minute 
books of the County Territorial Associations, has revealed a sometimes bizarre and 
occasionally bewildering picture of Government and War Office contradictions. By 
unravelling the nature and complications of the political and military difficulties involved 
in raising and maintaining Britain's auxiliary forces, this thesis attempts to develop 
recent research on the character, controversies and contribution of Britain's part-time 
amateur soldiers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1914 the defence of the United Kingdom was the responsibility of the Royal Navy, two 
divisions of regular troops and approximately 270,000 men of Britain's principal 
auxiliary, the Territorial Force. In general terms, the nation had implicit faith in the Navy 
and , after its shortcomings in South Africa and subsequent reforms, acknowledged the 
improving worth of the Army. Public sentiment towards the Territorial Force was, 
however, not so accommodating . The home defence army was widely ridiculed for its 
youth, inefficiency and consistent failure even to reach what was already considered to 
be an inadequate establishment. 
In the decade preceding 1914 the issue of conscription, whether for the Regular 
Army, Territorials or both, had aroused and sustained impassioned political debate. 
Equally emotive was the argument between those who believed any invasion would be 
presaged by a period of heightened international tension and those who considered it 
would come as a 'bolt from the blue'. As Anglo-French diplomatic relations thawed in 
the face of increasing German belligerence, Britain's frequently discordant naval and 
military authorities did manage to achieve a vague degree of coordinated anti-invasion 
planning. Nevertheless, given the War Office's commitment to raising a continental 
expeditionary force, many believed the mainland lay exposed. It was this concern which 
in 1906-07 had caused R.B. Haldane, the Secretary of State for War, to create the 
Territorial Force and which, in subsequent years , prompted him to allow the formation of 
other home defence auxiliary bodies. 
The first volume of the Official History of the Great War describes the mobilization 
of the National Reserve in a single paragraph. It explains the intention of the Reserve to 
'register and organize all officers and men who had served in and left any of the military 
forces of the Crown , with a view to increasing the military strength of the country in the 
event of imminent national danger'.1 This succinct entry was written on the assumption 
that the reader already knew something of the organization . This was a reasonable 
expectation as the existence of the National Reserve had been widely known and 
reported in the years preceding the Great War. 
Encouraged by the response to the creation of his Territorial Force in 1908, 
1 J. E. Edmonds, Official History of the Great War 1914: France and Belgium, Vol.1 , p.11 
Haldane proposed to capitalize on the initial national enthusiasm by announcing his 
intention of forming additional auxiliary units. With the purpose of widening the breadth 
of expertise within the first line auxiliary, he launched the Territorial Reserve, the 
Technical Reserve and the Veteran Reserve. Two years later his successor gave official 
sanction to another organization for home defence, the Corps of Guides . The 
Government intended to utilize the huge number of men within the country who had lived 
through the decades of invasion scares and spy mania, 2 who had fought in Britain 's 
numerous colonial wars , and who had been raised to believe in the virtues of patriotism 
and service in the defence of their homeland . The Territorial Reserve and elements of 
the Technical Reserve did not live up to expectation and generally proved to be 
disappointing failures. In contrast, the Veteran Reserve, which in 1911 was renamed 
the National Reserve, was destined to develop into an essential constituent of the 
auxiliary home forces . 
Haldane assumed that, now in their middle or even late middle age, those 
eligible for membership of the Veteran Reserve represented a significant reservoir of 
trained men who might wish to recapture the comradeship of service and feel that they 
could still be of use to their country. 3 Educated against a background of imperial rivalry 
and diplomatic brinkmanship to believe in Albion's infallibility, these ageing former 
servicemen would be required merely to transfer their inbred hostility from one putative 
challenger of Britain's perceived position of world hegemony to another. These 
veterans, many of whom were ex-Rifle Volunteers who, for reasons of age, business or 
principle, had declined to transfer to the Territorials, were asked to register their names 
and demonstrate a willingness to serve. 
The usefulness of the members and the extent of their organization were open 
questions. The public was enthusiastic about the movement but dubious of its potential. 
For its part, the Government was ambiguous about its encouragement. It took the credit 
for creating the Reserve but was unwilling to finance its development; it was deliberately 
vague about its future use but lauded those who made a commitment. In its early days 
the Reserve was generally perceived as a social organization for elderly ex-soldiers 
rather than as a source of reinforcements for the home army but, gradually, the 
Government granted financial concessions and came to understand that given a 
2 D.French , 'Spy Fever in Britain 1900-1915', Historical Journa/21 , 2, 1978, pp.355-370. 
3 Men who had finished their term in Section B of the Army Reserve were not necessarily in their 
middle age: they could still be just under 30 years old having served five years with the Colours and 
seven in the Reserve. Even completed Section D men need only have been in their mid-30s on 
discharge. 
specific role the Reserve could become a cheap yet potentially viable means of 
improving home defence. When war came, its members provided early reinforcements 
for the Expeditionary Force, helped to bring Territorial units up to establishment and 
supplied instructors to the New Armies. Thousands more volunteered to join the 
mushrooming number of Protection Companies raised by the Territorial County 
Associations. By accepting the responsibility of guarding vulnerable points, these 
detachments released Territorial battalions from their specific function of defending the 
British Isles. In 1916 many of these companies were amalgamated into a newly created 
organization for home defence, the Royal Defence Corps (ROC). Other National 
Reservists, some of whom were well into their sixth decade, volunteered to provide 
garrisons for protection work throughout the Empire. 
It was the same sense of duty which , in 1914 and 1915, compelled those 
members who had not joined the Regulars or Territorials to enrol in the burgeoning 
number of civilian defence units then forming across the country. Despite a continuing 
and depressing degree of government hesitation, the Volunteer Training Corps, and 
later the Volunteer Force, were eventually to become an integral part of Britain 's home 
defence forces. The War Office was taken aback by the successful spontaneity of the 
movement's growth and wary lest it had no control over its hydra-like expansion . The 
membership demonstrated its preparedness to place itself beside the anti-invasion 
units of the Regular and Territorial armies but it was for the Government and War Office 
to decide how far they were prepared to harness and utilize this determination . After a 
further period of delay, uncertainty and military crisis, the War Office reluctantly 
acknowledged that their services might help to resolve Britain's increasingly serious 
manpower shortage. In the Spring of 1918, dramatic and pragmatic action was required 
to secure the release of men eligible for foreign service and to reassure the public that 
in the virtual absence of Regular and Territorial troops, the coasts remained protected . 
In those crucial weeks of crisis the Government resolved to rely for mainland 
defence on a combination of the Royal Navy and under-age Regulars supported by the 
tribunal exempted, the medically unfit, the over-age and often part-time amateur and 
frequently volunteer auxiliaries. These units provided an essential supplement to the 
land defences of Great Britain but, with victory won and to the chagrin of their members, 
the work of the National Reserve, the ROC and the Volunteer Force went largely ignored 
and unacknowledged by a Government more intent on registering the efforts of the 
conventional arms. After some initial encouragement in the immediate post-war 
3 
months, the Government decided it could not sanction the reconstruction of a united and 
expanded volunteer part-time auxiliary. The ROC was to be reincarnated in an altered 
form but the Volunteer Force was disbanded and the National Reserve never 
reconstituted . It was a shabby and ungracious attitude toward men of all ages who had 
given of their zeal , time and money to supplement and assist the regular forces . 
CHAPTER 1: THE ISSUE OF HOME DEFENCE 1906 - 1914 
The threat of invasion from across the Channel or the North Sea has been a consistent 
cause of worry to the authorities of the British Isles from the Roman to Victorian eras. 
Whether real or imagined, this fear has scored deeply into the psyche of the British 
people. At times what amounted to almost popular xenophobic paranoia compelled 
governments to follow policies which they might rather have rejected . Additional 
expenditure on the army and navy might have satisfied the alarmed citizenry, but 
administrations were forced to cut back on other projects or massage existing budgets 
to protect against the perceived danger. The nineteenth century experienced several 
periods of acute anxiety which prompted successive administrations to pay heed to 
increasing public clamour for greater security. By the early years of the twentieth century , 
both government and military thought had all but discounted the viability of a successful 
enemy invasion. Nevertheless, blatant populist propaganda and rather more discreet, 
articulate pressure, combined to refute Whitehall 's view and ensured that the War Office 
and governments could not ignore the responsibility to plan and prepare for what they 
themselves considered to be an increasingly remote eventuality. 
Debate had raged between the services and separate schools of thought as to 
which of the armed forces should take primary responsibility for the defeat of an 
invasion fleet. 1 By 1907 Campbeii-Bannerman's Liberal Government had made its 
decision and was about to embark on a reorganization intended to ensure that the navy 
and the new Territorial Force would be strong enough to defeat any possible attempt to 
invade. However, several extra-parliamentary groups were demanding yet greater 
participation in those preparations and , following a government lead , between 1910 and 
1914 thousands of former servicemen enlisted in the Veteran Reserve, an organization 
designed to assist in home defence. When war came, many of these elderly ex-soldiers 
and sailors enlisted in various corps , battalions and units specifically to serve as 
auxiliaries should the Germans attempt an incursion. 
Most of the men who chose to register their names for the Veteran Reserve , and 
subsequently for the various war-raised auxiliary corps, had grown up in an international 
atmosphere of suspicion and tension . Although too young to remember the invasion 
' H.R.Moon, The Invasion of the United Kingdom: Public Controversy and Official Planning, 1888-
1918. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of London , 1968. The issue is also covered in J.Gooch , The 
Prospect of War, London: Cass, 1981 , pp.35-39. 
scare of 1846 and Wellington's pessimistic comments two years later,2 many wou ld 
have recalled the invasion 'panics' of the 1850s and 1880s. Technolog ical innovation 
had implanted in the minds of the British public the feasibility of the so-called 'bolt from 
the blue' . This envisaged an invasion without a previous declaration of war. Such a 
move. it was argued, would catch the navy by surprise and land an army of sufficient 
strength to overwhelm the paltry home defence forces assembled from Regular and 
Militia units. Although short-lived , the 'panic' of 1859 had a significant outcome as far as 
the concept of a defence force consisting of partially trained local citizens was 
concerned . In 1859, having earlier poured cold water on the proposal , the War Office 
and Government allowed the creation of the Rifle Volunteers . 3 A temporary defeat for the 
'blue water' school meant that ,at least for a time, the emphasis for home defence had 
switched from the navy to the army. With the navy facing increased technological 
competition from France, the Regular Army scattered over the Empire, and an increase 
in the balloted militia politically unacceptable, the inexpensive alternative was to raise a 
volunteer citizen force for local defence.4 
Initially, the Government proved reluctant to assume financial responsib ility for 
the organization of the Volunteers. Notwithstanding official obstruction and obduracy, 
and fuelled by recurring concern over the possibility of a 'bolt from the blue', during the 
next ten years the Volunteer Force expanded . The public's fears were heightened by the 
publication of several novels which related lurid stories of an enemy landing . For 
example, George Chesney's The Battle of Oorking, published in 1871 , was followed 
over the next decades by others of a similar nature. The outburst of interest in the 
alleged absence of adequate land defences also extended to alarm at the perceived 
impotence of the Royal Navy. The Naval Defence Act of 1889 and its provision of 
£21 .5million for new construction did help to allay the concern but in the public's mind , 
the threat of invasion remained of paramount importance until the 1890s. 
Although the 'blue water' school eventually regained its laurels and it became 
generally accepted that the navy could prevent a major invasion attempt, doubts 
remained over the ability of the fleet to cope with raids . A determined raid by an enemy 
2 In January 1848 the Morning Chronicle published a letter from the Duke of Wellington in which he 
predicted; 'Excepting immediately under the fire of Dover Castle, there is not a spot on the coast on 
which infantry might not be thrown on shore at any time of tide, with any wind in any weather'. Cited 
by J.Gooch, The Prospect of War, p.2. 
3 See 1. Beckett, Riflemen Form: A Study of the Rifle Volunteer Movement 1859-1908, Aldershot: Ogilby 
Trust, 1982 and H. Cunningham, The Volunteers: A social and political history, London , Croom Helm, 
1975 for accounts of the raising of the Rifle Volunteers . 
4 !.Beckett, op.cit., p.3. 
on British docks, harbours and arsenals could only be countered by maintaining at 
home a significant number of Regular soldiers and by a larger but equally well 
equipped volunteer part-time force. Enthusiastic as the Volunteers might be, there was 
by the 1890s a growing belief that they would be incapable of repulsing a landing by a 
substantial number of foreign troops. Seeking to exploit the public concern , those who 
maintained that a home army capable of meeting such a threat could only be raised by 
compulsion , advocated the introduction of a scheme which would compel every male 
citizen to perform his patriotic military duty in defence of his native soil. 
The concept of a nation-in-arms was not new but in late Victorian Britain , it 
impelled added urgency. The country became increasingly split between those who 
wanted a large conscripted force for home defence and those who believed a 
substantial number of Regulars supported by local amateur volunteers would be 
sufficient to see off any invasion or raid . Besides, so this latter school argued , if the navy 
had failed to prevent an enemy landing and lodgement, it meant that the fleet had 
already been defeated. As Britain could be forced into surrender through blockade and 
starvation, any invasion would therefore be unnecessary. In this scenario it thus did not 
matter whether the home forces were large or small, conscript or volunteer. 
Countering this argument, the supporters of a conscripted force for home 
defence, and indeed of conscription in general , believed that military training would 
bring the nation and army closer together. This was a development considered by many 
militarists, nationalists and even liberals to be crucial to the moral well-being of the 
country and to its social evolution . Although not a militarist society, late nineteenth 
century Britain was not immune to the philosophy that for certain highly developed 
states, war could prove to be economically, socially and strategically beneficial. While 
accepting that a conscript army might not be ideal for policing the far flung Empire, its 
proponents nevertheless argued that sacrifice and duty were the prerequisites for 
citizenship. Ignoring the potential dangers of offering the working classes the 
advantages of training in arms, and also the theory that conscript armies would prove 
too unwieldy on a modern battlefield, the pro-conscriptionists felt that, as a world power, 
Britain must be prepared to challenge not only the navies of her continental rivals but 
also their huge armies. 5 
Pressure for a more effective system of home defence than that offered by the 
Volunteers and for increased expenditure on the Regular Army grew as Britain 's 
5 For a detailed analysis of the contemporary arguments over conscription , see M.AIIison , The National 
Service Issue 1899-1914. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of London , 1975. 
7 
international isolation became more apparent. What might have been seen as 
'splendid isolation' by the jingoists in the music halls, was by the late 1890s proving to 
be a fundamental and, for the time being, an intractable dilemma for Britain 's military 
and naval chiefs . The first task of the newly created Committee of Imperial Defence was 
to investigate the likelihood and the potential success of an invasion of Britain .6 In 1903 
it concluded that the War Office's dragon of a full-scale French or German invasion 
attempt was finally slain and, as a consequence, it was considered safe to dismantle 
London 's defences.7 The report calculated that an enemy some 70,000 strong , requiring 
over 200 ships and an embarkation period of 48 hours would be required if it was to 
have any chance of success. There would be ample time for the navy to intercept the 
invasion fleet and for the Regulars and Volunteers to deploy should any of the survivors 
land. The committee 's conclusions were accepted by the Government and appreciated 
by the War Office but their implications and practicalities really did little to lessen the 
country's immediate strategic difficulties. 
Having long considered the defence of Canada against a belligerent United 
States to be impracticable, the War Office regularly turned its collective mind to what it 
considered an almost equally impossible, yet more likely task, the defence of India 
against a Russian attack through Afghanistan . The sub-continent absorbed 75 ,000 
British troops and , should war come, it was estimated that at least a similar number 
again would have to be despatched from home.8 Such a crisis would leave the British 
Isles almost denuded of troops. A simultaneous raid or invasion of Britain by Russia 's 
ally, France, would consequently have to be repelled by the few remaining Regular 
troops. These thinly spread professionals would have to be assisted by the under 
strength and largely inefficient auxiliaries. 
The Unionist Government realized that, given the alarming inadequacy of the 
army, and a navy which could maintain superiority only so long as its potential 
adversaries remained divided, War Office difficulties could only be alleviated by 
diplomacy. Even the most ardent isolationist came to understand that some form of 
agreement or understanding with foreign powers was the key to maintaining Britain 's 
international position . Tentative talks concerning a possible alliance with the German 
Government had foundered largely on the Kaiser's lack of enthusiasm to commit his 
6 The report can be found in Public Record Office (PRO) CAB 3/1/20A1 of 23/02/04. 
7 J.Gooch , Prospect of War, p.1 0. See also J.Gooch in !.Beckett and J.Gooch , Politicians and 
Defence, Manchester: MUP, 1981 , p. 73. The report's conclusions were accepted by the newly elected 
Liberal Government. 
8 For a lengthier discussion , see M.Howard , The Continental Commitment, London : The Ashfield Press, 
1989, pp.13-16. 
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army on Britain 's behalf against the Russians. While some in the British military 
establishment favoured a German alliance, others seized the opportunity offered by 
Chamberlain 's failure to woo Germany and looked elsewhere. In 1902 Colonel William 
Robertson described Germany as 'our most persistent deliberate and formidable rival ', 9 
while as Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, Sir John Fisher had been 
voicing concern over the proposed German fleet since 1898. With the notable exception 
of Lord Selborne, few took much heed of Fisher's warnings or of his later talk of the 
need to 'Copenhagen ' the fledgling High Seas Fleet. 10 Selborne, as First Lord , 
acknowledged that the navy's world-wide commitments meant that it was probably 
incapable of dominating the North Sea against a combination of enemies or, within a 
foreseeable future , against the threat of a hugely expanded German fleet. Admiral Tirpitz 
had made clear the purpose of his fleet when he announced to the Reichstag that it was 
designed to unfurl its potential between Heligoland and the Thames, 11 and that it should 
be strong enough, if not to destroy the Royal Navy, at least to ensure that it was 
sufficiently damaged to allow the possibility of landing a German invasion force . 
Selborne's concern over the potential of the High Seas Fleet can be seen in the 
influence the Admiralty exerted during the negotiations between the Foreign Office and 
the emergent power of Japan.12 The talks baulked for a time over Japanese reluctance 
to use its troops for the defence of British India but agreement was reached which 
ultimately allowed the Admiralty to return ships of the Far Eastern Squadron to home 
waters. The significance of the alliance, although unremarked by many at the time, was 
that Britain's willingness to leave the defence of her Far Eastern interests to her new ally 
was the precursor of a policy of concentration on European affairs and dangers. 
Within five years of the conclusion of the Japanese alliance, British diplomacy 
had secured the country from a war against a combination of France and Russia . 
Furthermore, when in late 1904 Admiral Sir John Fisher assumed the post of First Sea 
Lord , he immediately instigated a sweeping raft of reforms targeted at producing a 
Home Fleet capable of overwhelming the growing challenge from Kiel. Britain and 
Russia had come perilously close to war over the Dogger Bank incident but British relief 
at the destruction of her imperial rival 's fleet at Tsushima was to be short-lived . The 
Kaiser's anti-British attitude during the Moroccan Crisis had added further urgency to 
9 Ibid. I p. 35. 
10 A.J .Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, London : Cape, 1961, Vol.1 , pp.105-108. 
11 Avon Tirpitz, My Memoirs, London: Hurst & Blackett, 1919, p.92 and p 123. 
12 G.Monger, The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy 1900-1917, London: Nelson , 1963 and 
D.Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires 1894-1907, London : 
Athlone Press, 1966. 
9 
the unofficial Anglo-French inter-staff talks begun some months earlier. These tentative 
moves towards a British continental commitment were gently accelerated when the 
ramifications of the crisis reinforced the supposition growing within the War Office that 
India would no longer be the likely destination of a British expeditionary force . 
The crisis and the Alge<;iras settlement also prompted the War Office to begin 
work on a series of plans designed to wage a war against Germany. The need for such 
precautions had become all too apparent; until 1905 there had been in existence only 
one set of mobilization plans, and this was concerned exclusively with home defence. 
As this plan allowed for the mobilization of a mere 60,000 men , responsibility for 
drawing up mobilization schemes was shortly to be put into the hands of the General 
Staff.13 Furthermore, the War Office continued to give considerable thought to how a 
mobilized British army might be of vital assistance to the French in the event of a 
Franco-German war. Marlborough and Wellington's European campaigns were far 
distant but well-remembered within the British military establishment, and the despatch 
of another expeditionary force had been a possibility since Palmerston's signature to 
the Treaty of London. 14 Although the Kaiser might have regarded the Entente Cordiale as 
a revolutionary change in British policy, to Lord Lansdowne and the Unionist 
Government, its creation had been merely an expedient diplomatic manoeuvre.15 The 
agreement did not immediately and automatically align Britain and France against 
Germany but it did again imply that the War Office, Admiralty and Foreign Office were 
more concerned with European security than continuing the colonial squabbles of the 
previous century. As a consequence, the recently initiated talks between the two 
countries' staffs began to acquire a somewhat less informal mien . 
When Richard Burdon Haldane accepted the Seals of Office in December 1905, 
he inherited a War Office which, despite Esher's reforms, remained largely unprepared 
for anything other than another colonial war. The contemporary international hostility 
generated by the Boer War had persuaded , among other things, the Under Secretary of 
State to call for 120,000 volunteers to guard the coasts and the Prime Minister to urge 
the formation of more rifle clubs. 16 It had also encouraged two Secretaries of State to 
13 J.Gooch, The Prospect of War, op.cit, p.110. 
14 Indeed, the Stanhope Memorandum of 1888 had also actually acknowledged the concept of a 
British Continental involvement. However, the acknowledgement was very distant and the War Office 
had undertaken virtually no strategic planning for such an eventuality. M.Howard , The Continental 
Commitment, op.cit., p.35. 
15 Zara s .Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War, London : Macmillan Press, 1977, 
pp.148-49, 185. 
16 Ibid., p.21 . 
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attempt a series of reforms. However, both Brodrick and Arnold-Forster failed to carry 
their proposals when opposed by the entrenched vested interests of the Volunteer 
Force. 17 There had been, nevertheless, some success which Haldane could exploit. The 
creation of the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) and the Army Council did provide 
the new incumbent with the machinery capable of advising him and the cabinet on the 
strategic and technical requirements of the army. Haldane and Sir Edward Grey, the 
Foreign Secretary, understood and indeed encouraged the developing relationship with 
the French military authorities but were, at the same time, anxious that the talks be 
pursued with discretion. Neither of the men wanted to exacerbate the delicate relations 
with Germany but were equally determined to establish an army with a continental 
potential. 18 This was the fundamental intention behind Haldane's modernization plans: 
to create a professional, fully equipped striking force supported by a territorially 
organized second line capable of reinforcing and expanding the spearhead . Although 
the underlying purpose of the reforms was to remain clouded for some years, Haldane 
was to receive a good deal of cross-party support for his plans . 
British diplomacy and Haldane's proposals did not mean that the Secretary of 
State believed the left flank of the French army to be the only possible destination of an 
expeditionary force. They did, however, confirm current thinking within the War Office that 
North-Eastern France was the most likely place for its concentration. Supported by the 
CID's reassertion that invasion was a virtual impossibility, Haldane's essential 
consideration was to create the two armies with a minimum of financial expenditure . 
The first line had to be capable of rapid overseas deployment and the second of 
defending the British Isles with the minimum of assistance from the first. If this objective 
was to be realized, it would require reforms which would amount to little short of 
revolutionary. 19 
Haldane had first announced his intention of creating an auxiliary territorial 
reserve to complement the Regular forces in February 1906. Supported by Viscount 
Esher, he repeatedly expounded his theory that Britain's imperial requirements and its 
geographical position necessitated a highly trained professional force supported by a 
17 For the attempts to reform the Rifle Volunteers undertaken by Brodrick and Arnold-Forster, see 
I. Beckett, Riflemen Form, op.cit and E. Spiers, Haldane: An Army Reformer, Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1980. 
18 J.Gooch , The Prospect of War, op.cit, pp.92-95. 
19 For detailed discussions on the problems faced by Haldane in attempting to execute his reforms, see 
E.Spiers, Haldane: An Army Reformer, op.cit.; R.B.Haldane, Richard Burdon Haldane: An 
Autobiography, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1929; R.B.Haldane, Before the War, London : Cassell , 
1920; D.Sommer, Haldane of Cloan, London: Allen & Unwin , 1960. 
, 
home defence army of part-time soldiers.20 Although he could learn from the mistakes of 
his two predecessors and capitalize upon the widespread acceptance of the necessity 
for extensive improvement, Haldane knew he would have to devise an entirely original 
approach to reform. A sub-committee of the CID had concluded in 1907 that an 
organization capable of sending 100,000 men to India in the first year of a war was a 
'military necessity' 21 and a General Staff study reported that in the first six months of a 
war an expeditionary force of 140,000 would need 50,000 drafts.22 Haldane's original 
plans were aimed at creating the machinery by which these trained reinforcements 
could be sent abroad . It was reasons of political expediency which eventually forced him 
to alter the proposals and designated the second line auxiliary army purely for home 
defence. 
While Haldane worked to draw up his proposals, the fear of invasion continued to 
occupy the minds of Fleet Street editors and would-be novelists. Although the British 
press had generally welcomed the new era of apparent cooperation with France, public 
opinion refused to believe that the threat of invasion, whether by France or Germany, 
had disappeared . Erskine Childers ' 1904 tale, The Riddle of the Sands, was followed by 
a rush of invasion novels and novelettes.23 Between March and July 1906 the Daily Mail 
serialized what was to become one of the more widely read efforts, William Le Queux's 
The Invasion of 1910 and , during the same period, published a letter by Sir John French 
in which he forecast that a landing of 50,000 Germans could cause civilian panic and 
seriously disrupt Britain's trade and commerce. 24 A few months earlier in his Mansion 
House speech , Lord Roberts, the figurehead and principal mouthpiece of the National 
Service League, had called for boys to perform rifle drill and for the raising of a 'Home 
Defence Army'. He increased the pressure on the Liberal Government by demanding a 
'Million Men Standard' for home defence to be raised by universal service. 25 Roberts ' 
stature and oratory, complimented by powerful articles in The Times from its influential 
military correspondent Colonel Charles a Court Repington, as well as the plethora of 
alarmist novels, combined to arouse enough anxiety to force the CID to undertake a 
further invasion investigation. 26 By the time it reported, Haldane's new auxiliary force had 
20 J.Gooch, 'Haldane and the 'National Army", in !.Beckett & J.Gooch, Politicians and Defence, 
Manchester: MUP, 1981 , p.71 ; E.Spiers, Haldane , op.cit., pp.160-186. 
21 M.Howard , op.cit., p.18. 
22 1.Beckett & J.Gooch, Politicians and Defence, op.cit., p.77. 
23 For a discussion on the quality and scope of the invasion novels, see H.R.Moon , The Invasion of the 
United Kingdom , op.cit., pp.310-15. 
24 lbid., p.316. 
25 Ibid. I p. 323. 
26 The inquiry sat from November 1907 to September 1908. 
come into existence. 
In proposing a voluntarily recruited army for home defence, Haldane ignored two 
major recommendations of the earlier Norfolk Commission .27 Its report had suggested 
that auxiliary forces would only be capable of defending Britain against Regular troops if 
they were recruited compulsorily. The committee had also concluded that auxiliaries 
would be incapable of becoming the means by which the Regular Army could be 
expanded in time of war. While retaining the principle of voluntary recruitment, Haldane 
was prepared to shelve the commission 's report and to gamble that his attempt to 
reorganize the auxiliaries would succeed. If this aim could be achieved , Haldane 
believed it would confirm both that there remained enough patriotism within the British 
citizen to prevent the introduction of compulsion and that a second line army was 
capable of defending Britain 's coasts. There were many who concurred with this theory 
but equally numerous were those who were prepared to support the reforms on the 
anticipation that their undoubted failure would prove the need for compulsion . They 
agreed with Haldane that an extended school curriculum, the creation of Cadet units 
and Officer Training Corps in the universities would educate the nation along military 
lines and produce healthy and robust young men. 28 Yet, while supporting the reforms , 
they saw them as a means for preparing the ground for the introduction of a form of 
national service for home defence. Such a system would, they argued , have an 
inestimable influence on the nation's moral and social cohesion . The proponents of 
compulsion also agreed with Haldane's proposals with regard to the intended 
organization of the new force. The composition of the county associations was 
deliberately intended to attract the elite of local society and were seen by the pro-
conscriptionists as the instrument by which a compulsory army would, when the 
voluntary system had proved its inadequacy, eventually be created . 
Haldane's task had undoubtedly been made simpler by sympathetic lines of 
thought already apparent within both the CID and the War Office.29 The controversy 
between the proponents of a Regular Army comprising three corps and those 
27 1.Beckett 'The Territorial Force', in !.Beckett and K.Simpson, A Nation in Arms, Manchester: 
Manchest~r University Press, 1985, p.128; Beckett, Riflemen Form, op.cit., p.233; F.W.Perry, The 
Commonwealth Armies, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988, p.S. 
26 P.Dennis The Territorial Army 1907-1904, Woodbridge: Boydell Press for RHS, 1987, p.11 ; 
I. Beckett, 'The Nation in Arms, 1914-1918', in !.Beckett and K.Simpson , A Nation in Arms, op.cit., p.4. 
29 There is some dispute about whether the work of reform was as much Haldane's as he himself 
claimed . For example, the role of Lieutenant-General Sir Geral.d Ellison .. Haldane's Principal Military 
Private Secretary, appears to have been crucial in formulat1~g 1deas. Ellison was later Director of 
Organ isation at the war Office between 1908-1911 . For a d1scuss1on of the 1ssue, see E. Spiers, 
Haldane: An Army Reformer, op.cit., pp.74-78. 
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advocating 'big divisions', had been resolved in favour of the latter and equipment and 
planning which would allow for an efficient mobilization of an expeditionary force were 
well underway.30 Unfortunately, with Fisher having withdrawn his representative from 
discussions about how the army might be ferried to the continent, the War Office and 
Admiralty continued to work in mutual isolation and with a good degree of mutual 
mistrust. That difficulty had to be resolved but the other fundamental problem still to be 
addressed was how an expeditionary force could be supplied with sufficient numbers of 
trained drafts without leaving the British Isles undefended against a large-scale raid . 
The Regular Army had little faith in the auxiliaries either as a source of adequate 
reinforcements or as bodies with sufficient training and technical skill to defend Britain 
against a determined incursion. Admittedly, roughly 35% of the Militia did join the Army 
Reserve each year31 but to all intents and purposes, the War Office considered the 
Militia, Yeomanry and Volunteers to be virtually useless as fighting forces. 32 Despite their 
acknowledged limitations, unfortunately for Haldane the organizations still commanded 
considerable support in high political circles. Any attempt to abolish or reform the 
Volunteers would meet with intense opposition. Backed by Viscount Esher's powerful 
influence, Haldane was sufficiently confident to abandon his initial conciliatory approach 
and impose a settlement on the resentful Volunteers. In 1908 the Militia was converted 
into 101 Special Reserve Battalions and the Volunteers and Yeomanry were replaced by 
the Territorial Force . 
In order to secure these dramatic reforms Haldane had been forced to make two 
important compromises: First, he had to reduce considerably the number of elected 
members on the county associations, the organs by which the Territorial Force was to 
be run , and secondly, he had publicly to acknowledge that the new second line army 
was intended only for home defence. 
The concession over the composition of the county associations meant that 
Haldane had sacrificed one of the principal tenets of his new force. The Secretary of 
State had intended that the army as a whole, and the home forces in particular, should 
forge an essential link between the military and society, to form what he described as a 
'close and organic relation with the life of the nation'. 33 He favoured the concept of a 
nation-in-arms but wished to avoid the continental model of vast conscript citizen 
, 
30 J.Gooch , The Prospect of War, op.cit., p.108. 
31 P.Dennis The Territorial Army, op.cit., p.B. 
32 ln 1906 th' M'l't ' d the Volunteers were respectively 40,000 and 100,000 under strength . 
e 1 1 1a an h p 1 .. . J.Gooch , 'Haldane and the National Army' in I. Beckett and J.Gooc , o If/clans and Defence, op.cit., 
p.77. 
33 1.Beckett and K.Simpson, A Nation in Arms, op.cit., p.4 
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armies, creating instead a compact force based on voluntary service and organized on a 
regional basis.34 Unlike the Volunteers who received an annual government grant but 
who remained largely beyond War Office control, the new auxiliaries would accept 
central supervision of training and organization. The day-to-day running and 
administration would, however, be done by those who knew both the type of man and 
the area from which the force would be raised. 
Disappointed as he was with the need to compromise, Haldane did not feel all 
was lost. By acknowledging that the Special Reserve rather than the Territorial Force 
would be the organ by which the Regulars and the Army Reserve should be 
supplemented, Haldane had retreated from but had not entirely abandoned his original 
scheme. While emphasizing the new role for the second line army to Parliament, he 
maintained his hope that between one sixth and one quarter of Territorials would opt to 
undertake a foreign service obligation .35 That would mean a further 50 ,000 - 75,000 men 
available as trained reserves for the expeditionary force . Haldane also emphasized the 
new home defence role of the Territorials in the hope of persuading the Volunteers , 
many of whom deeply resented the reforms, to enlist in the Territorial units. The 
establishment of the new auxiliary army was set at almost 303,000 yet, despite the 
terms of service intentionally being no more onerous than those demanded of the 
Volunteers, this figure was later to prove overly ambitious. 
The Territorial and Reserve Forces Act of 1907 came into effect in April 1908. 
Haldane's final scheme was a somewhat disingenuous compromise meant to 
appease both supporters and opponents of the new Territorial Force. Although he 
achieved some success by his subterfuge, Haldane's most persistent detractors 
opposed him on a fundamental point. They argued that unless he had an ulterior 
motive, namely an underhand means by which to reduce the size of the Regular Army, it 
was futile to spend money on a force destined to serve only at home. The future size 
and possible use to which the army might be put were again subjects of intense debate 
for, at the very time of the Territorials ' birth, the second invasion inquiry was taking 
evidence. 
Admiral Sir John Fisher had thoroughly resented the founding of the new inquiry. 
During its course he continued to insist that the prevention of an invasion remained the 
preserve of the senior service and that only the navy had any understanding of the 
impact and significance of recent technological advances. Evidence submitted by Lord 
34 ln his Autobiography, op.cit., p.185, Haldane recalled that when he mentioned to the Army Council 
his intention of creating a 'Hegelian Army ... the conversation fell off' . 
35 p .Dennis, The Territorial Army, op. cit., p.13. 
IS" 
Roberts to the investigation outlined the National Service League's assertion that 
Germany's modern railways , docks and ocean-going liners would allow them to land 
20,000 soldiers on English shores within one hour. 36 Repington argued for a Territorial 
Force of 800,000, while Roberts maintained his call for the 'Million Man Standard '.37 The 
naval side was usually put by Julian Corbett, a civilian lecturer at the Naval War College, 
and the college's Commandant, Captain Edmond Slade. The central tenet of Corbett's 
thesis was that Repington and Roberts had taken no account of the difficulties an 
invasion fleet would encounter during its crossing and did not appreciate the Admiralty's 
recent changes in fleet deployment. The navy's defence was assisted by a declaration 
from none other than Grand Admiral von Tirpitz. The architect of the High Seas Fleet 
claimed that Germany was dumbfounded by British fears of a German invasion and 
believed that the number of British residents in Germany's harbour towns would make 
preparations for a 'bolt from the blue' impossible to hide.38 
This second inquiry reported in October 1908, six months after the Territorial 
Force had begun to recruit. The committee supported the findings of its predecessor by 
concluding that a successful invasion was an impossibility. Despite the Admiralty's 
acknowledgement that torpedoes fired from swarms of fast, purpose-built craft would 
severely hamper the fleet's efforts to defeat a raid, the War Office decided that a home 
army of two Regular divisions and 40,000 auxiliaries would be sufficient to repulse a 
landing. 39 This last conclusion ignored the protests of the General Staff which had 
argued that to leave two divisions of Britain 's already small army at home would 
'devalue' the country's use as a potential ally to a European power.40 The report did 
criticise the sanctioned establishment of the Territorial Force and dismissed its actual 
strength as totally inadequate but, having anticipated the criticism , the War Office had 
previously prepared a paper outlining the role of the Territorials in home defence.41 
Worries about the state of some harbour defences did also prompt the War Office to 
undertake some improvements on coastal sites. However, the overriding message was 
clear: the auxiliary forces were unsatisfactory but when supported by Regulars and the 
navy, Britain 's preparations for home defence were adequate. 
36 H.R.Moon , The Invasion of the United Kingdom , op.cit., p.359 . 
37 Ibid. 
38 Tirpitz's statement is printed in G.P.Gooch and H.V.Temperly, British Documents on the Origins of 
the War 1908-1914, Voi.VI , London : HMSO, 1930, p.116. 
39 Final report, CAB 3/2/44A of 22/10/08. 
40 J.Gooch, The Plans for War, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul , 1974, p.285. 
41 W033.462A 1291 , Home Defence: Appreciation of the Situation in the United Kingdom in the event 
of hostilities with a European Maritime Power, dated 1109/08. 
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Public fears were not allayed by the report's findings. Another rash of invasion 
stories, both in the illustrated mass market weeklies as well as the more responsible 
broadsheets and periodicals, again fanned national worries about a 'bolt from the blue' 
and the navy's inability to deal with it. Rumours that a substantial 'enemy' force had 
evaded the fleet and landed during the 1908 manoeuvres were repudiated by the First 
Lord, but the agitation refused to subside.42 With such unlikely bed fellows as Baden-
Powell and H.M.Hyndmann, the founder of the Social Democratic Federation , the 
movement complaining of the inadequacy of the home defences continued to gather 
momentum. The ratchet was twisted further by the antagonism which was known to 
exist between Admirals Fisher and Beresford over the composition and preparedness 
of the fleet, and by Lord Roberts ' refusal to be dissuaded, despite a personal appeal 
from the King , from delivering an alarmist speech in the Lords. Roberts ' subsequent 
oratory described portentous scenes of a rampaging invading German army supported 
by 80,000 trained soldiers already resident in Britain.43 He repeated his demand for one 
million men and for the Government to put the findings of the invasion inquiry into the 
public domain . 44 
The New Year saw no abatement in the nation's anxiety. A sensationalist yet 
ultimately mediocre play, An Englishman 's Home, by Guy du Maurier, opened at 
Wyndham's in January 1909. It played to packed houses and was adopted by the 
County of London Territorial Force Association. 45 The Harmsworth and Northcliffe press 
added their contribution by publishing articles calling for a strengthened Territorial 
Force, and a combination of pressure groups ranging from the National Service League 
to the Navy League, contrived to whip up public outrage at the increased level of German 
capital ship construction .46 Haldane had been surprised by the success and early 
impact of du Maurier's play, but quickly realized its potential for Territorial recruitment. So 
42 H.R.Moon, The Invasion ofthe United Kingdom, op.cit., p.380. 
43 Hansard House of Lords, 1679-1704, 23/11108. 
44 Not all of the military establishment agreed with Roberts' proposals for a large home defence army. 
In July 1909 Spencer Ewart, a pro-conscriptionist and Director of Military Operations, asked: What is 
the use of an army which can only be used on the assumption that the Germans have defeated our 
Navy and gained a footing ... Home defence is the most poisonous fallacy ever produced by man ... It 
will never be justifiable to raise more men for home defence than the irreducible minimum which 
must in any case be kept at home to hold our naval ports , prevent raids and preserve public order. 
Ewart Diary entry 12/07/09. Ewart MSS Voi.V. Cited in N.W.Summerton , The ~eve/o?me~t of British 
Military Planning fora war against Germany 1904-1914. Unpublished PhD thes1s, Un1vers1ty of 
London , 1970, pp.347-48. 
45 H.R.Moon, The Invasion of the United Kingdom, op.cit, p.399. 
46 The risks inherent in the construction of the Dreadnought, and the continuing worries over the 
Kaiser's attitude towards Britain , finally compelled the Liberal Government to lay down more capital 
ships than even the Admiralty had requested . 
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enthusiastic was the public's response to his call that the first seven weeks of 1909 
witnessed a net increase of 30,000 and forced Haldane to ask Parliament for an extra 
£400,000 in the 1910-11 Estimates· 47 He announced that every Territorial unit within its 
respective self-contained division had been allocated a war station , whether on the 
coast or as part of a mobile anti-invasion army comprising a mixture of Regulars and 
Territorials. 48 Haldane's punishing round of speeches to promote public interest in the 
Territorials had thus seemed to pay off and, indeed, had even helped to quell some of 
the more strident opposition to the reforms from within the Cabinet itself. In early 1910 
the number of part-time soldiers had reached 276,000, still about 10% below 
establishment but apparently heading in the right direction . 
The King's vital, albeit not always unwavering support for the Territorial Force,49 
had taken at least temporarily the wind from the sails of the National Service League. 
The League favoured national service on neo-Hegelian lines and believed that war 
against Germany was more than a probability. During the first half of 1909, spy scares 
continued to absorb public interest, Lord Wemyss introduced another resolution to the 
Lords to the effect that the Territorial Force did not constitute a sufficient deterrent to a 
potential invader and Lord Roberts fuelled the flames still further by introducing the 
National Service (Training and Home Defence) Bill. The Bill was defeated on party lines 
but, by the summer, the country had grown weary of this latest scare and was turning its 
attention to more immediate domestic issues. 
Nevertheless, the National Service League strove to keep the matter alive. In 
1910 when recruitment to the Territorials showed a marked decline, it unleashed a 
' 
sustained campaign of criticism against the new force. Its constant sniping and 
denigration of the Territorials probably did affect recruiting but both Roberts and 
Repington always insisted that their criticism was intended to awaken the nation to the 
inadequacies of the existing system rather than as opposition to the Territorial Force per 
se. Haldane tried to counter the League's hostility by allowing Sir I an Hamilton to write 
what virtually amounted to a government publication entitled Compulsory Service. 5° The 
book attempted to dismantle the League's polemic by arguing that national service was 
too expensive and unsuited to Britain 's unique defensive requirements . Haldane 
47 E. Spiers, Haldane: An Army Reformer, op.cit., p.172. 
48 Further testimony to Haldane's intention of using the Territorials alongside the Regulars both at 
home and abroad can be seen in the organization and equ ipment of the TF divisions. These almost 
precisely mirror those of the Regular units. 
49 Before giving the scheme his public support, the King needed some reassurance from Haldane over 
the quality of Territorial artillery. 
so P.Dennis, The Territorial Army, op.cit. , p.20; M.Howard, The Continental Commitment, op.cit., p.39. 
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himself had never entirely ruled out the possibility of having to accept a degree of 
compulsion and indeed, by 1910, a majority of the General Staff was known to favour its 
introduction. 51 However, even if he had himself unreservedly believed in its necessity, to 
have attempted to convert Britain into a major military power would probably have ended 
in political catastrophe. Compulsion would have split a Cabinet of any party and even 
the supporters of such a scheme admitted that its introduction would at least 
temporarily weaken the army by adversely affecting voluntary recruitment and thus the 
security of the Empire. 52 
One of Haldane's most important supporters in resisting the demands and 
criticism of the National Service League was Lord Esher. Although himself no hardened 
opponent of compulsion, Esher argued in favour of the voluntary system because he 
feared that the expense of a conscripted army would necessarily reduce the finance and 
thus the efficiency of the Royal Navy. There were many who agreed , already fearing that 
the state of the navy was verging on the parlous. They disagreed with Fisher's 
restructuring of the fleet and with the Admiralty's continuing obsession with a policy of 
blockading and raiding the German coast. To add more fuel to his critics' flames , Fisher 
not only opposed the idea of sending an expeditionary force across the Channel but 
also emphatically refused to guarantee its safe passage. The War Office had long 
despaired of the navy's plans for raids in the Baltic and on the German coast, seeking 
when the opportunities presented themselves, to propose alternative less ambitious 
schemes. Fisher remained obdurately opposed to forging closer operational links 
between the Admiralty and General Staff, claiming that he could not trust the War Office 
to keep secret the navy's plans for surprise attacks. Furthermore, Fisher allegedly 
harangued a sub-committee of the CID taking evidence about combined operations. 
Describing the War Office proposal to send an expeditionary force of 120,000 as an 'act 
of suicidal idiocy' and Haldane's plan to train the Territorials after war had broken out as 
'childish ', he apparently finished the outburst by declaring that the army 'should be 
administered as an annex of the Navy' and that the 'present follies should be 
abandoned '. 53 
Although by nature a more conciliatory man, Sir Arthur Wilson , Fisher's 
51 In his Autobiography, op.cit. , pp.195-96, Haldane explains that he told the House of Commons 'we 
should probably have to resort to compulsory military service'. He argued that the principle of universal 
liability to serve in home defence rested on a strong historical precedent and on the 'common law of 
the land '. Hansard, 5th Series, Vo1.1 , 1615,1625,4/03/09. 
52 1 n Before the war, op. cit., p.175, Haldane noted that the General Staff acknowledged it would be 
'unwise to try, during a period of unrest on the continent, to commence a new military system '. 
53 N.Summerton , The Development of British Military Planning, op.cit., p.318. 
replacement at the Admiralty, also remained wedded to the policy of blockade and small 
amphibious raids . Wilson's argument was savaged by Sir William Nicholson, the Chief 
of the Imperial General Staff, at the same meeting in which Sir Henry Wilson impressed 
upon the CID the need to send all six Regular divisions to France or Belgium. 54 To the 
War Office at least, the conference of August 1911 made uncompromising British 
support to France in the event of a German incursion almost inevitable. It also again 
confirmed that the invasion of Britain was not a viable scenario. 55 
Wounded as it was from Nicholson's mauling , the Admiralty resolutely refused to 
abandon the blockade and raid strategy it had been adumbrating since 1904. Fisher 
had withdrawn the Pacific, South Atlantic and North American Squadrons, amalgamated 
the Australian , Chinese and East Indian Squadrons, expanded the Home Fleet and 
wanted to redeploy capital ships from the Mediterranean to British waters . Despite the 
resultant growth in the number of ships available for home defence, during the 1912 
manoeuvres a 'German' fleet successfully evaded the Royal Navy to land a force of 
28,000 men in the Humber estuary. 56 Similar exercises the following year were 
prematurely ended when the 'enemy' force again landed a substantial number of men 
on the 'hostile' shore. 57 The ramifications of these operations threw up a significant 
paradox. For years the navy had claimed to be able to prevent invasion and raids on 
Britain but had, at the same time, been advocating a policy of raiding German coasts. It 
had argued that the High Seas Fleet would be incapable of preventing such operations 
but was now confronted with the possibility that even if the Germans were not expected 
to disrupt a British landing on its short and heavily defended coastline, the Royal Navy 
was unlikely to be able to stop a raid or even worse on the more exposed British 
shores. This anomaly within Admiralty planning was not lost on Nicholson. He noted 
that if the army wished to deploy a proportionally identical number and quality of troops 
along her Eastern and Southern seaboards as Germany could muster on her single 
coast, it would require 30 Regular divisions for home defence. Neither could he see the 
purpose behind Arthur Wilson's policy of raiding the German coast. Naval planning 
appeared to be to land troops on a beach with no object other than to entrench and 
54 CAB 21212. Minutes of the 114th Meeting of the CID, 23/08/11. 
55 Haldane's belief that the Territorials were efficient enough to deal with enemy raids received 
backing from Major-General Archibald Murray, the Director of Military Training. Murray told the 
conference that as the auxiliaries could mobilize within three or four days and Wilson 's plans did not 
envisage embarkation of the four Regular divisions of the expeditionary force before the fourth day of 
mobilization , the coasts would remain secure. CAB 2/2/2. Minutes of the 114th Meeting of the CID, 
23/08/11 . 
56 H.R.Moon , The Invasion ofthe United Kingdom, op.cit., p.427. 
57 Ibid., p.456. 
await the German response. 58 Asquith concurred, calling Admiral Wilson's plans 
'puerile and impracticable'.59 
The evidence is inconclusive but it seems probable that, by acknowledging the 
coast's vulnerability, it was the Admiralty which campaigned to reopen the invasion 
issue by pressing for yet another inquiry. 60 The navy wanted to ensure that when an 
expeditionary force left for the continent, two Regular divisions would be kept in Britain , 
ostensibly for home defence. Reasonable as this objective might have seemed, the 
hidden agenda behind the navy's case was pure self-interest. The divisions would 
certainly be useful as a deterrent but the Admiralty really wanted their troops to 
constitute its amphibious support. Fisher had gone but his legacy remained . 
Admiralty insistence seems to have paid off. Partly as a result of Churchill 's 
pressure as First Lord and partly as a consequence of a small but significant growth of 
discontent voiced from within his own partY', about the ability of the Territorials to cope 
with a landing of 70 ,000 men, in January 1913 the Prime Minister announced that yet 
another inquiry would be convened. 
The committee reported its findings in April 1914, and although they largely 
echoed the conclusions of the earlier investigations, there were some important 
differences.62 While the inquiry was taking evidence Repington opened a sustained 
barrage in The Times against the quality and strength of the auxiliary forces . The 
Territorial Force, he thundered, should be between 500,000- 600,000 strong and be 
raised by some form of compulsion .63 Roberts kept to his usual line of decrying the 
effective strength of the Territorial Force, believing that as presently officered and 
organized it 'would not have a chance' of defeating 70,000 enemy troops. It was, he 
58 Minute by Nicholson to Haldane, 25/08/11 . Cited in N.Summerton , The Development of British 
Military Planning, op.cit., p.462. 
59 Haldane mss: MS 5910 f.140. Asquith to Haldane; N.Summerton , The Development of British 
Military Planning, op.cit, p.463. 
60 Samuel R. Williamson Jr., The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War 1904-
1914, Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 1969, p.306 suggests that it was Repington 's 
influence which caused the inquiry to be established and that Henry Wilson believed it was a 
Government manoeuvre aimed at justifying reductions in the Territorial Force. H.R.Moon , The 
Invasion of the United Kingdom, op.cit., p.429 on the other hand, tentatively concluded that it was 
instigated by the Admiralty. 
61 For example, Arthur Lee MP, who was also a close friend of St Loe Strachey, wrote to The Times 
about the invasion issue on 17/07/12. For a discussion on the growth in public literature regarding 
both conscription and the proposals for despatching an expeditionary force to the Continent, see 
Samuel R.Wilkinson Jr., The Politics of Grand Strategy, op.cit., pp.301-02. 
62 CAB 3/2/62A. Report of the Standing Sub-Committee of the CID, Attack on the British Isles from 
Overseas, 15/04/14. 
63 Times, 6/02/13. 
2.1 
went on , 'unwieldy and unpracticed ' and likely to be more of a liability than an asset.64 
Esher, who as Chairman of the County of London Territorial Association had personal 
experience of the problems encountered with recruiting , believed the force would never 
attain a peacetime strength of 250,000 and doubted its ability to defend Britain unaided 
by Regulars.65 There was also a widespread belief that the auxiliaries would prove 
incapable of providing an adequate pool of thoroughly trained reserves, even after the 
six months Haldane had always insisted would be required . Seely, who had become 
Secretary of State for War in mid-1912 and whose main object was to keep the 
proposed expeditionary force as strong as possible, urged the committee not to 
prejudge the Territorials . He argued that the retention of two divisions in Britain would 
further damage Territorial morale by removing the prestige of their being the mainstay of 
the islands' defences. 66 
Having been rehearsed many times before, these military arguments were 
largely predictable. Evidence from the Admiralty, however, showed a marked shift from 
its usual stance. Their Lordships had already determined that the policy of close 
blockade of a hostile coast had to be abandoned in favour of distant patrolling aimed at 
denying the enemy access to and from the North Sea. Torpedoes and mines posed too 
many dangers to ships working close inshore. Technological innovations and failure of 
the previous two years ' manoeuvres had convinced the Admiralty that its 'absolute 
guarantee' of 1908 to intercept a force of 70,000 should be revised to a 'reasonable 
expectation ' that such a force would be discovered and intercepted.67 The navy was also 
concerned about the havoc a small enemy force landing from a single ship could wreak 
on riverside arsenals and docks, and about the disruption a strategically scuttled vessel 
loaded with concrete might cause to shipping movementS.66 The Admiralty pressed for 
the creation of a coast watch of auxiliaries and for much improved security on East coast 
installations. 59 There was a strong acknowledgement, therefore , that the navy no longer 
64 CAB 16/28A, pp.97-101 . 
65 CAB 37/115/24, Appendix XX, p.245. Lord Esher 17/06/13. 
66 H.R.Moon , The Invasion of the United Kingdom, op.cit. , p.445. 
67 CAB 37/115/24, Appendix XXII , 25/06/13. 
66 For acknowledgement of how blockships could hamper Britain 's prosecution of a war and theories on 
how to counter the threat, see CAB 3/2/56, Measures to prevent the blocking of Commercial Harbours, 
May 1913 and CAB 3/2/66, Blocking of Commercial Harbours, February 1914. 
69 The Army council had begun a further series of improvements on the East Coast defences in 1911 
when it increased the number of Royal Garrison Artillery batteries at Tynemouth. Unfortunately, th is 
was to be at the expense of the local Territorial Force unit. Northumberland County Association 
complained bitterly against the move and predicted increased problems in maintain ing the strength of 
its other batteries. The Commanding Officer of the battery predicted that a large number of his officers 
and men would resign in protest. Northumberland RO, NR0408/8, 20/11/11 and 31/01/13. 
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considered countering invasion to be its sole preserve. After decades of selfish and at 
times petulant non-cooperation, it was now anxious to increase the role and 
responsibilities of the War Office in the defence of the East Coast. 
Although the committee thought that a major invasion was unlikely, its final report 
recognized the need for armed guards to be available at vulnerable points in case of a 
surprise attack by a few hundred men. The members decided that if an invasion was 
attempted, it would probably be launched in the period between the despatch of an 
expeditionary force overseas and the six month working up period required by the 
Territorials. Seely argued that the 10,000 Regulars already earmarked for the flying 
column, and the Territorials who, it was widely but grudgingly acknowledged were 
showing signs of greater efficiency, would be enough to defeat the hypothetical invasion 
force of 70,000.70 There were others who could not face the prospect with Seely's 
equanimity. Roberts, not surprisingly demurred and called for a home defence army of 
510,000. This argument over the number of troops that would be required to defend 
Britain once the expeditionary force had sailed was to rumble on well into the war; it was 
to raise questions about the efficiency and strength of the home service Territorials , the 
Royal Defence Corps and the Volunteer Training Corps. 
It was against this background of a nation emerging from a period of prolonged 
and proud isolation and from a period of still partially unresolved naval and military 
debate that the creation and attraction of a new auxiliary force should be viewed . From 
the Mediaeval fyrd to the trained bands, Militia and nineteenth century Volunteers, the 
concept of an auxiliary home army was well founded. Britain was a country used to 
accepting military activity as an essential part of national life and which although not 
militarised in the Prussian sense, was not unafraid or ill-prepared mentally for war. 71 It 
was also a nation which, although riven by internal political and social discord , 
remained essentially patriotic. That patriotism had manifested itself in the popular 
culture of the early twentieth century as, indeed, it had throughout the previous 
generations. Men had been prepared, admittedly not always with complete enthusiasm , 
to train and practise their martial skills on village greens and sandy shores. The 
existence of the local companies had served to reassure the populace against foreign 
attack but had, of course, been used against their compatriots at times of internal 
unrest. Governments had alternatively appreciated and cursed their presence. They had 
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° CAB 3/2/62A, Attack on the British Isles from Overseas, 15/04/14. 
71 lt has been estimated that something like 8% of the male population of Britain in 1914 had 
experienced some form of military training and that 41% of boys had belonged to a youth 
organization of some description. I. Beckett and K.Simpson, A Nation in Arms, op.cit., p.7, p.4. 
been both feted and ignored by authority and derided by those who viewed them as 
tools of government repression or as pretentious, foolhardy misfits. The popular 
perception of the auxiliaries changed little during the Victorian era but, to the 
government, they were a convenient means by which it could save money and 
simultaneously reassure the occasionally panic-stricken public.72 The War Office might 
have ceased to believe in the possibility of invasion but important sectors within society 
were not quite so easily persuaded . 
The Edwardian public knew little of the extent of military planning or of the depth 
of the schism between the armed forces . The press and the squabbles within the 
House of Commons drew attention to the political and to some degree the strategic 
differences, but the detail remained a mystery. Apart from a small cabal within the 
Cabinet, the Liberal Party had little knowledge of how far Britain's military resources 
were earmarked for use on the continent. Had it known, Asquith's administration might 
well have fallen. 73 Preferring to keep his party largely ignorant of a likely continental 
commitment, the Prime Minister gave his full support to Haldane's programme of 
reform . Operating an efficient army and navy had the added advantage of curtailing if not 
containing expenditure which could otherwise be diverted for social measures. 
However, the public needed to see concrete evidence of Britain's security from attack. 
The might of the Home Fleet provided such testimony but the home army was a different 
matter. Britain 's long coastline invited invasion or raid and if an attacker evaded the 
fleet's watchful eyes, crucial coastal facilities or even London itself might be threatened . 
Haldane had attempted to mollify public anxiety by replacing the ridiculed Volunteers 
with the more compact Territorials but he was treading upon a potentially rocky road . 
The tradition of men serving as defenders of their own hearths might have been well 
established but so too was its martial inadequacy. History proved that the bulk of the 
72 For contemporary British attitudes towards patriotism and perceived duty in the 150 years before the 
outbreak of the Great War, see: L. Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707- 1837, New Haven CT., 
1992; S.Conway, The War of American Independence 1775 - 1783, Arnold : London , 1995; 
J.E.Cookson , The British Armed Nation 1793- 1915, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1997; J.H.Grainger, 
Patriotisms: Britain 1900 - 1939, London : Kegan Paul , 1986; E.J.Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism 
since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990; P. Langford , 
Englishness Identified; manners and character 1650 - 1850, Oxford: Clarendon , 2000; R.McKibbin , 
The idealogies of class; social relations in Britain, 1880-1950, London : Clarendon Press, 1994; 
R.Samuel , Patriotism: the making and unmaking of British national identity, 3 vols. , London: 
Routledge, 1989; G.Stedman Jones, Language of Class, Cambridge University Press, 1983. 
73 Asquith , Grey and Haldane's policies were 'unknown and probably unacceptable to the majority of 
his administration as well as of their parliamentary support' , N.Summerton, The Development of British 
Military Planning, op.cit., p.473. See also J.W.Coogan and P.F.Coogan, 'The British Cabinet and the 
Anglo-French Staff Talks: Who Knew What?', Journal of British Studies 24, 1985, pp.11 0-31. 
male population was reluctant to commit itself to part-time military training . In order to 
convince the nation as a whole that auxiliary forces could provide an effective defence 
against invasion, Haldane had somehow to disarm his influential and increasingly 
clamorous opponents. 
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CHAPTER II: THE TERRITORIAL FORCE RESERVE 
The War Office first began considering the Secretary of State's proposal to establish a 
reserve for the Territorial Force in December 1908. The creation of such an organization 
had been an integral element of Haldane's overall plan for the Territorial Force and 
provision had been made for it within Section VII of the Territorial and Reserve Forces 
Act, 1907. Haldane would certainly have been aware of the failure of previous attempts 
to form reserves for the auxiliary forces but appears to have been confident that on this 
occasion, it would prove to be a viable proposal. The omens were, however, not 
encouraging. A scheme unveiled in 1867 by the then incumbent of the War Office, 
General Jonathan Peel, to form a reserve involving the Militia had flopped, largely as a 
consequence of a lack of inducements, and Brodrick's later efforts to create a Yeomanry 
Reserve and a reserve for the Militia had also met with little success. A reserve for the 
Rifle Volunteers had remained similarly insignificant for most of its existence. 
Nevertheless, and apparently undeterred by these earlier disappointments, Haldane 
had informed the War Office that he intended to make an announcement concerning the 
formation of a reserve when he introduced the 1909 Army Estimates. 1 
In the event, one of the newly constituted county associations beat Haldane to the 
mark. In June 1908, a member of the Gloucestershire committee proposed the creation 
of a reserve of former Territorials, not to run in competition with the active Territorials but 
to ensure trained men were not irrevocably lost to the force . The committee queried the 
legality of raising a body of armed men without apparent parliamentary sanction, but a 
compromise was reached whereby it was suggested the men form themselves into a 
rifle club and, provided they were over 35 and either ex-Volunteers or, when it became 
feasible ex-Territorials, they would be given free use of the association's ranges and 
ammunition . 2 
Probably unaware that such a nucleus of his new scheme was already in 
existence, in March 1909 Haldane explained : 'We are organizing a new reserve of 
Territorials . We think that the men who pass through the [Territorial] Force with a good 
training should not be lost.' He went on to suggest that former Territorials should be 
1 1. Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition 1558-1945, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991, 
pp.186, 208. 
2 Gloucestershire RO, 02388/1/1 , 28/09/08. 
formed into a reserve which would increase the potential strength of the Territorial Force 
from 300,000 to 400,000. 3 The intended size of the Reserve was somewhat at odds with 
the preliminary discussions already taking place within the War Office and there was no 
public mention of the plan to form two other auxiliary elements which were certainly 
already under consideration . Nevertheless, the general principle of creating the Reserve 
was generally well received and it was made known that the next stage of the 
proceedings would involve negotiations with the county associations. 
The discussions already begun between the Army Council and the General Staff 
envisaged a reserve of about 60,000.4 The original plan was that it should comprise 
former Regulars, Militia and Special Reservists. There was some opposition to 
immediately establishing the Reserve as it might have served as an inducement to the 
86,000 ex-Volunteers who had joined the Territorial Force on a one-year agreement not 
to re-engage but leave and enrol in the Reserve. A preferred option was a suggestion 
that only men who had served as a Territorial for two or three years would be eligible to 
join . This would, it was hoped , encourage the one-year men to serve in the home army 
until they qualified for the Reserve. 5 Furthermore, the Adjutant-General 's (AG) 
department questioned the advisability of allowing a mixture of ex-Regulars and ex-
Territorials . Colonel Findlay, an Assistant Adjutant-General, (AAG) argued that, as the 
social ranking of ex-Regulars occasionally fell after leaving the army and that of ex-
Territorials sometimes rose , a combination of the two types of man might dissuade the 
former Territorial from joining. There would, he believed, have to be an harmonious mix 
if the Reserve was to work.6 The Chief of the General Staff, (CGS) General Sir William 
Nicholson, dismissed this theory. He believed that any former soldier whose social or 
financial position declined on rejoining civilian life would find it so hard to procure a 
living that he would never even consider joining the Reserve. On the other hand, an ex-
Regular whose social position had improved since leaving the army might be 
encouraged to join, as it would offer him the opportunity of mixing with his social 
superiors. 7 
There was less disagreement over the issue of camp. Colonel Findlay 
3 Hansard 5th Series Vol.1 .1623, 4/03/09. Hereafter, all references to Hansard are 5th Series. 
~ Unless otherwise indicated, detail for the following discussion on the creation of the Territorial 
Reserve comes from W032.6585, The Formation of the Territorial Force Reserve. The file contains 
several versions of draft regulations and correspondence, and minutes and annotations added by 
various departments within the War Office. 
5 9/Gen/1239 of 16/12/08. 
6 W032.6585 (4) , 24/03/09. 
7 W032 .6585 (5) , 27/04/09 . 
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suggested that although a proportion of the Reserve should be permitted to attend 
camp to replace absent Territorials , the presence of ex-Regulars and ex-Special 
Reservists should not be allowed as it might exacerbate social divisions. Besides, so 
the argument ran , if the efficiency demands for entry were made strong enough , camp 
would be unnecessary. Furthermore, if the Reserve was not allowed to camp it was 
anticipated that many one-year Territorials would be persuaded to stay in the Force for a 
longer period of engagement.8 The Director of Military Training , (DMT) Major-General 
Archibald Murray, did advocate the attendance at camp of a proportion of reservists but 
the principal reason given for rejecting the proposal of extensive numbers at camp was 
the expense. It was acknowledged that the administration grant to county associations 
would have to be increased as some early castings suggested that merely to finance an 
annual firing course for reservists would require an additional £7000 per annum. 
Findlay believed a better option would be to give rifle clubs a grant for 20 rounds per 
reservist and allow them to fire their course on local ranges. This, he argued , would 
have the additional advantage of introducing or extending the ex-Territorial influence into 
the significant number of country-wide rifle clubs.9 Nicholson rejected the idea because 
there would be little or no control over how the grants would be utilized . To emphasize 
the point, he added: 'Our military organization is complicated enough as it is. If we 
further complicate it by including Rifle Clubs or other irresponsible agencies, I am afraid 
it will become unworkable.110 
There was also some disagreement about the intended size of the Reserve. 
Haldane was known still to be thinking in terms of 100,000 , but to the Quartermaster-
General , (QMG) Lieutenant -General Sir Herbert Miles, this seemed unnecessarily 
large. He also insisted that, because reservists would be required to do so little training , 
those who joined should be and remain , efficient. He opposed allowing almost open 
admission and extended terms of enrolment as it could mean that an ex-Territorial 
could remain a reservist from the age of 25 to 50 years .11 The CGS seemed to be less 
concerned with efficiency than the Reserve's ultimate size. He was more sympathetic to 
Haldane's intention and , although he declared it was 'folly to deplete the Territorial 
Force in favour of the Reserve', expressed doubts about the advisability of restricting the 
Reserve to 60,000 or of fixing the total by Act of Parliament. As it depended upon 
variables and the unpredictable, the eventual required figure was, he averred , 
8 W032.6585 (4) . 
9 Ibid. . 
10 W032.6585 (5) . 
11 W032.6585 (8) . No date but probably June 1909. 
28 
indeterminate. It was unknown how far short of establishment the Territorial Force 
would be in 1912 (when the four-year men's term of engagement was up) , how many 
serving Territorials or reservists would renege on their mobilization commitment or what 
the wastage would be among Territorials during the first six months of war. He also 
feared that if a long period of colour service was required for enrolment, the Reserve 
would become top heavy with ex-NCOs. Friction might then occur as a proportion of 
them would be required to revert to the rank of private. 12 
There was an early lack of consensus over how the Reserve should be 
organized . Findlay wanted to see it formed into Reserve Units analogous to a mobilized 
Special Reserve.13 Lieutenant-General Miles fundamentally agreed, suggesting that on 
mobilization the number of Reservists required to bring the Territorials up to 
establishment would simply 'move up' to their parent unit. This would have the benefit of 
simplifying the storage and issue of clothing and equipment and thus reduce costs .14 
Nicholson opposed this suggestion and recommended a more flexible approach . He 
preferred to see the Reserve as merely a register of trained individuals who would in an 
emergency be expected to serve in any of their association 's units.15 
Once general agreement had been reached within the War Office, the proposals 
were presented to the Territorial Force Advisory Council in July 1909.16 With the 
exception of a few reservations regarding grants and conditions of service , the Council 
'cord ially welcomed' the War Office's draft memorandum and copies were sent to 
county associations two days later. 17 Simultaneously, a press communique was 
released to announce the Secretary of State's intention of creating the Territorial Force 
Reserve, Technical Reserve and Veteran Reserve during the financial year 1910-11 . 
The Treasury was reported to be aware of the proposals and the King had been kept 
fully informed .18 
Parliament had already begun to discuss the matter of the Reserves but the 
press release stimulated extensive interest across the country. The Director-General 
Territorial Force (DGTF) registered a 'large number' of applications to join one or other 
12 W032.6585 (5) . 
13 W032.6585 (4) . 
14 W032.6585 (8). 
15 W032.6585 (5) . 
16 The Council was established in 1908 to advise the Secretary of State upon the larger questions of 
policy affecting the Territorial Force on its formation . It consisted of representatives from the County 
Associations, representative officers of the TF and one or two distinguished officers. See W032.9698, 
The Territorial Force Advisory Council. 
11 W032.6585 (18), 27/07/09. 
18 W032 .6585 (198) , 28/07/09 and ibid., (19) , 29/07/09. 
branches of the Reserve and requested a further War Office communique to reduce the 
flow. 19 A consequent press statement of mid-August announced the War Office did not 
want individual applications and that no further progress would be made until the county 
associations had submitted their responses to the July memorandum.20 
Inside Parliament the Secretary of State continued to champion the idea of a 
reserve capable of bringing the Territorial Force to establishment on mobilization. He 
insisted the force should remain self-contained , with its own reserve from men who had 
been through the Territorial system. He used that as the reason for rejecting 
suggestions to open up the Reserve to ex-Army Reservists , to men who had not been in 
service since January 1905 or even to Volunteers who had not transferred to the 
Territorials . Any former Volunteer wishing to join the Reserve would have to have spent 
two years in the Territorials and at least a similar number with the old Volunteer Force. 
Despite these restrictions on enrolment, the Secretary of State aimed to create a 
peacetime Reserve of some 300,000. This ambitious target was required to keep up 
the strength of the active auxiliary force until new recruits could be enrolled and trained .21 
Haldane accepted the financial need to limit the number of reservists attending 
camp to those necessary to make up shortages but also intended that every reservist 
should be able to attend camp at least once during his four year period . Most of the 
points of order and questions from the floor were friendly (the Unionist Party as yet 
undecided on what attitude to adopt), but Haldane was forced to answer a potentially 
awkward written question from Murray Macdonald MP, by declaring that no enrolment 
would be allowed during the current financial year and that, although he did not 
anticipate the Reserve would add any significant amount to current expenditure, no 
estimates had yet been made. 22 The Secretary of State was somewhat disingenuous in 
his reply as the War Office had conducted investigations into the likely cost of allowing 
around 15% of the Reserve to attend camp. 23 He was either unable or unwilling to state 
when he believed the Reserve might attain its intended strength and deflected 
questions about financial provision by insisting nothing further could be done until the 
associations had replied to the circular.24 Not surprisingly, the county associations were 
19 W032.6585, no ref., 6/08/09 . 
20 Ibid. 
21 Hansard Vol.8. 1896-1898, 4/08/09. 
22 Hansard Vol.9 . 3, 9/08/09. 
23 The AG's Department did have a rough estimate of the expense involved in maintaining a 
Territorial Reserve of 60,000. The calculations assumed that about 15% of the reserve would attend 
camp to make good deficiencies within the TF units and to replace those Territorials who could not 
remain for the full two weeks. Calculations attached to W032.6585, no ref., 20/01/09. 
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also anxious to learn how the scheme was to be financed. Stirlingshire County 
Association even had the temerity to insist that until it knew what financial assistance 
would be received, it was premature to consider establishing a Reserve. 25 Other 
associations, although no less concerned than Stirlingshire, were not quite so 
dismissive. 
In the absence of definitive regulations, several associations wrote to the War 
Office requesting further information and clarity. A letter from the Commanding Officer of 
the 3rd County of London Yeomanry, via the County of London Territorial Association , 
arrived at the War Office in early October. Lieutenant-Colonel Jarvis announced that his 
regiment had formed a Reserve Squadron from men who had served with the Imperial 
Yeomanry in South Africa. The squadron was to hold one parade each year, its men 
could volunteer to attend camp and had agreed to offer themselves as trained soldiers 
to bring the regiment to establishment on mobilization . All of them were eligible to join 
the, as yet unestablished, Veteran Reserve but Jarvis wanted to know whether they 
would actually be members of the Territorial Force Reserve and thus qualify for the 
proposed annual 20 rounds per man.26 
The War Office, still in the midst of the consultation but determined not to 
organize the Reserve as units, replied that only men eligible for and accepting the 
liabilities of the Territorial Reserve would be allowed the privileges of the Reserve. 
However, as county associations were to be allowed to frame their own rules for the 
Veteran Reserve, the London Association would eventually be able to decide whether 
the ex-Yeomanry should remain as individuals within the Territorial Reserve or be 
formed into a Reserve Squadron under the umbrella of the Veteran Reserve. 27 
By the beginning of November 1909, the War Office had begun to assimilate 
replies from the county associations to the circular memorandum of July.28 
Notwithstanding the oppositions of individuals such as Colonel Sir Simon Lockhard of 
Stirlingshire who condemned the idea of a 'multiplication of partially trained men' as a 
'source of danger ... calculated to create a false sense of security in the country', 29 in 
25 Hansard Vol. 8.1898, 4/08/09; W032.6585, no ref., letter of 14/09/09. The association was already 
in something of a dispute with the War Office over its allocation of Territorial units and its prolonged 
and strident objection to the Territorial Reserve should be seen in that context. The association was 
equally concerned that the authorities resolve the issue of clothing for the reserve and its eventually 
delayed enrolling its former Territorials until the four-year men's engagements were completed. 
National Archives of Scotland (NAS), MD6/15, 7/09/09; MD6/16, 3/05/10, 12/10/10. 
26 W032.6585, no ref., letter of 9/10/09. 
27 Ibid., no ref. , letter of 19/10/09. 
28 W032.6585 (38A) . The replies were compiled into a report dated 15/11/09. 
29 NAS, MD2/1 , 27/08/09. 
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general , the associations were enthusiastic. They did, however, voice several important 
qualifications. Some thought that it was a little early to be forming a reserve for a force 
which itself was only two years old and that unscrupulous Territorial commanding 
officers (COs) might use the Reserve as a repository for their useless men. 
Commanding officers of, for example, Hampshire Territorial units, thought that the 
removal of the already 'scanty old soldier element' from their battalions and batteries 
would harm unit efficiency because the experienced men were needed as a leaven to 
the young recruits . They suggested no attempt to form a reserve should be made until at 
least April 1911 .30 General Nicholson dismissed these objections with a terse comment 
that a start had to be made sometime and that it was the responsibility of the 
associations to supervise the activities of their units' COs. Several associations 
advocated an unlimited number of reservists but the War Office, which had increased its 
original estimate of 60,000 to 100,000, insisted that without an upper ceiling , running 
costs could escalate beyond what could be afforded . There was a wide division of 
opinion within the associations as to the length of the qualifying period and the 
maximum age of reservists. The Army Council eventually decided upon a qualifying 
period of four years' completed training in the Territorials . In effect this meant that it 
would take a Territorial who could only attend camp for eight days each year, eight years 
to qualify. The War Office also allowed four years' combined service in the Yeomanry or 
Volunteers but these had to have been served within five years of the man's application 
to join the Reserve. Officers with four years' service could enrol, provided they were not 
on the General or Special Reserve Lists and they applied within ten years of their colour 
service. 
Most associations demurred at the suggestion of some that lapsed or untrained 
reservists should attend camp. They felt that the Territorials themselves were 
insufficiently trained to be able to cope with reservists who had not undergone 
preliminary drills. Eighteen associations recommended that all reservists should agree 
to a degree of compulsory training , and Hampshire suggested that, if reservists were to 
attend camp , they should have completed 50% of the number of drills required for a 
Territorial soldier in that year. 31 The Army Council refused such thoughts on grounds of 
cost and because it would fundamentally alter the whole scheme. It ruled such a matter 
was 'not a question for the associations'.32 
Interested as the Army Council was in the associations' responses , its overriding 
30 Hants RO, 37/M69/1 , 17/09/09. 
31 Ibid. 
32 W032.6585 (38A) , comment by AG. 
32. 
concerns were cost and time. In December 1909, Nicolson, now redesignated Chief of 
the Imperial General Staff, (CIGS) claimed that it was still impossible to estimate the 
expenditure required but warned that if it was substantial it would 'retard the completion 
of the Expeditionary Force and the Territorial Force'.33 A minute by Haldane insisted 
expenditure must be restricted 'to the absolute bare necessity or the projected 100,000 
will cost more than we can find' . 34 The need for economy even prompted Miles' 
department to question the need of providing the annual 20 rounds to Reservists from 
the Royal Artillery and Army Supply Corps. 35 The concern over the passage of time was 
linked to the approaching termination of engagement of former Volunteers who had 
enrolled for two years . If the Reserve was provisionally established by 1 April 1910, 
these men could resign from the Territorial Force on 31 March and enrol immediately in 
the Reserve. Further draft proposals, many of which included suggestions cul led from 
the associations' responses to the original circular, were prepared and discussed 
within the War Office and the King 's approval was secured .36 
On 7 March 1910, Haldane announced to the Commons, 'Provision for the 
[reserve) which the House sanctioned last year is now being carried a stage further.'37 
Enrolment in the Reserve would begin within a few weeks enabling , he predicted , the 
14 Territorial divisions to be quickly supplied with 'mature and trained men' on 
mobilization . With the issue one week later of a Special Army Order authorizing 
despatch of the regulations to the counties , Haldane's object had been achieved within 
the necessary time scale. Associations were informed that, although final decisions 
had yet to be made, they could immediately register the names of any soldiers whose 
terms of service were about to end . Thus, any Territorial about to end his engagement 
could now enrol in the Force's own reserve. 
The regulations confirmed that the Territorial Reserve would be sub-divided into 
three sections: the Reserve itself, the Technical Reserve and the Veteran Reserve.38 
Anyone who had served at least one term in the Territorials would be eligible to join the 
Reserve which, with an establishment of 100,000, was intended to reach 33% of the 
Territorial Force's designated strength . Men could enrol for between one and four years 
and, with the permission of the commanding officer of the Territorial unit, could 
33 W032.6585 (39), 2/12/09. 
34 W032.6585 (41 ), 28/12/09. 
35 W032.6585 (41A) , 18/12/09. 
36 W032.6585 (47) , 16/03/10. 
37 Hansard Vol.14.1169, 7/03/10. 
38 Original War Office Circular Memo No.262 of 21/05/09 was superseded by Special Army Order 
9/Gen/ 1259 of 23/03/10 which notified royal approval of the Reserve. 
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volunteer for drills and camp. No soldier would be allowed to serve more than four years 
and the compulsory age of retirement was identical to that enforced in the Territorials . 
Provision was made for men to fire an annual course and retain their uniforms but the 
principal tenet adhered to throughout was that of minimising cost. As an example of the 
official parsimony evident throughout the process, the QMG's department had its way 
over the musketry course. Only former yeomanry, infantry and engineers were to be 
allowed to fire 20 rounds each year; other arms were permitted only 10.39 In addition , 
and with the proviso that there should be no loss of public funds , associations were 
allowed to frame rules and conditions under which a reservist could purchase his early 
discharge.40 Haldane insisted that the administration of the Reserve should not 
materially add to the volume of work in the offices of the county associations but 
announced an increase in grants to cover the additional bureaucracy. 
The Unionist Party remained in something of a quandary. Its spokesman, George 
Wyndham, admitted to being pulled in two directions. A proportion of his party wanted 
him to accept Haldane's scheme, while another faction urged him to condemn it from 
the outset. Trying desperately not to sound too enthusiastic, yet not wishing to be 
accused of being overtly hostile and therefore unpatriotic, Wyndham decided that 
Haldane was 'superimposing upon a striking force a new body of men who will .. . either 
crush it or extract from it all that is good in it' .41 Wyndham could not bring himself to 
criticise the concept of the Reserve but questioned the timing and the failure to insist on 
camp attendance. In launching the Reserve before the Territorial Force itself was firmly 
established, he accused Haldane of reviving the 'pot-hunting Volunteer' .42 
Not surprisingly Haldane rejected Wyndham's assertion, claiming that the 
Reserve would provide a pool of trained men whose membership would be accepted 
entirely on merit. 43 When two other Unionists doubted whether a reserve without an 
obligation on its members to attend camp or drills would be of any military value,44 
several of Haldane's own party sprang to his assistance. One speaker claimed that as 
the Volunteers had themselves wanted a reserve, the Territorial Force Reserve was a 
39 Similarly, Reservists of the 6/Biack Watch were allowed to keep only their trews rather than their 
more expensive kilt. NAS, MD7/36, 28/10/10. 
40 After some discussion Shropshire decided to make the term of engagement two years. Purchase of 
discharge would be set at £2 in the first year and 30 shillings in the second. Shropshire RO, 1988/2, 
30/09/10. In contrast, the majority of associations elected to leave the issue entirely in the hands of 
the CO to which the man was attached . Somerset RO, DDX/TA/1 , 27/05/10. 
41 Hansard Vol.18 . 704, 27/06/10. 
42 Hansard Vol.18. 703-5, 27/06/10. 
43 /bid. , 719, 27/06/10. 
44 /bid., 786, 789, 27/06/10. 
'logical development'. He congratulated Haldane on resisting the temptation to fill it up 
immediately with 100,000 ex-Volunteers and accepted that while the severe qualification 
conditions would undoubtedly cause the Reserve to grow slowly, it would contain 
'thoroughly good men who had been through a uniform system' .45 This prediction of a 
pedestrian growth did not satisfy another member. He wanted Haldane to grant 
permission for associations to enrol former Regulars or auxiliaries in order to create a 
veterans' wing within the Territorial Reserve.46 Haldane, who did not wish to confuse the 
different elements of his new Reserve, declined to give any such guarantee.47 
Despite some unfriendly snipes, the idea of the Reserve was well received both 
within the House and the country. Some of the press simply reported the idea and 
awaited events, while others looked to its foundation with optimism. The Devonshire 
Association set up a sub-committee to look at the issue and decided that each of the 
county's Territorial units should have a specific number of Reserve officers. So 
enthusiastic and confident of its success was it that it passed regulations stating that, 
when the establishment of Reserve officers was complete and another officer who 
wished to join was about to leave the Territorial Force, the senior officer would 
automatically transfer to the Veteran Reserve.48 Similarly, Kent aimed to have a Reserve 
of nearly 40 men for each infantry company, all of whom would annually be required to 
perform five drills and a musketry course. 49 What Devonshire, Kent and several other 
associations were yet to realize was the degree of over-expectation incorporated within 
both their and the official proposals. Three years after it was created, as will become 
clear, the Reserve was acknowledged to be a miserable failure. At best it was capable 
of mustering a mere 2% of its anticipated 100,000 men. 
Simultaneously with his proposal to create the Reserve, Haldane announced his 
intention of forming Technical and Veteran Reserves. In the circular letter to the 
associations in July 1909, the Secretary of State declared his intention of enlisting the 
help of certain men whose specialist skills would be able to provide essential auxiliary 
assistance to the Regular forces during times of emergency. In particular he wished to 
45 /bid., 750, 27/06/10. 
46 HansardVol.17.215, 25/04/10. 
47 Ibid. An analysis of the Unionist Party's defence policy between 1899 - 1915 can be found in Rhodri 
Will iams, Defending the Empire , New York : Yale University Press, 1991 . 
48 Devon RO, 1715C/TA2, 15/06/10. The association decided that each of the artillery and eng ineer 
units should have two captains and two subalterns as their reserve, while infantry battalions should 
each have three captains and six subalterns. The county's Telegraph Company, ASC and ambulance 
units were also each to have at least one lieutenant in reserve. Other associations, for example the 
City of Edinburgh , continued to believe that the Reserve should equal that of establishment. NAS, 
MD11/21 , 8/11/10. 
49 Kent RO, MD/TA/1/1, 10/12/09. 
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attract vets, doctors, civil and electrical engineers and railway, telephone and telegraph 
personnel. The men need not have served in the military and the Army Council did not 
initially anticipate any burden of training would be laid at the door of the county 
associations. With a few exceptions the Reserve would be organized through the 
various technical and professional bodies representing the members' diverse skills 
and a Technical Reserve Advisory Committee. 
When he made his announcement, Haldane clearly had little firm idea of how the 
Reserve would operate. Several European powers, such as the Habsburg Empire, did 
have a similar organization but Haldane seems not to have thought of extending the 
British experiment further than a fairly loose liaison between the War Office and the 
Advisory Committee. In effect, all it would at first amount to was a register of men 'who 
would be invaluable in time of war, but who would be very difficult to get unless we had 
them carefully selected in the intervals of peace'. There was little indication of how the 
Reserve might be organized or mobilized, one Government spokesman unhelpfully 
declaring that the authorities were simply 'leaving it to develop'. 50 
This statement was not entirely accurate but in the preamble to the proposal the 
Army Council had outlined the difficulties it foresaw in attempting to organize the 
Reserve: 
It may be difficult, for the present, to lay down rules and conditions which could be made 
to apply, without modification, for all classes and categories in the Technical Reserve. 
Decentralization in matters affecting the Technical Reserve is therefore not an easy 
matter ... At a later stage such measures of decentralization as may be found possible 
will be adopted. 51 
Reaction to its formation was largely muted but there was a general agreement that 
such a reserve was desirable. George Wyndham's greatest fear was not that the 
Reserve was unnecessary but that it might only result in yet another mere 'paper 
scheme'. 52 Feedback from the county associations was not extensive. They tended to 
concentrate their thoughts upon the Territorial Force Reserve and the Veteran Reserve 
but some, jealous of their independence, reported that if there were to be a Technical 
Reserve, they would prefer to form their own rather than have one imposed from above.53 
so Hansard Vol.8 .1865, 4/08/09. 
51 War Office Circular Memo No.192 of 28/07/09. 
52 Hansard Vol.18. 706, 27/06/10. 
53 For example, the Wiltshire Association believed that a locally organized Technical Reserve would 
offer better potential than one raised centrally. Wiltshire RO, L 1/101/1 , 6/09/09. Hants RO, 37/M69/1 , 
17/09/09. 
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The Hampshire Association acknowledged the Reserve could be a very valuable force, 
especially for the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers and Railway Companies, but thought 
the men should have a certain degree of military training in peace time with the units to 
which they would be attached in war. Another association went even further and 
suggested its members should attend at least one Territorial camp in order to learn 
military discipline. The Army Council was not impressed, dismissing the suggestion 
with the acerbic assertion that 'discipline cannot be learnt by one day at camp'. 54 
Progress in developing the Reserve was slow. Having been really little other than 
redundant from the start, the Advisory Committee ceased meeting in 1913.55 The only 
element of the Technical Reserve which succeeded in establishing itself firmly within 
the broad spread of the county associations was the Voluntary Aid Detachment. Yet 
even this success had its limitations. The detachments were intended to care for sick 
and wounded Territorials within the immediate vicinity of their own areas and to provide 
personnel for hospitals and ambulance trains on mobilization . However, organizing and 
administering the Voluntary Aid Detachments (VAD) as part of the Technical Reserve 
resulted in the inevitable calls from the counties for additional finance. The detachments 
relied upon voluntary contributions and, when in 1911 Haldane refused a grant of £5 per 
detachment, the counties expressed concern about whether the units could be kept in 
existence. There had been disputes over the certification of orderlies which had done 
little to improve relations and morale. Eventually, when the War Office decided to accept 
certificates from organizations whose tests were not so rigorous as their own, the St 
John's Ambulance Brigade temporarily withdrew from the scheme.56 Furthermore, in 
early 1913 the Advisory Committee reported to the Army Council that although there was 
an abundance of women 's detachments, it was proving very difficult to attract sufficient 
numbers of men. 57 
The disappointing failure to recruit men into the aid detachments appears to have 
been typical of the generally disappointing development of the Technical Reserve as a 
whole . There were attempts to identify certain types of dockyard artisans and General 
Post Office telegraphists but these were more to do with ensuring they would not be 
allowed to enlist if war came rather than to encourage them to register their willingness 
54 W032.6585 (38A). 
55 The Territorial Force Advisory Council, which had met only seven times, was similarly dissolved in 
May 1914. on taking office Seely had originally thought the council might serve a purpose but its 
final meeting was held in April1912. W032.9698. 
56 Several TF associations minuted at some length the divisions and disputes between the various 
bodies compris ing the different VADs. 
57 Shropshire RO, 1899/34, 1/02/13. 
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to avail themselves to the army. The Army Council decided in 1911 to disassociate the 
Reserve from the Territorial and National Reserves and declared it to be supplementary 
to the army. This manoeuvre tried to give it a higher profile and allowed the recruitment 
of former Regulars into specific Reserves. These bodies fell under the aegis of the 
Royal Engineers and included specialists in the field of communications and 
transport. 58 One Territorial Telegraph Company was already earmarked for overseas 
service but a fundamental reason behind the Technical Reserve's lack of attractiveness 
to skilled men was the practice and attitude of many artisan trade unions. Several of 
these associations were actively opposed to the Territorial Force and had, from its 
inception in 1908, campaigned to discourage their members from enlisting . 59 
An example of one scheme organized under the auspicies of the Technical 
Reserve which seems to have come to nothing was a 1911 proposal by Eastern 
Command. It requested its associations to compile a register of all motorcycles and 
cars in their respective counties. The Sussex Association decided simply to ignore the 
request while the Middlesex Association was so uninspired by the proposal that it 
simply minuted the letter and noted it could be studied in the association 's office 'by 
anyone interested '. Kent at least made an effort and sent 2614 letters to known vehicle 
owners asking them to declare whether they would place their machines at the 
military's disposal in an emergency. When it received only 257 replies , the committee 
decided to delegate the task to unit commanders in the hope they might have a better 
response through personal contacts . The Command does seem to have established a 
Motor Cyclist Reserve Committee in 1913 but there is no evidence to suggest how 
58 Army Council Instruction 286 of 1911 . The establishment of the Railway Reserve was set at 345. 
Members received the same pay as Class 8 Reservists , 6d per day, and on mobilization would join 
existing Royal Engineer Railway Companies. 
59 Rather belatedly, W09/Reserve/1163 (AG1) of 17/06/14 ordered associations not to enrol dockyard 
workers and GPO telephonists in Classes I or II of the National Reserve. The Admiralty raised no 
objection to the ban and agreed that its workers should register only in Class Ill. ADM1/8391/71 ; For 
examples of labour opposition to the Territorial Force see: West Yorkshire RO WR Co.TA Association , 
Book 24, 30/06/09, letter from York and District Trades and Labour Council , NAS MD2/2 , 15/03/12 for 
mention of a Lanarkshire miner's leader urging men to resign from the Territorials and NAS, MD11/2 , 
29/10/13 for a minute of an Edinburgh Cooperative manager instructing his staff to either resign from 
the Territorials or from their position. 
successful it was in compiling the intended register.60 
One element which did eventually become a tangible part of the Reserve, but 
which had not only to struggle to gain recognition and acceptance from the War Office 
and which, like the VAD also suffered a fitful development, was the Corps of Guides. 
The original idea for such a corps had sprung from the Surrey County Association when , 
in February 1910, its committee requested the authorities to give consideration to the 
sanctioning of a new organization which would be able to provide specialist local 
knowledge to army commanders. 
In the introduction to a memorandum subsequently despatched to the War 
Office,61 the Chairman of the Surrey Association, Lieutenant-Colonel Ellison, recalled a 
1903 lecture delivered to the Royal United Services Institution (RUSI) by Colonel 
W.L.Davidson, then Commander Royal Artillery, North-Eastern District. Ellison 
acknowledged a debt to Viscount Midleton (as Brodrick the former Secretary of State for 
War had become), for drawing the association's attention to Davidson 's lecture entitled , 
A System for Local Guides for Home Defence. 62 On receipt of Surrey's memorandum 
the War Office decided that as similar work was already part of the Yeomanry's 
responsibility, it had no need to pursue the matter. In response, Ellison argued that 
reliance upon the Yeomanry would deplete its fighting efficiency and the units might in 
any case be overseas. A Corps of Guides should , he went on , be drawn from hunting 
men , farmers and the like, probably over military age, and who need not have any 
knowledge of the rifle or of military discipline. These District and Parish Guides would 
work under the supervision of a Chief Guide, who would in turn be responsible to the 
Territorial Force Association. A register of suitable men would be kept by each county 
and, to comply with the terms of the Hague Convention , they would be issued with a 
60 East Sussex RO, TER 4/2, 19/12/1 0; Kent RO, MD/TA 3/2, 24/02/11 ; London Metropolitan Arch ives , 
994/2 , 26/05/13; Essex RO, A9831 , General Purpose Committee, 25/06/13. War Office authority to 
form such a reserve came with W091/Reservel14 (AG1) of 14/04/13. There is evidence to suggest 
Scottish and western Commands also attempted to form a similar reserve. W09/Resl14 (AG1) of 
14/04/13 instructed associations to ascertain the availability of motorcycles and riders in case they 
were required for the expeditionary force and the Territorials . In 1910 the East Riding Association 
applied to the Army Council for permission to enrol farm wagoners of the Wolds as subsidiary drivers in 
the Technical Reserve with the intent that the men could be used as drivers for artillery units. East 
Riding RO, TAF/3. The War Office ruled against the proposal but in 1913 the Wagoners Special 
Reserve , which had been privately raised by Sir Mark Sykes, was recognized as a reserve to the ASC. 
Stand To! Nos.11 and 57, Summer 1984 and January 2000 respectively. 
61 Detail for the following discussion on the formation of the Corps of Guides comes from file 
W032.4744, Scheme for Local Guides for the County in the Event of Invasion (Surrey) . The file 
contains draft regulations, correspondence etc and a synopsis of the replies to the draft regulations 
from the county associations. Departments within the War Office added their comments and minutes. 
62 W032.4744 (2) , 23/02/10. 
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badge and hat. Each volunteer would sign a card declaring that he would be willing to 
act as a guide in his county to Crown forces. There would be close coordination over 
county boundaries but, and perhaps most importantly as far as persuading the War 
Office to agree in principle to the scheme was concerned , the proposal was to entail no 
expense to the state.63 
The initial Whitehall response was not encouraging . Major-General Archibald 
Murray, the DMT, wrote to Nicolson suggesting that as Territorial cyclist battalions were 
already supposed to be familiar with potential invasion sites, a Corps of Guides would 
be an unnecessary duplication. The DMT did not, however, entirely write off the idea and 
suggested that if the scheme was to be given a chance, Essex and Sussex should be 
used as trial areas. Nonetheless, he did take the opportunity to state that he would 
prefer between 70,000-100,000 men of the Veteran Reserve to offer themselves as 
guards for vulnerable points on the nation 's railwayS.64 A further minute from inside the 
War Office suggested that if a corps was formed it should be incorporated into the 
Veteran Reserve rather than be allowed a separate existence. This would be a sensible 
course of action , the annotation speculated, because many of the would-be guides 
were possibly already members of the Reserve. 65 
Representatives of the Surrey Association pressed their general scheme to 
Haldane in March 1910 and, in addition, stressed that potential guides should not be 
limited to men with previous military service. For that reason they argued, the corps 
should come under the auspices of the Technical rather than the Veteran Reserve.66 
Both the AG, General Sir ian Hamilton, and Haldane were positive in their response to 
the Surrey delegation and instructed the War Office to examine the scheme in detail. 
Unfortunately for Surrey, the machine worked slowly and it was only after several further 
letters of enquiry from the association that the War Office responded .67 
In March 1911, the DMT again concluded that such a corps was unnecessary. He 
suggested an alternative scheme to Nicholson whereby every cyclist battalion in 
Eastern Command should attach 10 to 20 'intelligent' men as guides to the HQ of the 
various mobile forces .68 The CIGS, the DMT and Brigadier-General Lancelot Kiggell , the 
Director of Staff Duties, who all believed that a group of untrained civilians would be 
more likely to 'hamper rather than assist the military forces', concurred with this 
63 Ibid. 
64 W032.4744, no ref., DMT to CIGS, 11/03/10. 
65 W032.4744, Minute 2, 8/03/10. 
66 W032.4744, Minute 6, 27/04/10. 
67 W032.4744, no refs , letters dated 21/04/11 and 11/12/11 . 
66 W032 .4744, no ref., DMT to CIGS, 15/03/11 . 
solution . Furthermore, Kiggell thought it 'unsound military policy to persuade individuals 
to undertake a measure of service which, while useless for military purposes, may be 
claimed by the giver as a fulfilment of their responsibility to the state'.69 
The consequence of this inter-departmental discussion and general reluctance 
to embrace the scheme was the despatch of what was to the Surrey Association a 
disappointing reply. In a transparent attempt to appease the association the War Office 
declared: 'Having regard to the amount of work which County Associations are being 
called upon to carry out [it would be] inadvisable at present to proceed with the 
scheme. '70 Although frustrated by the War Office's obvious lack of enthusiasm, the 
corps' proponents took solace in the implication that the scheme had not been 
irrevocably rejected . Letters requesting the proposal be granted further consideration 
were sent regularly to the War Office and it was known that Haldane remained 
essentially sympathetic. He continued to envisage that such a corps could become part 
of the Technical Reserve and even included a draft outline of the scheme in the circular 
memorandum sent to all associations in May 1910 which announced the formation of 
the Territorial Force Reserve. Haldane made it clear that he had no objection to 
associations compiling a preliminary register of guides.71 
By 1912, other organizations had joined with Surrey in its advocacy of a corps. In 
March the London Committee of the Legion of Scouts and Guides submitted an 
application for admission to the Technical Reserve and a letter from a Northumberland 
village offering the services of a group of cyclist scouts and guides landed on the desk 
of the DGTF in May. The War Office was also sent a copy of an address by Major Kitson-
Ciark of the ?/West Yorkshire Regiment to members of the Yorkshire Ramblers ' Club. 
The speech claimed that a corps of guides drawn from ramblers possessing specialist 
knowledge not always evident on Ordnance Survey sheets, could offer invaluable 
assistance to officers of the 5th Division in Leeds about to engage an invasion force 
debouching from York. 72 
Haldane's continuing reluctance to grant official sanction was rapidly exhausting 
the patience of the Surrey Association . Its formerly polite letters were followed by one in 
February 1912 which demanded to know whether their scheme had been entirely 
dropped. 73 The War Office sent no immediate reply but, in March, the Army Council met 
69 W032.4 7 44, no ref., DSD to CIGS, 18/09/11 . 
70 W032.4744, no ref. There are several drafts of the letter, dating from May 1911 to August 1911 , 
when it was eventually sent. 
71 9/Surrey/201 (AG5) , May 1910. 
72 W032.4 7 44, no ref. Letters and an abstract of an address given on 23/01/12. 
73 W032.4 7 44, no ref., letter dated 12/02/12. 
to discuss the issue. Having once more studied Surrey's proposal the Council finally 
agreed , provided no public expense was incurred , to authorize the scheme as part of 
the Technical Reserve. It decided to invite county associations to 'volunteer' to form a 
corps, thereby ensuring that they 'would not be able to complain that it is an extra 
burden ' .74 However, as the National Reserve was already in receipt of central grants, 
privately the War Office expressed concern that if the movement was adopted with any 
great enthusiasm, it would be unable to maintain the desired principle of no financial 
assistance. A minute by Seely, the new Secretary of State, acknowledged the delicacy of 
the position: 
No public expense means no direct expenditure of the public funds of the associations. 
The position is weak, but to allow associations to spend the money given to them for 
Territorial purposes, and then to refuse any grant, would be a more difficult position to 
maintain than a prohibition of expenditure from public funds . 75 
Despite this reservation the 1910 circular, which supported the scheme and 
which was based very largely on Surrey's original submission, was sent to county 
associations in October 1912. The Army Council warned associations that, as no grants 
would be available for organizing or maintaining the corps, any decision to form such a 
body was to be entirely the decision of individual associations. While insisting that local 
knowledge was an integral part of all Territorials' training, the Council acknowledged 
that a supplementary list of guides might prove useful. Any registered guides should be 
able to provide details of paths, fords, blacksmith and wheelwrights' shops and 
anything else that might be considered useful to military commanders .76 The guides 
would not bear arms unless they were existing members of the armed forces and 
would possess a badge rather than a uniform.77 
How the senior military authorities who had so opposed the formation reacted to 
the corps' creation is unrecorded. Seely's approval was probably given on the ground of 
political expediency. The Secretary of State needed the support of the county 
associations in his attempts to keep the Territorials at reasonable strength and in 
74 W032.4744 (30A) , 18/06/12. 
75 W032.4744, Minute 30, 22/06/12. 
76 The Army and Navy, 3/04/15 described the guides as a 'body of men organized on such a basis that, 
collectively, they know every local bridle path, footpath and track of any description in the county, and 
they can thus receive troops on the border of the county, pass them on from guide to guide, and 
forward their passage by the most suitable routes, through the county'. Cited in A.Strachey, St.Loe 
Strachey, London: Gollancz, 1930, p.249. Authorization to commence raising the corps came with 
WO 9/Surrey/201 (AG5) of 24/08/12, sent in October. 
77 War Office officials discussed whether to provide the guides with the green brassard issued to 
civilians employed with any expeditionary force . 
administering the National Reserve. In view of the increasing growth in pro-conscription 
sentiment within the associations, Seely could not afford to alienate them further by 
loading yet more work upon these voluntary bodies. By insisting that the creation of a 
Corps of Guides was purely optional, he aimed to prevent an open breach. But Seely's 
rejection of compulsion had to be balanced against the corps' potential utility. Like the 
National Reserve, a viable Technical Reserve could relieve some of the burden on the 
understrength and increasingly youthful Territorials while, at the same time, impose 
only a minimal financial commitment on the public purse.78 
Authorization to create a local corps did not initiate an immediate stampede but 
references confirm that almost two dozen counties, and not necessarily always those 
most likely to experience invasion or raids, discussed the formation of a corps and at 
least set up some preliminary apparatus. Consequently, Shropshire's claim in February 
1914 that it was the only association with an organized corps in operation was certainly 
misconceived.79 Several Scottish and English associations (including at least two 
whose National Reserve registers remained disappointingly empty) , launched their 
corps in 1912. From the outset, the Northumberland Association wanted to liaise 
closely with the police and local authorities and, following a subsequent meeting with 
the Chief Constable, it was decided to create the county's several guide districts from 
the Petty Sessional Divisions. There was some difficulty in securing the services of a 
Chief Guide the committee's favoured candidate being ineligible as he was on the 
' 
Reserve List. District Guides were appointed for all save one area by January 1914 but 
there were warnings from the grass roots that unless the guides were used, interest 
would invariably wane. The services of two game keepers were accepted but it was not 
until early 1914 that a Chief Guide was appointed and financial authorization granted for 
the issue of notebooks to District GuideS.80 
The East Riding Association appointed a Chief Guide in 1912 and , in December 
1913 Essex announced it had recruited its 300 guides, with the association's chairman 
' 
78 Cost remained paramount in all of Seely's calculations. A WO letter emphasized that the guides 
would not be awarded service pay even if mobilized. The CO of the troops to whom a guide was 
attached was empowered to remunerate the man in accordance with the nature and value of his 
service . The East Riding Association predicted difficulty in forming a corps if this unsympathetic 
attitude was maintained. The Council of County Territorial Associations, which had been created in 
June 1908 to effectively oversee the work of the associations, declined to take up the East Riding 's 
observation with the Army Council. Council of County Territorial Associations, Minutes, 14/03/13. 
79 Shropshire RO, 1988/34, 7/02/14; Devonshire appointed a Chief Guide in December 1912 but then 
appears to have done nothing more to develop a county-wide system. Devon RO, 1715C/TA2, 
11/12/12. Gloucestershire discussed the issue, twice postponed a decision and then abandoned the 
idea entirely. Gloucestershire RO, D2388/1/2, 17/03/13. 
80 Northumberland RO, NR0408/44, 8/10/12, 10/12/12, 5/07/13, 26/02/14. 
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acting as Chief Guide. The association's rules stipulated that all guides had to be men 
who were ineligible for the Territorials but who had served in the forces .81 Similarly, 
Sussex refused to allow anyone under 35 years to act as a guide and wanted 
assurance that the corps would not have a detrimental effect on Territorial recruiting .82 
Like Sussex, Essex decided to group its five districts according to the five principal fox-
hunting packs but, when in May 1914 Eastern Command queried whether Sussex's 
scheme was up and running, the association complained that only one master of 
hounds had bothered to reply to their original letter. In response to the same inquiry, 
Kent stated that the committee had declined to undertake any provision as there was 
already 'as much work as we can usefully perform with the National Reserve, Cadets 
and VAD. ' Carmarthen, a fairly unlikely area to suffer a raid by enemy troops, decided the 
lack of funding made raising a corps 'impracticable' .83 Wiltshire sought in vain for a 
Chief Guide and when the issue was discussed by the Middlesex Recruitment 
Committee it quite erroneously decided that such a corps was 'scarcely applicable' to 
the county. The General Purposes Committee refused to accept the decision and 
handed it back for further consideration . In a lengthier ruling the Recruiting Committee 
predicted the corps would draw men away from the Territorials and, as the county was 
'exceptionally' well provided for by Boy Scouts who could do the job just as well, the 
scheme was unnecessary. 84 Hampshire also believed the tasks could be left to the 
Scouts but clinched the argument for doing nothing by insisting that as guides would be 
used for the benefit of Regular troops, the Regulars themselves should provide them. 85 
In Scotland , Kirkcudbrightshire decided it would take no action to form what it 
described as a 'body of scouts' and Perthshire rejected the idea on grounds of cost. 
The City of Aberdeen resolved to delay the launch until a 'suitable opportunity offered ' 
and Glasgow, like Middlesex, considered the scheme was inapplicable to a city.86 
Further south Warwickshire took the unusual step of making branches of the National 
' 
Reserve responsible for raising a group of guides and several other counties appear to 
have invited a country gentleman to become Chief Guide and then let him get on with 
the organization . It took the outbreak of war to prompt the West Riding Association to 
begin organizing its corps but, perhaps not surprisingly, Surrey had nominated a Chief 
81 East Riding RO, TAF/2, 9/10/12; Essex RO, 6E17D/2, 4/12/12. 
82 East Sussex RO, TER 7/4, 14/05/13 and 7/3 4/12/12. 
83 Kent RO, MD/TA 1/2, 24/07/14; Carmarthenshire RO, TA/1/8, 9/01/13. Leicester also formed its 
corps based around the county's fox hunting packs. 
84 Wiltshire RO, L 1/101/2, 6/01/13; London Metropolitan Archives, 994/2, 28/10/12, 25/11/12. 
85 Hants RO, 37 /M69/3, 15/11/12. 
86 NAS, MD3/4, 14/1 1/12; NAS, MD7/36, 2/12/12; NAS, MD4/1 , 28/10/12; NAS, MD10/5, 7/10/1 2. 
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Guide some 16 months before the War Office had even sanctioned the corps' 
formation. 87 
Although the Corps of Guides made gradual, if uneven, progress during 1912, 
the Territorial Force Reserve experienced a far tardier development. County 
associations were proving reluctant to devote time to establishing it on any firm 
foundations without first securing an appropriate increase in central grants. 
Northumberland Association bluntly informed the War Office that the Reserve would 'not 
prosper' unless the authorities were to amend the age restrictions and provide enough 
funds for the men to fire their annual course. 88 Progress had been so slow, the City of 
London Association, for example, having succeeded in enrolling a mere ten men , that in 
March 1911 Haldane admitted the Reserve was 'very attenuated '. 89 One of the most 
frequent and regular critics of its lack of progress emphasized how the entry 
requirement of having attended camp for two weeks on four successive years precluded 
most men from enrolling. If those qualifications were relaxed and a retainer paid to the 
soldiers, Colonel Greig believed, the Reserve would be quickly filled by men with an 
obligation to serve. 90 
In contrast, the third element of the Territorial Force Reserve, the Veteran 
Reserve, had been expanding with unanticipated rapidity. Former Territorials might be 
uninterested in joining their own force's Reserve but they were demonstrating a 
remarkable willingness to enrol beside ex-Regulars and ex-Volunteers in a body which 
offered no social advantage, no opportunity to camp or drill and not even a promise of 
royal patronage. The Veteran Reserve had burst upon the national scene with a vigour 
and dynamism that had surprised even its instigator. 
Unaware that the year was to mark the peak in Territorial recruiting and eager to 
exploit the apparent success of his new force, Haldane announced registration for the 
Veteran Reserve would commence a few weeks after the Territorial Force Reserve itself 
had been established. 91 Conscious that Territorials who had joined at the time of the 
force 's creation would be approaching the end of their four year period of service in 
1912, Haldane hoped those soldiers who were not prepared to re-enlist for a further 
four years or who did not qualify for the Territorial Force Reserve might commit 
themselves instead to this new organization. However, a great deal of prompting and 
87 Warwickshire RO, CR1141/4,1/1 0/12; West Yorkshire RO, WR Co.Association , Book 2, 15/09/14. 
88 Northumberland RO, NR0408/5, 13/12/10. 
89 Hansard Vol.22.21 00, 14/11/11 . 
90 Hansard Voi.40.1379, 4/07/12 and Vol.50.11 73, 19/11/13. 
91 HansardVol.18 .722, 27/06/10. 
preparatory work had preceded his formal declaration that a Veteran Reserve was about 
to commence. Much of the credit for turning the concept into reality lies with John St Loe 
Strachey, editor of the Spectator, friend of politicians from both sides of the divide and 
consistent advocate of an expanded home defence auxiliary. 
In the early years of the century, Strachey had made efforts to form village rifle 
clubs and had even attempted different methods of the rapid training of soldiers in the 
Spectator's Experimental Company. 92 Articles in his periodical regularly discussed the 
formation of a corps of trained men who could be drawn upon in times of emergency 
and the creation of a reserve of one million rifles. Strachey had corresponded with Lord 
Roberts about the use of irregular troopS93 and earlier, in 1906, had spoken personally 
to Haldane about compiling a register of ex-soldiers. The Secretary of State wrote to him 
the following year expressing the view that 'the idea of a reserve of names ... is one that 
may be fitted into the new organization of the county associations '. 94 Strachey took his 
idea to the Surrey Association , which was sympathetic and co-opted him to the 
committee, but nothing further was attempted until the association had overcome the 
initial struggle to get the Territorial Force started . 
Strachey accepted he faced great difficulties in trying to convince sufficient people 
in authority to take the proposed movement seriously and in the practicalities of getting it 
established . The War Office kept no official register of men passing from the Army or the 
Reserve, neither had there been any widespread attempt by the Volunteers to maintain 
touch with former members. Many of his own friends thought Strachey was attempting 
the impossible and , notwithstanding the experience of the South African War, General 
Sir William Nicholson, CIGS and a fellow member of the National Defence League, 
called Strachey an 'ass' for believing that his 'improvised soldiers ' would ever be used .95 
During later years Strachey admitted that on occasions he too secretly wondered 
whether the plan was more harebrained than practicable. He spent nearly £3000 of his 
own money to get the thing moving , but did know he enjoyed the tacit approval of 
Haldane and the active support of the Surrey Association . In the spring of 1909 he 
placed adverts in Surrey newspapers inviting all trained men who were not connected 
with any existing reserve or unit to send in their names and addresses. Within a few 
92 A.Strachey, St.Loe Strachey, op.cit. , p.240. 
93 Roberts Papers. NAM 7101 -23/85/29, Strachey to Roberts 2/10/09. Having witnessed a cyclist 
company of the Hampshire Volunteers capture a battery of Royal Artillery during the 1901 
manoeuvres, Strachey was convinced 2-3000 civilian riflemen on bicycles could inflict severe damage 
on an invading army. 
94 Ibid., p.241 . 
95 lb 'd I ., p.301 . 
weeks, 800 Surrey men had registered. In the autumn Strachey wrote of this 'very great 
success' to Roberts . These: 
.. . eight hundred excellent men have a wonderful record of war service. They are also in 
the full vigour of life. Yet not one at present belongs to any unit of the national forces . 
They are absolutely out of the ken of the Service. I believe if the new Veteran Reserve is 
worked as we ... are working ours, our register of trained men will give the country a 
most useful reserve of 150,000 men. Of course they will want organization but merely to 
have their names and addresses and to be in touch with them will be something .96 
Strachey's consistent advocacy of a scheme to utilize the potential of former 
service personnel for home defence was later publicly acknowledged by Seely.97 
However, Strachey was not campaigning entirely in isolation . Several other individuals 
and bodies were also working along the same lines and although Strachey certainly 
played the largest and most public part in persuading the War Office that an 
organization of registered former soldiers would be a useful adjunct to existing auxiliary 
forces, other individuals should not be ignored. 
A proposal to form what was called a National Volunteer Reserve was mooted 
during discussions among a number of county associations immediately after the 
creation of the Territorial Force. Several commanding officers of battalions of the 
London Regiment were asked for their opinion on the matter and responded that the 
idea was interesting but somewhat premature.98 Proponents did not give up and , 
although receiving no official support, continued to press their case to county 
associations. There was general agreement that it would be a good idea to create such 
an organization but until there was War Office sanction, there was little that could 
officially be done. Typical of association responses was that of Lincolnshire. Its General 
Purposes Committee had received a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Ford , a former 
Commanding Officer of a Volunteer Battalion, requesting the county association to 
begin a register of would-be reservists. The committee decided that it could not yet take 
any action but handed the matter over to the Finance Committee pending further War 
Office moves.99 
As the new organization was intended to be an integral part of the Territorial 
Force Reserve, in 1909 the Army Council had begun to frame some draft regulations . 
96 Roberts Papers. NAM 7101 -23/85/29. Strachey to Roberts 2/10/09. 
97 Hansard Vol.35.454, 6/03/12. 
98 Guildhall MSS 12 613 Vol.1 , 29/09/08. 
99 Lincolnshire RO, TA1/1 . Ford also requested permission to address the Essex Association and 
expounded upon the idea of a volunteer reserve when he was allowed to address the City of London 
Association in April 1909. Essex RO, 6E17D/2, 3/03/09; Guildhall MSS, 12,606/1 , 20/04/09. 
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The Secretary of State did not want to frighten off potential members by stipulating 
conditions of engagement so, from its inception, the role of the Reserve in any 
emergency was kept deliberately vague. Suggestions of its future purpose in early drafts 
ranged from the innocuous 'various duties of minor importance' and 'miscellaneous 
functions' to 'various weighty duties'. 100 It is probable that Haldane had not yet, in fact , 
formulated a real role for the Reserve but, looking to the future , thought that such an 
organization would be of use in guarding vulnerable points. A sub-committee of the CID 
Was in the process of drawing up a schedule of sites which would need protection in 
war and was soon to publish its recommendations. There is no evidence to suggest 
that Haldane was waiting for the report before finalizing the duties of the National 
Reserve, but it is likely that he was aware of the committee's forthcoming 
recommendations. The committee, chaired by Admiral Bethell, the Director of Naval 
Intelligence, with Murray and Brigadier-General F.Ransford Hannay, Director of 
Fortifications and Works, representing the army, had also coopted the Commissioner of 
Police, Sir Edward Henry. A substantial list of sites, including shipyards, cable and 
wireless installations, collieries, railways and munitions works , deemed essential 
enough to warrant protection by the military or the site owners themselves was 
compiled . Henry submitted minuted, detailed evidence regarding the existing 
inadequacies of the police to provide sufficient cover for those sites they themselves 
were allocated or to supplement bodies raised by any of the private owners. In addition 
to these shortcomings, the sheer number of installations which the Regulars or 
Territorials would be required to protect was enough to absorb significant bodies of 
men who would have to be withdrawn from those forces responsible for meeting an 
invasion , was probably enough to convince Haldane that some other body or 
organization would have to be raised and utilized to lessen the burden on the Regulars 
and the Territorial Force. 
Reaction from the county associations to the draft regulations was generally 
favourable but there were some predictable criticisms and suggestions. Although 
Haldane and several of the counties advocated an upper age limit of between 55 and 70 
years , the War Office held the view that if the Reserve was to be of any real use, the 
voices and presence of elderly, experienced men, albeit too old for active duties, would 
do much to inspire and assist the younger elements. Many counties urged the War 
Office publicly to encourage attendance at drills and musketry and to allow, at least, 
annual musters. General Sir lan Hamilton, the AG, felt that as the Reserve might be 
100 W032.6585. Draft regulations for the Veteran Reserve, 
employed for many purposes, drills were unnecessary and parades expensive. 
Requests for men to be offered a financial inducement to enrol were also emphatically 
rejected on grounds of cost. One association suggested that certain government jobs 
should be reserved for members, but this too was rejected outright by Hamilton 's 
department who argued it was difficult enough to provide employment for ex-Regulars. 101 
With the support of the associations and many of the pro-conscriptionists (who 
saw the scheme as inadequate but at least a move in the right direction) , Haldane 
publicly expounded his proposals. He told Parliament: 
We are endeavouring to organize a Veteran Reserve, and in this connection are trying to 
get in each county a list of men who have served their country and passed through the 
colours and Reserve, and are willing without engaging themselves to be of use in 
whatever way they can .102 
He deplored the apparent wastage of so many men under 40 years of age who annually 
passed out of the Regular Army. If they chose to register in this new Reserve they would 
not be required constantly to maintain a level of military efficiency, but in an emergency 
would come forward and revise their latent skills . The Government intended to create a 
simple and cheap machinery by which these men could be utilized. Haldane even 
speculated they might be able to raise four divisions of fit and trained men to act as a 
third line behind the Regulars and Territorials . Until a survey had been undertaken to 
ascertain how many men might be willing to offer their services, Haldane refused to 
make any guarantees about attaching reservists to particular or specific Territorial units. 
With the determined object of keeping costs to a minimum, neither was he prepared to 
commit himself to promises of equipping the Reserve. 
Haldane was later to retract his loose talk of a third line army, for such a project 
would require an organization far too expensive and complex for the existing financial 
climate. However, he did repeatedly stress the importance of this new auxiliary to the 
wider concept of his citizen army. He wanted the veterans to become another link in the 
chain which bound the Army to the nation and the nation to the Army. Indeed, the 
memorandum to county associations emphasized the purpose of the Reserve as 
'bringing the Central and Local Authorities into effective relation with the mass of non-
organized military material which exists throughout the United Kingdom'. It was primarily 
for this reason that the Unionist Party decided to support the proposal. There were 
differences in approach between the two leading parties, but as it appeared Haldane 
101 Ibid. Analysis of replies from county associations to War Office Circular Memo No. 192 of 15/11/09. 
102 Hansard Vol.22 .2088, 14/03/11 . 
was intent on developing the Reserve both as a military force and as a body which could 
offer comradeship and social benefits to former servicemen, the Unionists were 
prepared to wait and see how it progressed. 
It was the emphasis on the social aspects of the movement which especially 
appealed to Charles a Court Repington. This exceptionally influential journalist and 
former soldier wrote for the Westminster Gazette and, later, The Times. He was an 
ardent supporter of the Territorial Force, on occasions even acting as Haldane's go-
between with the Unionists in the House of Lords. Converted to the conscriptionist 
cause but pragmatic enough to acknowledge that the political climate precluded its 
early introduction , Repington was the most important of the so-called 'patriotic editors ' 
Who openly and consistently warned of the invasion threat. 103 In a series of articles he 
had frequently regretted the absence of British organizations similar to the German 
Krieger Vereine and Landsturm. Once a British veteran left the armed forces there was 
little opportunity for him to maintain touch with his former comrades. Repington argued 
that if contact with these men was kept, they could perform the largely sedentary work of 
fortress garrisoning, thereby releasing trained troops for active duty. 
Repington welcomed the Veteran Reserve as a step toward this ideal. His vision 
Was the creation of veteran clubs, partly financed by private benevolence, in every 
sizable town , privileged positions for members at all public galas and civic occasions, 
military funerals and even involvement in life assurance provision. Age should not be a 
criterion as the membership would serve in local companies or battalions divided into 
active and sedentary sections. Overseeing the supervision of the movement would be a 
central body in London maintaining close contact with the General Staff, but not 
sufficiently powerful to interfere in the day-to day running and financing of the dispersed 
clubs. Although he applauded Haldane's scheme, Repington hoped, 'we may 
eventually find our veterans a much larger sphere of action than is dreamed in our initial 
regulations '. 104 Two weeks later he expanded further upon the idea in a letter to 
Strachey. Repington reiterated his theme that Veteran Reservists should eventually take 
over home garrisons, thereby releasing several Territorial divisions, but was not 
particularly enthusiastic about supplying them with rifles. Nevertheless, he foresaw that 
unless the veteran movement was made 'honourable and attractive ... after the first blush 
of the affair interest in it would wane '. The Government would have to work hard to 
' 
103 AJ .Morris (ed), The Letters of Lieutenant-Colonel Charles a Court Repington CMG Military 
Correspondent of The Times 1903 -1918, London: Sutton Publishing for Army Records Society, 1999, 
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ensure its success and he feared that unless a firm lead was provided , the counties 
would all go their own way with regard to its rules and organization . Such a scenario 
would echo the mistakes made by the creators of the Krieger Vereine and would result 
in the 'very devil of a trouble' in getting a common system into operation. 105 
For the time being at least, Repington and many other of the Reserve's 
supporters were to remain disappointed. The official regulations continued to reflect the 
War Office's insistence that specific local duties would only be determined following 
consultation with the constabulary. 106 The clear general intent was for the Reserve to 
remove horses and cattle from threatened areas and to provide guards for vulnerable 
points such as bridges, tunnels and gas works. Advocates of a more purposeful role for 
the Reserve were, however, encouraged by the hint that the younger and fitter reservists 
might be used as reinforcements to the Regular Army and to fill up vacancies and 
replace battle casualties in Territorial units. 
The regulations allowed virtually anyone who had some sort of military service to 
register his name. Officers who were no longer members of the Army Reserve or liable 
for call up were allowed to join, as were former Special Reservists and ex-members of 
the Militia. Former Rifle Volunteers were also accepted providing they were not already 
members of the Territorial Force or its reserve. Various other classes of men were 
eligible, as was any individual who cou ld produce to his county association a war medal 
as proof of former service. 
Surrey's premature start of registration meant that, by the time Haldane made his 
announcement to Parliament, the county already had 68 officers and over 1800 men on 
its books. 107 In West Lancashire, Colonel Hulme had also started to register men 
sometime before the local association had begun officially to recruit. This former 
commanding officer of a North-West Volunteer battalion personally paid for recruitment 
Posters to be displayed at police stations and had already raised several companies in 
Liverpool. Shortly after the county association began to recruit for the Veteran Reserve, 
Hulme invited the association to adopt his companies as going concerns . In addition , 
he suggested that the association pay him a bounty of £5 for every one hundred men 
105 House of Lords RO, Strachey Papers, S/17/1/1 . Letter from Repington to Strachey, 7/07/10 .. Cited 
in Morris, Repington Papers, op.cit. Document 83. 
106 Regulations for the veteran Reserve included with Regulations for the Territorial Force Reserve, 
9!Gen.No.1239, issued with Special Army Order of 17/05/10. 
107 Surrey RO, 608/1 , 23/01/11. surrey's planning and early success prompted the Middlesex 
Association to write asking for ideas on how it could begin to recruit and organize its own Reserve. 
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already registered. 108 Early private enterprise had also been attempted in Somerset. In 
September 1909, before it had itself begun to register, the association declared that as 
it bore sole responsibility for managing any Reserve raised in the county, a rival 
organization known as the National Volunteer Reserve had no legal basis and should 
be ignored by veterans.109 In nearby Gloucestershire a large body of ex-Regulars had 
been formed some eleven years earlier by a Major Knowles and, organized under the 
auspices of the Veterans' Rifle Club, claimed to be the pioneers of the movement then 
gathering a national momentum.110 These examples were unusual but not entirely 
exceptional and Haldane was forced to warn off unauthorized private individuals from 
attempting to thwart or to compete with the work of the associationS.111 Nevertheless, in 
their enthusiasm, many local military and political dignitaries continued their personal 
efforts until either subsumed within or amalgamated to the official system. 
In order to celebrate official recognition of the movement and to herald the new 
dawn, in June 1910, Surrey held a parade of 1300 men drawn up in 14 companies on 
Horse Guards. Among the many guests who took their place on the podium beside the 
jubilant Strachey were Sir lan Hamilton, the AG, General Ellison, the Director of 
Organisation, and the Secretary of State. Strachey read a letter of support from Lord 
Roberts and the corps reportedly marched and wheeled with a precision which drew 
applause from the audience and from the participants themselves. 11 2 Haldane was 
clearly surprised to witness so many veterans drawn from only one county within such a 
short time of the movement's official inception. Although evidently moved and 
encouraged by what he saw, he did not permit himself to be swept away by the 
occasion . His address was supportive, yet peppered with caution : 
I think [this] may prove to be an historic afternoon .. . it may be that we shall from this day 
see our way to get together in a fashion that has not been dreamt of before .. . lt remains 
to be seen how we can turn your patriotism to the greatest advantage to the nation . The 
regulations are only a beginning .. . [they] give us ground upon which , possibly hereafter, 
we may proceed much further. You are that kind of reserve which , if properly utilized, 
108 West Lancashire RO, 356WES/56, 29/09/11 . 
109 Somerset RO DDX/T A/1 , 24/09/09. 
110 Gloucestershi~e RO, 02388/3/1, 19/09/10. 
111 Times 8/03/11 . 
112 Roberts Papers. National Army Museum (NAM) 7101 -23/85/30. Strachey to Roberts 20/06/1 o. 
Strachey called the parade a 'wonderful gathering ' and described the physical condition of the men as 
'outstandingly good '. He thought any boys witnessing the spectacle would be impressed by the well 
fed , well dressed and evidently suitably employed ex-soldiers and dismiss the idea that 'the Army 
leads to the Workhouse'. 
52 
may be the best guarantee of peace and security for the nation.113 
Surrey's muster resulted in widespread, complimentary publicity, a fact which 
also encouraged Haldane's opponents to criticise his somewhat reticent public attitude. 
Adverts for a City of London Veteran Reserve appeared in the press and while urging 
employers to encourage their workers to join, admitted that its organizers could give 
only vague indication of what form the Reserve would eventually take. All it could offer 
with any degree of confidence was an annual muster and inspection. 114 Clearly 
impressed by what he considered to be the Reserve's as yet unrealized potential , 
Rowland Hunt MP heaped sarcasm upon Haldane by congratulating him for relying on 
others and private money to create the Reserve.115 
When it was necessary to do so, Haldane fielded such vitriol but he was content 
during the remainder of 1910 to let the movement first gather a momentum and then 
make an assessment on its progress. He announced that Lord Roberts had agreed to 
serve as the Reserve's Colonel-in-Chief and to chair a committee briefed to consider 
questions and queries from the associations. Roberts, although still a staunch 
advocate of compulsion and thus a vociferous critic of Haldane's overall defence policy, 
also accepted the Secretary of State's invitation to accompany him on a national tour 
intended to promote both the Territorial Force and the Veteran Reserve.11 6 While the 
press in general , and The Times and Spectator in particular, continued to urge 
registration, 117 Haldane gained time to reconsider the form and nature of the Reserve 
and to decide whether more needed to be done to induce men to enrol. 
Having spent the winter in reflection and under pressure from both inside and 
outside of Parliament, Haldane chose the setting of the Mansion House to expound 
further on the aims and purpose of the Reserve. At a meeting attended by Esher and a 
considerable gathering of military and political notables in March 1911 , the Secretary of 
State announced some revisions to the earlier regulations . He underscored his 
previous emphasis on the Reserve's importance as a social institution intended to 
11 3 Times 20/06/1 o. During the parade a bizarre incident occurred . The Officer of the Day of the 
Household Cavalry forced his horse through the assembled ranks of veterans. The Times reported : 'It 
cannot be conceived that this young officer realized in what presence he gave this unpardonable 
exhibition of unsoldierlike discourtesy.' 
114 Times 20/08/10. 
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11 6 E.Spiers, Haldane , op.cit., p.183. 
117 In an article on the Surrey National Reserve the Spectator, 7/01/11 , explained: 'It draws away from 
and denudes no other force. It is a case of using material of a high quality which was running to 
absolute waste'. 
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create a tangible bond between those still serving and their former comrades and to 
give members an honoured and privileged position at public functions. To encourage its 
development as a body of comrades he decided to abandon the upper age limit but still 
rejected the idea of demanding a binding agreement from members. Such an 
obligation would, in his view, run contrary to the conception underlying the Reserve's 
formation and, perhaps more importantly, involve the government in additional 
expenditure. In answer to those who had already raised the questions of firm 
agreements and uniforms, Haldane suggested they join the Territorial Reserve. He 
clearly considered the Territorial Force Reserve to be the senior of the two 
organizations, warning: 'It must be clearly understood that Veteran Reservists will only 
be used to fill up the ranks of the Territorial Force to the extent to which the Territorial 
Force Reserve may be insufficient for this purpose.' All he was prepared to promise the 
Reserve was close communication between the War Office and the counties within the 
broad scheme of home defence and a further look, when registration had had more 
time to materialize potential numbers, at what the auxiliaries might be allowed to do 
during an emergency. 118 Significantly, he made no further reference to a third line army.119 
Taking his lead from Haldane's speech during the 1911 Army Estimates debate, 
the Under-Secretary continued to stress the social importance of the Reserve.120 
However, although the Mansion House gathering and the subsequent debate in 
Parliament had offered no guarantee of purposeful future action save the possibility of 
filling up Territorial units, the counties, who with very few exceptions were fully behind 
the scheme and wanted to see it blossom, turned their thoughts to how they might turn 
the steady tide of enrolments into a flood . 
118 Times 8/03/11 . 
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CHAPTER Ill: CREATING THE VETERAN AND NATIONAL RESERVES 
While the response across the country to begin registration was certainly 
encouraging, it was not overwhelming. Committees were being established and 
thousands of men were enrolling, but in the absence of precise statements as to 
what might be expected of them, men in some areas were demonstrating a 
noticeable reluctance to commit themselves. Typical of the comments made by 
committee members were those of the Somerset Association. Men in the county 
were reported to be 'nervous' about giving their names because some evidently 
feared they would be called out on general mobilization and sent abroad; others 
assumed they would be posted to other parts of the country as fortress garrisons. 
The association had sent over 3400 circulars to known ex-servicemen and had 
received fewer than 430 replies. Nevertheless, the committee felt that once the 
matter had been thoroughly ventilated and responsibilities clarified, there would be 
no difficulty in registering a significant proportion of the remainder. 1 
Publicity was, of course, a major factor in attracting members and , not 
surprisingly, Surrey led the way. Strachey organized another huge parade of the 
county's Reservists at his home near Guildford. Besides the 2200 Reservists, 1000 
more than had mustered on Horse Guards 11 months earlier, were many senior 
officers from the War Office, including Generals Sir lan Hamilton, Sir John Spencer 
Ewart and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien. It was estimated that as many as 50% of the 
men , most of whom were well dressed and obviously in regular employment, were 
former Regulars with an average age of between 35 and 40. Lord Roberts 
addressed the parade, using the occasion to question how the Reserve might be 
used. While acknowledging the benefit of experience and maturity the veterans 
might give to young Territorial soldiers, Roberts thought that if used together, they 
might deprive the latter of their 'elasticity and dash' .2 As one of the leading 
proponents for conscription , Roberts unsurprisingly declared he would prefer to 
have the veterans kept separate from Territorial units and to get the home forces up 
to strength by compulsion. Twenty-five thousand armed and equipped veterans 
1 Somerset RO, DDX!TN1 , 24/02/11 . 
2 Times 22/05/11. 
should, he argued, become garrison troops and release the younger Territorials for 
mobile warfare.3 
An early means of attracting members was the announcement that 
Reservists would be invited to attend the coronation parade of George V in June 
1911. The Commandant of the Wimbledon company had written to the War Office 
in December 1910 suggesting the idea and was informed it was already under 
consideration. On hearing the news one disgruntled MP accused the authorities of 
attempting to bribe Crimean and Indian Mutiny veterans to join the Reserve by a 
promise of a place in the coronation procession.4 Most associations appear to have 
sent representatives to the parade, travelling expenses being met by the War 
Office. The Nottinghamshire Association went further by giving each of its 26 
representatives an additional two shillings per day for out-of-pocket expenses and 
arranging for them to spend three nights at Marlborough School, Chelsea. 
Cumberland and Westmorland, like several other associations, selected its 
representatives by seniority from the different ranks.5 
The crucial issue subsequently was how the limited number of coronation 
medals would be distributed. The War Office allocated medals in the proportion of 
one for every three men who had actually lined the processional route . Any officer 
who went was normally assured of receiving a medal. The remainder were 
distributed on the grounds of comparative company strength, which men in the 
London party had been the first to register their names, the most senior by age, 
those with the longest period of military service and even by ballot from those who 
had travelled to London .6 
Parades and publicity such as these did result in some acceleration in the 
number of men willing to register. Associations were supposed to send in monthly 
returns but national figures were , in fact, slow to be compiled. Nevertheless, in June 
1911 the number was thought to be high enough for one MP to speculate that 'in 
3 Ibid. 
4 Hansard Vol.24.1366, 25/04/11. 
5 Nottinghamshire RO, DDT/A 1/1 , 2/05/11 ; Cumbria RO, TIAF/1 , 23/05/11. 
6 Northumberland RO, NR0408/8, 26/05/11. The county gave a medal to Captain Hargreaves, 
principally in recognition for his work in raising the Haltwhistle Cadet unit. . Following some gentle 
complaints and queries the City of Edinburgh set up a special committee, which sat for several 
months, to decide on the final allocation of its 37 medals. National Archives of Scotland, .. 
MD11 /21 . 
the near future' national strength could be as high as 200,0007 ; in July 1911 the 
City of London reported that 150 men a day were enlisting. In the few weeks 
following the Mansion House speech and the Coronation, several associations 
across the country declared that hundreds had completed the form. 
Capitalizing upon the national publicity following from the events in London , 
associations embarked upon local recruiting campaigns to attract members. These 
were usually heralded by an appeal printed in local papers from the President of 
the County Association and followed by advertisements in post offices, police 
stations and cinemas. Some associations sent letters to managers of large 
factories, banks and Corporation departments requesting them to draw the 
attention of their workers to the Reserve, while one city committee displayed 
posters in public and private bath houses. Lords Lieutenant urged their deputies to 
take an active concern in the companies forming in their locality and serving 
members of the associations were requested to contact retired members of their old 
corps to promote interest. Once West Lancashire had obtained a list of ex-Regulars 
living in the county from the officer in charge of Number 3 District and. after 
Gloucestershire had acquired the names of its former servi.cemen from the Chief 
Constable, letters were sent inviting them to enrol.8 Wiltshire opted to leave the 
initial assessment of whether it was worth forming a Reserve to the opinion of the 
Chief Constable. On receipt of a positive report, it decided to publish an official 
leaflet.9 
Other methods frequently employed involved associations writing to town 
mayors asking them to organize registration on a municipal .basis and the 
distribution of leaflets requesting would-be members to enrol at drill halls. Sussex, 
which was dubious from the start as to whether the War Office was serious about 
allowing the Reserve a firm organizational structure, decided it would leave 
registration in the early months to what were described as 'agents' .10 Derbyshire 
and Lanarkshire approached local branches of Old Comrades' Associations and 
former officers were tracked down by searching the electoral register.,, Edinburgh 
7 HansardVol.26.1346,1/06/11 . 
8 West Lancash ire RO 356WES/47 19/02/12. The association sent 149 letters: 66 men replied : 
28 indicated they would register and 38 declined: Gloucestershire RO 02388/3/1 20/03/11 . 
9 Wiltshire RO, L 1/101/2, 24/04/11 . 
10 East Sussex RO, TER 7/2, 17/05/11 . 
,, Derbyshire RO, 0530/1 , 7/11/10; NAS, MD2/1 , 17/06/10; NAS, MD11/21 , 2/02/11 ; NAS, 
MD10/5. 23/01/12: NAS. MD7/24. 31/05/10. 
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went a stage further by suggesting that with the assistance of regimental 
associations, a central office could be opened in the city where discharged soldiers 
could both seek employment and enrol in the Reserve. Neighbouring Glasgow 
sent 1000 letters to members of an ex-soldiers' association known as the Queen 's 
Burghers but met with disappointing results: 614 of the leaflets were returned 
through the dead letter box. Fifeshire approached the Corps of Commissionaires, 
the several Scottish agencies for discharged soldiers and sailors, and the Army 
Temperance Association.12 
In one area of Essex, Local Education Authority Attendance Officers 
gathered information about ex-servicemen when on their normal rounds and Kent 
made a sensible decision to leave enrolment cards in the county's public houses.13 
Encouragement sometimes came from the former Volunteer battalions. A resolution 
from the members of the 1st Volunteer Battalion , Norfolk Regiment Veterans' 
Association 'heartily welcomed' the scheme and at least one northern town 
declared that Veterans' Reserve companies would be affiliated to the local 
Territorial battalion's companies. Similarly, in another demonstration of the intent to 
give its former Volunteers an obvious connection with their: successor unit, 
Hounslow's Veteran Reservists were informed that they were to have close 
association with the 8/Middlesex. Territorial commanding officers were asked by 
their associations to publicize the Reserve but were also generally reminded that 
their primary recruitment role was for the Territorial Force itself. To prove its 
commitment to the scheme, County Durham paid 12 guineas for a Roneo 
duplicator to run off its own handbills.14 
Posters and handbil'ls generally carried similar messages and designs. 
Hertfordshire almost copied the early versions of the War Office draft regulations 
when it described the purpose of the Reserve as being 'to fulfil in connection with 
local defence miscellaneous functions demanding from those who undertake them 
a spirit of military discipline and some knowledge of the use of arms' .15 Appealing to 
the virtues of patriotism and duty, advertisements usually stressed how the Reserve 
13 E ssex RO , 6E17D/2 , 7/09/10; Kent RO, MD!TA 1/1 , 30/09/10. 
14 Norfolk RO, TA 1/1 , 15/07/11 ; Oldham Chronicle 7/11/1 1, letter from Colonel Patterson , 
Commanding Officer 1 0/Manchester; London Metropol itan Arch ives, 994/1 , 24/11/11 ; Durham 
RO, OfT A Vol.1 , 5/10/10. 
15 Hertfordshire RO. TAFA/1 . 22/06/10. 
58 
would release the Regulars and Territo rials for more important work and how the 
new cadet units would also benefit from close links with the veterans' organization. 
Men were invited to apply for membership, with some associations requesting that 
recruits present themselves to the commanding officer of a unit of the same branch 
of the armed forces in which they had previously served. Other associations merely 
required the potential recruit to fill in an enrolment form and state whether they 
were former cavalry, infantry, artillery, etc. 
Other early recruiting schemes ranged from smoking concerts and the 
promise of military-style funerals for the men, to a luncheon for officers at a London 
hotel, paid for by a friendly benefactor.16 Sometimes proposals prbved a little too 
optimistic. What began as an idea for a promenade concert in Edinburgh's 
Waverley Market was reduced by several stages until it eventually materialized as 
a gathering in a local drill hall.17 Lest they become too profligate or enthusiastic in 
their benevolence, at least one County Association warned its Reserve's 
organizers not to incur expenditure from their own pocket. Should the habit become 
too common, wary members thought it might prevent suitable but less wealthy 
officers committing themselves to the scheme. Alternatively ,~t was thought it might 
lead to financial abuse.18 
A frequent recruiting angle was the Army's own stated motive for creating the 
Reserve. Adopting Haldane's own words, the Army Annual declared the 
organization should give 'those who have served effectively and worthily in any of 
the military forces ... a recognized and honoured position in the public life of the 
country' .19 The City of Westminster went a little further by suggesting members 
should: 
... prove to the public that we Reservists are valuable as a defending force or in any 
other capacity ... that we are valuable as a moral example to the young men of the 
nation, showing them the necessity for carrying out their principal duty, namely- to 
be efficient to defend their country and all they love and cherish within it.20 
16 Guildhall MSS, 12,613 Vol.1 , 5/04/11. Mr Hansford paid for a luncheon at De Keyser's Hotel for 
the 322 officers who had registered to date. 
17 City of Edinburgh , NAS, MD11/21 , February 1913. 
18 Shropshire RO, 1988/1 , 2/12/11 . 
19 ArmyAnnua/1911 , p.267. 
20 National Army Museum, AF-GEN 601 ,2/23/6. Letter from Colonel Montague Johnstone, ... 
9/05/12 . 
59 
Recruiting was given a further fillip in August 1911 when the organization's 
name was changed to the more youthful and purposeful National Reserve. A new 
set of regulations issued in November also persuaded thousands more of the 
doubters to sign. Although still describing the Reserve 'primarily as a register of 
trained [men with] no further obligation for military service', they did state that 
Reservists might be utilized 'either for active duties with the home defence forces or 
for other services' .21 This remained far from the categorical promise many of the 
Reserve's supporters urged, but it was progress. 
The most important difference between the original and revised regulations 
was the introduction of a classification system for members. Instead of simply 
maintaining a register, counties now had to enrol their members in one of three 
divisions. Class I was to consist of officers under 55 and other ranks under 45 who 
were considered to be physically fit enough to join a combatant unit. Class II was 
for officers between 55 and 60 and men between 45 and 55 who were fit either for 
combatant duty in garrisons or other fixed positions or for administrative work. 
Finally, Class Ill was to comprise officers and men not qualified to join the other two 
sections but who would become honorary members and be retained for 'social and 
influential purposes' . 
The regulations allowed individual associations to decide how their Reserve 
should be raised and organized within their area of responsibility. Members of the 
National Reserve sub-committees were generally also members of the various 
committees within the existing associations. In some areas local worthies whose 
money or influence were considered potentially useful were. co-opted to 
committees. Fairly typical of these committees was that set up by the Warwickshire 
Association. Its 18 members consisted of the President and Vice-President of the 
county association , one Lord , one 'Honourable', one knight, three colonels, four 
lieutenant-colonels, three majors, two esquires and the Mayor of Coventry.22 
Somerset's eventual 12 man committee possessed only one non-military member, 
with its most junior rank being a major and, as a means of widening its recruitment 
and general appeal , Hampshire expanded its original committee from four 
members by appointing 14 generals and colonels as vice-presidents.23 In sharp 
21 National Reserve Regulations, November 1911. 
22 Warwickshire RO, CR 1141/7, 17/01/11. 
23 s omersetRO . DDX!TA1 . 1/11/13: Hants RO. 37/M69/2 . 6/06/11. 
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contrast was the committee established by the East Yorkshire Association . It 
consisted of three former colonels of the Volunteers and a medical doctor. Perhaps 
reflecting the seriousness with which they regarded their new assignment, these 
men promptly decided the presence of two at their irregular meetings would 
constitute a quorum.24 Another slightly unusual committee was that established by 
the City of Dundee. It comprised only seven members, five of whom were civilians.25 
A later War Office circular which suggested associations should co-opt National 
Reserve organizers to the county committees was largely unnecessary as most 
associations had already taken this logical step.26 
The various sub-committees usually invited the association's chairman or a 
former colonel of the Volunteers to become Commandant of their county's 
veterans.27 In other instances suitable gentlemen of the county were considered for 
the post and the candidate with the most appropriate social or military background 
invited to accept the appointment. As gentlemen of leisure, they usually had the 
time and personal contacts to devote themselves to their new role. Not all 6f the 
men approached by associations eventually accepted the offer. Lincolnshire made 
an unusual decision by asking a former naval officer to take-the position . For 
reasons which are not entirely clear, a few months later the committee accepted 
instead the appointment of a lowly, ex-military man .28 One prestigious national 
figure, Field Marshal (FM) Lord Methuen, declined the invitation to become a 
County Commandant, declaring he would have nothing to do with the Reserve 
unless or until every member accepted a liability of some kind and knew where he 
had to go and what was expected of him on mobilization.29 o ·ccasionally a retired 
officer in the county would voluntarily offer his services. The application was usually 
accompanied by a request that, if selected, he should be promoted by at least one 
rank above that held on retirement. Enquiries were made of the War Office as to 
whether these requests could be granted. The authorities replied that existing rank 
must be maintained and that they had decided not to grant any commissions in the 
Reserve. The decision not to allow promotion within the Reserve or to allow the use 
24 East Riding RO, East Yorkshire Territorial Co.Association Annual Report 1910-11 2/11/11. 
25 National Archives of Scotland (NAS), MD7 /4, 22/04/12. 
26 War Office Circular Memo No.449 of 28/0313. 
27 W09/Res/454 (AG5) of 21/02/12 allowed the appointment of County Commandants. 
28 Lincolnshire RO, TA1/1, 7/06/12 . The new appointee was only a captain . 
29 Wiltshire RO. L1/100/3 . 27/01/13. 
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of conventional ranks did undoubtedly persuade some former officers not to enrol. 
Consequently, there was consistent difficulty in obtaining sufficient company and 
section commanders. Concern over these shortages resulted in a suggestion to the 
Army Council that officers joining the Reserve should have their name restored to 
the Army List. This, it was implied, would resolve the issue at a stroke.30 The War 
Office remained unconvinced. 
At least one association decided that as no one of sufficient prestige was 
currently available, a small committee of three could temporarily perform the 
function and several counties resolved not to appoint a County Commandant until 
the War Office had issued more information about his role and responsibilities. This 
practice continued in Durham and several other areas until mid-1912.31 In contrast, 
Buckinghamshire and the City of London decided to use the opportunity to promote 
the existence of the Reserve by offering the position to two of the nation's foremost 
soldiers, Field Marshals Lord Grenfell and Sir Evelyn Wood. 
Associations largely opted to organize companies of about 100, based on 
towns, boroughs, local or Parliamentary electoral districts and police divisional 
boundaries. A register was opened for each district, with a suitable gentleman or 
officer appointed as organizer and secretary. In the scattered areas of the Scottish 
Highlands permanent staff of the local Territorial companies were usually 
appointed to act as organizing officer for their district and awarded £10 for every 
100 enrolled members. Once registration began there was usually enough 
enthusiasm and interest to ensure a trouble-free formation of local units. Leading 
gentlemen in the community, many of whom were former Volunteers, easily filled 
the role of company officer and senior ex-servicemen became NCOs in all but 
name. At least one detachment however, appears to have experienced difficulties 
soon after its creation. John Evans, a former NCO resident in Alnwick, was praised 
by his association for 'energetic management' in getting the unit established. Evans 
secured the use of a nearby range and had ordered a company banner to be 
completed in time for a planned StGeorge's Day parade. Then relations began to 
sour and tension grew between members. As the trouble was ascribed to there 
being no officer, the county association appointed Captain Sitwell to command both 
30 Ibid., 408/44, 10/12/12. 
31 County of Perth, NAS, MD7/36, 11/07/12. In April the Northumberland Association decided that 
to appoint a Commandant would be 'neither necessary or advisable'. Northumberland RO~ 
NR0408/44. 16/04/14. 
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the Alnwick and Wool mer detachments. This clearly failed to resolve the issue as 
the association continued to receive undisclosed complaints from the men. Sitwell 
reported that because a number of men within the unit had constituted without 
authority a committee which was attempting to usurp his command, he insisted the 
association frame regulations to combat the crisis. After deliberation the association 
officers ruled that no man would be allowed to register whose service discharge 
sheet recorded his character as less than 'Good' ; any would-be recruit whose 
conduct was recorded as 'Fair' would have to be investigated by the county 
secretary. This agreement paved the way for Sitwell to dismiss Private Ross from 
the detachment as being of 'undesirable character' , and the trouble appears to 
have subsided.32 
The Gloucestershire Association also supported the action of one of its 
company commanders in convicting a man on a unspecified charge in what it 
called a Court of Summary Jurisdiction, and the commander of the Worthing 
company enquired of his county association whether the existing regulations 
allowed him to expel an undesirable. Lincolnshire Association appears to have 
been rather more selective from the outset. One local comrrrander asked his county 
committee whether a Boston man with several police convictions should be 
permitted to enrol. The committee resolved that the county did not require the man's 
services.33 
As membership grew, new districts and companies were created. For 
example, Durham expanded from its original15 districts when recruits from 
Spennymoor proved more plentiful than originally thought, arid Hull established a 
new company so that former sailors and Royal Marines were not required to serve 
alongside former soldiers.34 In the North Riding the strength of a standard company 
was established at 40, with assistant commanders being appointed for every 20 
men in excess of that number. Kent too pursued a policy of creating small , self-
contained units. It tried to enrol one section each of cavalry, artillery, engineers, 
32 Northumberland RO , NR0408/44, 20/04/11 , 12/09/11 , 10/10/11 , 14/11/11 , 16/04/12 ; 408/5 
3/11/11 . 
33 Gloucestersh ire RO, 02388/1/2, 17/03/12; Lincolnshire RO, TA1/1, 1/03/12. Other recorded 
instances of men being struck off are rare . Anyone who did not wish to abide by the rules could 
simply leave, but J.A.Smith of the 7/HLI contingent, is known to have been expelled for 
'misconduct' . NAS, MD1 0/6, 11/04/13. 
34 Durham RO, 0/TA Organization Committee Vol.2 , 15/07/13; East Riding RO, East Yorksfi ire 
Territorial Co.Association. Annual Revort 1910-11 . 
infantry and HQ personnel in its 400-strong local battalions.35 The principal Scottish 
cities organized their Reserves into specific brigades or battalions. Edinburgh 
opted to form one brigade of ex-Regulars and one of ex-Territorials, plus the HQ 
staff. Glasgow divided its groups into battalions of former naval personnel , 
Regulars and Volunteers, in which men previously members of the Scottish Rifles 
and Highland Light Infantry were kept apart. Dundee organized into seven groups: 
former sailors, cavalry, artillery and engineers were lumped together in one and the 
others were separated into companies consisting of certain battalions of Scottish 
regiments and according to whether they were ex-Regulars or ex-Volunteers. By 
1912 London boasted 36 battalions, organized into seven brigades. Within this 
host, the City of Westminster had two battalions, each of eight companies of 100 
men. The 1st Battalion comprised one company of Royal Navy, Royal Horse and 
Royal Field Artillery, one of Royal Artillery, two of cavalry, one each of Guards, 
engineers and departmental men and one mixed company, while the 2nd 
Battalion's eight companies were all infantry. Company commanders were a 
mixture of former Indian army and British cavalry officers, with a smattering of senior 
ranks from regiments of the line. Both battalions paraded col ours presented by the 
ladies of Westminster. 
County associations were always sensitive to any competition from other 
counties in the recruitment of men for their Territorial units. The City and County 
Associations of London were anxious to avoid running foul of each other when 
registration for the Veteran Reserve commenced. Consequently the Joint 
Committee of the two associations decided that the most amicable way would be 
for each of the capital's 28 boroughs to register and group their members. 
However, overseen by a Central Committee, Reservists were to be allowed to enrol 
in any borough they wished, not necessarily in the one in which they were 
resident.36 Unfortunately, the success of the Joint Standing Committee and the zeal 
with which its organizing officers conducted their tasks resulted in complaints from 
the Middlesex Association . The committee wrote to the Middlesex committee 
requesting permission to recruit within the Middlesex boundary because, it 
35 F.H.Reynard, A Brief History of the Territorial Force Association of the County of York (North 
Riding) 1908-1919, Northallerton : Joseph Walker, 1919, p.13; Kent RO , MD!TA 1/1 , 10/03/11 . 
Middlesex also contemplated forming a reserve of ex-cavalry but it appears to have come to 
nothing. London Metropolitan Arch ives, 994/1 , 28/04/13. .. 
36 Guildhall MSS. 12.606/1 . 10/01/11 . 
believed, Middlesex had done nothing about organizing its own Reserve. 
Middlesex wrote an indignant reply, insisting that its National Reserve was 
underway and blossoming. A few months later another letter complained to the 
Joint Committee that its officers were recruiting in Southall and demanded the 
immediate transfer of those members to Middlesex's register. The row simmered on 
until May 1914 when an agreement was reached whereby the City and County 
promised not to hold parades in areas which bordered Middlesex and not to enrol 
Middlesex residents. In return, the Joint Committee was to be allowed to hold 
'smokers' at Chiswick and Kew provided they were not advertized or used for 
recruitment purposes.37 
Other associations similarly agreed to restrict their recruitment activities to 
within their county boundaries. Amicable agreement was reached between, for 
example, the West and East Lancashire Associations. The initial idea of a joint 
central organizing committee was dropped in favour of a clear agreement not to 
register men from across the traditional 'county' borders. However, before long the 
neighbouring Cheshire Association complained to its West Lancashire counterpart 
that ~eservists from Liverpool were parading on the wrong side of the Mersey.38 
In many counties enrolment had exceeded expectation and in February 
1912, national strength was recorded at 76,000.39 However, within this generally 
satisfactory picture there were discrepancies. Durham was among the several 
counties to report initial recruiting as 'disappointing' yet it could offer no reasons for 
the apparent lack of enthusiasm among Durham's former servicemen .4° Fife 
bemoaned the fact that six months' of newspaper adverts had produced only 55 
members and , similarly West Lancashire reported 'very slight progress' in its 
recruitment. The annual report of the East Yorkshire Association noted succinctly, 
'the Veteran Reserve has not prospered' .41 Shropshire declared enrolment had 
been far from successful, blaming the poor response on a lack of financial 
inducement. A report stated that there had been plenty of enquiries from suitable 
37 London Metropolitan Archive ,994/2, 26/02/12 , 23/06/13, 25/05/14. Middlesex's own record 
was not flawless: Buckinghamshire complained in 1913 that an officer of the Middlesex Reserve 
was recruiting and encroaching on its county territory. 
38 West Lancashire RO, 356WES/47, 5/12/11 and 356WES/56, 30/08/11 . 
39 HansardVol.35 .1672, 18/03/12. 
40 Durham RO, OfT A General Purpose Committee Vol.1 , 29/11/10. .. 
41 NAS, MD7/24, 19/05/11 . West Lancashire RO, 356WES/26, 26/05/11 ; East Riding RO, East 
Yorkshire Territorial Co.Association. Annual Reoort 1910-11. 
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applicants but when the men were informed there was no enlistment bounty or 
retainer, nothing more was heard of them. A former NCO in the North-East was also 
frustrated by men who showed an early interest but decided not to register when it 
became apparent that it was only a 'paper force' whose members were unlikely to 
drill or exercise together.42 
In response to a recruiting circular from Lord Roberts which urged 
associations to do all they could to encourage enrolment, Renfrewshire minuted 
that it would be 'inexpedient to take further steps until the force could be recognized 
as more than a paper force' . Two months later, when Scottish Command was also 
inciting the association to do more, the committee declared 'nothing further could 
be done' . In similar vein, and having experienced an equally disappointing 
response to its initial campaign, lnvernesshire resolved to let Roberts' letter lie on 
the table.43 
Rural Devonshire experienced a huge variety in response to its campaign. 
Plymouth had soon registered 1290 men while Plympton District, which covered 23 
parishes, had managed to secure only four. The association's sub-committee 
decided the reason behind the differences was principally the failure to get 
sufficient energetic local organizers. As late as mid-1913 five of the county's 15 
districts were still without a secretary and many of the outlying areas had not been 
worked at all.44 Other, largely rural counties, reported similar problems and, in so 
doing, echoed Repington's earlier prediction that 'veteran societies will flourish or 
wither according to the amount of public spirit in each county' .45 Public spirit could 
be ignited in scattered locations if one man was prepared to travel abroad drawing 
the attention of the farmers and their labourers to the existence of the Reserve. 
Where there were men who more or less single-handedly raised the Reserve, it 
flourished .46 Nonetheless, and despite the tepid response in some areas, the 
majority of associations were clearly pleased with the response and were eager to 
42 Northumberland RO, NR0408 Association General Meetings Vol.5 , 24/11/10 . 
43 NAS, MD5/22, 8/01/12, 4/03/12; MD8/24, 19/12/11 . This ' lack of response' to the Reserve 
came at a time when the association 's Territorial infantry battal ion , the 4/Cameron High landers, 
was only 75% of establ ishment. 
44 Devon RO, 1715C/TA2, 18/06/13. 
45 Times 20/06/10. 
46 For example, Major Murray Stewart personally recruited 100 of the 153 early members ·n 
Perthshire and Sergeant John Snaddon was awarded a £1 honorarium for recruiting 192 
members in Clackmannanshire. NAS. MD7/36. 11/07/12: MD6/48. 4/07/12 . 
maintain the gathering momentum.47 
Most associations quickly adopted the idea of issuing registered members 
with a badge to serve both as a recruitment aid and as visual demonstration of a 
man's willingness to serve. Each association designed its own badge, usually a 
crown surrounded by the county's name and 'Veteran Reserve' .48 Wealthy 
benefactors, such as Sir H.Waechter in Surrey and Russell Colman in Norfolk, 
sometimes offered to pay for the price of the badges, typically 4d each, while 
Warwickshire optimistically billed the War Office for the cost and was subsequently 
disappointed with the response.49 Unsure of how popular the Reserve would prove 
to be, many associations were rather tentative in their initial ordering. Within a few 
months most were requesting another thousand from the manufacturers. At least 
one association decided its badge was too similar to those worn by the Cadet 
Corps and the Voluntary Aid Detachment and suggested that instead, a bandoleer 
ribbon should be worn. This would, it was advised, 'add to the prestige of those 
who had served their country' .50 Surrey decided that its officers' badges should be 
distinct from the other ranks by having them silvered and the Lord Lieutenant of 
Durham advocated that the number of years a man had sei'Ved as a Regular 
should be displayed on the badge. The Durham Association actually believed that 
after its slow start, a rapid increase in registration was 'chiefly due to the issue of 
badges'. The thought that the badges might be attractive to men who were not 
entitled to wear them prompted Derbyshire to number its badges to prevent misuse. 
Unsurprisingly, counties were determined to get as much publicity as possible from 
the distribution of badges. High profile civic ceremonies, often attended by a 
nationally known figure , were organized to boost recruitment and awareness. For 
example, the City of Dundee presented its early members with their badges at the 
47 Essex RO, 6E17D, General Purpose Committee 1912-13. The expense of a recruitment 
campaign sometimes surprised committees. When the Walthamstow District Times sent a bill for 
£13 to cover recent National Reserve adverts, the Essex Association resolved to pay only £8. 
48 Associations which had been quick off the mark subsequently ran into a little financial difficulty. 
Northumberland, for example, ordered four gross to be stamped 'Veterans' Reserve' and later 
refused to replace them when the organization's name was changed to 'National Reserve'. It 
eventually ordered more when the original supply was exhausted. Northumberland RO, 
NR0408/44, 11/12/13. Middlesex was rather relieved when its original supply ran out. They had 
been struck with the incorrect arms and could now be replaced by the later issue showing the 
recognized design. London Metropolitan Archive, 99412, 24/06/12 . Oxfordshire and Derbyshire 
were two counties which also presented certificates to their members. 
49 Warwickshire RO, CR1141/4, 22/03/11. 
50 Buckinahamshire RO. TA/1/4. 14/11/12. 
same ceremony as the 4/Biack Watch received its new colour and East Yorkshire 
invited Lieutenant-General Sir Hubert Plumer to distribute its badges.51 
The issue of badges did not invariably lead to a significant increase in the 
number of men registering . When the West Lancashire Association was informed 
by the Royal United Services Institution that the number enrolling in its area was 
'very small' in proportion to the population, it detailed its rec.ent disappointments: a 
meeting at St Helens had produced a poor response , failing health had caused the 
county's chief recruiter to move south, the commander of the Warrington company 
was on the sick list, recruiting in Barrow was at a standstill and the Preston 
company had not even submitted a report on its status or strength .52 Colonel Bodle , 
the Organizing Officer of the City of London Reserve, was equally concerned: 
'Something more was wanted to make men join [as] it was lacking in elements of 
attractiveness'. When the association advertized to raise a band only 12 men 
responded, and three of those applied for the position of bandmaster.53 A 
consensus was growing within the county associations and across the country as a 
whole that it was not enough merely to register and classify the names of men and 
then to do no more. If the Reserve was to grow and prosper, more would have to be 
achieved in the sphere of social and military activity. 
51 Surrey RO, 608/2/2 , 9/10/11 ; Durham RO, D!TAVo1.2, 30/01/12; Derbyshire RO, D530 No.1, 
14/07/11 ; NAS, MD7/4, 22/09/11 . 
52 West Lancashire RO, 356WES/47, 7/05/12. 
53 Reoort of a meetina of the Citv of London National Reserve. Times 24/09/13. 
CHAPTER IV: SEARCHING FOR AN IDENTITY AND A ROLE 
The question of giving the National Reserve some real identity and of allowing its 
members to belong to an official , recognized body caused frequent exchanges in the 
House and a seemingly never-ending flow of county resolutions to the War Office. With 
the exception of a few counties which very early on decided to leave the questions of 
drills and uniform until men arrived at their depots on mobilization , the associations 
regularly raised the issues of the supply of rifles and the provision of service dress.1 
Although some associations required a man to possess either a Volunteer Long 
Service Medal or a Territorial Force Efficiency Medal , and a commitment to join either the 
Territorial or National Reserve before allowing him to keep his dress uniform, it was 
fairly common practice for Territorial units to allow non-commissioned officers (NCOs) 
with ten years' service to retain their walking out or service uniforms on discharge; 
having bought their own uniforms, officers also retained their suits when resigning their 
commission. 
At first the War Office rejected petitions requesting officers be permitted to wear 
the uniform of their former corps on National Reserve ceremonial occasions but, 
bowing to an outburst of protest, it relented and granted permission for officers to do so . 
Other ranks were still forbidden to don theirs on like occasions. As they were not 
allowed to wear their old suits or be provided with National Reserve uniforms, several 
battalion commanders requested that their men be allowed to wear 'distinctive dress' , 
paid for out of their own pockets. Anticipating a War Office clim~ down, the Lambeth 
company had even, prematurely as it turned out, established a clothing fund for the 
supply of uniforms.2 The commanding officer of the North Shields detachment reported 
that his men were anxious to buy their own uniforms because it 'will be the way of 
keeping this company together'. 3 Whenever proposed designs (usually comprising a 
belt, bandoleer and cap) were sent to the War Office for approval , the reply was 
invariably disappointing . A common response from the War Office was that gentlemen 
of decorum would object to wearing a 'uniform cap with their normal plain clothes ', and 
that the buttonhole badge was sufficient under the Hague Convention for wearers to be 
1 One of those counties was Wiltshire. Nevertheless it did insist that peacetime shooting was essential 
for the Reserve 'if a man was to defeat his enemy'. Wiltsh ire RO, L 1/101/2, 22/04/12. 
2 National Army Museum, (NAM) AF-GEN 601 , 2/23/6. 
3 
Northumberland RO, 408/44, 14/05/14. 
treated as combatants . 4 
The War Office's stock reply to questions about uniform was, if a man wanted 
one, he should join the Special or the Territorial Force Reserve. As this could only apply 
to younger men, associations regarded it as a facile and insulting argument. As each 
county was responsible for hold ing mobilization stocks, the Chairman of 
Bucking hamshire for example, suggested to Major-General Bethune, the Director-
General Territorial Force, (DGTF) that they should carry 10% in excess of their 
establishment supply in case the National Reserve was called out. He went even further 
by requesting permission for the separate classes each to have a different uniform .5 
The Cornwall Association was one of several which resolved to take practical action and 
ensure that, in an emergency, there would be something in the stores. When its 
Territorials' grey greatcoats were replaced with drab in 1912, the association decided 
not to follow their normal procedure of selling discarded clothing for scrap but to keep 
them for use by the Reserve. 6 
The idea that Territorial uniforms should be supplied to the National Reserve 
was often criticized on the grounds of practicality. Uniforms were generally tailored for fit 
18 year old youths, not for middle-aged men with portly midriffs. This argument had 
prompted Colonel Banon, the Assistant Adjutant-General, (AAG) to explain to the 
Derbyshire Association why he was so opposed to providing service dress for 
Reservists: 
The sight of a body of old soldiers in plain clothes and medals is a much more dignified 
and inspiring sight than if they were clothed in badly fitting uniforms and out of date 
equipment. 7 
Furthermore, the authorities always asserted that as Reservists were not subject to 
military law there was always the possibility that some individuals might bring discredit 
on the uniform and, perhaps worst of all, foreigners observing the older members in 
uniform might mistake them for part of the Regular Army. The War Office also argued 
that as Army Reservists only received a uniform when they were recalled to the colours , 
it would be inappropriate to supply a suit to National Reservists . Like Haldane before 
him, Seely persistently insisted that other rank Reservists did not warrant a uniform 
4 
HansardVol.28.187 , 11/07/11 . 
5 
Buckinghamshire RO, T/N1/4, 14/11/12. 
6 
Cornwall RO, DDX295/4, 16/04/12. .. 
7 
Derbyshire RO, 0530 No.1, 10/07/12. Banon used the same justification to many associations. He 
thought men in civilian clothes and medals created more of a public spectacle than elderly men in ill-
fitting uniforms. 
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because registration did not signify a liability and because, unlike the other Reserves, 
there was no retaining fee or pay. 8 Some of the associations quietly and tacitly accepted 
this stance as they feared taking responsibility for possibly thousands of suits in the 
custody of men over whom they legally exerted virtually no control. 9 The County and City 
Associations in London thought the few occasions that Reservists might need a 
uniform for parades did not warrant the expense involved in buying them. They also 
believed that as so many of their men came from impoverished backgrounds, they 
would either not care for their suits or wear them for work because they had no suitable 
clothes of their own.10 
Although its representatives could provide a string of arguments, the principal 
reason behind the War Office's refusal to provide uniforms was cost. It was again on 
grounds of cost that for the first three years of the Reserve's existence the authorities 
maintained a stern opposition to providing separate funds for musketry practice. 
Haldane, and later Seely, gave repeated assurances that there were abundant arms 
and ammunition available in store which would be issued sh~uld an emergency arise 
but, they were not, both men insisted , available merely for practice.11 
Haldane expected a good proportion of Reservists would already be members of 
the 140,000 strong National Rifle Association and, as those who were not should be, 
the War Office ruled that county association funds could only be donated to those rifle 
clubs which already contained a significant number of Territorial members. This 
restriction does not seem to have deterred many committees as several associations 
immediately contacted their local rifle clubs to request that Reservists should be 
permitted to join and enjoy the privileges of membership . Oxfordshire Association 
donated £25 to the Oxford Rifle Association as an inducement to award prizes to 
Reservists and another £10 to the county's Miniature Rifle Association. This was 
followed a year later by another £25 for the use of facilities.12 Buckinghamshire went a 
8 
HansardVo1.27 .1145, 5/07/11 . 
9 Gloucestershire RO , 02388/3/1 , 18/12/11 . lnvernesshire recoiled against the difficulty of keeping 
track of uniforms over its widely scattered contingents. NAS, MD8/24, 16/12/13. Some counties 
devoted a considerable amount of time to the recovery of uniforms, or money to the value of, from 
men who had left the Territorial Force. Some occasionally awarded a gratuity to pol icemen who 
chased up the missing men and items. At least one association decided that fining men for failing to 
return their uniform was invidious. So many Wiltshire Territorials had emigrated to Canada with'out 
Paying their discharge fine or handing in their uniform, that commanding officers recommended those 
men who had paid their fine should be reimbursed . Wi ltshire RO, L 1/101/1 , 3/04/11 . 
,ow 
032/18612 , Report of the Executive Committee of the Metropolitan Mayors' Association , 
24/02/14. 
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little further and donated £50 to the County Rifle Association for National Reserve prizes 
and at the same time bought four miniature rifles .13 Devonshire awarded a grant of 6d to 
a miniature rifle club for each Territorial or National Reservist who became a member.14 
Thirty-two teams from the Surrey National Reserve entered the Rifle Association 
Challenge Shield competition in 1912, with the Thames and Richmond companies 
scoring a commendable 379 out of 400.15 Targets at Bisley were booked regularly and 
30 associations responded to a suggestion that an annual national inter-county 
National Reserve competition should be organized. Replies were not, however, 
invariably in the affirmative. The East Riding Association accepted the idea in principle 
but ruefully decided it could not enter a team because 'insufficient numbers of 
Reservists had enrolled'; Ross and Cromarty solemnly debated the issue before 
resolving not to join in the matter 'because no men have registered as Reservists in this 
country' .16 Following Northumberland's decision to enter a team captained by John 
Challoner, a nationally known shot, trials were held and the party duly travelled to Bisley. 
Despite much optimism the Northumbrians came nineteenth out of 58 .17 National 
championships were held again in 1913 and 1914, the teams' expenses usually being 
covered by county rather than specifically National Reserve funds. Sometimes this could 
lead to unintentional and excessive overspending: Lieutenant-Colonel Reid trained the 
Middlesex team so hard for the 1913 competition that he overspent his already 
considerable allocation by nearly £14. He was forced to request the county cover the 
embarrassment. 18 
Reservists also requested the use of Territorial drill halls and ranges . Indeed , 
associations believed that a proportion of the National Reserve grant paid to them by 
the War Office should be used to pay for such facilities . The Cornwall Association even 
asked the Army Council to sanction provision of an extra room in the blueprints for its 
new Penzance drill hall for the exclusive use of the Reserve; Hereford and Worcester 
Was only one of several associations prepared to recommend that each of its drill halls 
should be given up one night a week for use by the Reservists . Its miniature rifles were 
lent to the Reservists in return for a donation to cover wear and tear. The Whitehaven 
Company was fortunate to be promised the use of Territorial rifles on long loan 
13 
Bucking hamshire RO, T/A/1/1 , 3/07/13, 5/03/14. 
14 
Devon RO, 1715C/TA2, 12/06/12. 
15 s 
urrey RO, 608/2/2, 10/06/12. 
16 
East Riding RO, East Yorkshire Territorial County Association , no ref, 31/07/11 ; NAS, MD8/30, 
2/08/11 . 
nN orthumberland RO NR0408/44, 9/07/12. 
16 L I 
ondon Metropolitan Archive, (LMA) 994/2, 21/07/13. 
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providing they were stored in the armoury of the 5/Border Regiment. 19 Permanent Staff at 
Territorial drill halls were generally paid a small sum to maintain any National Reserve 
rifles stored in the armouries.20 Not all National Reserve units were, however, so 
fortunate as to be allowed the use of Territorial ranges and facilities . One of the 
contemporarily accepted reasons as to why Territorial recruiting tailed off after 1910 was 
the delay in providing ranges and drill halls for them. If Territorial battalions were finding 
it difficult to fire their courses and accommodate their men, they would have little 
sympathy with entreaties from a group of National Reservists . 21 
Encouragement to practise musketry was often provided by wealthy gentlemen 
who offered cups and prizes to teams winning competitions and to the men who trained 
them. Relations between the Territorials and those National Reservists who were 
dependent upon the use of Territorial ranges usually ran fairly smoothly , but the Oxford 
Association for example, admitted that 'knotty points were continually arising with regard 
to the granting of shooting facilities' for the Banbury Company.' 22 In another instance, the 
Commanding Officer (CO) of the 5/Highland Light Infantry complained to his association 
that the National Reserve were entering competitions with his soldiers and winning too 
many prizes. In the interests of unit morale, he urged the committee to provide separate 
prizes for the Reservists .23 Despite some obvious difficulties, particularly overcrowding 
on the ranges , there was a genuine desire among the Reservists to shoot regularly. 
The CO of the 7/Scottish Rifles even claimed that former soldiers of his regimental 
association were refusing to join the Reserve unless the county formed a rifle club for 
them .24 Hereford and Worcester also declared its men were showing the greatest 
possible keenness ... [and were] anxious to drill and shoot under their own officers '. 25 The 
officer went on to stress how important this aspect was to the Reserve: 'I venture to 
express the opinion that for the National Reserve to be a success, it must stand by itself 
and not be dependent on anyone outside its own ranks in organization , administration 
19 Cornwall RO, DDX295/5, 9/12/13 ; Worcestershire RO, 004:6BA5204/8 , 25/03/14; Cumbria RO , 
TTAF/1, 14/10/12. 
20 The average payment to Sergeant-Instructors was 3d per month per rifle . Authorization for 
associations to meet expenses for the care of Reservists' arms came with W09/Res/662 (F4) of 
29/11/12. 
21 Lanarkshire ruled that Reservists were not to use its Territorial ranges, a decision wh ich Scottish 
Command asked the committee to reconsider. The association finally accepted Reservists could use 
the facilities provided they did not interfere with the Territorials. NAS, MD2/2, 15/03/12, 17/05/12. 
22 Oxfordshire RO, 0/11/1 A 1 (2) , 28/10/11 . 
23 City of Glasgow, NAS, MD1 0/6, 26/05/13. The complaint was perhaps justified as the City team 
came fourth in the 1912 Sisley National Reserve Challenge. 
24 City of Glasgow NAS, MD10/5 , 23/01/12 . 
25 Worcestershire RO, 004:6BA5205/8, 25/03/14. 
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and training '. 26 
Unfortunately, because appeals for public donations became something of a 
necessity for some associations, this ideal was not always possible to deliver. Most 
associations established committees to raise funds to buy rifles and ammunition and 
thus allow their Reservists to purchase their ammunition at less than cost price. Others 
elected to spend a greater proportion of their War Office grant on ammunition than had 
been intended, usually at the expense of administration. The Shropshire Association 
was one of several which resolved that 50% of the National Reserve grant to Class I 
Reservists must be spent on musketry expenses. 27 The City of Westminster Battalion 
embarked upon an ambitious scheme to raise sufficient funds to convert two tunnels 
under Blackfriars Bridge into a miniature range for its own use, while the Stoke 
Newington Battalion decided to hire out its recently built range on one evening a week 
for the exclusive use of ladies. This served to act both as a publicity gesture and as a 
means of raising money to pay for its investment. 28 Northumberland neatly managed to 
avoid paying out more than the annual grant permitted by forming a County National 
Reserve Rifle Club to which members subscribed and, when it came up fbr sale, 
Cornwall bought the ranges and equipment of the County Volunteer and Rifle Club for 
the benefit of its Territorials and National Reservists. 29 Even pace-setting Surrey had 
appealed for public donations but a Northumbrian proponent urged a subscription 
membership because men 'valued things to which they subscribe more than those 
which are provided free'. 30 The enthusiasm of some units to prac~ise their musketry 
could occasionally cause difficulties with local residents. Officers of the Hackney 
Battalion had to fend off solicitors' letters complaining of the excessive noise emanating 
from the miniature range constructed next to their club house.31 
Linked to the issues of uniform and shooting was the obvious desire of National 
Reserve men to form a corporate identity. Repington and other of the Reserve's 
supporters had long been advocating such a scheme, believing it could most easily be 
achieved by holding regular company and battalion parades. In 1911 the Army Annual 
had advised occasional parades but shied away from suggesting they should be 
26 Ibid. 
27 Shropshire RO, 1988/1, 18/07/14. 
28 1n an unexpected role reversal in 1915, a Territorial battalion of the London Regiment requested .. 
permission from the National Reserve authorities to use the Blackfriars range as it could not gain 
access to its usual facilities . F.Maurice, The History of the London Rifle Brigade, London : Constable, 
1921 , p.256. Hackney Archives, D/S/49-12. 
29 Northumberland RO, 408/44, 1 0/12/12; Cornwall RO, DDX295/12, August 1918. 
30 Surrey RO, 608/5/1 , 27/06/1 0; Northumberland RO, 408/8, 10/12/12. 
31 Hackney Archives D/S/1 0/-1 , 13/02/14. 
compulsory. 32 Denied state money to finance headquarter (HQ) buildings on the 
argument that as the Reserve would not be mobilized by units there was no need for 
them, many battalions and companies seized upon this proposal to demonstrate 
publicly the physical existence of the Reserve. One officer thought the idea was long 
overdue, complaining that since the parade at which badges were issued some 
months before, the only experience he had of the Reserve's continued existence were 
occasional requests for financial assistance or employment from members. 33 
If they were to be allowed to hold parades, most battalions wanted a colour to 
lead it. However, when the West Ham Battalion asked the Army Council to petition the 
King to present its colour, Whitehall decided it was 'inappropriate' to expect royalty to 
consecrate anything resembling a colour to a non-military body.34 It eventually conceded 
that National Reserve units could carry a flag provided it was markedly different from the 
usual pattern and was accorded no military honours.35 Such niggardliness over royal 
patronage can be contrasted with the War Office's willingness to use the Reserve when 
it suited. Despite its refusal to allow the Essex Reservists to possess a recognized 
colour, the Army Council requested the men to parade in the presence of the King when 
he opened a new reservoir at Chingford. 36 
With the generosity of local benefactors prepared to stump up the necessary 
finance, parades became regular events. Mr Hansford donated an annual sum of £250 
for five years to provide for a yearly parade in London, St Loe Strachey supplied £400 for 
the 1911 parade on Horse Guards and William Hicking gave £200 for a post-parade 
dinner for 1550 Nottinghamshire Reservists .37 Attendances were normally impressive. 
For example, at rural Norfolk's first parade held in June 1912, 500 of its total registered 
strength of 751 turned up and in December 1912 the Newcastle Battalion of about 450 
men marched through the city's streets led by the Northumberland Veterans ' 
Association Pipe Band.38 So successful had the event been that the battalion 
immediately announced the opening of a public subscription to furnish a battalion 
banner. In 1911 Strachey paid the travel and refreshment expenses for a parade 
inspected by the indefatigable Roberts at Guildford and, in July 1912, the king reviewed 
32 Army Annua/1911 , p.268. 
33 Northumberland RO, 408/44, 12/03/12. 
34 Essex RO, 6E17D/3 and 9/Reserve/704 (QMG 7) of 27/02/13. 
35 The question of colours for the National Reserve was raised in the House in January 1913. Hansard 
Vo1.47 .637, 24/01/13. 
36 Essex RO , 6E17D/3, 22/01/13. 
37 Guildhall MSS, 12,606/1 , 11/10/1 0; Surrey RO, 608/1 , 31/03/11 ; Nottinghamshire RO, DDT/A 1/1 , 
30/07/12 . 
38 Norfolk RO, TA1/1 , 13/07/12; Northumberland RO, NR0408/44, 10/12/12. 
a huge parade of nearly 5000 Reservists , most of whose travel expenses were met by 
the West Riding Association , at Wentworth Woodhouse.39 A month earlier the King had 
attended what was probably the most impressive parade yet held for the Reserve. Over 
19,000 Reservists , including 150 Crimean and Indian Mutiny veterans, drawn up in the 
capital's 36 companies, assembled in Hyde Park. When the companies , complete with 
banners, marched past the king , one euphoric correspondent reported : 
They marched smartly and well, like seasoned troops. Strangely mixed as to dress, they 
appeared fit to a man to take the field. It needed little imagination to see a "nation in 
arms" as one gazed on that array of frock coats and fustian jackets, silk hats , straw hats, 
dockers' and labourers' caps and wide awakes, and high-lows and buttoned boots and 
gaiters .. . lt was a never-to-be-forgotten episode of national patriotism.40 
In areas where no individual was prepared to donate a substantial sum, county 
associations were faced with a dilemma. Territorial Force funds were not intended to be 
used directly for National Reserve expenses but when Shropshire sought sanction to 
use £180 of its surpluses to finance the travel and refreshments for a parade of nearly 
1000 Reservists at Shrewsbury, the War Office granted permission . 41 Other 
associations soon followed suit, but when Kent circulated its loc.al commanders about 
the possibility of holding a county-wide parade, they replied many of the men would be 
unable to attend unless the association was prepared to pay their travel costs. The 
county committee opted not to cover the cost and the parade was abandoned.42 
Payments were also sometimes made to cover less high profile events. Refreshments 
for mundane local church parades were provided but Cornwall demurred when the 
Falmouth Company requested the association to pay for its Christmas dinner.43 
Given the high profile of the conscription issue it is perhaps not surprising that 
reservist parades, or simply the men themselves, were occasionally usurped for overtly 
political purposes. When it was announced Lord Roberts would address the Norfolk 
Association of the National Service League in September 1912, the association 
requested 1 00 Reservists wearing medals and badges be present as a guard of 
honour. 44 Roberts had also used the huge Guildford parade by the Surrey National 
39 West Yorkshire RO, West Riding CountyTerritorial Association 1469/2, 1/07/12. 
40 Unidentified newspaper cutting of 10/06/12 in National Army Museum, (NAM) AF-GEN 6012/23/10. 
41 Shropshire RO, 1988/1 , 18/07/14. 
42 Kent RO, MD/TA1/2 , 14/06/12. 
43 Cornwall RO, DDX295/3, 8/10/12. 
44 Norfolk RO, TA1/2 , 29/04/12. 
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Reserve as a platform for again demanding the introduction of compulsory service.45 
Parades and assemblies were undoubtedly valuable recruiting aids. The 
Derbyshire Association used National Reserve church parades to distribute 
membership badges and the 50 men of the Banbury Company decided that a parade 
and dinner, paid for by public subscription and the county's General Purposes Fund , 
would help to publicize the Reserve and its activities. 46 Within the prestigious walls of 
Westminster Hall , men of No.1 Battalion City of Westminster, were instructed in 
signalling, musketry and ambulance work, and weekly undertook high profile marches 
through the streets of the capital. Unfortunately publicity could work both ways. At least 
one association decided that because it had enrolled fewer members than anticipated , 
a public parade would merely demonstrate the county's failure to attract recruits. 47 
Nevertheless, huge social gatherings such as a performance for Reservists by 
Hengler's Circus in Glasgow and the show organized by the City of Westminster 
Battalions at the StJames's Theatre in January 1913, were clearly intended to serve 
both as a means of encouraging comradeship and of keeping the Reserve in the 
public's mind. Advertised through an impressive partly-coloured glossy programme, the 
City's January matinee presented the band of the 2nd Life Guards and featured 
~ 
appearances by contemporary stars such as Vesta Tilley, Sir George Alexander and 
Irene Vanbrugh.48 
Occasionally, however, things could also go embarrassingly wrong . 
Worcestershire National Reservists hired the King 's Norton Drill Hall for a publicity 
parade but when the men assembled at the hall they discovered a political meeting 
already in progress. The police were called to adjudicate and decided not to allow the 
erstwhile warriors to enter in case a disturbance erupted .49 
The confusion witnessed at King's Norton can be compared to the 'military 
precision' observed at a Reservists' social gathering in a Yorkshire Mechanics' Institute. 
According to the local newspaper 200 members and their wives were 'marched' to the 
kitchen when the bugles sounded 'Come to the cookhouse door', and by waiting for the 
command 'sit' ensured there was 'none of the scrambling which is sometimes seen at 
45 Times 22/05/11. At least one attempt to utilize the Reserve for a overtly political purpose failed. In 
April 1911 a retired naval officer sent postcards to London units of the Reserve requesting their 
members to demonstrate in Hyde Park, with medals, against the employment of British troops to 'force 
Home Rule on Ulster'. A sergeant in one of the battalions claimed it was not his job to deliver mail to 
his men and complained to his local MP. Hansard Vol.60.1948, 8/04/14. 
46 Derbyshire RO, 0530 No.1, 4/09/11 ; Oxfordshire RO, 0/11/1/A1/2, 27/01/11 . 
47 Hertford RO, TAFA/1 , 7/07/13. 
46 City of Glasgow, NAS, MD10/6, 11/04/13; NAM, AF-GEN 6012/23/9. 
49 Worcestershire RO, 004:6BA5204/8, 25/03/14. 
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events of this description'.50 This type of social gathering exemplified Haldane's (and 
indeed Repington's) original vision for the Reserve. During his frequent visits to the 
counties , Major-General Bethune repeatedly reiterated the official view that it should be 
essentially a social movement. To the West Lancashire Association , for example , he 
declared he would deprecate any attempt to make the Reserve adopt what he called the 
'ordinary lines of military organization'. 51 Such a mistake, he believed , had been made in 
Germany when it tried to raise the equivalent of the National Reserve following the 
Franco-Prussian War. The concept had failed because potential members had recoiled 
from the military lines upon which the Reserve was based . Once it had been converted 
to a social movement, thus doing away with drill , shooting and uniforms, Bethune 
insisted men had 'queued to enlist'. Most members would probably have agreed with 
Bethune's sentiments and , possibly with his interpretation of the nature of the Kreiger 
Veriene. It is impossible to decide whether most of the men were driven by the need to 
demonstrate a sense of duty or because membership offered certain social 
advantages. What the evidence does certainly suggest is that the social aspect was 
undoubtedly an important element in the movement's popularity.52 
District organizers in Fifeshire resolved to create social and military clubs in all 
urban areas but the scheme was abandoned when the county association declined to 
offer any financial assistance. The North Riding 's 23 companies were rather more 
successful , each managing to establish a Recreation and Shooting Club almost 
immediately on foundation . The Lincolnshire Reserve also soon had several institutes 
up and running, with the Grimsby Company's club for example, appointing sub-
committees to organize its shooting, instruction classes and social activities.53 While 
there are several examples of regular social functions being held in buildings other than 
drill halls, some battalions chose to eschew the idea of temporarily hiring premises and 
opted instead to create permanent facilities for their members. 
These units wanted to establish clubs which would not only provide a focal point 
for battalion life but also, by proclaiming the Reserve's existence within the community, 
act as a strong inducement to recruitment. A proposal to furnish a building in Edinburgh 
so 0 ldham Chronicle 15/02/13. 
:: West Lancashire RO, 356WES/47, 27/05/11 . 
. The Reserve's original proposals had also suggested members could be accorded military funerals . It 
IS not known how many families availed themselves of the privilege but the Hampshire Association 
declined to cover the expenses incurred for two such funerals . It did agree however, to provide a coffin 
~oard , Union flag and gun carriage gratis. Hants RO, 37/M69/2 , 1/03/12. .. 
Co. of Fife, NAS, MD7/24, 23/01/14; F. H. Reynard , A Brief History ofthe Territorial Force Association 
o:the County of York, (North Riding) 1908-1919, Northallerton: Joseph Walker, 1919, p.13; 
Lincolnshire RO, TA1/1 , 10/07/14. 
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with a shooting range and run it as a temperance social club in conjunction with the 
city's 21 regimental associations eventually came to nothing, but Stoke Newington's 
Reserve took out a lease on a large house and refurbished it as both a social club and 
an HQ. The building was eventually reopened with great ceremony and wide publicity. 
Appeals for funds to underwrite the initial starting up costs of £400 had been appearing 
in the local press for some weeks and a fund- raising matinee attend by, among others, 
the Duchess of Argyll, Prince Arthur of Connaught, Earl Roberts and the Secretary of 
State for War, was held in March 1914. The accompanying publicity described the 
National Reserve as a 'useful body of seasoned men to complete the immature and 
often depleted ranks of the Territorial Regiments' . Such men deserved the pecuniary 
assistance of the public, it went on, because members received no pay for performing 
this patriotic duty and required a building 'where they may find refuge from the dark, 
rainy streets and enjoy rational amusements'. 54 
The nearby Hackney Battalion also decided to acquire a premises which it 
believed symbolized the unit's status and importance. It was offered the use of a 
building owned by Lord William Cecil and, in return for refurbishing and repairs, was 
allowed to occupy it rent free for the first year. The committee set about fund raising and 
•. 
deciding what facilities the club should offer. Size compelled it to settle for one rather 
than the proposed two full-sized billiard tables, but it did manage to accommodate and 
provide for a licensed canteen, carpets, easy chairs, wages for a full-time caretaker, a 
lad for general charring and the fortnightly services of a pianist. It also allowed free entry 
for its Class I and Class II Reservists and financed the construction of a parade ground 
and a miniature rifle range. Running such an ambitious club wa~ to cause the battalion 
financial problems once the majority of its members had re-enlisted following the 
outbreak of war. The committee had lost so much income from dwindling canteen sales 
that it appealed to the County of London Territorial Force Association for £120 to keep 
the club functioning. 55 
National Reservists in at least two areas decided to run their clubs as limited 
companies. The directors , who usually owned the largest blocks of shares, were largely 
the Reserve's commanding officers or other local gentlemen . However, the 
Bournemouth Club's share owners' list exhibts a remarkable degree of democratic 
involvement: blocks of shares were held by men registered as labourers, postmen, 
2l!!..mbers, motor mechanics and a lift attendant. 56 
54 N . 
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Important as they were to fostering a bond of friendship , identity and , in some 
instances employment, 57 to many Reservists and supporters of the movement, the 
parades, clubs and socials were not the primary considerations. To these enthusiasts, 
what was of more importance was the attitude of the War Office towards the Reserve 
and its continued disinclination to allocate its members specific roles at a time when 
the strength of most Territorial units was in marked decline. 
Echoing G.P.Gooch's comment of a few years earlier that 'long immunity from the 
realities of warfare had blunted our imagination ', Haldane attributed the post-1912 
decline in Territorial Force recruiting to 'a disease of ten years' peace'.58 Although young 
men were demonstrating a growing reluctance to enlist in the principal home defence 
force, throughout 1911 and 1912 the enthusiasm of older former soldiers and sailors to 
register with the National Reserve remained largely undiminished . In July 1912 the War 
Office announced that the 'response had exceeded estimated expectation ' and although 
disappointed at the very slow progress of the Territorial Force Reserve, it was content 
with the growing popularity of the National Reserve.59 However, many associations and 
individuals were becoming increasingly discontented at the authorities' refusal to define 
a specific role for the Reserve. 
A meeting in February 1912 of representatives from all of Lon'don 's 28 boroughs 
resolved to launch an assertive campaign to persuade Parliament to acknowledge the 
Reserve's worth. The meeting agreed to petition local MPs and the Lord Mayor to force a 
Bill which would recognize the Reserve as an integral part of the Regular Army and fund 
it by means of the Army Estimates.60 As if to underline its contemporary lowly 
expectations, adverts issued by the Hertfordshire Associatiqn continued to make it clear 
What potential members should not expect. Its posters explained that recruits would be 
able to use Territorials' ranges but would have to buy their own ammunition , that they 
would not be required to drill or exercise as armed forces, would not be given a uniform 
57 s 
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-and would not be issued with any equipment in time of peace.61 Frustration at such 
limitations and at not being allocated more definite tasks prompted the Leicestershire 
Association to protest 'it seems as though not being able to do anything in peace time 
prevents men from joining ' .62 Similarly, the Liverpool contingent was described as 
becoming 'very impatient' over the alleged lack of War Office appreciation. Its 
Commandant reported that it was 'becoming very difficult to keep them quiet' .63 In 
response, Major-General Bethune remarked the Liverpudlians' 'restlessness ' was a 
consequence of their being promised uniforms and equipment by their over-
enthusiastic Commandant. 64 
The Chairman of the Surrey Association regularly led the way in complaints 
against the War Office's refusal to assign specific duties to the Reserve. He insisted the 
registered men were keen, able and enthusiastic, and that 57% of them were under 40. 
Durham Association also recorded that their early entrants had an average age of only 
39 and that 42% of them were former Regulars. Even more impressive, the London 
Veterans ' Section reported that 61% of its members were ex-Regular soldiers.65 In 
response to this assumed potential , Lieutenant-General Elles, a former member of the 
Viceroy's Council, declared the War Office simply did not appreciate how good the 
material was and urged the authorities to make a definite statement on future policy. 
The Reservists could then see in 'black and white what the intentions of the War Office 
were with regard to the future administration, organization and maintenance of the 
National Reserve' .66 
At least one county certainly blamed the lack of central direction for its 
disappointing early recruitment figures. Kent placed adverts in all of the county's 
prominent local papers for three successive weeks but met with a very poor response . 
When the new regulations were adopted in 1911, the county decided to start again . 
Instead of attempting to compile a county-wide register, the association opted for what it 
called 'local semi-military units' . There was a central register but companies also 
maintained their own, thus making communication easier and gave the men a sense of 
belonging . Terms of membership were explained to each man individually and a 
member's eligibility was closely investigated . The association argued that organizing 
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them into battalions of more than 400 would prevent many from taking the obligation to 
serve and , furthermore , would break down on mobilization because men would only be 
willing to be attached to other units if they went with their comrades. From a low base of 
1400 in June 1911 , the register grew to over 6700 inside 15 months.67 
Nationally, numbers continued to rise from about 150,000 in August 1912 to 
190,836 by the end of the year. 68 This encouraging overall growth did , however, continue 
to hide some uneven local figures. Durham reported a four-fold increase in a 12 month 
period and Hertfordshire an impressive five-fold. These can be contrasted with under a 
two-fold increase by both Derbyshire and Shropshire. Major Muir complained of a 
reluctance among the old Volunteers of Walker and Wallsend to register, the exceptions 
being those who hoped enrolment might lead to civilian employment.69 Unsurprisingly, 
the general expansion coincided with increasing concern as to how many of these men 
might actually be of some military use. 
In March 1912, Jack Seely told the House of Commons that of a total strength of 
76 ,972, just under 28,000 were officers aged between 55 and 60 and other ranks 
between 45 and 55. One MP, somewhat dubious of Seely's confidence, wondered if he 
knew how many were aged between 90 and 100.70 A Leicestershire MP announced that 
in his county there was a full battalion of men under 45 and another half battalion aged 
between 45 and 55. The City of Westminster reported 60% of its 36,000 members were 
under 42 while Shropshire claimed 59% of its Reservists were under 45 years of age. 
One area of Scotland declared in rather more vague terms when it decided 60% of its 
recruits were 'fit to serve'; Wiltshire recorded that 50% of its men were 'eligible to serve 
in the field ' with a further 25% able to provide soldiers for fortress companies and 
administrative duties. 71 Equally obtuse were reports from the Woolwich Company which 
stated 1 0% of its members were 'fighting men' and 50% 'quite fit to go into the 
marching line', and Hampshire, which imprecisely claimed 72% were 'thoroughly 
efficient, good soldiers'. 72 
Precise statistics are difficult to find but a register of 82 of Stoke Newington's 
Reservists who had enlisted in 1911 and 1912 and who were still members in 1917, 
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does give some indication of what might have been a fairly typical battalion .73 Thirty-four 
percent of the members were ex-Regulars and 10% of the remainder, all ex-Volunteers , 
had served for more than 20 years . The average period of service for both the former 
Regulars and Volunteers was almost ten years . Sixty-eight percent were aged 49 or 
below, with the average age being 46 years . Many of the most experienced members, 
with 20 years or more in the Regular Army , were still only in their forties . Only four men 
of the 53 whose occupation is listed could be described as working in non-artisanal or 
non-professional jobs. Members of the Saddleworth Company came from similar 
backgrounds. Its officers were local mill owners and the men largely their employees, 
with 58 of the 99 members listed as occupation electors rather than lodgers. Only eight 
lived in what were the poorest factory or Co-operative-owned terraced houses, the 
remainder occupied the better quality housing which denoted the skilled or foreman 
class of worker. The number of former Regulars is unknown but there were two 
postmen, a job often given to such men. The majority of members were undoubtedly ex-
Volunteers, many of whose sons are known to have been currently serving in the local 
Territorial company.74 
Newspaper reports from across the country of National Reserve parades 
invariably describe the members as appearing prosperous and respectable. Many of 
the Northern members might have worn flat caps while their Southern comrades 
possibly preferred bowlers or boaters but, as an unrecorded yet substantial number of 
both the Stoke Newington and Saddleworth Companies' younger members are known 
to have re-enlisted in the Regular or Territorial forces in 1914 or 1915, these units must 
have fulfilled Haldane's object of representing a large and potentially very useful pool of 
trained men. 
In the face of insistent complaints about the lack of a specified role for these 
men, the Army Council became marginally more receptive to suggestions made by the 
county associations. However, it remained resolute in its determination to keep costs to 
a minimum. At a conference of county officials in December 1911 the Army's 
representative had acknowledged that the meeting's opinions on the liability of 
Reservists to serve on mobilization would be 'of great use to the War Office Advisory 
73 Calculated from muster roll. Hackney Archives, D/S/49/-2. 
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Committee'. Although no definite conclusion was reached on whether a proportion of 
the Reserve should be legally bound to serve on mobilization , the conference did pass 
a resolution which, if taken on board by the War Office, provided for a new section of the 
National Reserve. The intent behind the proposed new class was that membership 
should entail an 'honourable obligation' and that it should replace the Territorial Force 
Reserve. In this the representatives were developing a motion passed by the Surrey 
Association in January of that year which expressed the 'hope' that the War Office would 
recognize the National Reserve as the real reserve of the Territorial Force. 75 
The resolution passed at the December conference had reflected the 
widespread concern over the failure of the Territorial Force Reserve to attract recruits . Its 
abject failure led to a growing consensus that the National Reserve should be placed 
on a more organized basis and acknowledged as the true reserve of the Territorial 
Force. Another earlier, Surrey resolution, had urged the War Office to upgrade the 
National Reserve by allowing it to accept Reservists under 40 on mobilization, by 
maintaining arms for them and by permitting regular drills and shooting practice. When 
it made this demand the county's Territorial Force Reserve stood at three officers and 
three men; the registered strength of its National Reserve was nearly 2000. Similarly, 
the Buckinghamshire Association with a Territorial Force Reserve of only three officers 
and a National Reserve strength of 59 officers and 1500 men, also pressed the 
authorities to absorb the Territorial Force Reserve into the National Reserve. Even 
Gloucestershire, which had made the decision to create a reserve some months before 
Haldane's official announcement, had managed to attract only seven men ; the County of 
London, with a Territorial strength of nearly 30,000, had only 87 soldiers transfer to the 
Reserve between 1912-13.76 
Among the various reasons aired as to why men continued to be reluctant to 
register for the Territorial Force Reserve was the accusation that some commanding 
officers were actively opposed to it. They argued that the annual camp, the culmination 
of the year's training, would be devalued if there were men present who had not 
performed the preparatory drills in the preceding months. If numbers of Reservists did 
attend camp therefore, their presence would only serve to hamper training and 
efficiency. There was a logic in this stance but the fundamental reason why men failed 
to enlist was because the regulations were too discriminating. 
_ The War Office refused to contemplate abandoning the Territorial Force Reserve 
75 Ibid. .. 
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but did attempt to quell some of the complaints by dispatching Colonel F.L.Banon , the 
AAG, on a five month trouble-shooting tour of county associations in the summer and 
autumn of 1912.77 Banon's message to the associations was simple and frequently 
repeated . He stressed the National Reserve had 'come to stay' and anticipated that 
there would be one quarter of a million members by 1914. It had been created, he said , 
because there was a possibility of Britain becoming involved in a European war and 
because it was a 'great pity to allow a large number of trained and active men to 
disappear into civilian life'. 78 Exploiting his political master's contemporary concepts of a 
citizen army and of a nation-in-arms, he continually stressed that the Reserve would 
bring the army into touch with the nation and that by giving ex-Regulars, Militiamen , 
Yeomanry, Volunteers and Territorials an 'honourable position in their country', it would 
do much to 'break down any prejudice that still exists against young men joining the 
Regulars or Territorials'.79 Again echoing Haldane's sentiments, Banon explained the 
ideal of continuity of service: youngsters would begin elementary military drill in the Boy 
Scouts, progress to the Cadets and, when old enough, join either the regulars, the 
Special Reserve or the Territorials. Having served their time in the active forces, men 
would finally pass through the Territorial Reserve and the proposed three classes of the 
•. 
National Reserve. By 'carefully, methodically and inexpensively' registering the names 
of men in their final stage of service, counties would be creating a reservoir of men with 
military experience into which the AG could 'dip on mobilization' .80 Perhaps in 
recognition that the Technical Reserve was virtually moribund , Banon repeatedly 
emphasized that the National Reserve should contain men with technical, as well as 
the more traditional military expertise. He intimated that on mobilization, Reservists 
could act as medical orderlies, telegraphists , farriers, wheelwrights and clerks for both 
the Regulars and the Territorials . 
When fending questions about the issue, Banon invariably replied there were 
legal objections to amalgamating the Territorial and National Reserves and argued that 
such a move would create something approaching a third line army. It was noted earlier 
that this was a concept to which both Haldane and the War Office were fundamentally 
77 Colonel Frederick Banon had fought in the Soudan and South Africa campaigns and was a General 
Staff Officer 1 at the Staff College 1905-10. He became Assistant Adjutant-General (Director 
Recruiting and Organization) in July 1910. Leaving the War Office in March 1915, he became, in 
turn , General Officer Commanding 50, 197 and 219 Brigades. I am indebted to Dr John Bourne for 
this information . 
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opposed . Such an organization would incur costs which would undermine the basis of 
the Liberal Government's entire defence policy. Banon repeatedly stated that large 
sums were having to be spent on aviation and there was already insufficient funding to 
fully equip the expeditionary force. Cost was the reason why the War Office had been 
initially reluctant to allow the associations to form National Reserve companies or 
battalions for other than strictly administrative purposes and it also explains why the 
only uniform the War Office permitted Reservists to wear was, at most, a 'non-military 
style cap and belt' . 81 Ban on insisted there was no reason to provide free shooting 
facilities as the men would have ample opportunity to sharpen up their musketry with 
Reserve battalions on mobilization. Moreover, free shooting would only lead to 
demands for free travel and more ranges, thereby further restricting the ability of Special 
Reservists to practice. 
Finally, Banon usually referred to the counties' demands for a more formal 
military structure. The War Office refused to grant members military rank because the 
movement was not under military law; it preferred to see associations frame their own 
rules and run the Reserve as a club . This would allow them to expel any undesirable 
members without recourse to courts martial. Putting the Reserve under military law 
would, thought Banon, 'kill' the movement. Demands for the men to make a firm legal 
commitment to serve were also dismissed because, Banon explained, it would cause 
people to make invidious distinctions and comparisons between one man's patriotism 
and another's.82 
County associations treated Banon with courtesy, questioned him at length and 
then debated the outcome of the discussion at their next meeting . Nottinghamshire 
officials described his talk as an 'interesting statement as to War Office policy' ,83 but his 
words did little to appease the frustration felt by many associations at the lack of a 
designated future role. Acutely aware of the counties' trenchant criticism of the current 
regulations and shortly after the completion of Banon's countrywide tour, the War Office 
confirmed the new relaxed entry qualifications to which Banon had alluded. If 
commanding officers of Territorial units were prepared to accept them, the Reserve was 
now to be opened up to ex-soldiers and ex-Special Reservists .84 This proposal did 
Placate some MPs who, while still critical of the Territorial Reserve 's failure, 
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acknowledged it should take priority over the National Reserve. Most county 
associations were less convinced . To them the only plausible reason for the 
Government's refusal to amalgamate the two Reserves was that it might involve it in 
additional finance . 
Frustrated at the Government's perceived continuing neglect of the Reserve, the 
City of London Association laid a formal resolution before the War Office designed to 
alter the fundamental character and purpose of the National Reserve. The resolution , 
which went further than anything yet demanded, proposed that ex-Regular National 
Reservists under 42 years of age should make a definite commitment to fulfil the duties 
allocated to the Territorial Reserve and to 'take up such other combatant duties as may 
be required .. . in connection with home defence' .85 To emphasize the intended efficiency 
of this new force, it was proposed that an annual retaining fee of £1 should be paid to 
each man and that the county association should receive ten shillings per man to cover 
administration, costs of musketry practice and so on . Each association was to hold 
sufficient mobilization stores in arms, uniforms and personal equipment. Aware that a 
significant financial incentive to enrol might cause an exodus from the Territorials, the 
resolution suggested that a man should have to wait for eight years between leaving the 
Territorials and enrolling in the National Reserve. The proposal concluded with a stark 
warning: 
Unless some more definite policy and greater financial assistance be afforded the 
movement by the War Office, the magnificent response, which has already been given 
by officers and men throughout the country to form the Reserve not only will be wasted , 
but the future development of the organization will be rendered impossible'.86 
It was some weeks before the War Office replied to the association, and by then 
events had moved forward . Inside Parliament pressure for the Reserve to be allocated a 
more concrete role continued to swell. Amid repeated calls from various associations 
for a major rethink about the nature and terms of service, Seely regularly fielded 
questions from MPs with close personal links to county associations. He usually 
adhered to the line that the Reserve was a 'military asset of the greatest value '87 but 
constantly refused to accept that it constituted a third line army. He would only go as far 
as to acknowledge the suggestion that in an emergency, members might promise to 
put themselves at the disposal of the military authorities for service within the British 
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lsles.88 In this he was largely following the line of his predecessor. Haldane had also 
talked of the Reserve as having 'awakened the nation in military matters' and insisted 
that it had indeed become one of the recognized forces of the Crown.89 If that was the 
case, some argued, to what use was it to be put and how effective might the force 
actually prove to be? Was it merely as one MP claimed, a list that could be flourished in 
the face of the House of Commons to demonstrate there was no need for national 
service? Of equally persistent concern was the number of men who might prove to be of 
some military value. Rumours that Seely had persuaded 100 Chelsea Pensioners to 
join the Reserve in order to help to cover the deficiency in Territorial numbers, and the 
fairly widespread claim that 65% of the National Reservists on parade in Hyde Park in 
June 1912 would be incapable of doing anything of value, fuelled suspicions that the 
government really had no idea of what it wanted the Reservists to do. Captain Morrison-
Bell insisted that the nation had been misled by Haldane's optimism and that it was no 
use pretending that the men were a national asset if the War Office had no plan of how 
they were to be utilized.90 
In the face of strong opposition Seely refused to be drawn too far. He continued to 
insist that the Territorial Force Reserve would remain a distinct body and would not be 
replaced by the National Reserve but that the latter did enjoy a recognized position 
within the armed forces . He explained that he was in constant discussion with 
interested parties and claimed to have the support of St Loe Strachey in his intention of 
proceeding cautiously. Seely asserted: 
lf.. .you go to each man and say, "Will you guard that railway? Will you undertake to form 
part of the transport? Will you guard the lines of communication?" .. . you may kill this 
force ... lt is growing .. . but if we try to accomplish this too quickly and jam it into a mould of 
our own making, you may destroy it. 91 
Seely refrained from prescribing rigid rules and obligations for the Reserve because, he 
argued, they would defeat its very object. He wished to preserve something of the 
movement's spontaneity, preferring it to continue in like manner until eventually 
perfecting its own organization . He also claimed it would be unsound military policy to 
constitute the Reserve into brigades and divisions. But his underlying motives for these 
prognostications were all too transparent: to allow a major reorganization would do 
nothing except raise expectations among the Reserve's supporters and incur 
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unwarranted additional costs . 
While prone from time to time to muse on the potential of the Reserve, the 
Secretary of State remained reluctant to commit himself to any definite plan for its 
deployment. During one of his periodic ramblings , he concluded that as one hundred 
men serving under an officer had been a feature of military life since the 'dawn of 
history', he concurred with the essentially loose organizational arrangements most 
counties had already employed for their Reserve. He further expounded that a 
company's local knowledge would be of use in the event of an enemy raid and vaguely 
acknowledged that technical specialists within it could be employed to secure telegraph 
lines, post offices and the like . Those sympathetic to Seely and his stance revived the 
scheme that on Territorial mobilization the Reserve would man transport collecting 
stations, 92 but its supporters read more than they should have done into Seely's 
subsequent acknowledgement that some National Reservists had been asked whether 
they were prepared to serve under Territorial officers and NCOs. This announcement 
was made in response to what the chairman of one association claimed to be a 
'grievance manufactured ' by several newspapers. Sections of the press had reported a 
.. 
reluctance among some former Regulars to enrol in the Reserve in case they later 
came under the command of Territorials. Despite Seely's denial that he had any definite 
plans to utilize the Reserve in this way, further fuel to the idea that the National Reserve 
would be used to supplement the Territorials came when its strength was published in 
the Annual Return of the Territorial Force. Seely insisted that this was the logical place 
to print the figures because, like the Territorials , the Reserve was administered by the 
county associations. He did , however, emphasize that it would be wrong to assume that 
Reservists had agreed to serve under Territorial officers.93 
Seely was, if nothing else, a political chameleon . His autobiography makes 
audacious claims which belie his almost legendary fecklessness . In a style often 
reminiscent of Caesar, he argued his tenure of the War Office ensured that Britain 
became the most fully prepared of all the potential future belligerents.94 He made no 
mention of the development of the Reserve or of the delays and frustrations it 
experienced while he held the Seals. His reluctance to promote the Reserve did not, 
however, coerce its supporters into silent indifference. There remained sufficient 
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advocates of the movement within Parliament to maintain pressure, even if their words 
did fall largely on unreceptive ears. 
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CHAPTER V: NEW REGULATIONS AND RECLASSIFICATION 
In addition to the Government's reluctance to allocate the Reserve a definite role on 
general mobilization and to providing the inducements which most associations 
considered essential to maintaining the Reserve's developing vibrancy, was its 
continued failure to allocate adequate funding . The issue of finance was aired frequently 
in Parliament and invariably aroused considerably controversy and passion .1 
When the Reserve was first conceived the War Office awarded the associations 
one shilling for each man they registered. The counties immediately declared this sum 
to be hopelessly insufficient but warned organizing officers against requesting 
additional finance from them. Confronted with the problem of raising and then 
developing the Reserve with minimal official funding , some associations and local 
figures appealed for donations from their Lords Lieutenant, their deputies and wealthy 
private benefactors. Funds raised in this manner saw the associations through the early 
days of registration but, as costs rose , several announc_ed that unless the Government 
was prepared to increase the grant from one to at least five shillings, the men 
themselves would have to be asked for voluntary subscriptions. In 1912, Colonel 
Johnstone told the officers of the Westminster Battalion: 'Only when we get five shillings 
per man can we begin thinking about a drill hall or suitable meeting place, social 
gatherings, parades, miniature ranges , a band and many other essentials if we are to 
make our battalion efficient and popular for all ranks . '2 
Frequent complaint of the Government's financial stringency did not prevent 
associations from advocating that at least some Reservists should be awarded an 
annual retainer. Army Reservists were paid 6d per day in return for accepting the 
obligations required and many counties made the point that ex-Regular members of the 
National Reserve would be unwilling to undertake a firm commitment unless they too 
Were in receipt of a retainer. The War Office resolutely refused to entertain such a 
Proposal , with Seely repeatedly stressing that the Government could not afford to pay 
any retainer (let alone the £2 per head suggested by some associations) , in addition to 
the Reserve's other requirements. The cost he said , would be 'enormous ... [and] the 
1 
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expenditure would not be justified'. 3 
Although the 1911 regulations specified that associations should pass on the 
bulk of the War Office's annual grant to their National Reserve organizing committee, not 
all of them appear to have transferred the entire sum to which the commandant was 
supposedly entitled . The London conference of Commandants in December 1911 had 
concluded that the average annual expense per man was 2/1 d; some associations 
claimed it to be as high as 4/3d. Like many other counties, Nottinghamshire passed on 
only 6d for a reservist in his first year and 9d for his second and succeeding years . The 
sum retained by the association was used to cover its central administrative costs . 
Buckinghamshire took a similar line in 1913; until the whole matter of funding had been 
further investigated, it decided to give only 50% of the grant to the Reserve's organizer. 
Organizers' expenditure was rarely large: Warwicks spent about £300 per year between 
1911-13, Nottinghamshire about £60 in 1913 and Buckinghamshire £64. The City of 
London Association gave its organizer a sum of £300 to pay for registration expenses in 
October 1911 and rather optimistically billed the War Office for repayment. The amount 
was not forthcoming and, like several other associations, the City minuted that it had 
been let down by the authorities.4 
Whether because associations withheld too much of the National Reserve grant 
or whether it was a result of profligacy, by the end of the financial year organizers 
sometimes stared at a deficit. By the end of 1913, the Reserve's committee of the West 
Lancashire Association had overspent by £228 and requested the county agree to a 
reorganization of the internal financial arrangements. Th~ proposal would have allowed 
the Reserve to spend without constantly having to seek permission from higher 
authority. The association declined, explaining that as it remained responsible for the 
Reserve's finances it could not allow the organizer to overspend without specific 
permission . This restraint on expenses did not mean that the association was 
invariably reluctant to extend additional grants for the Reserve when the relevant 
committee requested them. The original sum of £300 for the rental of premises and 
£200 for fitting out the rooms was increased by £150 and £100 respectively in 1914. 
3 Seely at the Conference of National Reserve Commandants, 30/01/13. 
4 W032/18612 . This report by the Executive Committee of the Metropolitan Mayors' Association 
admitted that the shortage of funds was a result of expenditure on 'quite unnecessary items'. It cited 
the examples of the purchase of instruments and uniforms for battalion bands and of the hire of a 
band for a church parade. This expense absorbed almost one half of that battalion's entire balance. 
Report, 24/02/14; Nottinghamshire RO, DDT/A4/2, 11/12/13; Buckinghamshire RO, T/N1/22, Annual 
Report 1914; Warwickshire RO, CR1141/4; Guildhall MSS, 12,613 Vol.1 , 12/12/11 and MSS, 12,608 
Vo1.1 , 5/10/11 ; 
This responsibility to ensure that the National Reserve did not exceed its grant might 
have been the reason why, for example, the Derbyshire Association seems to have 
made a profit of nearly £20 on its National Reserve account in 1913, Hereford and 
Worcester £112 in 1914 and East Yorkshire a massive £361.5 
In November 1912, Seely announced he had managed to wring from the 
Treasury another £25,000 for the Reserve and sought friendly advice on how it should 
be distributed. His mail bag was not short of suggestions. Following a period of 
consultation, a compromise was reached on how much the additional award would be. 
It was decided that associations would receive 11 shillings for each Class I, six 
shillings for Class II and one shilling for each Class Ill. Although generally welcomed , 
these sums were declared inadequate. Seely did respond to complaints from several 
associations which had hired premises to assist with the Reserve's administration and 
who were now finding it difficult to find the rent by exempting such buildings from local 
rates. Useful as this was, many sub-committees contrived to obtain the use of adequate 
office space in a local drill hall. The West Lancashire National Reserve even submitted 
a bid to take over entirely the redundant former headquarters building of the Liverpool 
Irish. It abandoned the attempt when faced by the prospect of a huge repair bill to make 
the building habitable.6 Similarly the City of London Association decided the Duke of 
York's HQ building , with its offices, drill hall, recreation rooms and other facilities , would 
be suitable for its Reserve. Unfortunately, as hopes and expectations rose, it was 
announced that medical units of the 1st London Territorial Division were about to 
occupy the little space still available.7 
Having failed to acquire its own suite of offices to serve as a headquarters, (HQ) 
the City National Reserve, in the same way as most other battalions and companies , 
Was forced to share or rent whatever accommodation it could afford or beg . A majority of 
the Reserve's organizing committees undoubtedly did secure permission for the 
occasional use of local drill halls and generally enjoyed a good, cooperative 
relationship with the Territorial units to whom many members were later to be detailed 
s West Lancashire RO, 356WES/47 , 21/04/14 and 356WES/27, 12/06/14; Derbyshire RO , D530 No.2, 
1/07/13; Worcestershire RO, 004:6BA5204/8, 25/03/14; East Yorkshire Territorial County Association, 
Annual Report 1913- 14 
6 
West Lancashire RO, .356WES/47, 26/11/13. Some local branches approached their associations for 
Permission to ask councils for redundant buildings which might be converted to function as HQ. They 
Were invariably informed that public money could not be spent on such enterprises. One individual in 
Kent even offered to provide one third of the cost of building a room for the Reserve onto Dartford Drill 
~all .. He was similarly rebuffed . Kent RO, MD/TA1/2 , 14/02/13. 
~UIIdhall MSS, 12,606/1 , 19/03/12. The Duke of York's HQ was home to many infantry, yeomanry, 
artillery and medical units of the London TF. 
to join on mobilization. Most of the London boroughs allowed the Reserve to use 
facilities and office space at their Town Halls and schools and occasionally lent it 
clerical support. 
The steady progress in the number of men registering for the National Reserve 
and the growth in its activities during 1912 should be seen against the background of a 
continuing decline in Territorial recruiting . Despite the initial success in attracting a 
large percentage of former Volunteers, by 1913 the Territorial Force was substantially 
and , to many people's eyes, permanently below establishment. Doubts about whether 
even the paper strength of over 300,000 would be sufficient to guarantee home defence 
had been voiced in 1910 by George Wyndham, a respected former Under Secretary of 
State for War. 8 This concern was later echoed by Lord Esher who believed that the force 
would be unable to attract the 60,000 required annually to replace wastage. 9 Further 
anxiety about the ability of the Territorials to cope with a landing by Regular troops were 
expressed in reports which acknowledged that about one third of Territorials had failed 
to pass the lenient musketry test, only 155,000 of 252,000 soldiers attended annual 
camp for the full fifteen days and that in 1913, 40,000 of its members were under 19 
years of age. In a crushingly condemnatory speech during the 1913 Army Estimates 
debate, Wyndham thundered about the 'ludicrous standards of efficiency now operating 
in the Territorial Force'. 10 When these concerns were coupled to the fact that only about 
50% of those whose period of service ended in 1912 re-engaged, the force was 
accused of being 'plagued by inexperience and youth ' .11 The obloquy reached a peak in 
1913 and 1914 when it was admitted that 80% of the men had served for less than four 
years and that despite vigorous recruitment campaigns, the force had never reached 
more than 81% of establishment. In other words, it was no stronger than the Volunteers 
a HansardVol.18.701-2 , 27/06/10. 
9 
Viscount Esher, 'The Voluntary Principle' , in The Influence of King Edward and Essays on Other 
Subjects, London : John Murray, 1915, pp.114-124. 
10 Hansard Vo1.50 .1115, 19/03/13. 
11 
Public perception of Territorial efficiency had sunk so low that one MP felt compelled to urge the 
Secretary of State to ban a review called , Territorials, or England's Last Hope , then playing in 
Manchester. He considered the sketches were calculated to heap 'ridicule and contempt upon the 
Territorial Force'. Hansard Vol.56.1462, 6108/13. For a comparison of the relative strengths and 
Weaknesses of the Territorials and Regular forces, see W032.9192 Efficiency ofthe Territorial Force 
compared with the Regular Army, 1912. While praising the men 's attitude, the reports submitted by the 
General Officers Commanding Commands (GOG-in-Commands) were generally disparaging. They 
concluded that it would be 'unwise' to assume that the nine Territorial Force (TF) divisions would be 
capable of defeating four enemy Regular divisions. Although Bethune, the Director-general Territorial 
Force (DGTF), thought the Force was becoming increasingly more efficient, the Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff (CIGS) expressed grave concern over the capabilities of its officers and over its alleged 
lack of discipline. 
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and Yeomanry had been ten years earlier. 
A less than empirical survey of Territorial commanding officers by the National 
Defence Association (an organization which had very close links with the Council of 
Territorial Associations) , nevertheless revealed that 85 of the 97 respondents claimed 
that their units were seriously inefficient in musketry, marching and discipline. The 
Association , whose members included Lord Scarbrough and Charles Repington , 
subsequently wrote a memo to the Prime Minister drawing his attention to the 
shortcomings of the Territorials .12 When fewer than 20,000 of the Force's total agreed to 
accept the obligation, Haldane's hope that a large percentage of Territorials would 
agree to foreign service had also been dashed . 
The woes of the Territorials were exacerbated by the increasing pressure exerted 
upon the Government by the National Service League. With Lord Roberts as its 
figurehead , the League repeatedly stressed that compulsion was the only way by which 
adequate armies for overseas and home defence could be produced . Between 1908-
1914 five Parliamentary Bills proposing conscription had been laid before Parliament 
and in April 1913 a National Service (Territorial Force) Bill was introduced but withdrawn 
before a vote was taken. Roberts claimed not only did the.Army Council support 
conscription but that ten county associations had also declared their support for it. 
Furthermore, nearly one quarter of all members of the associations were thought to 
belong to the League itself. Increasing disquiet about a strength of only 236,389 in 1913 
caused the Essex and West Riding Associations to pass critical resolutions drawing 
attention to what they described as the failure of the voluntary system. When the 
resolution were circulated to the other counties for consideration, the County of London 
Association , among others, went a stage further and called for some unspecified 
system (although the implication was clear) , to provide an adequate army for home 
defence. However, after Lord Dartmouth had studied the county returns to the Essex 
proposal of Januray 1913, he concluded that the Council of Territorial Associations 
could not justify publically declaring whether it was for or against compulsion. 13 
Resolutions demanding changes in the enlistment process were passed from 
association to association . Committees frequently pondered how to improve 
recruitment but usually came to the same conclusion ; men who were not prepared to 
12 
National Defence Association , Minutes, 11/02/13. Duke of York's HQ. The Association and the 
Council of Territorial Associations shared the same offices and clerical staff. The former's chairman 
Was Sir George Goldie and while it shared the National Service League's concern of the state of the 
nation's defences, it disagreed with the League's remedy. 
13 Council of County Territorial Associations, Minutes, 10/0413. 
enlist or re-engage in peacetime would come forward in the event of war. Although their 
own county committee might advocate a system of compulsion for home defence, not 
all Territorial officers appreciated this stance. In the North-East, for example, the 
commanding officer (CO) of the 6/Northumberland Fusiliers reported in fairly typical vein 
that pro-conscriptionist propaganda was having a detrimental effect on re-enlistment. 
The largest proportion of his men unwilling to re-engage for a further term came from A 
Company 'which is comprised of men of a better standard of education , on whom such 
propaganda is more likely to have an effect' .14 Yet, although unconvinced of the 
effectiveness of the existing system, the National Service League did not deliberately 
attempt to undermine or oppose the work or function of the county associations. Many of 
its leading campaigners were, after all, members of Territorial Associations. 
In view of their anxiety about how effective their front line forces might be in the 
event of invasion or raid , it would have been understandable if the county associations 
had paid little attention to the well-being of their affiliated National Reserve units. 
However, as there was already talk of using the Reserve to fill up the ranks of the 
Territorials in the event of war, relations between the Territorials and the National 
Reserve were for expediency, if nothing else, generally cordial. The close liaison arising 
from sitting on both the Territorial and National Reserve Committees permitted Colonel 
Crawford , Commanding Officer of the Northumbrian Divisional Royal Engineers, for 
example, to lend the Engineers' band for a National Reserve parade at his own 
personal cost. 15 
Hereford and Worcester Association actually paid 3d to any Territorial soldier who 
recruited a man to the National Reserve 16 and it was noted earlier that Permanent Staff 
attached to Territorial units were often used as administrators for the Reserve. The City 
Association encouraged sections of its Reservists to attend Territorial camps and urged 
the commanding officers to accept and welcome the men. 17 Joint exercises, such as 
one which involved an attack by a Territorial battalion of the Duke of Wellington 's 
Regiment on a village defended by members of the Huddersfield National Reserve 
Battalion , also occasionally took place. Several associations considered giving 
recruitment grants to National Reserve organizers because they noted a correlation 
between an increase in the number of Reserve and Territorial enrolments. The City of 
14 N 
orthumberland RO NR0408/5 8/08/13. 
:: Northumberland Ro: NR0408t44, 12/03/12. 
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Glasgow suggested sending a letter from the Lord Lieutenant to each National 
Reservist encouraging them to urge young men to join the Territorials and offering an 
award of 1/6d for each new soldier they recruited . The County of London Association 
praised the borough-based methods employed by its National Reserve organizers and 
contemplated copying it for its declining number of Territorials . The committee argued 
that a similar system would inevitably be adopted if a voluntary Territorial Force was 
abandoned in favour of compulsion but decided that under existing circumstances, 
such a localized system could not be universally applied .18 
The presence of National Reservists on association committees thus usually 
resulted in an encouraging degree of cooperation between themselves and the 
Territorials . It was not a legal necessity for associations to have Reservists on their 
main committees but most seem to have co-opted members.19 On at least one 
occasion though, a War Office suggestion that Reservists should automatically become 
members of committees did cause friction within an association . In November 1913, 
the Cumberland and Westmorland Association held a long discussion on the merits of 
coopting at least one reservist to one of its committees. The secretary of the National 
Reserve stated that the Reserve was a 'very important thing ' but because no one else 
seemed to be taking much interest in it, he was having to do all the work himself. He 
insisted that unless someone who was 'keenly interested ' in the Reserve was put onto 
the county's committee , 'the work would not be done.' This drew a furiously 
unsympathetic response from Colonel Dudgeon. He exclaimed: 'Bother the National 
Reserve! We have to think about the fighting force and the National Reserve will have to 
give way. ' When it was pointed out to the irate colonel that the Director-General of the 
Territorial Force would shortly be visiting and would expect to see some real 
organization of the county's Reserve, Dudgeon exploded : 'Whoever comes down to see 
the National Reserve will have to take what we have got. .. Whatever happens to the ' 
1a L 
ondon Metropolitan Archive , (LMA) NTN14, 5/12/12. The system would not, for example, have 
been suitable for the London Scottish and London Irish Battalions. 
19 
WO Circular Memo No. 449 of 28/03/13 announced that the Army Council thought it 'desirable' to 
have co-opted National Reservists on association committees and there is some evidence to suggest 
local branches requested associations to co-opt Reservists. For example, in June 1912 the Eastbourne 
Battalion successfully petitioned the Sussex Association to co-opt Major-General Sir F.W.Benson to 
represent its views. East Sussex RO, TER4/2, 14/06/12. The circular also prom~ted the Joint Standing 
Committee administering the London Reserve to co-opt the four General Officers who commanded 
the capitals ' National Reserve Brigades. London Metropolitan Archive , NT N1 , 22/07/13. 
National Reserve I don 't mind . It is the fighting force that I am concerned about.'20 
This vehement outburst was possibly exceptional , but all associations were , of 
course, primarily interested in the strength and efficiency of their Territorial battalions, 
batteries, yeomanry and medical units. Most yeomanry and artillery units were virtually 
up to strength but overall, in September 1913 the Territorial Force was nearly 67 ,000 
below its authorized establishment. The shortage among Territorial infantry was of 
paramount concern to the associations and, unfortunately, there was currently little 
encouragement to be had from the number of men enrolling in the Territorial Force 
Reserve. 
In the few counties which still bothered to record its strength, the Territorial Force 
Reserve remained largely in single figures. Commanding officers were periodically 
instructed to impress upon their men the importance of the Territorial Force Reserve 
and the West Lancashire Association even circulated all of its Class Ill men with a letter 
outlining the advantages of joining the Territorial Reserve. Justifying their decision on 
the Government's alleged lack of adequate finance, most counties seem to have opted 
not to initiate the Reserve or simply to let it wither and die if it showed little sign of life . A 
circular of November 1911 from the Derbyshire to other associations seeking 
suggestions on how the Reserve might be bolstered drew a predictable response from 
the City of Dundee. Its committee declared men preferred to join the National Reserve 
because there was no obligation and concluded that unless the War Office offered 
further inducements, 'nothing further could be done' .21 Even the relaxation of the 
regulations to allow former Regulars and Special Reservists to join failed to result in 
any appreciable growth in membership. During the 1913 Army Estimates debate Seely 
admitted bluntly: 'The Territorial Force Reserve practically hardly exists because there is 
no inducement to commanding officers or to county associations to form it' . He believed 
/ 
the men were there and anxious to serve, but accepted that for various reasons , 
'financial and others', they were declining to join .22 Few could argue with that assertion . 
One of the largest of what few Reserves existed was that administered by the 
Nottinghamshire Association . In April 1912 it had the names of only three officers and 
2
° Cumbria RO, TTAF/2 19/11/13. The Cumberland Association was more sympathetic to the Reserve 
than Dudgeon but the Carnarfon Committee remained resolutely opposed to forming a National 
Reserve because, it believed , it would interfere with recruitment to its Territorial formations. In 1912 
the association 's three units were 332 men short of their establishment of 1177. Carnarfon County 
Association , National Army Museum, 7209-1 -1/2, 19/07/10, 8/11/12 . 
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22 Hansard Vol.50 .1 089, 19/03/13. There are several examples of candidates being refused permission 
to enrol in the TF Reserve , usually because they were deemed to be ineligible. The Sussex 
committee even rejected one officer because he had formerly served in the Worcestershire Regiment. 
23 men on its books.23 At the same time the East Lancashire Association , whose 
Territorial units were at an average of 90% establishment, registered a mere six officers 
and 15 other ranks in its Reserve. 24 Twelve months later, when the Reserve was 
reported to have a national strength of 880 all ranks, Seely attempted to strike an 
optimistic note by announcing it was approaching 1400 and rising .25 His cheery tone sat 
uncomfortably with the knowledge that there were currently some 105,000 eligible 
former Territorials who had chosen not to enrol in the Reserve. Seely acknowledged the 
Reserve's poor standing and agreed with Colonel Greig that some further amelioration 
of the regulations would have to be made. 26 
Nevertheless, the War Office remained reluctant to authorize any scheme to 
bolster the Reserve which strayed from even the slightly more relaxed official 
regulations . Lord Hythe proposed to form an effective Regimental Reserve for the West 
Kent Yeomanry by allowing Reservists to camp for one week after the regiment had 
completed its annual training . As it was proposed to allow men to join the Reserve after 
three rather than four years' service, a change in official regulations would have to be 
sanctioned . The county association approved the scheme, agreeing to pay for the 
Reserve's travelling expenses and Lord Hythe offered to provide the men's pay and 
allowances if the War Office supplied arms and ammunition. After consideration the 
Army Council decided such a scheme might work for the \Nest Kent Yeomanry but ruled 
it was unsuitable for the bulk of the reserve forces and refused to sanction the 
proposal.27 
Unpersuaded by Seely's own public belief of a brighter future, calls to abandon 
entirely the Territorial Force Reserve and replace it with a stronger and more dynamic 
National Reserve continued undiminished . The agitation coincided with yet more 
resolutions and expressions of discontent from the counties which demanded a more 
explicit definition of what the Reserve would be expected to do should the Regulars and 
Territorials be mobilized . Typical of the calls for the Government to stop its 
procrastination came from a representative of the Leicestershire Association : 
23 
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I simply wish that the members of the National Reserve should know that it is 
recognized that they are a portion of the defensive force of this country; they want to 
prove that it is so, and they want to know that they will have real business before them 
on mobilization . 28 
This was echoed by a resolution submitted by the Council of County Territorial 
Associations clearly designed to provoke a War Office response: 
In view of maintaining the interest of the men and of leading them to believe in the utility 
of the National Reserve, the War Office [should] be moved to take steps to draw up 
schemes for utilization ... such as: protection of the lines of communication , public 
buildings, power stations, of landing stations, the protection and distribution of food , 
technical services such as the RAMC [Royal Army Medical Corps] , ASC [Army Supply 
Corps], remount duties, telegraphists etc., local guides and messengers.29 
Similar sentiments were expressed by the Kent Association in February 1913 when, 
having enthusiastically registered over 5000 Class I and 2350 Class II , it pithily minuted: 
'It is understood that the Government intend to make use of this force in some manner, 
but nothing is yet known except for reports appearing in the papers' .30 
However, although sympathetic to its ambitions, many MPs and military men 
were extremely dubious about the value of the Reserve and indeed of the Territorials as 
a whole . The National Service League's campaign for conscription remained insistent 
and, in warning against what many saw as an over-estimation of the Reserve's 
potential, they had a point. It is possible that 70% of those registered nationally were ex-
Volunteers rather than former Regulars, but firm figures are hard to find . In Preston , 
56% of the Reserve were ex-Regulars, 44% in Shropshire, 40% in Liverpool and only 
20% in Southport. 31 The remainder were thus overwhelmingly former Volunteers , men 
Who in 1908 had not transferred to Haldane's new force, or a smattering of Volunteers 
Who had spent a year or two in the Territorials. The majority of these men were of 
middle age, probably married , held steady jobs and were unlikely to be fit enough for 
immediate active service. If they were members of a rifle club they might have kept up 
their musketry but the War Office was sufficiently pragmatic to assume that 20% of 
registered men would be of absolutely no military value whatsoever. What the military 
2B H ansard Vol.41 .2720, 5/08/12. 
29 Report of the National Reserve Committee of the Council of County Territorial Associations, 
Minutes, 25/09/13. 
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authorities required was some analysis of the Reserve's composition and an 
assessment of how realistic it was to plan on the assumption that the Reserve might be 
used to bolster the expeditionary force and the home army. In 1913, therefore, the War 
Office issued a new set of regulations32 and an instruction for the counties to undertake 
a survey of their Reserves with a view to assessing how many members might be 
capable of performing a useful, albeit still loosely defined , role . 
For the purposes of the survey the War Office required the counties to reclassify 
their men into the following revised divisions: Class I was now to consist of officers and 
other ranks who satisfied the medical requirements for active service at home and 
abroad; Class II was for officers and senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) under 
55 and men under 50 years who were fit enough for a home defence combatant unit for 
duty in fixed positions or for administrative work at home. The new Class Ill was itself 
divided into three categories: the first two sections consisted of men who declined to 
undertake any obligation but who qualified by age and physical fitness for Classes I and 
II , while the third comprised those whose age or fitness precluded them from doing 
anything militarily useful. These men were to be considered honorary members and 
were permitted to attend parades and socials. Finally, the War Office not only wanted 
associations to categorize their men by age but also by training and occupation . 
The authorities continued to shy away from asking men to undertake a definite 
liability for military service, but members who were eligible to register in Classes I and II 
were invited to sign what became known as the 'honourable obligation' to the effect that 
they would offer themselves for service at a time of imminent danger. In return for this 
undertaking and provided that they were deemed fit and accepted , on mobilization 
Class I men were promised a gratuity of £10 and Class II, £5 . The regulations stated 
that men in these two classes would be used to reinforce the Regular Army and to fill up 
vacancies and provide for wastage in Territorial units. They would also be used to 
strengthen garrisons, guard vulnerable points and what were termed 'other military 
dutiers'. 
As a palliative to the new regulations and the work involved in applying them, the 
War Office relented and offered to supply rifles to the associations for up to 1 0% of 
registered Reservists . It declined, however, to cover the £1 1 Os required to convert worn 
32 The provisional regulations, which were later adopted in their entirety came out as 
W09!Reservel711 , issued with Special Army Order of 7/03/13. 
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but serviceable .303 rifles to fire .22 ammunition ,33 continued to claim that additional 
miniature ranges were unnecessary because existing facilties were adequate and 
refused to supply free ammunition for men to fire a recognized course. It did eventually 
concede that it would increase the annual grant if the extra money was spent on 
ammunition and also accepted the proposal that provided they were wearing their 
badges, Reservists travelling to ranges by train were entitled to a reduced fare. 34 
The announcement concerning provision for improved musketry was , with 
obvious reservations , generally welcomed by the counties , but the War Office's decision 
to classify the Reserve into three distinct divisions attracted considerable contemporary 
criticism. The most common complaint concerned the mere three months in which 
Whitehall expected the work to be completed. The Durham Association, among others, 
recorded it was 'impossible' to do it in the time allowed because the work involved was 
'excessive'.35 The Nottinghamshire Association simply decided it would not attempt to 
allocate its Reservists to the different classes until the War Office made more 
information available. 36 The Devonshire Association was infuriated because every man 
would have to be reinterviewed by administrators who were already overworked and 
unremunerated. One of its most diligent workers resigned in protest. 37 The Norfolk 
Association also thought the extra work involved would cause its administrators to 
resign and feared that many of its Reservists might recoil from signing if they had to 
decide in which class they should attest. 
The process of reclassification naturally involved the counties in additional 
expenditure but the War Office declined to acknowledge this by providing any extra 
funding . As it decided every member should be interviewed personally in order to 
explain the new regulations , Kent Association estimated the cost of the exercise to be in 
excess of £300. Fortunately, either as the result of judicious husbanding or wilful 
underspending, over 54% of the county's National Reserve grant remained unused. The 
33 Not all of the War Office's rifles were received with the anticipated acclamation. The Middlesex 
National Reserve reported ruefully that its quota of weapons was so worn as to be incapable of 
shooting . London Metropolitan Archive, 994/2, 28/04/13. Several Scottish associations also protested 
in similar vein . The rifles were variously described as 'quite useless' and 'obsolete'. Furthermore their 
loading and sighting qualities made them unsuitable for use in competitions with Territorials. In 
September 1913 the War Office conceded the problem and allowed Reservists to use the same long 
charger loaders as supplied to the Territorials. 
34 Authority granted by 14/TF 412 (QMG FA) of 17/09/13 , Circular Memo No.469. The sums involved in 
shooting were quite significant. In response to an enquiry from Scottish Command in 1913, counties 
estimated that to provide free ammunition for their Reservists would cost them between £50 and £197. 
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36 Nottinghamshire RO, DDT/A 8/1 , 16/04/13. 
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additional costs incurred by the reclassification process were covered by this 'reserve ' .38 
Not all associations had been quite so thrifty. Northern Command requested its 
counties to register men according to , for example, whether they would be useful as 
administrators, mechanics, storemen, postal workers or horse collectors . One 
association queried the additional expense of gathering this specific information and 
was informed no extra funds were being made available. Complaining that the annual 
grant was already fully utilized in covering general costs , the association declined to 
carry out Northern Command 's wishes. 39 
A further problem facing county secretaries was in persuading men who were 
eligible to register for Class I to present themselves for a medical. This was especially 
relevant in the case of those members resident in rural districts. When they did report, 
many men anticipated receiving an enrolment fee while others, not unreasonably, 
expected an immediate reimbursement of their railway fare . Two men from North 
Shields complained that they had taken time off work to attend and asked for 
compensation . The men were paid but it was stressed that they were a special case. 
Northumberland decided that until the War Office laid down what each man should 
receive, the county would give one shilling to each Class I and Class II men once they 
had attended their medical and signed their obligation card. Finances were stretched 
further in Wiltshire when the county representative of the British Medical Association 
announced his members would insist on charging 2/6d rather than the one shilling 
determined by the War Office for each medical. The association also reported a 
reluctance among its men to take the medical in case a failure prejudiced their 
prospects in civilian employment. Another county recorded its regret that men had to 
undergo a medical and petitioned the War Office (without any success) , to have the 
policy scrapped .40 Stirlingshire and Lanarkshire merely resolved to do nothing. The 
policy was successful until the Army Auditor discovered Stirlingshire had not accounted 
for any payment to examining doctors. The War Office's attention was brought to this 
omission and the county was forced to comply. Although it was more enthusiastic to 
conduct medicals than its neighbour, the Edinburgh Association was frustrated in its 
36 Kent RO, MD/TA 1/2, 14/02/12, 9/05/13 and 28/03/13 . 
39 Northumberland RO, NRO 408/8, 31/01/13. 
40 Northumberland RO, NR0408/44, 14/10/13; Wiltshire RO, L 1/101/2, 27/10/13, 9/03/14; London 
Metropolitan Archive, 994/2, 15/12/13. The National Reserve Committee of the Council of County 
Territorial Associations also recommended the Government abandon the idea of medicals until ot 
unless the men were called up for service. It reported 'many counties are at present at a standstill 
owing to the present ruling '. Council of County Territorial Assocs ., Minutes, 25/09/13. W09/Res/956 
(AG1) of 29/11/13 insisted the practice would be continued . 
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attempts to fulfil the instructions when 165 of its 340 registered Class I men failed to 
attend for an examination . Of those who did respond , 14 failed what was an essentially 
cursory test. 41 
The City of Aberdeen was, like several other counties, disappointed at the 
generally poor response to its invitations for men to attend meetings where the new 
regulations were to be explained. Having decided to hold a supper the secretary sent 
out 1020 invitations and self-addressed cards. Fewer than 600 men replied .42 It was 
not, however, only the men themselves who created problems for the administering 
officials. One harassed individual complained not of Whitehall bureaucracy or apathetic 
members, but of a lack of cooperation from his county's own officers. So many 
detachment commanders had not completed a return that the county resorted to posting 
letters to individual members. In defence of his inaction, one officer exemplified the 
frustration of many. Colonel Hicks explained that because the Government had not seen 
fit to officially recognize his position as an officer of the Reserve, he was not authorized 
by the King to administer the regulations. 43 
The counties were also very concerned at the expense which, they predicted , 
would inevitably be incurred by the extra administrative work involved in applying the new 
.. 
regulations . Furthermore they pleaded, with some justification, that not only would the 
revised demands mean more work, but that their existing clerical resources would be 
overwhelmed . Several of them immediately appointed an additional clerk, usually at a 
salary of 25 shillings per week, paid for by a grant from the county. These men, who 
were sometimes themselves registered members, worked under the control of the 
Commandant. Other associations, for example West Lancashire, were prepared to 
appoint one of their own senior members at a higher rate ; he was empowered to pay a 
clerk if he wished to delegate a proportion of the work. Some of these individuals 
subsequently did quite well from their developing positions. Captain Etherington , for 
example, started off at £80 per year in December 1911 and won an increase to £150 per 
year in April 1913. The secretary of the Sussex Reserve did even better. The county 
association agreed to the appointment of a clerk at 30 shillings per week funded purely 
from the National Reserve grant, but was prepared to finance half of an increase of £75 
41 NAS, MD6/19, 5/06/13; MD2/2, 1 /05/14 ; MD11 /21 , 25/03/14. The Army Council had original ly 
intended that Class I men should undergo the same medical as that required for men joining the 
Regular army. It was ultimately significantly downgraded to a fairly simple check of eyes, teeth , legs 
and lungs. However on mobilization, Reservists called up to the Regular Army had to pass the 
.. 
standard army test. 
42 NAS, MD?/4, 4/04/13. 
43 Northumberland RO, NR0408/44, 5/07/13. 
(which took the secretary's annual salary to £400) from county funds at a time, it was 
pointed out, when the association was cutting grants to its Territorial units. Other 
counties expected the permanent staff attached to Territorial battalions to do the work 
and often granted the sergeant an annual gratuity of between £5 and £7. Aberdeen 
granted a £40 increase to its secretary to cover the extra work , funded equally from 
association balances and National Reserve grants. 44 
Overall , the counties' responses to the revised regulations reflected their general 
disappointment with the Government's perceived lack of confidence in the Reserve's 
potential. There was widespread discontent at the continuing failure to demand a 
definite commitment to serve and calls for improvements ranging from inducements 
such as Reserve pay and free shooting facilities, to the need for closer liaison between 
the War and the India Offices in order to address the problem of officer shortages, 
remained incessant. There were even objections to calling the new new Class lila men 
'honorary' rather than 'veteran' members. But above all, there was the widespread belief 
that without the requirement of a absolute obligation to serve (and some tangible 
recognition as compensation for making such a commitment), the new regulations had 
done nothing , as the Ross and Cromarty Association put it, 'likely to result in 
establishing a Reserve of any solid value' .45 More specificallY', a point to which the 
counties' replies once more most often objected was the frequently criticised proposal 
that ex-Territorials would have had to serve eight years in the ranks , or four in the ranks 
and four in the Territorial Force Reserve, before being allowed to register in the National 
Reserve. As most Territorials only served for four years, this regulation would have 
seriously limited the number of men who would be a_vailable for duty. Nottinghamshire 
expressed the arguments typical of many; if this regulation were to be enforced it would 
mean the majority of potentially useful Reservists would of necessity, be ex-Regulars .46/ 
Gloucester again took the opportunity to express its doubts about whether men 
would register for Class I unless a 'considerable' bounty was offered . Essex followed a 
line similar to Nottinghamshire's when it protested that the proposed regulations were 
certain to have a discouraging effect on recruitment. It felt that men accepting the 
obligation of Classes I and II would be filling vacancies already existing in the first and 
second line armies and so could in no sense be deemed 'supplementary' to the full 
44 West Lancashire RO, 356WES/47, 15/04/13; East Sussex RO, TER 4/4, 31/03/13; NAS, MD4/57, 
30/05/13. W09/Gen/3543 (F4) of 6/05/13 laid down the limits within which associati.ons could fix 
secretaries' salaries in view of the additional work involved in reclassification . 
45 NAS, MD8/30, 19/03/13. 
46 Nottinghamshire RO, DDTA 4/2. Report dated 13/03/13. 
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establishment of those forces . The committee believed : 'Should that be the inference, it 
is doubtful whether any man will readily accept the obligation desired '. Moreover, as 
most of the county's Reservists were men who had completed their service liabilities 
years before, it was thought extremely unlikely that recently discharged Territorials 
would be willing to register. 47 
The Nottingham Association also wanted a War Office guarantee that whenever 
possible Reservists would be posted with their old comrades back to their old corps -
Regulars with Regulars, Volunteers with Volunteers, Yeomanry with Yeomanry, etc. If 
the War Office agreed to this , the committee believed , 'we shall be able to provide a full 
and adequate reserve both for the Regulars and the Territorials'. If, on the other hand 
the War Office persisted with its refusal to promise members they would not be drafted 
irrespective of their wishes and of their former service, 'we may get very few men at all ' .48 
The City Association moved a similar resolution four months later and suggested that 
the eight year service rule for a Territorial soldier should be reduced to four on condition 
that the man accept the obligation for Class II and was allocated to his former unit or to 
a Territorial unit of the same branch. 49 
The Army Council once again demonstrated !ts by now traditional contempt for 
the counties' suggestions and responses on how the Reserve should be developed . 
Nevertheless, and in spite of the administrative difficulties and the short time allowed by 
the War Office for the survey to be conducted , by February 1914 most associations had 
despatched their returns . Once it had an idea of the numbers in each of the three 
divisions the authorities determined what they deemed should be the required county 
establishment for Classes I and II . In most cases th~ numbers suggested were far in 
excess of those actually registered. For example, Hereford and Worcester had only 50% 
of its required establishment for Class I and 25% for Class II, while Hertfordshire had 
only 50 of its required 230 Class I men. The secretary of the association complained 
that a 'considerable number of men failed to reply to my invitation to join the class for 
which they are eligible'. Western Command told West Lancashire that the association 
would be required to furnish 655 Class I to fill up the Reserve Battalions of the King 's 
Liverpool Regiment, the Loyal North Lancashire and the King 's Own. This was a 
...... 
number far in excess of those on the register. Oxfordshire Association noted with some 
47 Gloucestershire RO, 02388/1/2, 17/03/13; Essex RO, 6E17D/2, General Purposes Committee letter 
of 17/03/13 to War Office in response to the draft regulations which had been issued .. >Nith 
W09/Reserve/711 (AG5) of 6/03/13. 
46 Nottinghamshire RO, DDTA 4/2, 13/03/13. 
49 Guildhall MSS, 12,613 Vol.1 , 22/07/13 . 
surprise that the number of Class I allotted to Wiltshire was between four and five times 
the number allocated to itself yet the actual strength of Wiltshire's register was only 
about double that of Oxfordshire's. This was an obvious miscalculation as, despite the 
Wiltshire Association being one of the most enthusiastic in its development of the 
Reserve and in a position to be able to boast that most of its Territorial units were up to 
strength, in May 1914 the county had only 26% of its Class I allocation. Middlesex was in 
an even more deplorable position . Only 12% of its total membership was registered in 
Class I or II and it could muster just 16% of its supposed allocation of Class II. 
Gloucestershire was equally unsure whether it would manage to find its quota and 
wanted the Army Council to guarantee that ex-sailors would not be called up into 
Territorial units in order to make good any shortfall. 5° 
On the other hand, Shropshire was considerably more confident and felt it could 
easily fulfil Western Command's requirements for its Class I Reservists. It reported that 
it still had many more members who after medical examination would also become 
eligible and, in similar vein, Essex readily accepted a War Office request to have its 
allocation of Class I increased from 230 to 400. Devonshire was disappointed to be 
informed it would have to provide only 200 Class I when it claimed to have over six times 
that number available. The committee thought it would consequently lose so much 
money in grants that it would be unable to finance many of its Reserve's existing 
activities. 51 
Despite a shortage of officers which was making organization somewhat 
problematic, Derbyshire had initially reported it would have no difficulty in finding its 230 
for Class I and 1000 for Class II. Its committee even feared ill-feeling amongst those 
Whose age precluded them from registering in Class II. Unfortunately, the association's 
optimistic expectations were dashed and, in January 1914, it could muster only 135 al)d 
688 men respectively for the two classes. Presumably because it wanted to keep what 
few men it had for use in protection companies, the association then informed the War 
Office of its opposition to the intention of using Class II men to make good deficiencies 
in the Territorial battalions. It did not suggest how the shortages should be made good , 
but as its Territorial Force Reserve numbered only six officers and 30 other ranks , it no 
doubt endorsed the Secretary of States's own hope that sufficient young and willing 
so w 
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civilians would be forthcoming when the call came.52 
Kent's early expectation of easily fulfilling its quota was similarly shattered . The 
association thought 3500 men were eligible for Class I on age alone and wondered at 
the paltry total of 233 allocated by Eastern Command. Within a few months however, the 
secretary complained of men 'avoiding ' registration and of the impossibility of collecting 
what cards had been signed . The committee decided to write to the War Office asking 
for a definition of what actually constituted 'imminent national danger' and as late as 
November 1913 debated whether to call a special conference of National Reserve 
commanders to discuss the men's disappointing response. Aberdeen 's confident 
assertion that it too would find 'no difficulty' in securing its quota of Class II Reservists 
was also seen as hollow when it finally admitted it had registered only 49% of its 
allocation. 53 
In contrast, Buckinghamshire was anxious to discover how many of its Class I 
were required by Southern Command and where they would be sent on mobilization . 
Furthermore, once it had discovered the number of Class II needed to fill up the county's 
Territorial units, it decided to pre-select the most suitable candidates. Durham also 
immediately allocated its 214 Class II men to Territorial units; 142 were to go to the 
infantry battalions of the Durham Light Infantry and the r emainder to various other units , 
including the Durham Royal Garrison Artillery Heavy Battery. Associations were allowed 
to register Class II men equivalent to the difference between the war establishment and 
the present strength of its Territorial units, together with an excess of 25% on that 
establishment. So that they could be contacted immediately on mobilization , 
Commandants were required to forward the addresses of the nominated men to the 
commanding officers of the various Territorial units .54 Durham was content to accept the 
scheme but Nottinghamshire, probably ignoring the wishes of its own Chairman, 
protested that it could 'produce the impression among the men that they are rendering 
themselves liable to be used for purposes which they would very much dislike'.55 
The survey and the subsequent classification revealed two important things 
about the Reserve . First, recruitment had slowed from its boom period of 1911 and 
1912 and second, that only about one quarter of the 200,000 registered men could be 
assessed as having any real military value. There were exceptions, but most counties 
recorded the number of men who had enrolled in the previous year in scores rather than 
52 Derbyshire RO, D530 No.2, 23/04/13. 
53 Kent RO, MD/TA 1/1, 14/06/12, 25/07/13; NAS, MD4/44, 6/06/13. 
54 Buckinghamshire RO, T/A/1/1, 5/03/14; Durham RO, Organization Committee Vo1.2 , 3/02/14. 
55 Nottinghamshire RO, DDTA 4/2, 13/03/13. 
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hundreds. Northumberland was one of several counties which reported recruiting to be 
at a 'standstill' despite. This was in spite, it was regretted , of having recently provided 
and furnished a club room for the Newcastle Battalion.56 
Seely's analysis of the returns showed that nationally there were just under 
14,000 Class I and 46,000 Class II men. The great majority of members were thus 
Class Ill, whose age or reluctance to commit themselves to the 'honourable obligation' 
made them of dubious reliability. Furthermore, evidence suggests that at the most, only 
about one third of the men in Classes I and II were ex-Regulars as opposed to former 
Volunteers, Militia or Special Reservists. 57 The relatively low number of men in Class I is 
perhaps surprising when considering annually something like 12,000 men left the Army 
Reserve. However, it was widely accepted that in total, only something like 5000 of 
these ex-Reservists would be fit enough, willing or able to fight in a campaign beyond 
four years of their release. Before condemning these former Regulars for their apparent 
lack of patriotism, it should be remembered a man's personal and domestic 
circumstances often changed significantly during the time spent in the Army Reserve . 
The paucity of men to fill shortages within Territorial units was further 
compounded by the Reserve's regulations which stipulated that men not required for 
Territorial units should be used to furnish contingents for the protection of local 
vulnerable points. In an acknowledgement that some counties might find it difficult to 
provide its quota of Class I and II men, the War Office helpfully, but unrealistically, 
suggested they should make up their number from excess men in neighbouring 
counties. The War Office had long anticipated using the Reserve in protection squads 
but the 1913 regulations still failed to give a firm lead in defining, other than in general 
terms, what was meant by 'vulnerable points'. To do so would, the War Office believed , 
involve a commitment to increased expenditure. 
The survey had, in reality, provided only a speculative idea of the organization 's 
potential for it was a reserve in name only. While many members were known to belong 
to rifle clubs, the War Office could only guess at the physical fitness of the men . Being a 
good shot did not mean that a member was capable of marching a significant distance. 
What was undoubtedly a minority of its members had been in the Regular Army and 
could thus be assumed to be familiar with its ways and demands. But, even if a man 
Was reasonably fit, a proficient shot and an ex-Regular, it would of necessity be weeks 
56 Northumberland RO, NR0408/44, 9/04/14. 
57 Hansard Vol.59.217, 3/03/14. A breakdown of Glasgow's different divisions shows tha t of its 202 
Class I and 736 Class II, somewhere around 31% and 28% respectively were former Regulars. NAS, 
MD1 0/6, 26/09/13. 
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before he could be efficient enough to take his place in an overseas battalion . As even 
the Territorials' most strident supporters accepted the need for an intensive post-
mobilization six month training period for its young soldiers, it was optimistic to assume 
that a 45 year old family man could be ready in substantially less time than a fit 20 year 
old with probably no commitments. Few military thinkers were prepared to assume the 
Reserve would be capable of filling up the Special Reserve or Territorial units, believing 
instead that it would do no more than act as guides or orderlies in the event of invasion. 
During the Army Estimates debate of June 1913 Colonel Burn became one of several 
Members who thundered their doubts: 
You cannot look on the National Reserve as a real reserve in the sense that men will be 
fitted to join the ranks in the event of our Expeditionary Force being ordered abroad. 
Many of them have never been in the army at all and they get no training year after year. 
How can men without uniforms, without officers and without training be fit to take their 
place in the Army and face a continental foe?58 
In contrast, Seely, either from faith or perhaps from motives driven more by propaganda , 
declared that the Reserve would be 'extremely valuable in maintaining lines of 
communication' and then, somewhat more extrava_gantly, that its members were 
prepared to serve 'anywhere in the world'. 59 Having been earlier condemned for his 
refusal to declare a more specific role for the Reserve, Seely was now condemned for 
his optimism. His musing that the Territorial Force would be completed on mobilization 
by National Reservists elicited a sarcastic response from one critic who ridiculed the 
lack of an obligation on the part of the Reservists . He accused Seely of being 'too 
modest' and suggested he might as well include Ch.elsea Pensioners and Boy Scouts 
in his calculations. 60 
This comment was typical of the disdain heaped upon Seely for his apparent / 
support of the idea to use the Reserve to complete establishments for the Territorials 
and Special Reserve. From his position as Chairman of the County of London 
Association, Lord Esher described the idea of using the Reserve as a 'sort of bucket for 
filling up gaps' in the Regulars and Territorials as 'a very great error' . the Reserve was 
not originally intended, he insisted, as a supplement to the Territorial Force and was a 
'distinct force ... with an entirely distinct function '. Knowing that their units would be made 
up to strength from this reservoir of former soldiers, Esher argued, might cause some 
£Qs to neglect Territorial recruiting. Such a policy would 'take the steel out of 
58 H -
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Associations , out of commanding officers and out of the men themselves'. 61 
Inside Parliament, the Unionist spokesman thought it 'perfectly ludicrous' to 
contemplate putting these old sweats, who knew every trick of the soldiering trade , into 
the same units as raw recru its. To emphasize the perceived danger, Colonel Burn 
informed the House that a senior Territorial officer had exclaimed 'heaven help us if the 
Special Reserve and the National Reserve were used to fill up the ranks of the 
Territorials '. Other MPs similarly believed putting hard-bitten former Regulars under the 
command of a naive Territorial officer, possibly just out of public school, would inevitably 
create difficulties of discipline and morale. Captain Hessel's solution was to suggest 
putting skeleton cadres of these old soldiers into specified units of the Special Reserve 
or to form them as the nuclei of protection companies. Major Stanley agreed the 
Reservists were 'excellent men' , but joined in the cry that militarily they should be 
discounted . Mr Hunt went further, declaring that it was unfair to expect these men , many 
of whom had 'already done their bit for their country' to be prepared to serve in such a 
'rotten organization '. It was not their fault, but the fault of the industrial system and 
employers who would not allow men time off for training. 62 
Despite the seemingly relentless criticism,.during the debate on the 1914 
Estimates, Seely expressed a remarkable confidence in the condition of the various 
reserves. He acknowledged the Special Reserve was some 13,000 short of 
establishment but was confident that as an identical number of National Reservists had 
agreed to serve overseas, the Special Reserve remained in a position to fulfil its 
designated function of rapid reinforcement of the Regular battalions. 53 He praised the 
Patriotism and willingness of these National Reservists , especially as they were 
prepared to serve without 'fee or reward of any kind in the meantime'. Seely next turned 
to the Territorials. He claimed that as 45,000 Class II Reservists had undertaken to / 
serve at home and the Territorial Force was in his estimation 56,000 under 
establishment, these Class II men would go a long way to making good the deficit. He 
Was so convinced these Reservists would come forward on mobilization that he 
assured the House there was no reason for it to be 'concerned for the state of the 
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British Army, either with regard to the Regulars , Special Reserve or the Territorial 
Force' .64 
At least one county was more than a little suspicious of the Secretary of State's 
apparent insousciance about the condition of the Reserves. The City of London 
Association demanded to know whether the Army Council was intending to make good 
the deficiencies in the Special Reserve and the Territorials entirely from the National 
Reserve.65 The Reserve was supplementary to the establishment laid down for the army 
so it could be surmised that if the War Office was intending to make up numbers by 
using the Reserve it could finance the Territorial Force at a permanently lower 
establishment. The Liberal Government, determined to keep military expenditure under 
a tight rein , certainly appreciated the savings to be made by funding the National 
Reserve rather than financing a full strength Special Reserve and Territorial Force. One 
dubious member pointed out that as the Regulars and Territorials were both well under 
establishment, a substantial amount of the current year's Estimate would remain 
unspent. He enquired optimistically of the Secretary of State whether he intended to 
allocate the underspend on equipping the National Reserve.66 Seely declined to give 
such a guarantee. 
The City of London's attempt to discover whether the War Office intended to 
make up the shorfall in the Special Reserve and the TF with National Reservists 
followed hard upon a meeting between a deputation from the Metropolitan Mayors' 
Association (MMA) and the Under Secretary of State. The MMA was an independent body 
Which did not speak for the London Division of the National Reserve but which did have 
close links with it. The association's committee passed a resolution in March 1913 
urging its members to encourage Reservists to sign for Classes I or II, to campaign for 
the War Office to improve provision for rifle practice and to agitate for an increase of the 
grant for Class Ill men from 1 shilling to 2 shillings. The association sought permission 
to send a deputation to speak with Seely. On receipt of the request Colonel Banon 
recommended the rejection of all parts of the association's resolution but suggested 
that the deputation should be allowed to visit the War Office. He pointed out the help the 
Mayors' Association had already offered the Reserve in the way of publicity and practical 
assistance and thought that to deny them a meeting would probably result in them 
Withdrawing their support. Seely decided against attending the meeting personally but 
lli}reed that Tennant and the Adjutant-General, (AG) Lieutenant-General Sir Henry 
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Sclater, should receive the deputation. 
Tennant was clearly determined not to concede any points to the deputation , 
which consisted of three Mayors. When they outlined the financial difficulties of 
attempting to arrange socials and parades for their men in an attempt to make them 
feel part of a purposeful organization, Tennant told them the grant was not intended to 
provide members with social entertainment and scathingly asked what function for the 
nation's benefit their Class Ill men could possibily fulfil. He showed little sympathy when 
informed that battalions could not afford to supply additional practice ammunition or that 
members expected to have a band present at parades. A.D.Dawnay, the Mayor of 
Wandsworth said his men were too poor to pay increased subscriptions and while his 
local battalion had earlier managed to raise £50 in a public appeal , only £3 had been 
forthcoming in a second attempt. Members and the public argued that if the Reserve 
was important, the Government, and not rate payers, should finance it. Dawnay did not 
want a Mayor's Fund to buy uniforms because he feared members would take the 
uniform and never be seen again and, in another moment of great candour, H. B. Bird , 
Mayor of Shored itch, admitted that his men wanted to be in 'a glorified position without 
taking the obligation'. They were, he said, 'not prepared to to do anything to work for their 
living' . When Sclater suggested they join the Territorials if they wanted a uniform, 
Dawnay tried to temper some of Bird's frankness by explaining that most of the men 
were married with families to support, would not be granted leave by their employers 
and that the summer camp was a 'terror' to them. 
Having heard enough and denied the deputation any concessions, Tennant drew 
the meeting to a close by thanking them for their help and promising them that he would 
tell the Prime Minister that they considered the 1 shilling grant for Class Ill inadequate. 
Sclater told the Mayors to keep encouraging their members to sign for Classes I and II , 
but made a cutting remark about how London was 'by far the most behind-hand ' in 
securing signatures. Tennant's and Sclater's less than cooperative attitude did not 
Prevent R.W.Granville-Smith, Mayor of the City of Westminster, declaring that they had 
given the deputation 'hope of some encouragement' . Whereas before the meeting he 
had considered the 'task almost impossible', he now assured Tennant they would 'go 
back to our districts with fresh endeavours because we shall feel that the task is not 
113 
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quite impossible' .67 
Surprisingly, despite its entrenched and apparently hostile attitude towards 
virtually anything the associations recommended or requested, the War Office did not 
completely alienate the organizations upon whom it depended for the successful 
administration of the Reserve. It disputed the combined associations' views on 
uniforms, musketry, funding and intended role, vetoed the idea that the National 
Reserve should be allowed to raise medical units and still refused to allot Class Ill men 
to any other than vague local protection duties, but still largely enjoyed the confidence of 
the county committees. 58 
The same could not be said of Seely himself. Like many British ministers before 
and since, Seely ultimately came to grief over Irish affairs. As Secretary of State he bore 
primary responsibility for the defence of the troubled province. On taking the Seals he 
inherited an existing scheme for mobilization which required mainland Territorials to 
replace Regular battalions withdrawn to constitute part of the expeditionary force. There 
was concern among both politicians and the military that any delay between the 
departure of the Regulars and the arrival of the Territorials might invite a hostile raid 
aimed at exploiting the South's anti-British sentiment. This would have the twin 
objectives of embarrassing the London Government and of disrupting mobilization . 
Leading protestants in the province believed that a locally mobilized National Reserve 
could help to prevent that possibility by garrisoning ports and coasts and perhaps serve 
as a deterrent to a general rising. 69 
Haldane had certainly been in favour of such a scheme but it was littered with 
Problems. Not least was the fact that because Rifle Volunteers and T erritorials had 
never been raised in Ireland, there were no county associations able to administer the 
Reserve .70 Registration would therefore have to be administered by an organization / 
specially raised for the task. Of even greater local and contemporary concern was the 
67 w 032/18612.17 A. Verbatim report, Visit of Deputation of Deputation of Metropolitan Mayors ' 
Association, 23/06/14. When sending the account to Seely, the Secretary, R.Brade, drew particular 
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obligations' . Brade also minuted that the Treasury had recently challenged even the 1 shilling grant 
:nd that any additional expenditure on shooting provision could not be justified . 
In response to enquiries, the War Office also refused permission for men to enrol who were 
!;mporarily resident in the colonies . 9/Reserve/666 (AG5) of 23/12/12. 
W032 .6638, The Formation of the National Reserve in Ireland, 1910-1914. The .detail for the 
;?llowing discussion comes largely from this file . 
1 
For the difficulties and problems which beset attempts to form , or ban , auxiliary forces in Ireland, see 
·Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition 1558-1945, Manchester: MUP, 1991 , Appendix, pp.291-95 .. 
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possibility of arming Irish nationalists with National Reserve weapons.71 As there was 
in reality no intention of issuing permanent arms to the Reserve, this objection carried 
little weight. Traditional British doubts over Irish loyalty to the Crown, however, remained . 
Another consideration which further seemed to hamper the reserve 's progress 
was the familiar one of finance . The War Office refrained from making definite plans 
until the Treasury approved a grant. This was finally agreed in May 1912, five months 
after Lord Roberts' National Reserve Committee had announced it was in favour of 
creating a Reserve in Ireland . Seely's arrival at the War Office in June 1912, however, 
coincided with significant political developments within the island and , as a 
consequence, public planning came very much to a halt. 
In March 1913, Seely stated in the House that the 'appropriate machinery' for 
registering an Irish Reserve was still under consideration .72 He offered this assurance 
even though he had probably already decided not to pursue the issue for in June his 
office informed the Irish administration , but not Irish Command , that the plan was to be 
shelved. 73 Registration would only have served to further heighten the political turmoil 
and tension in the period about to culminate with the Home Rule Bill. Expedient as his 
decision may have been, Seely's lack of honesty glearly confused Irish Command , 
Which remained in favour of the scheme, and also Colonel Banon, his own 
representative. In August, Banon had told an audience in Newcastle that as the Irish 
were a 'military nation' of former Regulars and Militia, they were ideally suited to forming 
a Reserve and registration was about to begin .74 Following the Curragh Incident a flurry 
of short lived activity did occur, but in effect the proposal was dead. Given the wariness 
with which Whitehall traditionally approached Irish matters, the War Office's tortuous 
procrastination was perhaps only to be expected. Nevertheless, an opportunity to 
provide Ireland with a reserve of loyal , trained men was lost and it ensured that when , 
War came, British Territorials would be sent to guard Irish ports. 75 Any former soldier of 
non-military age who, had the chance materialized, might have chosen to enrol in an 
Irish National Reserve was, when younger comrades were leaving to enlist in the 
71 
Facilitated access to weapons had also been one of the reasons why Ireland had not been permitted 
to form Rifle Volunteer units in the nineteenth century. 
12 H 
ansard Vol. SO. 722, 17/03/13. 
73 
W032.6638. See also E.A.Muenger, The British Military Dilemma in Ireland, Kansas: Gill & 
Macmillan , 1991 , pp.162-3. 
74 (Newcastle) Daily Chronicle 2/08/12 . 
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tWas not as if Ireland was short of paramilitary units in 1914, but there were no-battalions of Irish 
Territorials. Colonel Greig claimed the 100,000 Ulster Volunteers were a well trained force , 'equal to 
rneet any army in the world ' and demanded that these men of 'Carson 's army' be recogn ized as the I. , 
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Regular Army, unable to serve in any military capacity. 76 
Seely's responsibi lity for the defence of Ireland, and indeed for the army as a 
whole, came to an abrupt end when the mishandling of the Curragh Incident caused his 
resignation . The premature termination of his period of tenure meant that he was 
unable to accept his invitation to attend the Surrey auxiliaries' Whitsun Camp at 
Stachey's Newlands estate. The house, which had been designated an emergency 
wartime hospital, had several Voluntary Aid Detachments attached and the other 
element of the county's Technical Reserve, the Corps of Guides, was inspected by 
Major-General Sir William Robertson . The highpoint of the occasion was the inspection 
of 1000 National Reservists, 300 of whom had opted to serve abroad with Regular 
units, by the Adjutant-General. Strachey considered Sclater's presence to be essential 
for both he and Kitchener had been in India for some years and knew little of the 
Reserve or of its possibilities. Having observed the culmination of the weekend 's 
activities, an exercise in which the Guides penetrated a Reservist outpost line thrown 
around the estate's reservoir, the Sclater apparently later informed Kitchener of his 
impressions and of his assessment of the Reserve's mobilization potential. 77 
Strachey was delighted with the way the camp had gone and with the seemingly 
favourable impression the event had had on the guests. Thanking Roberts for his 
attendance, Strachey enthused: 
The battalion you saw defeats the idea that old soldiers wouldn 't be of any use ... They 
seemed to have forgotten nothing of their cunning and it was a real pleasure to see 
them crawling through the woods or holding the outpost line .. . ! believe that with proper 
officers such a battalion would be exceedingly formidable. 78 
In June 1914 The Times could not resist again drawing attention to the 
Government's perceived neglect of the Reserve's potential. Impressed by the spectacle 
of the 1st London National Reserve Division arrayed for inspection on Horse Guards, 
the correspondent noted: 'At present much enthusiasm and esprit de corps which might 
be usefully directed for the public advantage are officially neglected except when 
required to cover other official shortcomings' .79 Two weeks after the death of Franz 
76 I 
. n her The British Military Dilemma in Ireland, op. cit., Muenger correctly outl ines the problems 
Involved in the attempt to create an Irish National Reserve but seems unclear to what real purpose its 
members might have been put. She misses the significance (p.158) of the forwarding of applications 
:rom Irish ex-soldiers to join the Reserve by the Spectator. By despatching the applications Strachey 
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.Strachey, St.Loe Strachey, London : Gollancz, 1930, pp.250-6. 
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Roberts Papers. NAM 7101-23/85/32. Strachey to Roberts 4/06/14. 
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Times 29/06/14 . 
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Ferdinand the Surrey National Reserve demonstrated what could be achieved with only 
minimal Government support. The Croydon Battalion became the first unit to parade in 
full uniform, paid for by the men themselves or the battalion 's own central fund . Strachey 
told them the military authorities could not long persist in their 'dog-in-the-manger' 
attitude and would soon be forced to allow county associations to clothe certain 
sections of their Reservists through a combination of official grants and private 
benevolence. eo Strachey and the National Reserve were not to wait long before his 
prophecy became fact and a mere eight weeks after the Surrey auxiliaries had executed 
the scheme around Newland's reservoir, they guarded it in earnest in anticipation of 
German saboteurs. 
80 Times 13/07/14. 
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CHAPTER VI: MOBILIZATION AND A NEW AUXILIARY 
Three days after hostilities commenced, the Under-Secretary of State for War 
announced a review was underway of how the National Reserve could best be utilized.1 
This statement, which underscored the Government's earlier reluctance to commit itself 
to establishing a specific role for the movement's personnel, was supported by the 
Chairman of the Oxfordshire Association , Lord Saye and Sele. On 12 August he 
circulated all county associations declaring, 'The time was not yet ripe' for dealing with 
the employment of the National Reserve.2 By the time these announcements were in the 
public domain, several thousand Class I and Class II National Reservists had already 
joined Regular or Territorial units. Given the War Office's reluctance to commit itself to a 
specific role for the Reserve, it is not surprising that thousands of members did not wait 
to be called up. Many of the ex-Regulars who presented themselves at the local 
barracks and depots were immediately posted to their regimental Reserve Battalions 
and were soon drafted to France as reinforcements. 
The early findings of Tennant's intimated review appeared in the form of two War 
Office letters sent to General Officers Commanding Commands (GOC Command.s).3 
The Army Council instructed Commands to liaise with their respective civil authorities 
and warn them that military assistance would not be avaible to quell any local civil 
disorder. The local authorities were to be informed that they could request the help of 
Class Ill National Reservists over 50 years of age to guard against civil disturbance and 
protect vulnerable points; Regulars or Territorials designated for those tasks could then 
be released for other duties. In order to qualify for pay, these men would have to attest 
for one year or the duration but would not be supplied with uniforms or arms. Four days 
after despatching the second of the two letters, the War Office thought again and 
instructed Commands to suspend any action already taken on them. A set of revised 
instructions4 issued two days later put Class II Reservists at the disposal of GOC 
Commands; they were told to ut~ize the men to form guards or to replace Territorials 
already detached from their own units to protect vulnerable points. These men were to 
be provided with arms and clothing. Any Class Ill men whose services might be 
1 Hansard Vol.65.2156, 7/08/14. 
2 W09!Reserve/1278 (AG1) of 11/08/14. Lord Saye and Sele to county associations. 
3 W065!308 (AG3) of 10/08/14 and 11/08/14. 
4 W065!314 (AG3) of 17/08/14. 
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requested by the civil authority or by local companies or individuals, would not be 
provided with arms and would receive only a brassard. They, like the Class lis, would be 
attached to a local Territorial unit and a daily charge levied for their services. The Class 
Ills were not, after all , to be attested and, as they were to be paid by their 'employer', the 
state was not prepared to accept any liability for them. 
Further instructions invited those ex-Regulars and non-commissioned officers 
(NCOs) of Classes I and II under 42 years of age who had not responded to earlier, 
informal exhortations, to join the New Army as NCOs; other members under 42 in both 
classes were urged to enrol in the Reserve units currently in the process of formation . 
Those Class II men who were over 42 were told to enlist in Territorial units as 
supernumeraries and, after some official equivocation , were allowed to assume their 
former rank. 5 This option was also made available to members of Class Ill, but they 
were to receive no gratuity. It was stressed througout that these men were to be used 
solely for protecting sites of military importance; any water, gas or electrical company 
who wanted to use Class Ill men as guards would still have to pay. Thus, by the third 
week in August, those National Reservists who had chosen not to enlist until they were 
called were in receipt of their call up papers. They were under no legal obligation to 
respond but if they did, the Class Is and lis would qualify for a gratuity. Events were now 
unfolding so rapidly that at least one association warned the War Office that congestion 
at the local barracks would cause a delay in processing its men. Nevertheless, 
Hertfordshire claimed that by mid-September 'practically the whole of Classes I and II ' 
had rejoined the colours and a 'considerable number' of eligible Class Ill had also 
gone. In total this involved over eighty Class I and nearly 250 Class 11. 6 
While thousands of prewar members were prepared to enlist voluntarily or go 
when called, many other former servicemen preferred simply to register as National 
Reservists and await developments. Evidence about the precise numbers registering in 
August and September is very sketchy as few complete registers have survived . The 
extant Nottinghamshire roll demonstrates a definite increase in registrations during 
August, with nearly 250 men signing once the war was under way. 7 In East Yorkshire, an 
additional 105 Class I and 187 Class II men also decided to register in the first two 
weeks of the war and, by May 1915, 1618 men or 53% of Northumberland's total, had 
joined since 4 August. Fife experienced a 40% and Lincolnshire a 35% increase in their 
5 W0651315 (AG3) of 22/08/14. A draft of the letter had stated that any National Reservist who was not 
prepared to attest as a private should not be called . 
6 Derbyshire RO, 0530/2, 26/08/14; Hertfordshire RO, TAFA/1 , 19/09/14. 
7 Nottinghamshire RO, DDTA 9/1 . 
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membership, whilst a further 33 men joined the Stoke Newington Battalion . Of this latter 
group, the average age was 47 years , with 49% of the total being 49 years or under. One 
third of the men were ex-Regulars and the average length of military service for the 
whole group was an impressive eight years. 8 
Why these men waited so long before offering their services is open to some 
speculation. They might have been swayed by the contemporary patriotic fervour then 
sweeping the country, or it might be that anticipating eventual enlistment they secured 
their eligibility for a gratuity of £5 or £10. If that was the case, they had to register quickly, 
for the War Office, no doubt expecting some men might not be registering for purely 
altruistic motives, announced that only Reservists who signed their willingness to serve 
before 11 August would be entitled to the gratuity. This was followed in September by an 
instruction preventing associations from registering any additional Class I men. The 
authorities decided sufficient time had elapsed to allow men to fulfil their honourable 
obligation and that the class was now closed . Any Class I member who had not been 
called was instructed to transfer to Class II or Ill. 9 
In view of the avalanche of demands made upon the county associations in the 
early weeks of the war, it is little wonder some of them temporarily lost interest in how 
their Class Ill Reservists might be used. Faced with the tasks of bringing their units up 
to war strength and of fully equipping them, the associations had more pressing 
problems than concerning themselves with how their often more elderly former warriors 
might be used. There was also the disappointment at Kitchener's decision not to use 
the associations as the vehicle by which the army was to be expanded but, in truth, the 
associations had undertaken little preparation to cope with a sudden explosion in 
numbers. 
It was perhaps ironic that Haldane, the man who had engineered the process 
whereby the second line army could reinforce the first, should have recommended 
Kitchener's appointment as Secretary of State for War. For his part, Kitchener was 
acutely concerned about the possibility of invasion, believing that if he chose to commit 
the home army to support the overseas expeditionary force, anti-invasion planning 
would be severely, and perhaps fatally, disrupted. Moreover, given the independence of 
.. 
the county associations and the alleged inadequacies of the Territorials, the Secretary 
of State's decision to ignore the 'town clerks' army 11 0 and start from scratch to mould a 
8 Northumberland RO, NR0408/5, 17/05/15; Figures calculated from National Archives of Scotland 
(NAM) MD?/24, 19/02/15; Lincolnshire RO, TA1/1 and Hackney Archives , 0/S/49/-2. 
9 W09/Reserve/1312a (AG1) of 9/09/14. 
10 Viscount Grey of Falloden, Twenty-Five Years , London : Hodder & Stoughton , 1925, Vol.ll , p.68. 
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new force suited to his needs for overseas service is perhaps understandable. To 
Kitchener, who possibly confused the National Reserve with the Special Reserve,11 and 
indeed to many of the county associations swamped by new recruits to their first, and 
shortly afterwards, their second line units, Class Ill men of the National Reserve 
commanded a low priority. Nevertheless, some associations decided not simply to 
await a War Office decision and , by anticipating the various uses to which their Class Ill 
might be put, began to organize their men into groups ready for later deployment. 
Several National Reserve units had already printed posters and cards which 
requested their under 55 year olds to declare whether they would enlist in the 
Territorials, join a local guard unit or be prepared to serve in the battalion if it was 
posted away from the locality. Thousands of these cards were distributed within hours 
of the outbreak of war. Reservists over 55 years were urged to offer themselves as 
neighbourhood guards and all members were advised of parades when 
measurements would be taken for uniforms and boots. 
Only two days after the declaration, officials of the London National Reserve 
Division also began to make contingency plans. It was agreed that command of the 
division be handed over to the commandant and brigade commanders and that the 
secretary of the Joint Command should become one of the GOG's (General Officer 
Commanding) staff officers. The two London Associations claimed that, if required , they 
had some 36,000 men ready for deployment. On 10 August the Commandant of the 
Cambridgeshire battalion was instructed to proceed with allocating men to guard 
positions and, working within the proviso that the association was not to become 
responsible for any financial outlay, began to compile lists of men aged over 50 years 
who had previously agreed to make themselves available. Derbyshire also ordered its 
commandant to begin organizing his Class Ill men and allocated local branches of the 
National Reserve an advance of funds to cover initial expenditure. With the support of 
the Chief Constable, on 13 August the association officially requested the War Office to 
allow them to call up Class Ill men as Special Constables to guard railways and other 
vulnerable points. Nottinghamshire went a stage further by authorizing the commandant 
to purchase greatcoats, caps and armlets for its Class II Reservists who, it was 
assumed, would soon be ordered to guard local points. Inverness. decided to 
reorganize all of its units into one battalion commanded by the association's President. 
All calls for utilization of the Reserve were now to go through him rather than the 
11 !.Beckett, The Territorial Force', in !.Beckett & K.Simpson (ed) A Nation in Arms, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1985, p.130. 
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Commandant and a committee was formed to liaise with the local railway companies, 
the owners of the Caledonian Canal and the Chief Constable to ascertain how many 
Class Ill men under 50 would be required to furnish guards. 12 In those frantic days of 
early August one battalion commander was not prepared to wait for his association to 
allocate him and his men duties: Colonel Sharples of an East Lancashire National 
Reserve battalion submitted a resolution to the East Lancashire Association requesting 
it to mobilize his men immediately as a battalion of infantry, adding that the officers had 
offered to contribute £1000 towards the expenses.13 
Bucking hamshire was one of the first counties off the mark in forming and 
deploying what were shortly to become known as Protection Companies. On 6 August 
the association decided to combine Class Ill members in adjoining parishes to form 
guards for bridges, waterworks and other essential sites. As the War Office's stated 
intention for the National Reserve was to provide protection for vulnerable points, the 
creation of such local guards, albeit before ordered to do so, was predictable. 14 Tennant 
acknowledged the gathering momentum when he told the House that the county 
associations had received instructions to enrol volunteers from Classes II and Ill for 
such work and that a considerable number of Reservists were now so employed .15 At 
the request of the GOC Dover Fortress, a 40-strong garrison of Reservists was 
guarding Dover harbour and a little later 214 Northallerton Reservists were sent to 
Stockton as an Observation Company. In early September, Western Command ordered 
the East Lancashire National Reserve to find a guard of 136 men under the command 
of a former colonel of the Northumberland Militia for the Manchester Ship Canal and, 
following a request from Eastern Command for a list of officers prepared to command 
railway companies, Cambridgeshire began to organize its Class Ill men into such units. 
By October, 120 of the county's Reservists had been sent to Suffolk to guard points in 
Stowmarket and Lowestoft.16 
The order to post companies away from their own county prompted several 
12 NAS, MD8/24, 17/08/14. 
13 Guildhall MSS, 12,613 Vol.1 , 28/07/14; Cambridge RO, R/68/11 , General Purpose Committee, 
10/02/14; Derbyshire RO, 0530/2, 13/08/14; Nottinghamshire RO, DDTA/4/2, 13/08/14; Manchester 
RO, M73/3/21 , 11/08/14. 
14 Buckinghamshire RO, T/A/1/4, 6/08/14. On 25/09/14 GOC Southern Command ordered these C1ass 
Ill protection groups to stand down unless the water companies or local corporations paid the men for 
performing the guard duty. As they were reluctant to do this , members of Volunteer Training Corps 
(VTC) often replaced the National Reservists. 
15 Hansard Vol.66.45, 26/08/14. 
16 Kent RO, MD/TA 3/3, 9/09/14; F. Reynard , A Brief History of the TF Association of the County of 
York (North Riding) 1908-1919, Northallerton: Joseph Walker, 1919, p.13; Manchester RO, M73/3/6, 
11/09/14; Ca.mbridgeshire RO, R68/11 , General Purpose Committee, 14/10/14. 
queries regarding propriety. When Northern Command asked the Derbyshire 
Association to provide a guard of 1 00 for a prisoner of war camp at Dennington Park, the 
association agreed but suggested that the Leicestershire Association would be a more 
appropriate body to supply the men . Some weeks later the Cambridgeshire Association 
was asked to provide yet more men for duty in Suffolk. It agreed, on the firm 
understanding that the officers should also come from the Cambridgeshire Association . 
The county later protested when Eastern Command proposed to split one of the 
companies serving in Suffolk into separate detachments; strong representation 
ensured that it stayed as a discrete unit. 17 
These early local and district moves came with the tacit knowledge and approval 
of the War Office, but it was not until September that Sir Francis Lloyd , the GOC London 
District, assured members that the National Reserve would be officially and nationally 
called upon at the 'earliest opportunity' and in substantial numbers. 18 Lloyd was actually 
a little behind events for, by the time he gave this assurance, the War Office circular 
requesting associations to encourage ex-Regular NCOs on their registers to enlist as 
instructors to New Army units had already been issued and call up of certain Reservists 
was about to begin .19 Nevertheless, not all associations were organizing as promptly as 
the War Office wished . Perthshire initially resolved it would do nothing about forming 
guard sections until instructed to do so by Scottish Command and until it had arms for 
the men . A few days later the committee decided that War Office proposals for providing 
guards for vulnerable points were 'practically unworkable in this county'. 20 
A fundamental problem facing associations with widely scattered units was one 
of supervision. Sporadic transport services meant Commandants were physically 
unable to visit the various sites and requests to their Commands for cars or 
motorcycles were usually refused . The problem was exacerbated by the continued 
shortage of junior officers who would otherwise have been able to relieve some of the 
burden and the fact that so many of the commandants' own committees had 
themselves re-enlisted in the Regulars or Territorials . Unfortunately, many of these men 
were also local commanders and on their departure for service did not hand over their 
17 Derbyshire RO, 0530/2 , 28/12/14; Cambridgeshire RO, R68/11 , General Purpose Committee, .. 
23/12/14, 17/01/15. 
18 General Sir Francis Lloyd , quoted by H.J.Tennant. Hansard Vol.66.675, 10/09/14. 
1 ~ W09/Reserve/1378 (AG1) of 8/09/14 followed hard on a telegram making much the same request, 
sent to many associations a few days earlier. By mid-September about 90 of Surrey's Reservists had 
followed this route , a figure which by November had risen to 220. Surrey RO, 608/2/2, 14/9/14 and 
9/11/14. 
20 NAS, MD7/37, 14/08/14 and 18/08/14, in response to W065!314 (AG3) of 17/08/14. 
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battalion or company registers. Coupled with a stream of often contradictorary orders 
from Commands and the War Office, it is perhaps surprising that so many associations 
did manage to provide sufficient guards in August and September for their dispersed 
and numerous locations. 
By early October, Buckinghamshire had received orders from the War Office to 
provide a railway company comprising three officers aged between 40 and 55 years, 
and 117 other ranks. The association decided it would try to get Class II men for the 
other ranks, promising that they would be armed and equipped as Territorials . War 
Office regulations stated that Class II men would be required to attest as privates and 
that they should enlist on the understanding that service would last for the duration. By 
the end of the first week of October, Hertfordshire had already mobilized , clothed and 
equipped a guard of two officers and 60 men; in London, over 2000 Reservists were 
guarding strategic sites within the capital and in the North-East just under 600 had 
become part of the home defence forces guarding the Tyneside shipyards and 
munitions works. One company of Cornish Reservists was despatched for similar work 
to the National Explosives factory at Hayle.2 ' 
Few of these early companies received anywhere near full equipment. Originally 
the army described these guards rather quaintly as 'watchmen' and ordered them to be 
provided with uniform, cap, puttees and coat. It further decided that 'any old 
equipment. .. would suffice'. By October it had provided scarlet armbands printed with 
'National Reserve' for use by any association which could not yet supply uniforms. 
Reservists on guard at Ely pleaded with their association to provide them with rifles, 
clothing and boots but, like all associations, Cambridgeshire was desperately trying to 
provide its Territorial units with whatever equipment it could acquire. Oxfordshire 
dispatched its first reservist company to duty without either rifles or greatcoats. Railway 
companies came low on its priority list, but in November the War Office declared that it 
would try to issue up to 50% of the arms required by men on railway protection. 
Weapons might, of course, be needed but, to many Reservists guarding exposed 
stretches of railway line, the more pressing need was for personal comforts . The 
Mayoress of Leicester quickly organized a comforts committee and sent mufflers and 
boots to the men of one of the county's companies which were 'very much appreciated ' . 
.. 
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Similar donations were made by several other communities and individuals. 22 Local 
communities could also provide Reservists from outside their area with needs other 
than for their immediate personal use: the people of Leigh clubbed together to buy the 
National Reserve guards of the local prisoner-of-war camp some miniature rifles and 
ammunition for training purposes.23 
Leicestershire reported that the response to its call for volunteers was 'speedily 
forthcoming', but that the five officers and 209 men guarding railway viaducts and 
bridges would have been in position much earlier had the 'necessary shelters been 
provided' . Nottinghamshire was only one of several associations slow in kitting out its 
men because stock sizes of Territorial suits were unsuitable for the Reservists and the 
committee was forced to commission specially made uniforms. In contrast, by early 
November the Shropshire Association, which had for years been a by-word for financial 
efficiency, had fully clothed all three of its companies, each of which comprised two 
officers and 117 men. Things were slow to improve for the East Riding's contingent on 
guard duty in Southern England. The Assistant Commandant Number 1 Line of 
Communications, Winchester, Lord Saye and Sele, requested the men's association to 
use some of its annual grant on providing comforts for them. The county responded 
curtly that there were no funds available; consequently its men remained ill-clad and 
cold .24 
The tardy official supply of uniforms encouraged some individuals to acquire 
them from alternative sources. This could cause problems and prompted Sir William 
Byles to complain that the lack of control was allowing some men fraudulently to wear 
purchased suits . 'What' he asked of the Under Secretary of State, 'if he was a common 
criminal?' Tennant, whose patience was clearly wearing thin, offered the irrisory retort: 
'Then he should be treated as such'. 25 
As autumn gave way to winter, Reservists up and down the country spent many 
cold , uncomfortable nights pacing stretches of railway line, peering over parapets of lofty 
22 A Mrs Pullar of Dunbarnie was praised by the Perthshire Association for knitting 30 cardigans for its 
Reservist railway guards at Craigend at a time when the association had not yet approved an order for 
new uniforms. NAS, MD7/37, 24/09/14. 
23 Army Council Instruction No. 9 of September 1914; ACI 22 of October 1914; Cambridgeshire RO, 
R68/11 , General Purpose Committee, 25/11/14; Oxfordshire RO, 0/11/1/A1/3, 31/10/14; ACI44 of 
November 1914; Leicestershire RO, DE819/1 , 15/03/15; Leigh Chronicle 12/02/15. .. 
24 Leicestershire RO, DE819/1, 4/02/15; Nottinghamshire RO, DDTA 4/2, 14/01/15; Lanarkshire was still 
complaining in December that it could not acquire uniforms large enough to fit Reservists, NAS, 
MD2/2, 18/12/14; Shropshire RO, 1988/2, 7/11/14. The county association was placed first for the sixth 
successive time in the War Office's Financial Statement for 1913-14. 1988/35, 24/07/15; East Riding 
RO, Annual Report 1913-14; 
25 Hansard Vol.69.1130, 17/02/15. 
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viaducts or guarding isolated pumping stations on Welsh reservoirs. Although 
unglamorous work the presence of the Reservists meant that the Territorials did not 
have to provide these guards; they could instead spend their time more profitably in 
training for overseas service. Ten companies of the Surrey National Reserve, a total of 
30 officers and 1170 men, guarded the network of lines converging on Victoria and 
London Bridge, while men from Essex, Hertfordshire and the other Home Counties 
provided cover for the approaches to the other London termini. This deployment allowed 
Territorial battalions of the two London divisions earmarked for coast defence or the 
mobile army, to concentrate quickly in their anti-invasion assembly areas.26 
To protect a stretch of the Southampton-Waterloo line, a guard of 120 Derbyshire 
men was sent from the industrial Midlands to Hampshire. Such work was monotonous 
but not without danger. Captain Ewing, commander of the Rye company, was killed by a 
train while guarding Martello Tunnel outside Folkestone harbour. Numerous as they 
clearly were, absolute figures for the numbers of men employed in protection work are 
difficult to determine. The Government fielded such questions by refusing to declare the 
numbers on security grounds and by admitting there was not the manpower available to 
compile the figures. 27 
The difficulty facing the War Office over how it should proceed in its use of Class 
Ill Reservists was made clear when one MP suggested the mobilization for foreign or 
home service of all National Reservists under 50 years of age. Tennant replied that 
because Class Ill members had never undertaken a definite liability there were no 
existing powers by which they could be called. He did however, assure the House that 
as the 'majority' of Class I and II had enlisted by late November, the call up of eligible 
National Reservists was virtually complete.28 Despite this confident message, the War 
Office was in fact very concerned that many Class II had not yet presented themselves 
for service and, also, that many who had, were either or not being efficiently utilized or 
· could not be found work. It acknowledged that the system could not yet cope with 
enlisting all Class II men to Territorial Force protection companies, but insisted that 
where vacancies did exist, preference should be given to Reservists rather than to any 
other recruit who was not prepared to accept the general service liability.29 
The War Office had received several letters from disgruntled Class II Reservists 
. ~ 
See W033/694, Home Defence; Central Force Scheme for details of how and where a Central Force 
comprising Regular and Territorial units would operate. 
27 
Derbyshire RO, 0530/2, 15/03/15; L.A.Vidler, The Story of the Rye Volunteers, Rye: Rye Museum 
Committee, 1954, p. 72; Hansard Vol. 70.41, 22/02/15. 
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ansardVol.68.1122, 25/11/14. 
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W09!Res/2151 (AG1) of 21/12/14. 
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complaining that they were being ridiculed for wearing a badge signifying membership 
of a branch of the Crown 's forces for which the Government apparently had no use. 30 
The authorities did not want to lose track of the Class lis but neither did they want to call 
them up into Territorial Reserve Units, thereby flooding those battalions with home 
service men. Nonetheless, Banon and Sir Douglas Dawson had been impressed by 
the youth and evident former military experience of those Reserve Territorial Companies 
of the London National Reserve they had inspected, and believed they would make 
good recruits for the Home Service Territorial battalions. In the expectation that many of 
them would later accept the foreign service obligation, the War Office did , therefore, 
express the wish that a proportion of Class II men should be permitted to enlist in the 
Reserve Units. 
The authorities were also convinced that many Class II were not enlisting 
because their employers were refusing to let them go. It was decided to instruct county 
associations to ascertain how many of their remaining Class lis would be prepared to 
fill up existing or, if additional units were authorized, potential home sevice vacancies. 
The War Office acknowledged that it could not at present use all of the registered men 
unless it was prepared to raise more Protection Companies than it was , at the time , 
contemplating. Consequently, in December, associations were instructed to write to all 
registered Class II men who had not yet enlisted to warn them the War Office was 
considering withdrawing the right to a bounty for those who delayed any further.31 The 
letters informed the men that in most cases they would be able to join their own or 
neighbouring county units but instructed them not to resign from their civilian jobs until 
they had actually been accepted . Registered men who could not provide a satisfactory 
reason for failing to honour their obligation were told they would be removed from the 
register and instructed to return their badges. In response to a War Office request for 
opinions, several associations considered that bounties should be withheld from those 
· men who did not intimate a willingness to serve before a suggested deadline of 1 
February 1915.32 Furthermore, they also agreed that Class II Reservists who could not 
yet enlist because there were no vacancies in their local units, should undergo a 
medical examination and wait until the army had the resources to raise more home 
service Territorial battalions or companies. 
30 W032/18617, Call up of Class A National Reservists, 1914-1916. One such let.ter, from H.Jones of 
Prestwich, Manchester, was addressed to the Prime Minister. Paper 1A and Minute 2. 
31 W09!Reserve/1751 (AG1) of 28/11/14 and two others of similar content dated 21/12/14 and 
24/12/14. All originated from Army Council Instruction (ACI) 311 of November 1914. 
32 The War Office finally ruled that Reservists could wait to enlist until December 1915 before forfeiting 
their bounty. No.9/Reserve/5199 (AG1) of 18/11/15. 
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Some associations requested advice on what they should tell those men who 
were willing to join but for whom no vacancies existed . Demonstrating a remarkable 
lack of sensitivity, the Gloucestershire Association asked whether it should offer them to 
other counties, whereas East Lancashire said it had earmarked its unused Class lis for 
the association's proposed 2nd Reserve Division or additional Protection Companies. It 
believed, however, that a good proportion of the men would not ultimately be prepared to 
relinquish their civilian employment. 33 The Somerset Association reported that as its 
Territorial battalions were in India and there was no authority to raise 2nd Reserve 
Units, the men should be embodied either as an infantry unit, or as a collection of 
National Reserve Companies, under a Battalion Commanding Officer (CO) at Bath . 
When equipped and ready they could be detailed to guard vulnerable points, be put on 
road-making or used for coast defence. The association emphasized that as most of its 
remaining Class II were of significant age and enjoyed considerable civilian status, 
enlistment would involve financial sacrifice. 34 The War Office replied it had no intention 
of creating or employing National Reserve battalions, and was e_qually blunt to the 
Oxfordshire Association when it suggested that sending the letter requiring Reservists 
to have a medical would lead to wholesale resignations. Provided they were attached 
as supernumerary to the County Regiment, the association expected its remaining 
Class II to enlist in its proposed 2nd Reserve Unit or in its railway companies. Any 
attempt to force the men into other counties' units would, it reported , meet with failure . 
The War Office testitly declared that it had no objection to clearing the county's register 
of any men who were not prepared to honour their obligation .35 
The War Office's insistence that men who were not immediately required to enlist 
should have a medical was a cynical yet practical means of saving money and 
determining how many might be available if it did decide to raise more Protection 
Companies. Colonel Banon estimated the medicals would eliminate between 40% -
50% of Class II men who would , therefore, no longer be eligible for a grant. The 
proposal met with only one recorded objection. The Warwickshire Association , which 
was discharging unfit men 'almost daily' wanted an even more stringent examination 
because the age of the men and the exposed nature of guarding railways required them 
to be of sound physique. The War Office replied, giving short shift. 36 There were, .. 
however, complaints over how the medicals were conducted and the loss of pay for 
33 W032/18620 (11A), Call up of Class II National Reserve, 1914-1915; W032/18617 (50). 
34 
W032/18617 (78) . 
35 W032/18617 (41 H), (67) and (43A). 
36 
W032/18620 (Minute 15) and (58A). 
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men attending them.37 
In mid-January, the War Office instructed associations not to accept any more ex-
soldiers under 38 years of age and fit enough for normal soldiering in Protection 
Companies. A few days later it also requested associations to estimate how many 
additional companies it could clothe and equip from existing stores. The authorities 
were considering using Class II men to raise extra companies and were encouraged by 
the counties' responses. Of the initial 27 replies, only two said they were not in a 
position to raise further companies. However, others pointed out that they had the men 
available but clothing them was a different matter. 38 The men required their suits to be 
specially made and manufacturers' promises were proving valueless. Moreover, 
Oxfordshire reported its 'main difficulty' to be not a shortage of men, but of officers. The 
association complained of the long delay between its forwarding of prospective names 
and eventual War Official approval. Meanwhile, the men had to be paid and supervised , 
tasks which usually devolved upon the already over-worked association secretary who 
no longer held a commission and wore no uniform.39 Warwickshire believed it could 
raise two companies in 14 days but warned that there had been considerable 
dissatisfaction when the War Office had earlier said it wanted the Reservists to enlist 
and had then done no more. This time, it insisted, orders had to be 'definite' or the men 
would again be exposed to 'unpleasant criticism in civillife'.40 
Clackmannanshire decided not to enquire how many men might be available 
because it wanted its remaining Reservists to enlist, not in new Protection Companies , 
but in the 2nd Reserve Battalion of the ?/Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.41 Most 
asssociations, however, undertook to send the letter but discovered that so many men 
had either moved from their registered address or had already joined up that a good 
proportion of them were never acknowledged . The 44 letters sent out by Perthshire 
elicited a mere six replies. The City of London sent letters to 773 of its Reservists who 
had originally declared a willingness to serve; 214 of the letters were either returned as 
the recipient no longer resided at the recorded address or were simply ignored. The 
circular did however prompt 341 Reservists to give a promise to enlist and another 94 
37 Ibid., (34A). The authorities wanted the medicals to be undertaken outside the men's working hours. 
But, a shortage of doctors militated against this intention and it was decided to give the men up to 3 
shillings for the loss of a whole day's work. Ibid., (43a). 
38 W032/18617 (50A) , (50W) and (50V). Hants said that in addition to its 110 available National 
Reservists , there were nearly 600 fully equipped Home Service Territorials who had not gone to India 
With the county's 4th and 5th Battalions. 
39 Ibid., (48B). 
40 Ibid., ( 50AA) 
41 NAS, MD6/48, 4/12/14. 
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replied claiming they were medically unfit. 42 
In prewar years the failure of men to keep their commandant informed of 
changes of address was a constant complaint of branch secretaries. Once the war 
began, the quantity of administrative work exploded, with clerks working around the 
clock to register new members and process papers. Some associations' clerks were 
posted to area offices of their regional command, and Reservists were often drafted in 
to replace them. The men were usually granted a gratuity of between £5 and £10 for the 
tasks they had performed under extreme pressure, but Mr G. Carter was awarded a 
particularly large honorarium of £25 from the East Riding Association for his additional 
work between August and December 1914.43 
Association clerks attempted to deal with a seemingly daily shower of official 
forms . Among the more important of the December arrivals was a War Office directive 
ruling that Reservists employed by firms working on government contracts were not 
required to enlist. Provided these men were not employed as messengers, liftmen, 
timekeepers or watchmen , they were to be exempted and their names transferred to the 
Class Ill register. Some Reservists who were employed by firms engaged on 
government work or on the railways were to be given a special badge and retained in 
their present class. 44 The Government was desperately attempting to establish some 
degree of order amidst the chaos and dislocation of the initial rushes to enlist. It was 
too early for the later issue of lengthy, explicit lists of reserved occupations, but efforts 
were under way to establish a system whereby industry and transport would not be 
jeopardized by the loss of men to the army. Sufficient regulations had been passed by 
the end of the year for 87 of the City reserve to claim they were unable to join up 
because they worked for the Post Office, the Bank of England, in arsenals or on other 
government work.45 It was largely the clerks who had to decide which Reservists were 
eligible to remain in civilian occupation, which were of acceptable age to enlist and 
which of the local protection companies were short of members. 
Life for those Reservists who had volunteered for work as protection guards 
remained far from a sinecure. However, the rapid creation and expansion of the railway 
companies had created problems other than a mere shortage of equipment. In 
42 NAS, MD7/37, 27/11/14; Guildhall MSS, 12,613 Vol.1 , 26/01/15. The missing 124 replies probably .. 
claimed their writers could not enlist for family or business reasons. 
43 
East Riding RO, TAF/7. 
44 W09!Reserve/1379 (AG1) of 14/12/14. Class Ill Reservists were instructed not to wear their National 
Reserve badge in case it was mistaken for that of a munitions worker. This edict was announced in 
Parliament. Hansard Vol.77 .1293, 1 0/01/16; Worcestershire RO, 004:6BA5204/8, 14/12/14. 
45
Guildhall MSS, 12,613 Vo1.1 , 26/01/15. 
130 
February 1915 the War Office was forced to respond to complaints from the 
associations about the character of some of the men serving within them. Reservists 
with dubious integrity had been causing concern to certain battalion and company 
commanders. The East Lancashire Association reported that it had a number on its 
books who were 'without doubt not of a character who could be recommended for duty', 
and Scottish Command had complained to the Perth Association in late August that a 
'number of undesirable National Reserve recruits [were] doing a great deal of harm' to 
the 6/Biack Watch . The association disclaimed responsibility by insisting that it was 
commanding officers who selected or accepted recruits. 46 However, in an effort to 
prevent such men from joining units, subsequent instructions required county 
associations to demand a man's discharge certificate or a satisfactory civilian 
testimonial before engaging him.47 
Besides those Reservists employed in railway protection and those who had 
gone into the Regulars or Territorials, the majority of uniformed Class II and Ill men 
were formed into guards for the increasing number of prisoner ot war camps. The 
appearance of these auxiliaries often caused considerable excitement to the locals in 
those first , whirlwind months of war. Typical of the scenes repeated across the country 
was that of the arrival of about 1 00 National Reservists at Leigh in December. The 
guards, largely from the Manchester area and reported to be 'fine, bronzed and 
experienced men', marched with fixed bayonets through a cheering crowd from the 
station towards an empty mill undergoing conversion to a POW camp. The men were of 
middle age and described as 'being of the working class' . It was 'to their credit that 
though too old for service at the front they have come forward to do work they are fully 
capable of, and .. . have all left situations much more remunerative than the scanty army 
pay they are now receiving at the camp' .48 
On occasions, companies had to make hasty and ill-prepared departures for 
such duties. When a batch of Cornish Reservists was ordered to travel to Dorchester at 
short notice, there was a desperate and embarrassingly lengthy search for weapons to 
send with it.49 Hampshire Reservists were employed guarding Germans on a prison 
ship and in providing guards for Indian convalescent homes. Other detachments 
protected the Thoneycroft and Sopwith works at Woolston and a whole battalion of 
Wiltshire men acted as military police and carried out other general security duties for 
46 W032/18617 (50) ; NAS, MD7/37, 24/08/14. 
47 ACI 267 of February 1915. 
48 Leigh Chronicle, 11/12/14. 
49 Cornwall RO, DDX295/3, 13/10/14. 
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the Aldershot garrison. Guard routine was normally uneventful but in November 1914 
Reservists were involved in an incident at the aliens' internment camp on the Isle of 
Man. Several internees were killed when the guards opened fire on demonstrators 
during a food disturbance.50 
As autumn developed into winter, another group of auxiliary defenders was also 
taking up its war stations. Unlike the largely armed and uniformed National Reservists 
on prison work or protection duties, men of the newly-raised Coastwatch were furnished 
only with a brassard. The problem of how to maintain observation and communications 
along the Eastern and Southern coasts had been taxing the Admiralty for some years .51 
The men manning the coastguard stations were naval ratings, about two-thirds of 
whom would be required on mobilization to provide crews for reserve ships. The 
remaining third was to be retained in coastguard stations which, in time of war, became 
naval signalling stations. The navy hoped some Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve men 
might be available for coast watching but considered their lack of special training made 
them of dubious quality. The Admiralty therefore proposed that certain Chief Petty 
-
Officers would remain on duty at the coastguard stations during the early days of war to 
liaise with special service sections of Territorial cyclist battalions.52 However, as it was 
acknowledged that only about 25% of men in the already under strength cyclist 
battalions would volunteer for a special service section , large areas of the coast would 
remain unpatrolled. 53 The army had outlined a scheme in May 1913 whereby the cyclist 
patrols would be supplemented by secret observers who would remain in the area 
following an enemy landing to pass on intelligence to report centres. In February 1914, 
a joint Admiralty and War Office committee considered the defence arrangements for 
the principal and lesser ports of the kingdom and how a warning system for hostile 
raids might operate. The two services agreed that, if war came, the navy should 
continue to man the 66 coastguard stations in Scottish, Eastern and Southern 
Commands and rely upon the cooperation of the Territorials , police and customs 
so Hants RO, 37/M69/3, National Reserve Report, March 1915; Wiltshire RO, L 1/101/2, 14/12/14; 
Oldham Chronicle, 23/11/14. 
51 In some respects the new auxiliary force was similar to the old Sea Fencibles. This organization , 
raised for coast defence during the Napoleonic Wars , allowed for the emergency mobilization of 
fishermen and the like. 
52 Cyclist battalions were raised by several county associations from 1909. Besides the normal 
problems of recruitment, the units suffered from major and prolonged difficulties with equipment, not 
least over the quality and style of bicycle . 
53 Furthermore, these men would have to begin patrolling during the precautionary period - ie before 
the Territorial Force was officially mobilized. CAB3/2/63A, Methods of Passing Intelligence of Hostile 
Raids to the Admiralty and War Office, January 1914. 
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officials. 54 
In August 1914 the scheme was put into operation but existing manpower 
resources made it impossible for long stretches of vulnerable coast to be patrolled 
regularly. During the autumn of 1914, the period when both the War Office and Admiralty 
believed a large raid or even invasion remained a distinct possibility, fishermen and 
other seafarers on the east and south coasts were invited to form a civilian auxiliary 
which was to be known as the Coastwatch . Members exercised the same powers as 
special constables and under the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) could stop and 
arrest people behaving in what they considered to be a suspicious manner. These, 
usually elderly men, were also required to report on aircraft and ship movements. The 
work was performed in all weathers, often with the assistance of Sea Scouts who acted 
as messengers. 55 At the request of the War Office, Customs and Excise personnel were 
also involved, although technically their jurisdiction was limited to quays and docks. 
Following correspondence with the Admiralty, Customs House issued a number of 
circulars which eased cooperation between the authorities and detailed what their men 
and the part-time volunteers should be looking for and reporting on. 56 Very little evidence 
has survived on the activities of the civilian Coastwatch but, like their counterparts in the 
Volunteer Training Corps, (VTC) it gave men above military age the chance to 
demonstrate their patriotism by offering their services on a part-time basis. 
One source does record that about 100 National Reservists acted as coast 
watchers under the 'instruction' of the Commandant of the Plymou~h Fortress in and 
around Sidmouth . The same source claims that local residents paid for the watchers' 
out-of-pocket expenses. 57 If this was the case, the Reservists were probably Class Ill 
men working on their own initiative and patrolling without arms or official recognition . 
Thousands of their comrades who were too old, medically unsuitable or in essential 
occupations which precluded their becoming members of Protection Companies, 
continued to parade and availed themselves to any water or railway company who 
wanted their reservoirs or bridges patrolled . Some armed Reservists were certainly 
employed by water companies in South Wales but the Chief Constable warned the 
Home Office that unless it or the military authorities were prepared to underwrite the 
54 CAB3/2/71A Coast Defence of the United Kingdom and the Question of Coast Watch . 
I 
55 War Illustrated, 12/08/16, p.604. 
56 CUST 143/19, Revenue Cruisers and Coastguard; CUST 49/352, Coast watching, 1915. Although 
prepared by Customs House, the Admiralty published Memo for the Information of members of the 
Coastwatching Force on certain points of Customs ' Procedure as its own M. 04312115 of 15/06/15. 
57 J.Tindall , The Sidmouth Volunteers 1914-1918, Exeter: Culverwell & Sons, nd. , p.7. 
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guards' costs , the water companies' payments would last only a few weeks. sa 
Occasionally Reservists formed parades with the local Territorial units or, more 
commonly, with the local Volunteer or Civilian Defence Corps. In many districts a natural 
convergence of the Reserve with the Volunteer Training Corps developed and many 
senior officers of the Reserve who were too old for active service were frequently the 
driving force behind the creation of Volunteer units. 
The appearance of these new, local auxiliary groups should be seen in the 
context of the remarkable enthusiasm displayed by the civilian population for the 
outbreak of war. In the opening days of the conflict, the frequently derided Territorials 
attracted lengthy queues of would-be recruits. Many of the under strength infantry 
battalions reached war establishment within hours of opening their drill hall's doors 
and, when full , often had to direct the disappointed men elsewhere. Kitchener's call for 
the initial 100,000 was met with an equally enthusiastic response and these new 
battalions were, of course, also recruited on a territorial basis. The importance of local 
identity and municipal autonomy in early twentieth century Britain l?.hould not be 
overlooked when considering the growth of auxiliary forces. Besides the four national 
constituent countries of the United Kingdom, there were emphatic regional divisions. 
Throughout the closing decades of the previous century, loyalty to the country and 
Empire was paralleled with an indigenous pride in county or borough. The spontaneous 
growth of the new civilian defence forces in towns and villages across the kingdom 
reflected , as indeed had the National Reserve in earlier years , not only patriotic concern 
for national defence but also a fierce belief among the middle and artisan classes that 
their area should be seen to be making a contribution to national and local security. 
There was an obvious parallel with the explosion of these groups with the formation of 
the Rifle Volunteers in the previous century. Napoleon Ill's threat was later mirrored in 
the fear of the Kaiser's challenge to Britain's global position and her naval supremacy.59 
Given the passions and concern aroused by the earlier prewar invasion scares, the 
nation hourly expected boat loads of German soldiers to risk the gauntlet of the Royal 
Navy and throw themselves ashore on the East Coast. With the bulk of the Regular 
forces earmarked for the continent and the Territorial divisions stretched to the limit and 
of uncertain quality, the invasion force would, in the view of the man on the Clapham 
omnibus, have to be confronted by bodies of irregular auxiliaries. The enthusiasm with 
~hich Britain's shopkeepers, factory owners and financiers re-embraced the traditional 
58 H045/1 0766/272183/1 . 
59 For an exhaustive discussion on Anglo-German difficulties, see P.M. Kennedy, The Rise of the 
Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914, London: Allen & Unwin, 1980. 
134-
-concept of a volunteer auxiliary demonstrated the same belief which had prompted their 
fathers and grandfathers to create the Rifle Volunteers : a country dominated politically 
and economically by the skills and enterprise of the middle class must rely on that 
same class for home defence. 
This sense of self-salvation was perpetuated through the nineteenth century 
Volunteers to the creation of the Territorial Force and the National Reserve. Although 
most former Regular rank and file soldiers originated in the lower social orders, army 
mores and discipline often spurred and secured social improvement. Although the 
Government publicly encouraged the National Reserve, belonging to the organization 
cost its members money; by virtue of their membership and personal expenditure, 
Reservists showed how deeply they had absorbed the middle class principles of duty 
and service. Presidents and Chairmen of Territorial Associations did tend to come from 
the landed classes, but the Territorial movement involved a very middle class dynamic. 
Rank and file of the London battalions were principally men and boys of the lower 
middle or artisan classes; the vagaries of employment and irregul~u hours precluded 
other than the most dedicated of labourers from joining. In the northern towns, a degree 
of industrial feudalism prevailed. Those employers who supported the movement 
exchanged their occupational suits and umbrellas for Sam Brownes and swagger 
canes; their foreman functioned as NCOs and the mill hands, as privates. Holding a 
commission in the Territorial Force could bring social and business advancement but 
the Territorial officer corps remained a limited and somewhat exclusive circle . The 
declaration of war gave the opportunity for those men whose business, family 
commitments or age had previously denied them the chance to demonstrate their 
military potential. Of course, many did see the creation of the local Volunteers as a way 
by which they could ostensibly exhibit their patriotism and municipal pride but, at the 
same time, limit their obligations and commitment. Patriotic as their actions might 
appear, no worthy entrepreneur or businessman could readily forego the financial 
opportunities which the war might afford.6° Furthermore, the middle class trader could 
argue that if he abdicated his commercial responsibility and enlisted in the army, he 
would , in fact be betraying his class and country. The suspicion that not all men of the 
volunteer groups became members for entirely altruistic reasons was a principal 
reason why the War Office viewed the movement with such early mistrust. 
It became of a point of contention among several of the new auxiliary groups to 
60 
There was also, of course, the fear that war would cause severe disruption to trade in foreign 
markets. Many mills , already on short time, laid off thousands of workers when overseas orders were 
cancelled . Similarly, the money markets immediately diplayed considerable anxiety. 
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claim that they had been the first to form. There were several contenders including, for 
example, Bideford in Devon and a five man bowling team from Wandsworth ,61 but the 
honour should probably go to the residents of Saughall and Mollington on the Wirral. 
The 5.00pm edition of the Chester Courant on 4 August recorded that men of the two 
villages were already drilling in anticipation, should war come, of a German invasion; on 
the day following the declaration, 50 men assembled and registered their desire to form 
a citizen body.62 This claim to be the first of the groups was later acknowledged by 
General Sir O'Moore Creagh , one of the founders of the Volunteer movement. However, 
when a letter by Percy Harris, a prominent Liberal member of the London County 
Council was published in The Times on 6 August, national attention was drawn to the 
incipient movement. Harris bemoaned the hordes of men whose 'potential energies are 
wasting themselves in crowding around and cheering at the Palace and Government 
Offices, embarrassing the Police and in no way helping the defence of the country' . He 
went on to suggest the holding of parades in public parks where young men could be 
trained by old soldiers before next being drafted into the Territorials. He thought the 
movement should be independent of the War Office and, through a system of inter-
municipal benevolence, richer boroughs would be able to provide financial assistance 
to their poorer neighbours. Councils, Poor Law Guardians, friendly societies and trade 
unions should, observed Harris, all have a part to play. In a less than politically adroit 
remark, he concluded his thesis by rashly suggesting the proposed London 's corps 
could be modelled on the Ulster Volunteers. 53 
Despite this unfortunate analogy, the letter spurred others to action; both Arthur 
Conan Doyle and H.G.Wells had letters printed two days later.54 The former advocated 
the formation of what he described as civilian companies of the National Reserve. With 
the correct guidance and assistance these groups would quickly be able to mount 
g.uards on lines of communication and even help to garrison fortresses. This 
'Landsturm', as Doyle called it, would provide a 'stepping stone' for the younger men 
into the Territorial Force and thence 'into the firing line'. Despite his call for guidance, 
Doyle accepted that the contemporary pressures upon the War Office precluded any 
Governmental assistance and insisted that the movement should be born by 
'independent local effort'. Wells followed a similar theme. He wanted men in the 
61 Volunteer Training Corps Gazette, No.3, 19/12/14, p.42. Hereafter, VTC Gazette ; F.Simpson The 
Chester Volunteers , Chester: Courant Press, nd ., p.21 . 
62 E.J.Disbrowe, A Historyofthe VolunteerMovementin Cheshire 1914-1920, Stockport: Hales & Sons, 
1920, p.3. 
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southern counties to be armed and to wear a badge in lieu of a uniform. Thus equipped 
they could assist in transport duties and even conduct guerrilla warfare. With 
considerable understatement he admitted that it would be 'perhaps not a very effective 
fighting force' but argued that it would permit the release of substantial numbers of men 
who were 'now keeping order'. A third correspondent that same day wanted the creation 
of training centres across the country where businessmen could receive the rudiments 
of military skills. Such a movement would, he held, have to be universal and could even 
incorporate first aid training for women .65 
On the day these letters were published a preliminary committee comprising Sir 
Charles Stewart, the Public Trustee, General Sir O'Moore Creagh, who had just returned 
from a term as Commander-in-Chief India, Master Bonner and Percy Harris, met to 
discuss strategy. They agreed to approach Lord Desborough, who had already been 
drilling men on his Bucking hamshire estate, to invite him to become president of the 
committee now dedicated to raising a civilian guard for the capital. 55 
Momentum continued to gather and on 1 0 August at a meeting under the 
auspices of the National Patriotic Association, Harris outlined the proposed scheme. 
The NAP had developed from the Employers' Patriotic Association and was led by Sir 
George Pragnell, Chairman of the Employers' Territorial Association . Pragnell was 
supported by other leading figures in the City as well as Sir Frederick Cook, Lord 
Desborough, Lord Lovat and O'Moore Creagh. Good wishes had also been sent by the 
Lord Chief Justice, Arthur Balfour, Lord Rosebery and prominent leaders of the Anglican 
and Catholic churches. Harris' suggestions were well received and the meeting 
resolved to form a London Volunteer Defence Force. With Desborough as president, 
O'Moore Creagh as military advisor, Harris as secretary and Bonner as the legal 
advisor, the committee decided to establish touch with the Territorial associations 
within the London area but agreed not begin recruiting until Kitchener had secured his 
one hundred thousand men. 
Harris' scheme immediately attracted a great deal of attention across the City 
and the County of London. Within the boroughs, businesses and captains of banking 
and insurance houses displayed enthusiastic interest. Many of the leading companies . 
soon began to hold classes and to drill their employees under the instruction of tl'le old 
soldiers usually found on the staff of most large businesses. In addition, one Territorial 
association outside the capital is known to have sought War Office permission to 
65 Ibid. 
66 A 
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assume responsibility for organizing the formation of a local defence corps, 
guaranteeing that it would not affect army recruiting .67 The Times reported it had been 
'inundated' with letters whose correspondents ranged from elderly veterans to 
adolescent public school boys. Most of the enquiries and suggestions concerned the 
use of volunteers to guard bridges and other important municipal sites, but at least one, 
from a Colonel A.J.Fergusson, wanted Parliament to pass an Act empowering local 
authorities to call out all able-bodied men for evening musketry practice. St Loe Strachey 
immediately pointed out that High Sheriffs already held ancient powers to call upon men 
over 16 to repel the king's enemieS.68 Sheriffs should, he argued, inform their Chief 
Constables that they would readily accept responsibility for assisting the police by the 
temporary enrolment of suitable citizens. In view of the large numbers of Germans 
already in the country, the guarding of bridges by volunteers was, Strachey considered , 
a justifiable and legal precaution taken against the king 's enemies.69 Other 
suggestions included utilizing the City Imperial Volunteers' Fund to allow men to leave 
their civilian positions to undertake military duties; an idea from Mrs Hugh Ford , the 
founder of the Ladies' Rifle Club, that a Women's Rifle Corps could be usect to 
supplement London's defences and quell any riots that might occur; a demand by the 
Mayor of Poplar that the Government decide 'now whether they will ever require the 
National Reserve' and an insistence that it 'treat the trained soldier [of which he claimed 
there were over 500 in his borough] with the consideration he deserves'; and news that 
in order to keep them from both 'starvation and mischief', casual dock labourers in 
Bermondsey were drilling in return for food. Major Haggard promised £5000 to help 
raise a regiment of veterans aged between 50 and 60 for guarding vulnerable points, an 
Inns of Court Veterans' Corps was formed and there was an appeal from R.O.Burlison 
for old public school men to create a corps of elderly infantry. Finally, Scotland Yard 
announced that it would use the services of volunteer motor cyclists to distribute royal 
proclamations throughout London , a scheme which was soon echoed in other 
counties. 70 
67 Wiltshire RO, L 1/101/2, 22/08/14. 
66 This involved the raising of the posse comitatus, a levy of all able-bodied males between 15 and 
60. The posse had been called out intermittently at times of national danger or civil disorder, the last 
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In a further letter, Conan Doyle wrote to record that his local corps had enrolled 
250 men in only three days, and also to express his concern that groups across the 
country were expecting too much from the War Office. For the time being , thought Doyle, 
the groups should be content with drill and in sending any eligible men on to the 
Regular forces. In other words, they should 'wait in patience on the chance that they may 
some day be of service' .71 Wells was not quite so restrained . Although he insisted that 
all corps must operate under firm discipline and possess a uniform to save them from 
'butchery' in the event of capture, he allowed that the uniform should be provided by the 
men themselves. It could consist of a tweed suit simply converted by the addition of red 
facings and felt hat. He went on to describe how the volunteers would turn the 
countryside into a 'bed of stinging nettles ... as soon as rifles and ammunition came to 
hand'. 72 
Wells' view of a belligerent and aggressive corps was criticised by Sir Foster 
Cunliffe. Cunliffe believed the movement was in danger of 'travelling in a wrong 
direction' and questioned the wisdom of Wells' suggestion of using what Cunliffe called 
'quarter trained men' in the of 'waylaying scouts, sniping ... and hedge and ditch work'. 
To him, guerrilla warfare was the last resort of a country whose military organization 
was already shattered and would inevitably result in widespread civilian panic. He 
predicted that the movement would indeed attract men who should be in the army and 
wanted all corps to be brought immediately under government control in order to avoid 
'waste and dispersion'. Until Kitchener's armies were close to completion , the War 
Office could not be expected to do anything more on the volunteers' behalf. When the 
authorities had more time the corps could then be coordinated with the other elements 
of home defence. 73 
Discussions about the nature and possible role of the Volunteer movement were 
brought to an abrupt, albeit temporary halt, by an announcement from the War Office 
banning such groups and their parades. The authorities had clearly been taken aback 
by the pace at which bodies of volunteers were emerging and, amidst all their other 
problems and concerns, it viewed with misgiving any organizations which might, 
71 Times, 13/08/14. Doyle wrote to the Sussex Territorial Association seeking permission to use the 
Crowbrough Drill Hall and range. As his corps of Volunteers was already regularly using them , the 
committee decided to take no action. Sussex RO, TER8/1 , 16/09/14. 
72 Times, 17/08/14. 
73 Times, 18/08/14. 
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whether intentionally or not, interfere with recruiting for the Regular forces. 74 
The summary ban came as a surprise and disappointment to the movement, but 
several days later the War Office intimated that it was prepared to allow groups at least 
to retain their organization in case they might be required at some later date. A well-
known barrister and Justice of the Peace, George Cave, suggested that any disgruntled 
volunteers should instead enrol in the recently revived Special Constabulary; the 
membership of at least two corps is known to have immediately transferred its loyalty to 
the force and was sworn in as Specials. 75 In response to Cunliffe 's earlier criticism , 
H.G.Wells maintained that irregular forces scattered among hedges could induce an 
'extraordinary check upon hostile scouting' ; this was certainly preferable, wrote Wells , to 
the spectacle of the same men standing at their doors and gazing helplessly at the 
passing enemy. He insisted that he had no desire to interfere with the official war 
machine but did 'suggest that too exclusive an insistence upon the 'machine' may lead 
to the refusal and discouragement of much exterior enthusiasm without any 
corresponding advantage to the machine' .76 
The 'machine' was already attracting both criticism and support from within the 
movement. Individuals complained of being 'cold shouldered ' or recognized that the 
War Office opposition to voluntary auxiliaries was merely history repeating itself.77 Other, 
generally more prominent individuals such as Sir George Pragnell, requested the 
membership not to criticise but to 'mark time' . Pragnell accepted the War Office's 
assertion that the civilian volunteers might be seen as competition to the Regular forces 
was clear and 'unanswerable'. He requested frustrated would-be Volunteers to wait for 
the time 'when we are allowed to form a fifth line of defence and to drill all those on the 
Territorial waiting lists as well as those men over the age of enlistment'. When 
permission came, it would have to be on approved lines and on the understanding that 
the Territorials National Reserve and police should have first call on those under 35 
' 
years . In the meantime, he wanted men to conserve their enthusiasm for later use and 
assured them that 'marking time need not be lost time '. 78 
74 Central Association Volunteer Regiments, The Volunteer Force and the Volunteer Training Corps 
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The London committee had never expected the authorities to provide anything in 
the way of material encouragement, but neither had it anticipated such determined 
opposition . Sir O'Moore Creagh sought and obtained an interview with Kitchener during 
which he attempted to persuade the Secretary of State of the merit and value of bodies 
of volunteers scattered throughout the capital. Kitchener, who of course had no intention 
of allowing even the Territorial Associations to be the means by which a huge 
continental army could be created, was unlikely to allow an ad hoc rabble of unarmed 
civilians to run in competition with the established forces of the Crown. This concern 
was emphasized in a War Office letter of 26 August: 
The Army Council feel strongly that, if such bodies as that proposed are organized with 
the sanction of the War Office, it will inevitably tend to draw public opinion from the vital 
question of the augmentation and upkeep of the authorized Forces of the country.79 
Kitchener and Reginald McKenna, the Home Secretary, had discussed the Volunteer 
issue several days earlier. Both had agreed that the movement was likely to inhibit army 
recruiting and was to be opposed by both the War and Home Offices. A circular 
discouraging the formation of such groups and authorizing the police to remove any 
posters advertizing their existence was sent to mayors and Chief Constables on 17 
August. 80 
With Kitchener's mind resolute, Percy Harris sought Haldane's help and advice. 
The former Secretary of State could do little except suggest that the committee approach 
Creedy, Kitchener's private secretary. Creedy proved of little assistance and the 
movement appeared thwarted. However, out of the blue came a note from Tennant 
inviting Harris to have talks with him. 81 
What encouraged the Army Council's change of mind is not entirely clear. It did 
not amount to a complete reversal of attitude but it did provide the movement with a 
glimmer of hope. The War Office was no doubt angered at the number of civilians and 
long-retired officers who claimed to know better than they how the defence of the British 
Isles should be safeguarded. No matter how patriotic their intent, many of the 
movement's enthusiasts and proponents were undoubtedly militarily ignorant. Their 
dream of an army of irregulars supplementing the Regular forces and creating havoc on 
the lines of communication of an invading force was grist to the mill to magazines and 
79 Cited in F. Simpson, Chester Volunteers, op.cit. , p.24. No other copy of this letter has been found in 
any War Office file or local corps ' minute books. 
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story books; to the Army Council , the threat posed by such groups was likely to be a 
danger more to the home than the enemy forces. Nevertheless, the War Office probably 
realized that it could not prevent the growth of the local units or sustain a ban on them 
drilling in company yards or on village greens. If their continued growth was inevitable, it 
would be preferable for the War Office if there was some central body, run by reliable 
pillars , who would , should the Army Council ever devise a use for them, be responsible 
for their overall administration . Tennant's approval of the committee's continued 
existence was a tacit acceptance that he could really do nothing to prevent the local 
groups from forming . 
Despite the War Office's reluctance to encourage the services of these untrained , 
ill-disciplined and disparate bodies of unarmed civilians, many of the membership 
remained undeterred and continued to parade and drill. Even some of the movement's 
advocates acknowledged that 'armed civilians are a danger to themselves and a 
menace to their friends' , adding that if the Government allowed a reversion to the old 
Volunteer system, everyone would become tolerably 'safe from the dreadful fate of 
armed civilians '.82 Several corps, for instance the East Riding and Lincolnshire groups, 
continued to insist that they never intended themselves to be considered as a force for 
home security, claiming they were merely providing men with the opportunity to drill and 
prepare them for possible military service. 83 Whatever the interpretation of what may or 
may not have constituted auxiliary units for home defence, the theory held by some that 
a National Volunteer Guard could be formed within a month entirely ignored the fact that 
the Territorial Force, created to replace the creaking and inefficient Volunteer system, 
had been widely criticised for apparently failing to attain efficiency despite its six years of 
existence. Furthermore, the Guard 's advocates argued that the alleged abundance of 
ancient instructors could rapidly and easily transform the citizenry into an armed and 
reliable part-time force . Other of the scheme's proponents suggested landowners and 
others familiar with the use of firearms should offer their land and expertise to the 
Guard ; rifles, ran the argument, would be supplied by the War Office and the 
ammunition by public subscription . Moreover, German prisoners of war should be 
forced to assist in running the rifle ranges in return for the 'luxurious feeding ' they were 
currently receiving .84 
Several of the movement's supporters argued that it could be developed without 
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-the immediate assistance and support of the War Office: after all, throughout their 
existence the Rifle Volunteers had been dependent upon public subscription 
supplemented by only a small central grant. The historian H.A.L.Fisher also looked 
towards a district-funded force. He thought the thousands of northern mill hands 
currently on short time would never enlist in the army unless they were made completely 
redundant. But, before the inevitable occurred Fisher, with a fine misconception of what 
the future demands of 'total war' would be, believed the men could be trained by the 
civic authorities in concert with local employers. When unemployment finally drove them 
into the army, they would at least be partially trained . Others, echoing Harris' and 
Doyle's earlier suggestions, thought that the patriotic concern already displayed by the 
larger employers should be further utilized to finance the volunteer bodies who would 
thus be organized on the basis of mill, factory or office.85 
Disappointed as it was with the War Office's unwillingness to encourage the 
movement, at the end of August the committee nevertheless seized the opportunity 
offered by Tennant's amelioration of outright opposition to submit a policy statement to 
the War Office. 86 It stressed that although the London Volunteer Defence Force was not 
currently performing drills, letters were pouring in from units across the country seeking 
guidance and advice which the committee was attempting to provide. The policy outline 
wrote of the value such corps would be in the event of invasion and described the work 
already being undertaken by the Central Committee. It was in the process of compiling 
a nationwide list of potential instructors and recommending the adoption of Infantry 
Training, 1914 as the programme for the suggested three drills per week. It wanted 
corps to be formed among the professions, institutions, clubs and business houses in 
addition to larger places of employment and those being raised by civic authorities. The 
constant avowal throughout was that all corps should encourage eligible men to join the 
Regular and Territorial forces but also to provide for those who had a legitimate reason 
for not enlisting a meaningful programme of training. Finally, and in order to exert 
additional pressure upon the authorities, Harris suggested that Lord Desborough and 
the committee would welcome the opportunity of a further meeting where the proposals 
and ideas could be more fully discussed. 
Tennant, who had again been in contact with the Home Office and knew of the 
85 Times, 24/08/14. 
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increasing number of enquiries from Chief Constables seeking clarification ,87 agreed to 
another conference and after further consultations with Kitchener, confirmed that the 
authorities had no wish to see a London Defence Force ra ised. However, the Under 
Secretary did add that they would not object to the Central Committee providing 
instruction in drill and in any musketry practise the availability of weapons and ranges 
might permit. 88 
Throughout the discussions both sides had emphasized that the new auxiliaries 
would target those men over military age and those who were disqualified or unable to 
enlist for some other reason. The provincial press was already warning against using 
the VTC as an excuse by eligible men not to enlist in the army. For example, one 
editorial declared a man should not 'shirk his responsibility or delude himself into the 
belief that he is obeying his country's call' by enrolling in a corps, and an early set of 
rules for one Cheshire unit emphasized it was 'not intended as a hinding place for men 
who are trying to shirk and on no account must be used as such'. 89 From the outset the 
Central Committee was fully aware that corps could become a haven for men who, 
although of suitable age, preferred not to join the army. Citizens reluctant to enlist could 
shelter behind the text of the committee's own declaration that such men were indeed 
willing to defend their shores and merely needed a lead and instruction on how their 
home-based services could be best utilized. With the Territorials having already been 
questioned on their willingness to serve overseas and the New Armies and the second 
line Territorials in existence really only in name, there seemed a valid and justified 
reasoning behind the argument that men who at least for the present were unable to 
join the army could still exhibit their patriotism by accepting some preliminary training. 
Individually some men might use the Volunteer corps as an excuse but to the War 
Office, if and when the age for enlistment was raised or conscription was introduced, at 
least a proportion of the new recruits would have some elementary military skills . As the 
Weeks passed and the initial surge of voluntary enlistments declined, the War Office 
Was to grow increasingly concerned at the number of men in the volunteer corps who, 
for reasons best known to themselves, had so far resisted the call to enlist. 
By early September then, a degree of recognition had been achieved . The War 
~ffice was prepared to tolerate the Volunteers provided it kept a careful eye on them and 
87 F 
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ensured they were not detracting from normal recruitment. To the Central Committee, 
this acceptance was a beginning to what they anticipated would develop into a wider 
recognition of the movement's value. Until the War Office had the time and resources to 
do something more positive with the Volunteers, the committee thus became 
responsible for drawing up rules, regulations and conditions of affiliation for a national, 
rather than merely London-based movement. In the coming months it was to develop 
into a clearing house and central administrator for the groups and individuals seeking 
information on how to form and run a local corps. In keeping with his earlier role as the 
champion of part time, auxiliary forces , Richard Haldane, the Lord Chancellor, lent the 
committee two disused courts in the Royal Courts of Justice where, in the words of one 
of its instigators, it became ' the first private organization ever entrusted by the state with 
the organization of a voluntary army'. 90 
90 W0161 /105, The Creation of the VTC. 
CHAPTER VII : THE ROAD TO RECOGNITION 
Thus, within a few days of the declaration of war and largely on their own initiative, 
unused Class Ill National Reservists and members of the embryonic Volunteer groups 
commenced parading and patrolling. Bridges, railway lines, reservoirs and other similar 
sites which were deemed to be potential targets for espionage activities were visited by 
groups of inspired and enthusiastic men, usually armed with no more than a pipe or a 
brush handle. At least those National Reservists amongst them had some military 
knowledge, no matter how distant or out of date it may have been ; the Volunteers had 
little save their sense of duty and perhaps an appeased conscience. 
However inadequately armed or prepared they may have been, Volunteers were 
keen to be seen to be making a contribution to local defence. On occasions, though , 
their enthusiasm caused unforeseen difficulties. When one group's offer to guard 
sections of the Great Western Railway's track was declined by the company its 
members instead seized on an invitation from their Chief Constable to patrol a local 
reservoir. The corps then demanded the Rural District Council construct them a hut, that 
the Chief Constable supply them with what they called 'authorization cards ' and next 
proceeded to make life uncomfortable for guests of nearby houses by accusing them of 
trespass. When the Volunteers later began to bombard the district engineer with 
demands that he make safe the alleged dangerous and insecure manhole covers 
around the reservoir, the Council concluded the Volunteers were more trouble than they 
were worth. The Chief Clerk wrote to the corps thanking members for their assistance 
and assured them the reservoir no longer needed protection. 1 Another corps indignantly 
refused to guard a railway viaduct, claiming it had not been raised to perform such 
duties; it did eventually allow its members to patrol the structure provided it was 
understood they were acting purely as private individuals. The Sussex Home Protection 
Brigade had no such reservations and recorded its frustration at the lack of response 
from the Southern Railway to its offer of providing over 200 would-be guards. One North-
Eastern corps took it upon itself to organize the housing of Belgian refugees , and 
another was requested by the police to utilize patrols its to search for spies signalling to 
offshore U-boats. 2 
1 Somerset RO DD/X/TBW. Winscombe and District Civil Defence Force, Minutes 18/08/14 - 24/09/1 4. 
2 Stockport Archives, D1697, DDND, Cheadle Hulme Volunteer Defence Corps. Minutes 9/1 2/14; VTC 
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From time to time, Class Ill National Reservists were invited to attend combined 
parades intended to spur recruitment for the New Armies and Territorials. On these 
occasions they stood alongside Kitchener and more senior auxiliary formations , feeling 
they too belonged to the Crown's burgeoning armed forces and in the hope that they, 
too, would eventually be uniformed and utilized . Besides the official assemblies (and 
entirely unrecognized by the War Office), 'hundreds, if not thousands' of National 
Reservists were also reported to be parading every Sunday on Wandsworth Common .3 
This statement by the 'Navvies' MP' John Ward , precisely illustrated the contemporary 
public confusion over the residual members of the National Reserve and the emerging 
Volunteer Training Corps (VTC) . Thousands of Class Ill men had enrolled in their local 
Volunteer units and while both organizations remained without arms and uniform, there 
was little to distinguish a reservist from any other member of a Volunteer Training 
Corps. As the War Office had no intention of using the elderly Reservists as 
combatants, it continued to resist demands that they be provided with uniforms. The 
somewhat motley appearance on parade of these veterans had earlier caused one 
observer to liken them to a 'body of strikers'4 ; stung by this and other similar affronts, the 
Huddersfield Battalion determined to portray a semblance of uniformity and requested 
that members on parade should sport a bowler hat. 5 Such events were sometimes a 
disappointment to the local populace who, used to cheering battalions off to war, often 
turned out in numbers to watch any display. On hearing military music one young patriot 
recalled being 'thrown into a frenzy of excitement. .. I dragged on my boots and rushed 
out - only to find it was merely the local National Reserve being played to church by the 
town band '.6 
Those National Reservists who were either still awaiting the call to serve or who 
accepted their age was against them, played a major role in the growth of the Volunteer 
movement. Once the majority of his members had gone into the army or protection 
companies , commandants of National Reserve companies sometimes formed a VTC 
from the remnant of his unit,? When the local companies were later formed into 
battalions, their commanding officers, adjutants and quartermasters were often 
members of the Reserve. Later still, when the Volunteer Force became organized along 
county lines, several National Reserve County Commandants accedecf to the equivalent 
3 Hansard Vol.68. 550, 19/11/14. 
4 HansardVol.59 . 1141 , 10/03/14. 
5 Saddleworth and Mossley Reporter, 19/10/14. 
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position in the new auxiliary movement. 8 In the early days, though , it was very often at 
the lowest local level that the Reservists had a crucial influence. With their knowledge of 
drill, no matter how antiquated it might have been , they provided a core around which 
the small units could form , develop and mature. Their experience and skills were to 
prove invaluable assets to the instigators of the volunteer movement, permitting the 
towns' and villages' businessmen, shopkeepers and traders to assemble and drill with 
at least an air of plausibility and dignity. 
The response to the Government's acceptance of the Volunteers' right to 
assemble, together with the German outrages in Belgium which helpfully made it into 
an increasingly accommodating enemy, was immediate. Those groups who had , as 
requested , 'marked time' or even disbanded, reformed and other individuals and 
companies who had been waiting on official approval , now also announced their 
intention of raising a corps. They knew the War Office was merely tolerating their 
existence but hoped that under the responsible administration of the Central 
Association , the Government would eventually go a stage further and ultimately, through 
material and financial means, actually encourage their growth. With so many of the first 
line Territorials gone or about to go overseas, those enthusiasts with uncluttered minds 
believed the Volunteers should immediately be incorporated within the overall plans for 
home defence. In consequence, the three month period between September and 
November 1914 witnessed an explosion of corps of the strangest and even bizarre kind . 
Although several corps did describe themselves as groups of artisans and 
labourers, the educated , professional middle classes were the prominent and 
dominant figures in the revival of the movement, To many members the corps was an 
opportunity to fulfil some repressed military ambition, to meet socially with colleagues, 
or to feel they belonged to something which contained an intrinsic patriotic worth . The 
Central Association was in no doubt what the real aim of the corps should be: their 
primary purpose was to assist the authorities in enticing men into the Regular or 
Territorial forces . All corps proclaimed this to be their central tenet but some were 
unsure of how much further they should go in defining additional objectives. The Essex 
Volunteer Regiment refused to be explicit about its duties; it merely stated that affiliated 
.. 
corps must be prepared to carry out any orders given it by military or civil authority. Some 
of the various Athletes' Corps made it clear they did not want to develop into bodies of 
town guards or an armed reserve, but would simply be organizations where men who 
8 General Sir Richard Harrison in Devonshire and General T.C.Porter in Cornwall are two of the many 
examples who combined both roles. 
wanted instruction in drill could receive it. Alfred Bigland MP did not agree with th is 
essentially pacific stance and told the Birkenhead Corps that it had been formed 
because the War Office had not yet understood the 'feelings among all classes of 
citizens' that they 'had a right to be recognized as belligerents'.9 
An article in the VTC Gazette explained that the movement had not emerged as a 
consequence of any public panic but rather by putting a system in place was 'to guard 
against the possibility of such panic' . In a series of advisory articles O'Moore Creagh 
took the Volunteers' objectives a stage further; he wanted them to dispute every inch of 
ground , dig up roads and generally harass an invader by any means available. One 
National Reserve commandant told a Lancashire Volunteer corps that at present they 
would be 'worse than useless' for such operations and would be destined to remain so 
unless or until they resolved upon a programme of serious training . A early editorial in 
the Gazette had taken a long term view and talked of the need of a united organization to 
act as a second line in order to strengthen Britain's negotiating position at a peace 
conference. A little later General Plumer, General Officer Commanding (GOC) Northern 
Command , added to the debate by suggesting to the Duke of Devonshire that 
Volunteers might be able to release Regulars of the home army for France. This 
'enlightened ' view of probably the most senior officer yet to make such a suggestion 
was followed by a further treatise which again looked far beyond the movement's 
immediate secondary aims of providing recreation and encouraging socia l intercourse 
and good health . After the war the movement would help to 'organize training beyond the 
soccer field ' in the country's poorer districts: 'There the seeds of chivalry, fair play, and 
character formation can be sown ... The Volunteer movement supplies a game in wh ich 
all can play' . This 'practical patriotism' and idealistic foresight was undoubtedly an 
incentive to many; to others, the movement was nothing but a justified escape from 
enlistment. Resentment against this latter group was not slow to surface and many 
corps decided that no man of military age should be enrolled no matter what excuse he 
might have for not enlisting. 10 
Among the early groups to form or reform were those based on golf clubs, the 
larger City institutions and manufacturing companies. Even: 
9 Essex RO Box Z11A; VTC Gazette, No.5, 2/01/15, p.66. 
10 VTC Gazette, No.4, 26/12/14, p.64; No.6, 9/01/15, p.85-6; Blackburn Times , 5/02/15; VTC Gazette, 
No.3, 19/12/14, p.40; No.5, 2/01/15, p.72; No.44, 280. One Rifle Volunteer veteran was scath ing 
about men who used the corps as a shelter. Some he knew used drugs to feign heart problems when 
they were eventually called up and , 'I am glad to say that in some cases the heart was affected 
permanently'. T.Murray Ford, Memoirs of a Poor Devil, London: A.M. Philpot, 1926, p.188. 
The sculptor flung aside his chisel , the painter his brush , the writer the pen , the 
musician his instrument and the actor the buskin . They held out their empty hands for 
rifles and flocked to learn the soldiers' trade which hitherto they had almost despised .11 
The muster roll of the United Arts Rifles was almost a Who 's Who of the English art 
world and, not inappropriately, paraded in the Royal Academy's courtyard and held 
meetings in His Majesty's Theatre. Its uniform of a white sweater earned them the 
sobriquet of The Unshrinkables and it even attempted to form an active service section . 
'Godley's Own' was named after its 'commanding officer', the Public Orator, A.D.Godley, 
and had in its ranks the Poet Laureate, Robert Bridges, and Professor Sir Gilbert 
Murray. Other groups were formed from existing organizations such as the Optimists, a 
businessmen's club, sportsmen's associations, many of which formed a loose 
confederation known as the Athlete's Volunteer Training Corps and , not without some 
verity, the Old Boys. One body consisted of deaf mutes, who gave and received orders 
by sign language, and another was formed as the JuJitsu VTC. 
Other groups, although perhaps rather less glamorous and more conventional , 
proved equally attractive. Under the auspices of the Earl of Essex, the creation of a 
National Volunteer Reserve, with a target membership of 100,000 was announced . 
However, the organization soon ran into internal troubles . In the eyes of some members 
its committee lacked members of sufficient status; complaining of a lack of leadership 
and direction, companies transferred en masse to VTC units.12 
Although in many areas would-be members flocked to enrol , in some poorer 
districts instigators found recruitment more challenging. One former colonial officer 
organized meetings in a nearby district but had to resort to door-to-door canvassing in 
order to convince its doubting residents of the seriousness and potential of the 
movement. 13 His neighbours were not the only citizens who harboured doubts about the 
utility or point of the undertaking. Inhabitants in some inland counties believed the 
enemy would never penetrate so far from the coast and even if they did , 'these men 
would not make any difference'.14 In the same manner as earlier auxiliaries had in the 
past been mocked, parades of Volunteers in public parks were sometimes derided by 
observers and led to resignations from those who could not tolerate the ridicule .15 In 
11 Edward Patton (ed) A Record of the United Arts Rifles 1914-1919, London : Alex Maring, 1920, p.1. 
'
2 See Macleod Yearsley, Home Front Diary, IWM Dept. of Documents, DS/Misc/1 7, p.74 and 
'Sentinel ', The Chronicle of the City of London Volunteer Corps, copy in IWM Dept. of Printed Books, 
K2090. 
13 War Illustrated, 29 July 1916, p.570. 
1 ~ C.F.Harris, op.cit., IWM Dept. of Printed Books, TSS 33953. 
15 The Times History of the War, Voi.XX, Part 258, p.362. 
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some areas many men attended the inaugural meeting and then failed to reappear at 
subsequent drills. 16 In others, some potential members did not survive the first route 
march.17 Undoubtedly there was a lack of direction , much energy was uselessly 
expended and what was achieved was of little military value. What they did possess 
was a commendable, if naive martial spirit , and a thirst to learn. The War Office 
remained unimpressed . It resolutely retained its lack of enthusiasm and displayed only 
a 'tolerant indifference' to their existence.18 
Government attitudes hardened further when the October recruiting figures for the 
New Armies and Territorials were computed. The fall in enlistments was a 
consequence of many factors but the War Office again assumed that a major cause 
was that eligible men were preferring to enrol in the VTC. So far, Parliament had shown 
only a passing interest in the movement; calls to impose rifle practice on all men aged 
between 18 and 30 and to provide weapons, ammunition and instructors for privately 
raised corps, met with a predictable response. An offer of 5,000 volunteer motor cyclists 
was similarly rejected and a demand for the War Office to raise squadrons and 
battalions of veteran Yeomanry and Territorials to guard bridges was refused on the 
grounds that the National Reserve was already employed on such tasks.19 Tennant had 
referred vaguely to the possible employment of civilians in a 'semi-military capacity' as a 
means by which the civil power could be assisted in the event of disturbances, but 
Parliament was, in reality concerned with weightier problems. Nevertheless, in view of 
the growing concern with regard to the number of German spies supposed to be 
abroad in Britain, the role of the police and of the Special Constabulary was of 
considerable importance. 20 
Discussions between the Home and War Offices about the function of the police 
in war had been in progress since 1909, and a circular of 1912 detailing the duties of 
the police and the Special Constabulary, was reissued in late July 1914.21 The police 
were required to work in cooperation with the military authorities, to guard vulnerable 
points and to liaise with factory owners and other employers; many of these were 
expected to provide some precautionary measures on their own volition . Chief 
16 For example, 100 men were present at the first meeting of the Lydney VTC but only 20 enrolled. 
Gloucester RO 05627 7/6. 
17 F. Simpson , Chester Volunteers 1914-1920, Chester: Courant Press, nd, p.37. 
18 J.M.Osborne, 'Defining Their Own Patriotism: British Volunteer Training Corps in the Fi rst World 
War', Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.23 (1988) , p.65. 
19 Hansard Vol.66.158-161 , 27/08/14. 
20 Ibid., Vol.65.2311 , 10/08/14. 
21 Home Office Circular 227,602 of 7/11/12. 
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Constables, whose powers had been recently strengthened by the Official Secrets Act of 
1911 , could take any measures they thought necessary to provide protection for 
strategic sites, report sightings of enemy vessels and also to keep watch on aliens. An 
earlier Home Office circular of 1911 specified the potential of the Special Constabulary 
(originally raised under an Act of William IV and officially known as the Second Police 
Reserve) in assisting the police in providing guards and in quelling public 
disturbances. 22 The Specials had not actually been called out since the Fenian 
disturbances of 186723 but several of the larger towns and cities already had a volunteer 
section of men affiliated to London's Westminster Guard. This unofficial body of nearly 
2000 'Specials' formed in 1912, had a dark blue uniform and helmet, a rifle range 
complete with animated target, a signals section and its own band . Its purpose was to 
offer assistance to the regular police at times of civil disorder. Although the numbers 
involved in the Guard were tiny, it was assumed that in the event of war large numbers 
of elderly former policemen, ex-soldiers and stalwart citizens within the civilian 
population as a whole , would enrol as Specials and help maintain order and assist in 
the evacuation of threatened areas. 24 There was no suggestion in any of the circulars 
that a force of armed or unarmed civilians outside the jurisdiction of Chief Constables 
might be needed as a supplement to the First or Second Police Reserves. 
But, events were compelling a change in Home Office policy. Special Constables 
were enrolled almost as soon as the war began and in many counties the response 
was good . In others, Chief Constables found it difficult to recruit men in sufficient 
numbers and believed the Volunteers were a more attractive option for men willing to 
perform a civic service. The Chief Constable of Lincolnshire required 300 Specials but 
complained that he could not recruit them because those most suited to the role were 
joining the local Volunteers. The corps' promoters would not supply the pol ice with a list 
of members' names and, because the Chief Constable thought it was beneath his 
dignity to appeal directly to the corps, his Specials remained significantly under 
strength. A subsequent Home Office letter to the two promoters, a solicitor and a 
company director, applauded their patriotism but to prevent what it called 'confusion ', 
appealed to them to encourage their members to enrol as Specials. The corps decline~ 
.. 
unless or until the Home Office laid down the precise terms and duties of a Special. 25 
22 HO circular, no ref. of 15/09/11 found in W032.9098, The Duties of the Civil Police in the Even t of 
War. 
23 !.Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition , 1558-1945, Manchester: MUP 1991, pp.191-2. 
24 Ibid. 
25 H045/1 0766/272183/5. 
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In contrast to the attitude of Lincolnshire's Chief Constable, the Police Chronicle 
welcomed the Volunteer movement and supported a scheme promoted by Sheffield 's 
senior police officer. He had met the Volunteers' leaders in mid-August and concluded 
that if 'systematically organized ' and trained in drill and musketry, the corps could be 
used to assist the police in civil disturbances. The Home Office was horrified at the 
suggestion that armed Volunteers , even though under control of the civil authority, might 
be used to quell disturbances. The result, both politically and socially, would be 
disastrous and was to be actively discouraged.26 Nevertheless, the Police Chronicle 
thought that the use of Volunteers who, it mistakenly believed were in 'many respects 
vastly superior to the Territorials ', would prove an 'infinitely more serviceable scheme' 
than the mere enrolment of Special Constables. It urged Chief Constables throughout 
the country to emulate Sheffield's lead.27 
Only a few days later Birmingham's Chief Constable wrote to the Home Office 
asking for guidance when he suspected his Watch Committee was about to follow 
Sheffield 's example. He was simply advised to remind the committee of the August 
circular but letters from several Chief Constables to McKenna's office did eventually 
force a more definite response. The Home Office decided it was imperative to keep the 
Volunteers distinct from the Specials and very gradually began to move towards its 
eventual conclusion that they should become the sole concern of the War Office. Chief 
Constables could, if they chose, become vice-presidents of the groups, provided there 
was a clear demarcation between his official and his Volunteer responsibilities. 28 The 
official Home Office line, at least for the time being, was that the degree of cooperation 
between the corps and the civil authority should be limited to encouraging Volunteers to 
enrol as Specials. Many Volunteers did combine the dual role but, in the early weeks of 
the war, the issue remained far from resolved and only a few weeks later the Home 
Office was again reconsidering the relationship between the two auxiliaries. 
Although few in authority expected a full scale invasion there was still the 
possibility of an early raid with the intention of disrupting British mobilization . Even 
when the critical period of August had passed and German forces remained heavily 
engaged in the offensive against Belgium and France, Kitchener hesitated about 
.. 
despatching a sixth division of Regulars to join the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) . An 
appreciation by Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence 
(CID), predicted that if France and Russia collapsed the Germans would be able to 
26 H045/1 0766/272183/1. 
27 H045/1 0766/272183/8. 
28 Ibid. 
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transport up to 195,000 men across the North Sea. There was thought to be sufficient 
shipping available for the task, British knowledge of what was going on in German ports 
was scanty and the German minefields laid down the East Coast were interpreted as 
providing a preliminary protective screen to an invasion force. Although the Central 
Force of Territorial divisions under the command of General Sir ian Hamilton was still in 
its formative stages of mobilization and training, the ports' garrisons were assessed as 
sufficient to deal with a raid on the East or South Coasts. While concluding that invasion 
was unlikely, Hankey did suggest the construction of trenches and the laying of wire on 
certain beaches as a precaution against a raid . 29 
Partly influenced by Hankey's paper, but more concerned by the German advance 
down the Channel coast, Kitchener abandoned the long-established plan to defeat an 
invasion inland . Instead, he began preparations to counter the enemy on the beaches. 
Although viewed by some as a drastic and even questionable move, it was in reality an 
understandable reaction to a changed scenario. Previous plans had anticipated a 
German attack on the line Thames-Wash, but with. the German right flank now 
sweeping through northern Belgium, the coast of Kent was vulnerable to German craft 
operating from Ostend, Antwerp and Zeebrugge. The defences between Dover and the 
Thames were markedly inferior to those north of the estuary and any winter deadlock on 
the continent might, believed Kitchener (who displayed a remarkable lack of 
appreciation of the importance of weather conditions in the Channel) , permit the 
Germans to assemble an army of up to 200,000 covered by Zeppelins. The fall of 
Antwerp and the enemy's continued advance along the coastal plain caused Hankey to 
grow increasingly pessimistic. He predicted shore defences would soon be 
overwhelmed, Territorial resistance would crumble and the BEF would be forced to 
return to save London. Even Churchill, who had been confident of the navy's ability to 
defend the shores was, by late October, taking additional precautions against the threat. 
On receipt of reports that Germany was concentrating shipping, the Admiralty 
redeployed squadrons of pre-Dreadnoughts, standing patrols were increased and the 
Coastwatch extended.3° Fisher's return to the Admiralty also resulted in further anti-
invasion measures and on 20 November, when tides and the moon were considered 
suitable for an invasion, he and Kitchener were anxious enough to deploy 300,000 
troops on the East Coast. The Germans failed to appear but Churchill continued to 
redeploy vessels , prepare blockships and even considered an idea of setting the sea 
29 CAB 3/2/78-A, Attack on the British Isles from Overseas, 14/09/14, pp.2-9. 
30 ADM 137/965/98, Anti-Invasion Policy 1914. 
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aflame with petrol. 31 He became increasingly confident and persuaded the newly 
formed War Council (whose inaugural meeting on 24 November concentrated on the 
issue of home defence), that the improved measures were now so advanced that 
Germany were unlikely to attempt an incursion in strength .32 
Among recent Government innovations had been the creation of County 
Emergency Committees whose function was to effect the evacuation and organization of 
areas most vulnerable to a German raid or invasion. Hankey had apparently been 
working on such a scheme in prewar days33 and in mid-September, when the 
correspondence in the national press about the potential of the Volunteer movement 
was approaching a climax, he suggested to the CID that confidential instructions be 
prepared in case the Germans did come. Hankey's proposals appeared in early 
October but the Prime Minister decided the recommendations should only be made 
public if invasion was deemed imminent. Moreover, Asquith further insisted that the very 
existence of local committees tasked with executing the instructions should also remain 
secret. 34 
One of the areas most likely to fall victim to a German incursion was the county of 
Kent. Harris, its Lord Lieutenant, attended a meeting of fellow Lords Lieutenant at 
Bayham Abbey on 18 October where plans concerning control of the civil population 
were outlined . Harris received his copy of the instructions from Sir Edward Troup , 
Secretary to the Home Office, and under a week later instigated a Central Organizing 
Committee. This held its first meeting at Maidstone to discuss Troup's leaflet and its 
implications. The committee agreed the population should be instructed not to leave 
their homes or destroy livestock and burn food unless ordered ; all physically fit men 
were to be put to work digging defences and should provide themselves with the 
necessary tools ; citizens were to 'maintain a calm demeanour, to avoid all panic, and as 
far as may be possible, to continue their usual avocation' . Crucially, civilians were to be 
ordered that in the event of invasion they should surrender any personal arms and , 
above all, not fire on German soldiers. The VTC were not specifically named but all 
citizens were to be warned that, as Germany had not signed the section of the Hague 
Convention regarding the questioning of civilians, residents should not familiarize 
themselves with friendly troop movements or defences. 
31 H.Moon, Invasion of the UK, op.cit., pp.517-519. 
32 /bid., pp.522-523. 
.. 
33 Lord Hankey, The Supreme Command 1914-1918, London: Allen & Unwin , 1969, Vol. 1 p.216. 
34 CAB 3/2/BOA, Instructions to Local Authorities in the event of Belligerent Operations in the UK, 
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This early paper then envisaged no role for the VTC. Their members would be 
expected to act as all citizens were expected to act, viz in accordance with instructions 
given by the civil or military power. To emphasize the point, Lieutenant General Stopford , 
GOC 2nd Army Central Force, asked Harris to organize and enrol about 400 Special 
Constables. Their task would be the supervision of the civilian work, to act as 
motorcycle despatch riders and, if it became necessary, to assist with the evacuation of 
livestock. Stopford also wanted to know how many cattle and sheep would need to be 
cleared from coastal areas, whether the clearance would hamper troop movements and 
how such clearances might affect civilian morale.35 
Harris' committee proceeded with plans for moving animals, burying wagon 
wheels and designating routes by which civilians might be moved. Unsurprisingly, it too 
considered the role of the Specials would be of crucial importance in these operations 
and it was assumed a sufficient number of them could be raised from among the 
professional and trading classes. A revised memo from Stopford entitled Preparations 
for Civil Authorities for Action in the Event of Hostile Landings also underlined the role of 
the Special Constables. Local committees, which were to be centred on police 
divisional areas, were instructed to preselect and enrol 'trustworthy and discreet' 
individuals upon whom a local force of Specials could be expanded. Once again , there 
was no mention of possible participation for the VTCs already raised in Kent. 36 
Nevertheless, when the Mayor of Queenborough wrote to W.B.Prosser, the County Clerk 
and the man responsible for coordinating the Emergency Committees, he announced 
such a committee had been established as early as 6 August and that 'everything was 
now entirely under control '. The measures taken included the swearing in of 150 
Special Constables and a rifle club of over 100 strong. All these members were 
chillingly described as 'armed, carefully trained [and} competent to deal with any 
situation that may occur'. 37 
Committees in other counties were also beginning to think along similar lines. 
The Military Representative in the Chorleywood and Rickmasworth area had 
successfully prevented the formation of corps in his district but when the movement 
35 Among other documents relating to operational strategy and tactics, Stopford presumably had 
access to Central Forces Scheme which provided immense detail of the number .. of animals likely to be. 
available to an invading force. Calculations suggested, for example, that there would be 35,000 meat 
rations per square mile in areas within 25 miles of a landing place. W033/694, Central Forces 
Scheme, August 1914. 
36 CAB 3/2/80A. The sub-committee which produced the report of 6/10/14 had also heard that 
Brightlingsea had similarly spontaneously formed a local committee. If the Germans landed the 
committee had decided to organize the movement of all boats up river. 
37 Kent RO, C/A2/5/1 . 
received government recognition he altered his position . He was now prepared to 
consider the use of any group affiliated to the Central Association , provided it accepted 
that its first duty was to assist the Emergency Committee. The county's Chief Constable 
endorsed this stance, insisting that the Volunteers must operate under his authority. 
The Home Office too, whose principal aim in regard to the Volunteers was still to 
prevent them from interfering with the recruitment of Specials, was coming to the 
conclusion that they had to be more formally organized and controlled , if only to prevent 
them from becoming a nuisance to the work of the Emergency Committees. 38 
The creation of the local committees and the preliminary administrative work 
involved much time and some expense. Yet, when presented with travelling claims and 
out-of-pocket expenses from the individuals involved , the Home Office responded in 
typical and traditional fashion . Initially it expressed surprise and then indignation that 
any civil member should expect recompense for sitting on the committees. Still 
generally preferring to ignore the offers of assistance made by Volunteers who, besides 
attempting to arm and equip themselves had again been inspired by a further series of 
impassioned letters in the press, the authorities continued to emphasize the primacy of 
the Special Constables. This recent correspondence and the Volunteers ' own desire to 
express their patriotic and military prowess in some accepted manner, were about, 
however, to force themselves into the Government's equations for home defence. 
The twin spurs to the creation of the Emergency Committees were to ensure 
systems were in place by which the perceived threat of invasion could be countered and 
as a means of quelling civilian anxiety about what was to be expected of the population 
if the enemy did actually come. In October, the Northcliffe press had again turned to the 
possibility of invasion and the speculation of how the Germans might behave if they did 
arrive. Repington stoked the debate in a series of strident and alarmist articles: 'We 
must expect to be attacked at home ... we must not rest under any comforting illusions 
that we shall not be assailed'. He called on the Government to instruct the public 'how to 
act, on the coast, in the interior, in the towns and on the farms ... we must expect from the 
authorities a prompt announcement of their views'.39 H.G.Wells had continued his 
regular correspondence with The Times and, to a lesser extent, with the Daily Mail. 
Despite protests from some writers, Wells repeatedly advocated the use of Volunteer 
bodies as irregular troops to harass the invading force. He dismissed critics who 
demanded civilian submission and those who argued that irregular action would 
38 H045/1 0766/272183/13. 
39 Times, 15/10/14. 
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inevitably lead to German atrocities: 'This seems to me to set a premium upon brutality 
on the part of the invader and cowardice on the part of the invaded' .40 One of his 
severest opponents remained Sir Foster Cunliffe. He maintained that the type of 
irregular defence championed by Wells was 'not efficacious' and would only result in 
'frightful suffering on the helpless' for no military gain : 
Just because we are unprepared is no reason to attempt to repair lost opportunities by 
reckless and ineffective action now that the moment of peril is upon us ... The real and 
only defence of our country is the regular army ... The great thing to avoid is the creation of 
bodies which would not effectively contribute to the strength of our military forces .41 
In similar fashion , the Duke of Rutland told his Territorial County Association that 
resistance by irregular forces would result in 'wholesale shooting ' of civilians.42 
Throughout October the columns bulged with arguments for and against the 
recognition and development of the Volunteer movement. The discussions were often 
linked to the question of aliens and spies, other topics which were similarly absorbing 
the nation. The Times was currently demonstrating a 'preoccupation with the spies 
business', and the Home Office was accused of 'complacency' in its alleged delay in 
introducing restriction movements on aliens and Belgian refugees.43 Despite frequent 
headlines recording French and British successes on the Western Front, the 
accompanying maps and their indications of current troop dispositions were beginning 
to show how uncomfortably close to the French coast the battle lines were drawing . 
Repington maintained the onslaught on the Government's lack of preparedness by 
demanding the appointment of Lord Roberts as Commander-in-Chief Home Defence 
(C-in-CH D) and urging the population to be trained in guerrilla tactics . The Times' stable 
mate, the Daily Mail, was rather less convinced of the need for armed volunteers until 
the end of the month when it provocatively published the Preparations for Invasion, 
issued in 1801 .44 Wells' next contribution was a remarkably lurid and vehement article 
which attacked the establishment and virtually all who were denying the populace an 
opportunity to participate in the defence of Britain . Remembering how his earlier letters 
had been received with 'forced amusement by "experts'", and caused him 'for a time' to 
remain silent, he now rejoined the debate with a vengeance. Acknowledging that the · 
likelihood of a raid in strength was remote, he turned his vitriol upon the authorities: 
40 Times, 22/08/14. 
41 Ibid., 25/08114. 
42 Leicester RODE 819/1 , 10/12/14. 
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Still, as the trained mind does insist upon treating all unenlisted civilians as panic-
stricken imbeciles and upon frightening old ladies and influential people with these 
remove possibilities, and as it is likely that these alarms may even lead to the retention 
of troops in England ... it becomes necessary to insist upon the ability of our civilian 
population, if only the authorities will permit the small amount of organization and 
preparation needed to deal quite successfully with any raid that in an extremity German 
'boldness' may be attempted . 
He then went on describe how: 
Everyone is going to fight and if we cannot fight according to the Rules of War apparently 
made by the Germans for the restraint of British military experts, we will fight according 
to our inner light. .. lf the experts attempt any pedantic interference, we will shoot the 
experts ... and burn their houses ... lf the Germans get cut off ... we will massacre every 
straggler. Their officers will be hung and their men shot. A German raid to England will 
not in fact be fought- it will be lynched. 
In an emotive, demagogic climax which inflamed the hearts of the Volunteer movement, 
he demanded arms, uniforms and, by the declaration of the levee en masse, the 
recognition of military status for every man in the country. He acknowledged the 
Government's necessary preoccupation with equipping the New Armies but concluded : 
.. .for the rest they seem to think that the chief function of Government is inhibition ... lt is 
sheer greed for direction that has led to their systematic thwarting of civilian 
cooperation . Let us warn them of the boredom and irritation they are raising . This is a 
people's war, a war against militarism; it is not a war for the greater glory of British 
diplomatists, officials and people in uniform. It is our war, not their war, and the last 
thing we intend to result from it is a permanently increased importance for the military 
caste. 45 
The Daily Express also showed renewed interest in the Volunteers' case but in 
view of what it perceived to be a remote possibility of an incursion, the Manchester 
Guardian remained sceptical of the need for the movement. Never one to ignore an 
opportunity to promote the cause of auxiliaries, St Loe Strachey wrote several supportive 
articles in the Spectator. He argued that the Germans might well gamble on an invasion 
and, in the absence of the Regulars and the ill-prepared state of Kitchener's armies and 
the Territorials, a national army of 'Town Guards' could make the difference betweerf a 
successful defence of the country and capitulation .46 Even reports from German papers 
of the army's supposed demoralization following its failure on the Aisne and the 
assertion that the setback must have had a 'crippling influence' on the idea of an 
45 Times, 31/10/14. The article was also published in the Daily Mail of the same date. 
46 Spectator, 7/11/14. 
I SCi 
expedition against Britain , failed to staunch the flood of concern .47 
In the face of such fury, protest, speculation and , at times even measured debate, 
official thinking began to show indications of a change of direction. Lloyd George spoke , 
albeit in muted tones, of the need for civilians to play a part in home defence and Balfour 
used his influence to help persuade the Government that publication of the secret 
documents sent to the Lords Lieutenant, and a declaration that Emergency Committees 
were already in place, would allay rather than fuel public panic. This was not done 
immediately but when rumours began to circulate, the Government did acknowledge the 
committees' existence; for the time being though, they refrained from publishing the 
detail. 48 Moreover, Asquith and the War Office had determined they could no longer 
largely ignore the potential danger of a nationwide civilian auxiliary. The passions 
aroused within public opinion by the Volunteer issue could not be simply dismissed as 
civilian self-indulgence. Although the papers lauded the BEF's feats of arms, it was 
becoming clear that the Allies had suffered severe setbacks and that the war would last 
longer than the turn of the year. Public opinion had been whipped up by naval losses in 
the North Sea, the fall of Belgian ports, and Zeppelin alarms. To deny those respectable 
citizens who clamoured for some encouragement, if not outright acceptance, and who 
were prepared to devote time and personal money in preparing themselves to make a 
contribution, would have proved difficult, unnecessarily provocative and politically 
damaging. While they did not shift their opinion that the Volunteers were likely to be 
more of a hindrance than a help to the Regular forces, the War Office was concerned 
that as the groups existed, they should be brought under a tighter control. 
The first hint came in a revised version of Instruction to Local Authorities, 
circulated in early November. The sub-committee had originally recommended that 
civilians should offer no resistance ; this new paper chose to omit this suggestion but 
did not replace it with anything more explicit. It warned of the probability of reprisals if 
rifle club members loosed off a 'few stray shots', but more encouragingly added 'we 
must not deprive ourselves of the assistance civilian volunteers can offer'. There was to 
be no universal prohibition on Volunteer activity as 'different districts must be treated 
differently' but until they had at least been issued with badges, Lords Lieutenant wer.e 
.. 
ordered to instruct the non-badge bearing populace not to offer any resistance. The 
slightly altered position, although still a far cry from that which writers such as Wells 
were demanding, illustrated that the Cabinet was beginning to consider a possible use 
•
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for the irregulars. 49 In the meantime, it was prepared to let the groups arm and drill , 
provided the practice did not involve any expenditure to the military or the Treasury. The 
crucial factor was to ensure the corps had a discipline and sense of responsibility 
which would prevent them from running amok and causing additional difficulties to the 
mobile forces. In short, in the same manner as it had extended control and then 
eventually reformed and reshaped the Rifle Volunteers, the War Office was applying 
similar, familiar methods to rein in the new aspirant auxiliaries. As the Territorial 
Associations were already too involved to accept further organizational responsibilities , 
the Government opted to utilize the same channels of authority, the Lords Lieutenant, as 
had traditionally been employed to administer the Militia. The Lords Lieutenant had 
been instructed to establish County Emergency Committees and the apparent corollary 
was for them to exercise authority over the defence corps which could , through their lack 
of control, pose a threat to civil order. 
Throughout October and November, the House of Commons remained excited 
with talk of spies, German atrocities, the fortunes of the BEF, raising the New Armies, 
shortages of munitions and equipment, overseas trade and how to mobilize the 
country's latent industrial capacity. It also, of course, concerned itself with the tasks and 
difficulties facing the National Reserve in its role as guardian of vulnerable points and , 
increasingly, with the Government's reluctance to encourage the growth of the Volunteer 
movement. Sir Henry Craik, one of the National Reserve's most consistent supporters, 
urged the Government to recognize as part of the the Crown's forces those Volunteers 
who had already acquired uniforms and were drilling as corps .50 The Prime Minister's 
reply, which gave no indication of a letter about to be despatched to Lord Desborough 
containing the Government's plans on how the Volunteers were to be effectively 
shackled, merely reiterated that all corps should, free of charge, affiliate to the Central 
Association. 51 
This letter52 was the War Office's official response to the mushrooming Volunteer 
movement and the Army Council's first determined attempt to assert some measure of 
control over it. The letter's seven conditions for recognition amounted to a synopsis of 
officialdom's contempt and distaste for civilian auxiliaries. Five of the conditions were~ no 
.. 
more than most of the membership might have predicted : no arms, ammunition, 
clothing or financial assistance would be provided from the public purse; a uniform 
49 CAB 3/3/83A, 9/11/14. 
50 Hansard, Vol.68 .197, 16/11/14. 
51 Ibid. 
52 20/Gen.No.3604 (AG1) of 19/11/14. 
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could be worn (but only when training) provided it was distinguishable from Crown units 
and displayed no badges of rank; members were obliged to wear a red brassard with 
the initials G.R. inscribed in black; the accepted military ranks and titles were not to be 
used and no form of attestation involving an oath was to be permitted . 
Disappointed as they were, most Volunteers realized that the Government had 
sufficient difficulties in arming and equipping the Kitchener and Territorial forces and 
accepted the restrictions; those who had experience of the Rifle Volunteer movement 
easily remembered the parsimony of government grants in the pre-1908 era. The 
refusal to allow a uniform which might be confused with that of a real soldier, the 
instruction not to salute officers, who of course held no rank or commission , and the 
insistence on the brassard, were all deeply disliked and were to cause friction within the 
movement and between its advocates and the War Office. These conditions were 
intended to deny them any pretence of military status or potential and although the 
membership was in general hostile toward them, Volunteers accepted them simply as 
the familiar and traditional official attitude to auxiliary forces as a whole. They 
condemned the authorities' restrictions but in the same self-effacing manner of earlier 
auxiliaries and by excusing them as the proclamations of a reactionary and hide-bound 
War Office, turned them into vehicles of self-ridicule. Typical of the early, dismissive 
responses came from 'One of 'em' : In view of the denial of military ranks and 
terminology he suggested the senior officer should be the 'manager' and company 
commanders 'bo'suns'; the battalion should be renamed the 'mob', the company the 
'crowd' and the platoon, the 'rabble'. As numbering off was an established military 
practice, men on parade should instead shout 'A, B, C'; 'Boy Scout weapons of bows 
and arrows' could be carried by the most advanced and trustworthy members. In the 
absence of military uniforms, men should decide between pierrot costumes or 
sandwich boards. Finally, as saluting was forbidden, the 'rabble' would raise their hats 
when addressing the 'manager' .53 
Questions concerning the brassard, uniform and the denial of military ranks were 
raised immediately in Parliament but the Government's answers offered little hope of 
amelioration. 54 Only the day before Tennant had read the War Office's letter, Josiah 
.. 
Wedgewood praised the action of one minister in arming his tenantry, quoting with 
favour the more extreme sections in Wells' recent article. However, he demanded that 
ministers do more than issue shot guns and buckshot to their tenants and provide a 
53 Daily Express, 27/11/14. 
5~ For example, Hansard Vol.68. 775, 782, 940, 23-24/11/14. 
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firm lead to the nation as a whole. In his opinion the argument instructing the populace 
to remain acquiescent was an irrelevance since the Germans had committed atrocities 
alike to both armed and unarmed Belgian civilians. 55 As it appeared to remove what the 
membership believed was its raison d'etre, Tennant's reading the following day of the 
scornful War Office letter did little to appease the movement's adherents When 
clarification was requested about why, if the Volunteers were not to be used as 
combatants , the Government was now apparently encouraging their development, 
Tennant again replied in disparaging manner: 'The feeling in the country has been that 
there has been no need to encourage these organizations ... Their utility in times of 
emergency will be to remove stock and to help the threatened inhabitants' .56 
Tennant issued this statement in the knowledge that the crucial date of 20 
November had passed without invasion, that the Emergency Committees in threatened 
areas were enrolling their core members and special constables, numbers of livestock 
to be slaughtered or removed were being ascertaining and evacuation routes allocated. 
Although there are no direct references to their use it is likely, given the Lords' 
Lieutenant close links with Territorial Associations, that county Corps of Guides were 
approached to assist in these tasks. Nevertheless, events in the counties were not 
running quite so smoothly as had been intended. Rumours of imminent civilian 
evacuation and reports from areas where no local preparations had been undertaken at 
all caused some concern. Kent Organizing Committee, for example, submitted a report 
which talked of a 'certain uneasiness' amongst the civil population as to what they 
should do if the Germans came.57 
Tennant's statement granting the Volunteers partial recognition and its coupled 
insistence that they were not to be regarded as combatants , contained an obvious 
paradox. In questions concerning the National Reserve he and his predecessors had 
often used the argument that a badge was sufficient to denote the wearer as a bona 
fide soldier and not a franc tireur. The man was thus protected under Article 1 of the 
Annex to the Hague Convention of October 1907.58 Moreover, both Tennant and 
McKenna of the Home Office stated that the Volunteers ' compulsory-worn brassard 
performed the same function . This interpretation of the Hague Convention was 
55 Hansard Vol.68.866, 23/11/14. 
se Hansard Vol.68 .1112, 25/11/14. 
57 Kent RO C/A2/5/1 . Letters from Mayor of Sheerness to Harris, 18/11/14; from Harris to Prosser, 
23/11/14; from Harris to Home Office, 1/12/14. 
56 See Hansard Vol.68 . 782, 23/11/14. 
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questioned by some 59 but the Government's pronouncements appeared to contradict its 
affirmation that Volunteers were not combatants. The ambiguity was carried further 
when another Government memo of 27 November, sent to the Lords Lieutenant and 
Central Association for onward distribution , instructed the district authorities to 
encourage all men not in the Special Constabulary to join their local corps. Any who 
refused were to be warned that without a badge or brassard he must surrender any 
weapons and must not fight; he would be relegated instead to digging trenches and 
burying the dead. The memo did not touch upon what form of fighting the Government 
seemed to be suggesting the Volunteers might undertake, but the Prime Minister had 
already dismissed the idea of issuing a 'compendious statement' detailing the duties 
for which corps could volunteer. Asquith , in what was either a deliberate corruption of 
the truth or an ill-informed brief, decided that a sufficiently 'large number' of leaflets 
giving such information were already in the public domain. 60 
Choosing to ignore for the present the contradictory statements and the inclusion 
of what were clearly unsympathetic conditions, the Central Association decided to 
celebrate the Government's recognition of the Volunteer Training Corps by staging a 
huge rally at the Guildhall . Impassioned speeches from the platform of dignitaries , 
which included Lords Desborough , Winchester and Glenconner, the Marquis of 
Lincolshire and the Dukes of Devonshire and Norfolk, described how the movement 
had begun as a spontaneous demonstration of the citizenary's patriotism and how 
important it had now become to the general picture of home defence. Speaking of the 
'far reaching calamities' that might follow an invasion, Norfolk urged all present to 
encourage and develop this new auxiliary movement.61 In view of the Central 
Association's determination to display a positive attitude now that the Government had 
granted limited recognition , the rally steered away from the two most controversial 
conditions imposed by the War Office. The bulk of the membership was far from 
59 Professor T.E.Holland, an acknowledged expert on international law, queried whether the brassard 
adequately fulfilled the Convention's four conditions for recognition and drew attention to the 
controversies of 1871 with regard to franc tireurs. Times, 25/11/14. Holland later suggested to 
Kitchener that he might be allowed to prepare a set of instructions which would guide the actions of 
the civil population should the Germans invade. He argued that a brassard was insufficient protection , 
that Volunteer corps must have properly commissioned officers and a more definite form of 
recognition than a mere letter from Lord Desborough. Furthermore, corps must not be allowed to work, 
in small groups and the idea of a levee en masse would have to be expressly reJected . Sir Edward 
Troup advised Hankey that Holland 's views were 'entitled to great respect' . 
H045/45/1 0766/272183/40. 
60 Hansard Vol.68.1304, 26/11/14. 
61 Several of the speakers had themselves earlier been heavily involved in the Rifle Volunteers and 
the Militia. 
satisfied with the qualifications already mentioned but could, for the time being , accept 
them as tools of military and financial expediency. The restrictive nature of the remaining 
two conditions were, however, perceived as a threat to the very continuance of the VTC. 
Rules 1 and 7 stated : 
It is to be clearly understood that only the names of those who can be registered who 
are not eligible through age to serve in the Regular or Territorial Army, or are unable to 
do so for some genuine reason which is to be recorded in the Corps Register; in the 
case of the latter, they must agree in writing to enlist if specifically called upon to do so. 
[and] It will be open to Army Recruiting Officers to visit the Corps at any time and to 
recruit any members found eligible for service with the Regular Army whose presence in 
the Corps is not accounted for by some good and sufficient reason . 
The Central Association clearly found itself caught in a seemingly intractable dilemma: It 
had secured the recognition for which it had campaigned, but the central conditions of 
that recognition were at variance with what most of the membership had desired or 
expected. Moreover, the first and last clauses were recognized as severe challenges to 
the movement's future expansion. The Liberal Manchester Guardian drew attention to 
the Central Association's difficulties when it wrote of the rally's 'interesting silence' 
about the rules . It sided with the movement in acknowledging that the War Office had 
'actively discouraged' the Volunteers' formation , accepted that the 'striking condition 
had, on the face of it...the look of compulsion ' but, although asserting that the 
Government should offer an official explanation as to why it was exerting 'this very 
drastic' pressure, it could not agree with those critics who claimed the rules were 
compulsion in all but name.62 
The Manchester Guardian was not alone in remarking upon the 'silence' at the 
Guildhall rally. Before long letters from disaffected Volunteers showered upon the desks 
of newspaper editors and into the office of the newly founded Volunteer Training Corps 
Gazette. One correspondent, the secretary of a Warwickshire corps, complained that a 
considerable number of delegates had remained behind to demonstrate their 
discontent with the conference's refusal to debate the conditions and also with the 
Chair's sole interest in the purely parochial concern of the defence of London. The writer 
considered Rules 1 and 7 to be 'unworkable since, if adopted and carried out the 
Volunteer Corps would be the means of exercising a compulsion which the Government 
itself dare not exercise'. Other correspondents described their 'amazement' and 
'disgust' at the Government's stance. The Volunteers had worked and trained at their 
82 Manchester Guardian, 26/11/14. 
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own expense only to discover that in 'certain cases the penalty for doing so is 
compulsory enlistment' . The authorities' attitude was nothing but a 'gratuitous insult' 
and Rule 7 was described as little better than an updated version of the press gang.63 
The storm of protest continued unabated throughout December. In an early 
editorial the VTC Gazette, an independent weekly journal but one through which the 
Central Association was occasionally permitted to voice its opin ion , declared that the 
War Office 'had not quite overcome its apathy' and had attempted to secure a tolerable 
arrangement with the movement by means of 'ambiguous phrases wh ich may be 
differently interpreted to cover divergent views'.64 Herein lay the crux of the problems with 
Rules 1 and 7. In essence, Rule 1, which soon became known as the 'peccant 
paragraph ', did not insist that men of military age should, if called , join the army. If the 
situation did ever arise when a Recruiting Officer made such a demand, the Volunteer 
had merely to resign from his corps; he would then have the same status as all other 
citizens in a non-conscriptionist state. However, the anti-War Office passions aroused 
by its previous reluctance to acknowledge the Volunteers had not softened and indeed , 
in some quarters had even confounded reason . Imbued with the nineteenth century 
ideal of /aissez-faire and the memories of aristocratic mismanagement of the Crimean 
War, the middle-class Volunteer resented the unwarranted interference of War Office 
'old fogies ', and saw in the hated two paragraphs the means by which authority aimed 
to control and eventually stifle their movement.65 
Protest in some corps against the rules resulted in internal recrimination and 
resignations . Unfortunate local secretaries attempted to explain what one described as 
the 'somewhat ambiguous and certainly vague conditions '66 to members and several 
groups declared that if the War Office continued to insist upon the retention of Rule 1, 
there would be a flood of resignations . Others followed the early examples of Preston 
and Bracknell Corps and predicted early disbanding. A meeting chaired by Lord 
Dartmouth at Stafford openly declared its hostility to the conditions and a motion of 
censure from the floor against Dulwich Corps' leadership for recommending affiliation 
without consulting the membership went to a vote. Other corps refused to affiliate to the 
Central Association until or unless the 'extraordinary' and 'drastic' restrictions were 
abandoned. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding authority's 'discouragement' , the 
83 Daily Express, 27/11/14. Rule 7 actually soon became known as the 'Press Gang Clause'. 
84 VTC Gazette No.1, 5/12/14, p.10. 
85 J.M.Osborne, 'Defing Their Own Patriotism: Brtitish Volunteer Training Corps in the First World War', 
op.cit., p.61 . 
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enthusiasts resolved to continue to drill and organize. H. G. Wells maintained his flow of 
supportive letters and regretted that the War Office was retaining its 'habit and tradition 
of thinking of civilians as something quite outside military purposes and possibilities'. 
He believed the authorities either misunderstood or were deliberately choosing to 
ignore the Volunteers' potential; unless this attitude changed and the 'tactless 
pressure' reduced , Wells foresaw a slowing of momentum and possibly even a 
terminal decline. 67 
In response to the hurricane of fury from the membership, the Central 
Association issued a recommendation that until the conclusion of negotiations with the 
War Office about the conditions, corps should not accept any man of military age unless 
he had been rejected by the army. Many corps had from their outset abided by such a 
'rule ' but those who had not, experienced yet more resignations . One corps minuted 
that although it thought all its members of military age had valid reasons for not 
enlisting, it was impossible for them to remain in the unit if they had to 'swear an 
undertaking they could not carry out [and] like the honest men they were ', they left.68 A 
ferocious letter from one member typified that of many. The correspondent declared that 
under the War Office's conditions his corps would reduce in size from 1000 to 200 , 80% 
of his men being of military age. Most members rented their homes on three to five year 
leases and army separation allowances would be just sufficient to cover the annual 
charge of £45. If his wife and children were not to be sent to the workhouse or 
condemned to starvation at the 'whim' of any Recruiting Officer who chose to examine 
the register, the husband would have to be in receipt of a private income The authorities 
were therefore in effect stating that if a man wanted to defend his family, 'the only way he 
can do it legally is to join the army and let them starve' . Like many others, the writer 
condemned the compliant and reverential attitude of the Central Association towards 
the War Office: 
Unless the Central Training Corps refuse any recognition which does not cover the 
case of married men it had better shut up shop and give place to a central organization 
in closer touch with the real necessities of the situation. 69 
67 VTC Gazette, No.5, 2/01/15, p.75; No.6, 9/01/15, pp.90-91 ; No.2, 12/12/14, p.28; No.3, 19/12/14, 
p.37. 
68 Stockport Archives, 01697, DDND. Cheadle Hulme Volunteer Defence Corps, Secretary's Report, 
30/09/15. In some corps many fit men of military age res igned when newspapers had earlier 
questioned their motives for joining a corps. For example, the players of Blackburn Rovers and three 
committee officials of the local Athletes ' Volunteer Force resigned when their unit decided no men 
eligible for the army should be allowed to remain members. Blackburn Times, 12/09/1 4. 
69 VTC Gazette, No.4, 26/12/14, p.62. 
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As many members no doubt left for other reasons , it is impossible to determine 
precisely how many men resigned directly as the result of Rule 1. One corps claimed to 
have lost 76 of its 114 recruits as an immediate consequence of the rule / 0 this may 
have been typical or exceptional but correspondents who laid the blame purely at the 
door of the military authorities sometimes suggested that the movement should ignore 
the dictates of the Army Council and proceed independently: 'Why should we trouble 
about War Office recognition? This effete and red-tape-bound organization is doing its 
best to kill our movement in quite its best traditional manner. Our policy should be until 
sanity prevails to ignore them' .71 
However, it was not only letters critical of the authorities which appeared in the 
press. Several writers with rather more perception and less emotion pointed out that 
Rule 1 was not an underhand means of compulsion ; any who thought it was, they 
suggested , were wittingly or unwittingly misconstruing its real purpose.72 Others 
criticised the Volunteers for craving recognition but simultaneously refusing to place 
themselves under obligations which was not to their liking. In other words, they were 
aspiring to the status of soldier but were reluctant to accept the responsibilities that 
such recognition involved . Besides, ran the thesis, recognition would serve no purpose 
unless the Volunteers were armed. Without arms, but as members of a 'military force' 
they could, without ever having struck a blow, be interned as prisoners of war. Adherents 
to this persuasion advocated the status quo: the War Office could for the moment advise 
and, when conditions permitted, provide the movement with arms. Only then could the 
corps 'answer in a manner befitting its aspirations, and in such numbers as the general 
circumstances and individual obligations warrant' .73 
By Christmas 1914, representatives of the Central Association and the War Office 
negotiating a resolution to Rule 1's difficulties had fudged a compromise. The 
authorities were not prepared to rescind the rule but agreed that it would not be 
enforced in cases where there were good reasons for the man not to enlist; only in the 
gravest of national emergencies would the army overrule this exception . In return , men 
of military age enrolling in a corps would be expected to sign a slip pledging them to 
accept the terms of the War Office letter of 19 November. If a man declined to sign he 
was not to be admitted to the corps. The perceived corollary to this was that Voluntesr 
groups would thus consist primarily of men aged over 38 years - or, as Harris pointed 
70 Stockport Archives , op.cit., Cheadle Hulme Volunteer Defence Corps, Secretary's Report, 30/09/15. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Daily Express, 28/11/14. 
73 VTC Gazette, No.4, 26/12/14, p.62. 
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out, those very men for whom the movement had originally been intended.74 
The compromise was acceptable but unsatisfactory to both sides. The 
authorities remained concerned that eligible men would salve their conscience by 
enrolling ; the Central Association considered the rules were still too restrictive . The 
Daily Despatch rallied to the defence of the Central Association , complaining that the 
committee had come under: 
... unjust criticism ... lt had no choice as it was for the War Office to lay down the terms on 
which it would recognize the corps. The only question is as to whether the War Office 
could have made the conditions ... less apparently dramatic.75 
A further problem which had remained unresolved during the discussions was what, 
and in whose opinion, constituted a 'good and genuine' reason for not enlisting. The 
Gazette urged the membership to bombard MPs with letters in the hope that the 
Government might prove vulnerable to pressure from anxious backbenchers and thus 
force the War Office to soften its position .76 Meanwhile, the Central Association was, in 
turn, deluged with letters from corps' secretaries-seeking guidance on how to assess 
the acceptability of a man's reason for not enlisting . 
In January, the Central Association released a circular listing what the committee 
considered were valid excuses for non-enlistment. Besides the physically unfit, the list 
included those employed by firms working on government contracts, railway workers , 
civil servants, postal employees and teachers whose application to join the army had 
been refused by their education authority. Helpful those these guidelines were , there 
remained several important omissions and ambiguity. Many married men on small 
incomes or shopkeepers had claimed they could not afford to enlist, so too did many 
single men supporting aged parents and businessmen working longer hours to cover 
for employees who had gone. To many it seemed incongruous to deny useful training to 
these groups who were willing to give a limited service and, instead, allow them 
ultimately to join the 'corner boys in the streets' .77 A consequential further significant fall 
in numbers was gloomily predicted in the columns of the Gazette. Any man who did not 
fit into the prescribed categories but felt honour bound not to sign the pledge, would 
revert to the status of shirker and would thus be, by definition , unpatriotic. Unhappy as it 
. 
was with the Central Association and the War Office, the Gazette decided corps should 
74 Times, 14/01/15. 
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accept the compromise and 'behave in a manner which befitted a disciplined military 
body' - something which they singularly were not,l8 In case of dispute or where 
clarification of a man's suitability was required , corps secretaries were advised to 
enquire at their local recruiting office; in instances where a recruiting officer inspected a 
register and did not accept a man's stated reason for refusing to attest, the Volunteer 
was advised to resign. At least one corps decided to submit all applications by men of 
military age to the recruiting authority while another elected to let the committee decide a 
man's suitability.79 One Vice-Lieutenant decided it was probably impossible to define a 
clear reason , especially as decisions might ultimately rest with individual Inspecting 
Officers, among whom there was no universal consensus.80 There was so much 
confusion that calls were made for the War Office to issue an exhaustive statement of 
who could or could not enlist in the Regular or Territorial forces.81 Matters were made no 
clearer when the Chief Recruiting Officer for London District informed the Optimists' 
Corps that the army had no intention of forcing eligible businessmen to enlist but at the 
same time warned against men of military age sheltering in such corps. 82 Advice from a 
King 's Counsel which ruled that the agreement had only a moral rather than a legal 
obligation, also failed to provide an adequate conclusion . 53 
The Government's concession in recognizing the Volunteers was not a 
conversion to a belief in their utility. Tennant was brusque in reply to Members who 
invited him to expand on alleged reports of complaints about the conditions. He 
dismissed the queries by stressing the conditions had been accepted by the Central 
Association and insisted no amendments were contemplated or anticipated .84 A 
subsequent answer, which implied Volunteers were parading about the streets as 
'dandies' , demonstrated that his disparaging attitude had not altered . Moreover, he 
fuelled further confusion and anger by claiming that Rule 7 had been deliberately 
included to 'compel' eligible men to enlist. 85 For the Opposition, Walter Long appeared 
to agree with him: Rule 7 was essential and if there was to be an army for home 
defence, it must be properly constituted , be under military control and be uniformed. 'We 
78 VTC Gazette , No.7, 16/01/15, p.104. 
79 E.J.Disbrowe, A History of the Volunteer Movement in Cheshire 1914-1920, Stockport: Hales & Sons, 
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Book, 8/02/15. 
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81 Hansard Vol.69.505, 9/02/15. 
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should', he continued , abandon the proposal that a lot of civilians are to be collected 
together under a civilian , that they are to be decorated with a brassard and told that the 
Germans would regard them as soldiers '. He predicted the Germans would simply 
hang them from the nearest tree and warned against the movement being used 'in 
order to occupy a large number of energetic gentlemen who think they are serving their 
country. 86 
These unsympathetic comments came at a time when the Volunteers were 
attracting rather more ridicule than normal. The letters on the brassard proved a delight 
to the movement's detractors: epithets such as 'Gorgeous Relics ', 'Grandpa's 
Regiment' and 'George's Wrecks' flowed from the pens of wits; the Brighton Corps was 
nicknamed the 'Wifeguards', the Bedford Volunteers, 'England's Last Hope' and the 
popularity of route marches was thought to be a consequence of the public houses 
visited along the way. 87 Counter-attacking, the Gazette, which at times was not above 
criticising the conduct of some corps, lambasted Walter Long's 'gaucherie'. After 
condemning both front benches for their lukewarm support, the editorial concluded : 'We 
must not be too hard on the poor man. He does-not know what he is talking about'. 88 
Despite the indifference shown by ministers, several backbenchers maintained a 
steady if undramatic pressure on the Under Secretary of State. Questions repeatedly 
pressed the case for clarification, arguing that but for the two contentious rules , 
'thousands of men' would enrol.89 
Tennant did display rather less hostility when he assured the House that the 
Government would use only the powers of persuasion and not those of compulsion . 
Furthermore, although he refused to publish details of a meeting which discussed 
Volunteer membership and training between Kitchener and the Lords Lieutenant on 11 
February, he did state that the Government had 'no wish' to see the corps disbanded. 90 
The meeting had been at the instigation of the Lords Lieutenant and was intended to 
clarify some of the ambiguities thrown up by the Government's recognition of the corps. 
The Secretary of State emphatically declared that the Territorial Associations should not 
disperse their energies on projects for which they had not been created and that it had 
never been the intention of the War Office to confer Volunteer officers with spurious 
titles. He believed the Lords Lieutenant had a crucial role to play in their counties ' . 
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defence but insisted they were not permitted to confer or confirm Volunteer 
appointments in their official capacity. If an individual happened to be the chairman of a 
local corps he would be entitled to do so, and while Kitchener would not state whether 
he wanted Lords Lieutenant to assume such positions, neither did he discourage them. 
He would not allow public money to be spent on organizations of dubious utility but did 
suggest in a vague way that they might, under the auspices of the Emergency 
Committees, perform some unspecified tasks. They were to hold themselves at the 
disposal of the acting authority, be it the Lord Lieutenant, Police or Military. The Lords 
Lieutenant, who were themselves far from unanimous in opinion about the use or 
potential of the Volunteers, left the meeting with the impression that Kitchener was not 
entirely hostile to the movement but had more pressing things to consider.91 
Tennant certainly thought the meeting useful and decided he could be rather 
more ambivalent towards the Volunteers. He was perhaps encouraged by some luke 
warm support from a recent CID meeting in which Arthur Balfour had spoken of the 
Volunteer movement as being a 'plan for the utilization of men of every kind and degree' 
and Sir lan Hamiliton, GOG-in-C Central Force, .thought that despite their 'anomalous 
position ... some of the VTC were already shaping into bodies which might be of military 
value in an emergency'. 92 By this time, some of the earlier problems and 
inconsistencies had certainly been resolved : The National Reserve had been organized 
into companies and was deployed in guarding the most vulnerable points; the aliens' 
threat had diminished as a result of Government action ; the Emergency Committees in 
the threatened areas were operating and difficulties concerning the use and 
organization of the Special Constabulary, which remained the Government's preferred 
means of exerting control over the civilian population and for covering sites not protected 
by the National Reserve, had been clarified . 
The relationship between the Specials and the Volunteer corps had remained a 
subject of serious discussion within the Home Office. Some armed Class Ill National 
Reservists in Wales had been enrolled as Specials and were patrolling vulnerable 
points93 but, during November and December, letters from Chief Constables continued 
to seek guidance on their relationship with the Volunteers. One Chief Constable thought 
that corps should be directly attached to the Specials and drilled by them. He had . 
recruited 4000 Specials and wanted to increase the number to 10,000 by including the 
Volunteers. He therefore proposed to encourage the movement, provided the corps 
91 W070.43. Record of meeting, 20/GN/3736A, 11/02/15. 
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understood that they would come under his direct control. The Home Office thought it 
inappropriate for such a large number of quasi-military bodies, far in excess to what the 
county's civil authority might require , to be controlled by the Chief Constable. The matter 
was turned over to the War Office for consideration .94 
Buckinghamshire's Chief Constable believed that he could affiliate the VTC to the 
Specials and have them work closely together under the authority of the Emergency 
Committee. The Buckinghamshire scheme, whereby a Special could join the 
Volunteers but had to accept that his primary responsibility was as a Special, was 
adopted by the Central Association as a model for other counties .95 But matters were 
considerably easier in Bucks because Lord Desborough was both an officer in the 
Specials and, it was assumed, would also soon become the commanding officer of a 
Volunteer battalion . The relationship between the Chief Constable and Desborough (as 
well as the latter's intimate relations with other leading figures in Buckinghamshire 
society who were officers in both organizations), was thought to be a guarantee of the 
scheme's success. The Home Office agreed but warned that in other counties the 
personalities of their Chief Constables might work against the proposal succeeding. 96 
Home Office officials were continuing their gradual move away from believing that they, 
rather than the War Office should accept responsibility for organizing or containing the 
Volunteers. Although they argued for the rescission of the earlier circular which had 
advised Chief Constables not to become involved with the emergent VTC, they no 
longer saw any advantage in the civil authority acting as the controlling power. 97 
The Home Office was still undecided about whether to allow corps ' members to 
become specials in all but name when the committee of the Central Association met 
with the Lords Lieutenant and Chief Constables of counties on the East Coast. The 
meeting was intended to explore how the Volunteers might be used by the Emergency 
Committees, but it failed to attract a full quota of representatives from even these , the 
most threatened of areas . When Desborough offered the help of VTC for clearing 
animals and populations, the Duke of Northumberland objected . He insisted the 
machinery for executing those tasks was already in place and he did not want it 
replaced or supplemented by a body which enjoyed no legal status and worked under 
no established control. General Baden-Powell's suggestion that all Volunteers shoul.d 
94 H045/1 0766/272183/9. 
95 H045/10766/272183/84. 
96 In mid-1915 the Deputy Chief Constable of Kent wrote to the County Clerk suggesting that because 
they appeared to want to perform the same tasks as his Specials , 'the Maidstone and District VTC ought 
to be squashed at once'. Kent RO C/A2/14/2 , letter of 5/06/15. 
97 H045/1 0766/272183/13. 
be enrolled as Specials was also rejected because not all Volunteers might possess 
the criteria required for a Special. Desborough countered by suggesting that a man 
could fulfil both roles without compromising efficiency: once he had performed his tasks 
for the Emergency Committee, he would return to the coast, put on his Volunteer 
brassard and become a combatant. A Home Office observer at the conference reported : 
'The meeting did not seem to advance the purpose of the Association and the Lords 
Lieutenant seemed to find difficulties in the way of using the Volunteers with or in place 
of Specials' .98 Despite the apparent reluctance of the Lords Lieutenant to acknowledge 
a role for the VTC, the Home Office had still not quite resolved entirely to rel inquish its 
ever more tenuous interest in the Volunteers . Troup issued a new circular to Chief 
Constables in mid-December which again instructed them not to oppose the formation 
of corps, and to encourage men who could not enlist in the army to enrol in a local corps 
or as a Special. There was, he wrote, 'nothing incompatible' in becoming a member of 
both organizations. 99 
A tacit acceptance that the Volunteer corps might be put to use where there was 
an insufficient number of enrolled Specials had begun to appear in some quarters even 
before Troup's latest memo reached the counties. General Sir lan Hamilton certainly 
recognized that the VTC did have some potential. While emphasizing that anything 
approaching a military structure would be insupportable, and accepting that even if 
armed they would be incapable of offering any real resistance, Hamilton noted that 
small, mobile VTC commandos, fighting with local knowledge would add to the 
difficulties of an enemy obliged to forage for food .100 General Stopford , General Officer 
Commanding 2nd Army Central Force, also began to envisage a use for the VTC. He 
informed Lord Harris that discussions between Kent's Emergency Committees and 
local residents could be held with a view to producing guards for any unprotected 
points. 101 Again, there was no specific mention of employing the local Volunteers for 
such work and, indeed, Harris later stressed to his Chief Clerk that as yet neither he nor 
the Territorial Association had been given any authority to organize or deal with them. 102 
The Earl of Sandwich, Lord Lieutenant of Hampshire, decided to seek clarification from 
the Home Office on whether the recent circulars did in fact invest any responsibility for 
the VTC in his hands. In his reply, Troup again confirmed the Home Office intention .of 
96 H045/10766/272183/16. 
99 H045/1 0766/272183/17. 
100 H045/1 0766/272183/28. 
101 Letter from Stopford to Harris, 8/12/14, in Kent RO C/A2/5/1 . 
102 W020/Gen/3604 (AG1) of 20/11/14 to Lords Lieutenant said only that it was 'advisable' to bring the 
VTC into one county-wide organization . 
further distancing itself from the Volunteers. He informed the Earl that he was passing 
his letter on to the War Office. 
The Home Office was not actually foregoing or abdicating responsibility for the 
control of the VTC because it had never possessed it in the first place. What it was now 
accepting was that, with recognition, the movement was acquiring a more definite 
military stance and envisaging a more active role than the mere shepherding of people 
and animals from coastal regions. The movement might still prove useful to chief 
constables and Emergency Committees but if they were ever deployed in a civil 
disturbance, the Home Office did not want to suffer the opprobrium of having employed 
armed civilians against compatriots . If the Earl of Sandwich was to be expected to 
organize the Volunteers in Hampshire, Troup believed he should take instructions from 
the War and not the Home Office. 103 
In Kent, Lord Harris announced he was prepared to attempt the introduction of 
some sort of order into this 'uncontrolled, uninspected [and] disorganized movement' 
but could not do much until he knew more about them. Acknowledging the now altered 
Home Office stance, Harris emphasized that if fie was to be expected to undertake 
responsibility, he should do it through the medium of the Territorial Association, and 
thus the War Office, and not through the Chief Constable.104 Harris was , in fact, 
suggesting the process should go a stage beyond which the Government was for the 
present prepared to permit. It wanted the Lords Lieutenant to become involved in 
containing the Volunteers but bulked at the idea of loading additional work on the 
already overburdened Territorial associations. Besides, not all Lords Lieutenant were 
quite so willing as Harris to deal with the Volunteers. Despite his earlier support for the 
movement Lord Rosebery wrote that there were no Volunteers in Midlothian and that he 
was loath to encourage or organize them. There were several unarmed New Army 
battalions in his county and he deprecated the idea that Volunteers might be able to 
acquire weapons while the Kitchener men went without. The only possible use of an 
unarmed and untrained badge-wearing Volunteer, thought Rosebery, was as target 
practice. Lord Harewood was equally antagonistic. He was reported to have declared at 
a meeting of his West Yorkshire Territorial Association : 'Nothing would tempt me to 
encourage or support a lot of unauthorized squads of franc tireurs'; a view the Gaze.tte 
.. 
suggested was nothing short of pusillanimity. 105 
In the early weeks of 1915 then, the Government had managed to devise some 
103 H045/1 0766/272183/23. 
104 Letter from Harris to Home Office, 7/12/14 and to Balfour, 8/12/14, in Kent RO C/A2/5/1 . 
105 VTC Gazette, No.1 0, 6/02/15, p.162. 
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element of order and control over the chaos that was the multitude of corps and bodies 
constituting an unofficial system of home defence. Moreover, it had called up and 
deployed the National Reserve and had measures in place to prepare for civilian and 
animal evacuations from threatened areas.106 The sometimes unwanted energies and 
awkward dynamism of the VTC were being channelled through a body of responsible 
and, it was assumed, compliant patriots. The Central Association and its supporters 
were certainly unhappy with the Government's grudging acceptance of their existence 
and would continue to campaign for a greater role in home defence but, to the 
authorities, the movement was now manageable. In due course the War Office might 
award it some additional concessions and responsibilities ; for the present though , the 
military hierarchy had more pressing matters to consider. However, constraining the 
VTC did not signal the end of the Government's problems with auxiliary forces . 
Throughout 1915 one of the continual irritants which Tennant and his colleagues were 
compelled to address involved pay and bounties claimed by National Reservists . In 
addition, the militant patriots of the VTC were not prepared unquestioningly to accept 
advice or guidance emanating from the Central-Association . The Government may have 
exerted some restraint over the auxiliaries but the apparently ungrateful bodies retained 
a remarkable independence and capacity to cause embarrassment. 
106 Not everything concerning planning for the evacuation of livestock had gone as painlessly as 
Emergency Committees had hoped. The Thanet Committee reported that attempting to shoot the 
estimated 14,000 sheep and nearly 3000 cattle on the island would result in alarm among the 
population. It therefore requested the Home Office to supply sufficient serum and hypodermics to 
poison the animals. The Government's refusal to compensation to farmers for losing their livestock was 
heartily condemned. Report of 7/12/14 and letter from Harris to Balfour, 18/12/14. Kent RO, C/A2/5/1 . 
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CHAPTER VIII: LEGAL DIFFICULTIES 
In reflective yet optimistic mood at the end of 1914, Percy Harris believed : 
One of the features of the past few months has been the rise of a great volunteer self-
managing and self-financing army for home defence. I do not think it is yet realized by 
the public what a great movement has been going on their midst.1 
Harris had cause for optimism for it was estimated that about one million men had 
enrolled in Volunteer corps. There remained another 2.5 million aged between 38 and 
59 years thought to be sufficiently fit to join or be of use. But that, of course, was one of 
the fundamental problems. To what use could these untrained, undisciplined and 
largely unarmed groups be put? The Government had awarded them reluctant and 
partial recognition but could foresee no useful purpose for their existence and was not, 
given its already considerable commitments, prepared to contemplate looking for one. If 
the Volunteer movement was to survive and find a niche it would, for the time being at 
least, have to rely upon the old Victorian middle-class virtues of self-sufficiency and self-
reliance. 
With the movement under constraint, the Government could afford to appear 
benign . Tennant's earlier statement that he had no wish to see the Volunteers 
disappear2 was reinforced by Lord Crewe, the Lord Privy Seal and Lord Lieutenant of the 
County of London, when as guest of honour he attended a County of London Volunteer 
Training Corps' (VTC) reception . Furthermore, royal approval appeared to have been 
tacitly given by George V's inspection of over 2000 National Guard at Buckingham 
Palace. Following the parade his private secretary wrote to Desborough expressing the 
King's opinion that Volunteers might be usefully employed assisting the National 
Reserve in guarding vulnerable points. 3 Encouraging as these statements and actions 
might have seemed, the Government nevertheless remained resolutely convinced that 
the extent of central assistance should remain limited merely to watching , controlling 
and, where necessary, baulking . 
1 P.Harris interview in the Daily Chronicle, quoted in VTC Gazette No.5, 2/01/15, p.65. 
2 Hansard Vol. 70.283, 24/02/15. 
3 The Leicestershire & Rutland Citizens ' Corps Gazette No.7, 11103/16, noted it had 'always been a 
source of gratification to the VTC that. .. the King was one of the first to recognize the potential value 
of these Corps in a letter addressed from the Royal Pavilion , Aldershot Camp, 21 March 1915'. 
. 
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The insistence upon the inclusion of Rules 1 and 7 in the conditions of 
recognition did lead to many resignations . Some corps were forced to amalgamate and 
a Corps of Civilians was founded in London in which some of those who left the VTC 
enrolled . Corps in Leeds were thought to have lost 600 men and yet more disappeared 
nationally when several commandants ruled that all members of military age must 
resign .4 In the face of dwindling numbers there was a further spate of rationalizations 
amongst corps. For example, the Athletes' Volunteer Training Corps, which had 
attached groups in many towns and cities, agreed to affiliate and then amalgamate with 
the Central Association . There were also widespread calls to change the movement's 
name to the National Guard; this , it was argued , had a more patriotic and dignified ring 
and as such would aid recruitment. In an effort to stimulate enrolment, the Gazette 
decided the motto for 1915 should be 'Aim high'. Such a slogan would , it hoped, allow 
the movement to 'at least reach above mediocrity' .5 
On the ground, the movement was a disparate and sometimes competing 
collection of enthusiastic yet disorganized groups. Much of the impetus for expansion 
continued to come from officers of the National Reserve who generally organized their 
corps along the Reserve's same territorial areas of recruitment. The Central 
Association 's growing influence and control could deal effectively and easily with the 
relatively well-disciplined groups, but for the others, the association faced a bewildering 
challenge. The Central Association 's Executive Committee was allowed by the War 
Office to affiliate corps and to act as the recognized channel of communication between 
itself and the multitude of local corps. Willing as it was to attempt the task, the 
committee faced the prospect of trying to assert control , or at least influence, over corps 
which kept no registers, resented outside interference and possessed no recognized 
constitution. There were regular complaints that officers were elected or appointed only 
because they had taken the initiative to raise the corps or because they were local 
gentry, but with little regard for their ability or experience. 6 Many corps actually exercised 
a democracy entirely unsuited to a supposed military unit: committees and non-
commissioned officers (NCOs) were often elected by members; accounts were opened 
at banks chosen by lot; secretaries did not respond to official letters and requests ; there 
was no compulsion to drill or execute orders and , if an officer made himself unpop'ular, 
he could be replaced by his men. Discipline rested on good will and sensible 
4 VTC Gazette Vol.1 No.18, 3/04/15, p.333, Vol.1 No.19, 10/04/15, p.351 and Vol. 1 No.16, 20/03/15, 
p.291 . 
5 VTC Gazette Vol.1 No.7, 16/01/15, p.102; Vol.5 2/01/15, p.78 and p.72. 
6 VTC Gazette Vol.1 No.21 , 24/04/15, p.390; Vol.1 No.19, 10/04/15, p.358. 
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cooperation: aspects of corps' existence which were not always appreciated by some 
former military personnel. In one instance a retired major and long time organizer of the 
National Reserve was 'induced ' to join a VTC only to find his authority superseded by 
juniors and civilians. Objecting to such 'derogatory treatment as to constitute a complete 
libel' to his abilities as an officer and unable to appeal to any general officer to appoint a 
board of enquiry, he felt there was no alternative to resignation. 7 
Many corps were, in effect, run as clubs, some even providing suggestion boxes 
in whatever building might constitute a drill hall . Gradually, as with the City of London 
Volunteer Corps, a more conventional discipline was asserted. In March 1915, the 
corps decided to restrict the committee's activities to commercial matters and to allow 
the commandant, who it was accepted held a rank equivalent to a commission in the 
Crown 's forces, sole control over military affairs.8 
Many corps were composed of men from the labouring and working classes, but 
the majority comprised men from the professions or artisan groups. In effect, three 
types of corps evolved during the early perioc;l. The largest group was those raised in 
small towns, villages or by employers and ranged from collections of businessmen and 
shopkeepers, to the employees of Messrs Brunner, Mond & Co. at Winnington and the 
brickworks at Hindley. The second group comprised specialists or professional men 
who chose to serve with those in similar occupations. Into this category fell the Piano 
Trade Corps and several of the railway companies who raised and eventually equipped 
their men. The final group included those corps raised by men from a particular 
background or class: the Old Boys, Optimists and Public School Corps, for example, 
were for those who could afford a higher than typical subscription and expected 
membership to provide the benefits of a social club . Membership of all three categories 
depended upon the assumed ability to pay, patriotism, of course, not being permitted to 
compromise exclusivity. Subscriptions ranged from 1 d per week to an entrance fee of 
ten shillings in addition to a weekly payment of 6d . Artisans might be expected to pay 
five shillings to join whilst manual workers were admitted for an annual fee of two 
shillings. Among the more exclusive corps, the London National Guard demanded an 
entrance fee of £1 and the means to provide a uniform and weapon .9 
. 
In addition to a subscription, one corps demanded a minimum height of five feet, 
an ability to parade in a bowler hat or flat cap, and a successful medical examination . 
7 Hackney Archives D/S/1 0/-8. Letter from Major Baldock to the Mayor of Hackney, 4/03/ 15. 
8 For example, see City of London Volunteer Corps papers, Imperial War Museum Dept. of Printed 
Books, 316.33. K876. 
9 VTC Gazette Vol.1 No.3 19/12/14, p.42; Vo l. 1 No.4 26/12/14, p.63. 
Corps were formed in the Royal Courts of Justice, by the staff of Punch and by several 
breweries; members met in crypts, church halls, scout huts, on village greens and in 
the damp, unfinished basement of London's County Hall. Some corps decided to 
establish themselves as specialists groups. The Birmingham Electrical Volunteer 
Force attracted artisans from the electrical trades and the Chief Engineer of the General 
Post Office (GPO) invited men from the engineering, stores, telegraph and telephone 
departments to enrol in a corps and be available to train potential members of the Royal 
Engineers (RE). Station companies were established to guide and transport men 
returning on leave and protect them from the harpies who frequented London's main 
line stations. A number of cyclist battalions were formed and Warwickshire raised a 
cavalry corps armed with lance and carbine. A mounted League of Guides was 
organized in London and a Naval Home Defence Corps formed at Greenwich. A 
Masonic lodge was established within the City of London National Guard 10 and the 
Aldeburgh Company elected to divide itself into platoons of sailors, fishermen and 
cricketers. These local corps were sometimes instigated by the local vicar, the scout 
master, the eccentric retired colonel or simply by well-meaning and dutiful citizens.11 
By June 1915, about 1100 corps with a total of 390,000 members had affiliated to 
the Central Association; it was thought there were probably another 900 corps with a 
further 200,000 members still unaffiliated.12 Remarking on the expansion, The Times 
suggested the Central Association 'might almost grow frightened of the monster it [had] 
created '. 13 Although not 'frightened', the Central Association remained concerned that 
the unwieldy beast should be further constrained. In May it was announced that the 
movement's original spontaneous organization would be replaced by a system based 
on county regiments. Within a short time, 21 of England's 41 and two of the dozen 
Welsh counties were so organized. 14 In most counties the procedure was simple and 
uncontroversial. For example, the 27 corps in Middlesex all agreed to form a County of 
Middlesex Regiment, using the seven Parliamentary constituencies as the basis of the 
10 The Guard's committee comprised the heads of practically all the leading financial and commercial 
institutions of the City. These included Lord Rothschild (then also Lord Lieutenant of 
Buckinghamshire) , and the chairmen of the London & SW Bank, the London Joint Stock Bank and the 
National Bank. Times 17/12/14. 
11 E.J.Martin, 'VTC 1914-1918'. IWM Dept.of Printed Books; Blackburn Times~ ?/11/14 ; M.Yearsley, 
IWM Dept.of Documents DS/Misc/17, p.75; VTC Gazette Vol. 1 No.7, 16/01/15, p.107, p.107; No.1 2, 
20/02/15, p.204; Vol.3 No.62, 5/02/16, p.150; Vol.1 No.19 10/04/15, p.358; No.9, 30/01/15, p.139; 
Vol.2 No.38, 21/08/15, p.182; Vol.1 No.5, 2/01/15, p.72. 
12 VTC Gazette Vol.1 No.19, 10/04/15, p.350. 
13 Times, 6/04/16. 
14 VTC Gazette Vol.1 No.22, 1/05/15, p.41 0. 
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organization .15 In other areas some Lords Lieutenant, such as Fortescue in Devonshire 
and Harewood in the West Riding , remained reluctant to have dealings with the 
Volunteers and did nothing to help with the reorganization. Fortescue, in particular, 
attracted a significant amount of opprobrium from several corps' secretaries for his lack 
of support. 16 Similarly, Lord Harris in Kent. Although in his private capacity he 
sympathized with the movement and believed that as Lord Lieutenant he could give it 
increased impetus, he was determined not to be rushed into a hasty reorganization. 
Despite several requests for advice he heard nothing from the Home Office and had 
employed no clerical staff to assist in what he anticipated could develop into a 
voluminous amount of associated correspondence. As the Territorial association was 
already overloaded with work and of course under no obligation to take on the 
administration of the VTC, Harris opposed the idea of developing a county scheme. 
W .B.Prosser. the overworked and overburdened County Clerk offered to help Harris with 
any associated administrative work, 17 but Harris still failed to acknowledge any 
advantage in a countywide regiment or in a s~ggestion to amalgamate existing units.18 
He did, nevertheless, suggest that if the military authorities could 'make up their minds 
to face the situation' and invite Lords Lieutenant to assist them in working on a scheme 
whereby Volunteers could be used to relieve Territorials and National Reservists on 
vulnerable points, he would be prepared to take a more active and public role in 
promoting the movement. 19 
Of more immediate concern to Harris th~n a War Office request to create a county 
regiment was the authority and position of those gentlemen within the county who had 
raised and now officered the corps. Harris believed it was essential the Central 
Association insist upon members swearing an oath promising to obey the orders of 
their superior officers. It was noted earlier that although most Volunteers appear to have 
been willing to accept orders from those they had elected , there was no compulsion to 
do so. If members did not like an order they could resign, but the democratic nature of 
the movement required a committee meeting to expel any member who refused to do 
the honourable thing. When one Commandant announced he was arbitrarily changing 
15 Times, 9/02/15. 
16 For example, see a letter from the Secretary of the Torquay VTC to Fortescue of 7/06/15. Devon BO 
1262M/L 125, Bundle 14. A 
17 Prosser had earlier written to his equivalent in Bucking hamshire asking whether that county had 
appointed additional clerical staff to help with VTC work. Although he received a negative reply, 
Prosser agreed to Harris' request. Kent RO C/A2/14/2. 
16 Harris reminded A.F .Uniacke, Secretary of one Kent VTC, that the Yeomanry and Volunteers of 
1794 had remained as separate administrative units for years. Letter 2/02/15. Kent RO C/A2/14/2. 
19 /bid. 
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the drill night, the membership organized a postal vote to oppose the decision. So 
strong was the resentment against the action , which had been done 'to suit the 
Commandant's convenience and not ours', that the Commandant himself was forced to 
resign .20 
Harris was not the only official concerned with the lack of Commandants' 
authority and there were many others who were growing increasingly perturbed about 
the legal status of the movement. Conscious of the lack of legal standing and because 
he continued to believe the VTC would be of little practical help, Tennant continued to 
insist that any duties assigned by Emergency Committees should only be performed by 
officially appointed Special Constables. Some of its supportive MPs, such as Sir 
Courtney Warner, warned that the expansion of the Volunteer movement and its 
willingness to accept the growing number of tasks without any legal obligation or 
effective War Office control were, in fact, turning them into 'very dangerous people' .21 
The Central Association published pamphlets stressing how affiliation gave, 'a 
hallmark - in the same way as does the Amat~ur Rowing Association ', provided corps 
with lists of drill instructors, assisted them in obtaining rifles and helped in settling 
disputes between units. 22 In reality though, its authority was limited. As more corps 
embarked on an increasingly varied range of jobs, this concern amongst the 
membership about whether what they were doing, or might be called upon to do was 
legal, continued to grow. Some dismissed the anxiety with the, by now, well-worn 
argument that an invading German army was unlikely to abide by conventional rules ; 
others, perhaps unsurprisingly from an organization whose central administration was 
conducted from the Quadrangle of the Royal Courts and many of whose leading figures 
were barristers, appreciated the need for a campaign to secure legal protection for 
members engaged on voluntary duties. The same Times leader which had described 
the movement as a 'monster' went on to add that the leadership was not 'frightened ' of 
its own creation because it was a 'very humble-minded and good-natured monster that 
only longs to make itself useful' .23 That indeed, was the point. The membership was 
craving for something useful to do and, business and work commitments allowing , was 
willing to consider most requests for help. For that assistance to be effective, legitimacy 
was a prerequisite. 
At his meeting of 11 February with the Lords Lieutenant, Kitchener had expressed 
20 Stockport Archives 01697, OONO. Letter 23/06/15. 
21 HansardVol.70.968, 4/03/15; Vol.69 .626, 10/02/15. 
22 Central Association circular. Found in Stockport Archives 01697, OONO. 
23 Times, 6/04/15. 
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the view that Volunteers might be allowed to remove livestock from threatened areas. 
The Secretary of State's main concern was to keep the movement under control , but he 
feared it was drifting into more of a military role than either he or the War Office intended . 
It was an open question, said Kitchener, whether the VTC were not pushing the matter 
too far and thus jeopardizing their own potential usefulness.24 Many Volunteers would 
not have agreed with Kitchener but without arms, uniform or legal protection they 
considered there was little they could actively do to thwart an invasion. Some, as we 
have seen , were patrolling the coast and local vulnerable points while others helped 
construct a military road in north London, assisted their local fire brigades, undertook 
rescue work during the East coast raids, complied lists of privately owned hand carts 
and ladders, cleared the wards of St Bart's during air raids, assisted some RE at the 
Hatfield tank trials and distributed the canvass of householders prepared to 
accommodate refugees fleeing an invasion of the East coast. In July the War Office 
asked former NCOs in the Volunteers to re-enlist as instructors and in August the 
movement took the opportunity to be seen to ~e doing something of national importance 
by distributing and collecting National Registration forms . In London , thousands of 
Volunteers continued to spend their weekends digging trenches forming part of the 
capital's defences.25 
In February 1915, the Central Association circulated corps to ascertain how many 
members would be prepared to do day or night patrols, weekend duties away from their 
immediate locality or, if invaded, serve anywhere in the UK.26 The response was good, 
and in May, General Lloyd told the National Volunteer Reserve that he was talking to 
Oesborough about how else they might be used. General Sir Edward Hutton hinted that 
if the National Reserve was sent to France on line of communication duties, the VTC 
would be utilized as protection companies to replace them. 27 Hutton later went further 
and suggested that Volunteers might be used as base guards in France.28 Some letters 
to the Gazette suggested forming the Volunteers into garrison brigades of 
businessmen who could leave their work for a definite and contracted period of a few 
months, and General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, General Officer Commanding (GOC) 
24 Devon RO 1262M/L 125, Bundle 14. Letter from Lord Fortescue to a local VTC Secretary, 7/07/15. 
25 VTC GazetteVol.2 No.27, 5/06/15; Blackburn Times, 20/03/15; Lancashire RO DDX/11/1 ; T.Murray 
Ford , Memoirs of a Poor Devil, London: A.M .Philpot, 1926, p.189; E.J.Martin, V TC 1914-1918', IWM 
Dept. of Printed Books (3rd Voi.Bn.Herts Regt) ; C.Gerring, A Record of the Early Volunteer Movement 
(The Sherwood Foresters) , Nottingham: Sisson & Parker, 1920, p.14; W018/Inf/2004 (AG1) of 
25/05/15; VTC GazetteVol.2 No.36, 7/08/15, p.147; Fortnightly Review, Jan-June 1918, pp.764-774. 
26 VTC Gazette Vol.1 No.17, 27/03/15, p.310. 
27 VTC Gazette Vol.1 No.26, 29/05/15, p.484; Vol.2 No.28, 12/06/15, p.24. 
28 Times, 27/07/17. 
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Eastern Command, asked Suffolk's Volunteers to do certain guards, simultaneously 
assuring them he was considering using them to protect the county's main railway 
lines. 29 Several score Volunteers on the Isle of Man were employed in guarding the 
aliens' concentration camp but when 300 mainland Volunteers also offered to perform 
weekend patrols on the island they were accused of selfish motives. 30 
Willing as they were to attempt most things, Volunteers did on occasions recoil 
from accepting all invitations or requests for their labour. There was a reluctance to 
undertake the task of hospital orderlies for the Red Cross 31 and Lord Fortescue met 
with a hostile response when he wanted Volunteers to help with the harvest in Devon. 
Across the country thousands of members did go into the fields but Fortescue was 
brusquely accused of holding 'misapprehensions as to the object' of the VTC 
movement32 Another suggestion whereby the Volunteers would guard prisoners of war 
while the Germans collected the harvest was thought unwise because, in the absence 
of legal standing, a Volunteer shooting an escapee could be hanged for murder. 
Although Brigadier-General Bridgeman expre~sed this interpretation as 'something 
characteristic of a Government composed of lawyers',33 the assumption was technically 
correct. There were other occasions when military personnel requested the assistance 
of Volunteers but declined the ensuing offer when it was realized the Volunteers had not 
sworn any attestation and enjoyed no legal protection . 'When the Volunteers are called 
upon to undertake the duties of the National Reserve' wrote one editorial in the Gazette , 
'these things will have to be sorted out' .34 
Questions concerning legal status had been raised in Parliament by both 
supporters and detractors of the movement. Although they were sometimes related to 
what would happen if a Volunteer shot and killed an individual not responding to a 
challenge, 35 they were usually linked to the issue of the hated brassard which 
Volunteers were obliged to wear on duty. Despite widespread abhorrence, an 
avalanche of hostile letters at this 'hideous' and garish armlet made, it was alleged , 
29 This work was later described by one man who volunteered for these duties as 'very tedious and a 
considerable strain '. E.R.Cooper, MSS, IWM Dept.of Documents. 
30 VTC GazetteVol.1 No.13, 27/02/15, p.238; Vol.2 No.3?, 14/08/15, p.169; Vol.2 No.29, 19/06/15, 
p.41 ; Blackburn Times, 15/05/15. 
31 Stockport Archives D1697, DDND, 12/04/15. 
32 Letter of 8/05/15, Devon RO 1262M/L 125. The VTC Gazette Vol.2 No.28, 12/06/15 , p.24, also 
objected to the expectation that Volunteers would help with the harvest. 
33 Quoted by M.Yearsley, IWM Dept.of Documents DS/Misc/17, p.78. 
34 VTC Gazette Vol.2 No.29, 19/06/15, p.46. 
35 Hansard Vol.71.588, 27/04/15. Tennant generally avoided the issue by answering that the VTC 
were for training only and if they were called upon to do anything else, procedures would be put in 
place. 
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from a section of red petticoat, and mercilessly ridiculed in comic journals, 36 the Gazette 
followed the official line: the brassard would be sufficient to prevent any wearer being 
hanged as a franc-tireur and , besides, it argued, they were often worn by Regulars to 
denote a specialization . When , in July 1915, it asserted that dislike of the brassard was 
diminishing, the editor received a deluge of letters expressing entirely the opposite 
opinion .37 
Apart from its deliberately conspicuous appearance, the brassard was hated for 
what it was perceived to symbolize: confirmation that the wearer was a civilian and not a 
combatant. The Central Association insisted (even to the 'amazement' and initial 
incredulity of a beleaguered Tennant) 38 that the brassard should be worn even when the 
Volunteer was in a uniform of his own particular corps. Anyone could get hold of and 
parade about in a uniform, but the brassard exhibited membership of an affiliated corps. 
Commenting on the peculiarities of the regulations , Sir William Bull speculated 
Volunteers certainly did not want to be mistaken for franc-tireurs and hanged , 'but would 
prefer to be shot in the ordinary way'. He ass~red the House that personally he had no 
particular desire to be shot but, if presented with the option , would prefer that to being 
ignominiously hanged. He concluded by predicting the brassard would not be 
recognized by invading Germans any more readily than a British army would recognize 
its legality in Germany.39 Tennant suggested Bull address his remarks to the General 
Staff in Berlin and failed to be moved by the argument that the only purpose of forcing a 
Volunteer in uniform to wear the brassard would be to throw the valid ity of the uniform 
into doubt.40 Undeterred by Tennant's oft-repeated answers, Sir J.D.Rees complained 
that Lord Desborough and the Central Association were even opposing the wishes of 
Lord Kitchener and the War Office by insisting on the wearing of the detested 'Christy 
minstrel kind of symbol'.41 Tennant agreed to consult again and returned to the House 
with the conviction that the brassard would continue to be compulsory. In similar fashion 
as the Gazette, and with as little apparent knowledge of fact, he expressed the opinion 
that brassards were 'becoming quite popular'. When advised of his error, and now tired 
of the issue, he decided in July that the matter was closed .42 
38 E. Patton ( ed) , A Record of the United Arts Rifles 1914-1919, London: Alex Maring, 1920, p.12; 
Fortnightly Review, Jan-June 1918, p. 765. .. 
37 VTC Gazette Vol.2 No.33, 17/07/15, p.104; Vol.2 No.34, 24/07/15, p.127. 
38 HansardVol.70.631 , 1/03/15. 
39 Ibid, Vol. 70.628, 1/03/15. 
40 Ibid. , Vol.71 .164, 20/04/15; Vol.71 .2116, 18/05/15. 
41 /bid., Vol.71 .2418, 19/05/15. 
42 lbid., Vol.72.75, 7/06/16; Vol.73 .1481 , 21/07/15. 
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Questions and answers on the issue of the brassard did have their lighter 
moments but matters concerning other areas of legality, notably those involving 
expenses, uniform and weapons, were treated with considerably more gravitas. The 
movement was outraged in May to learn that while members of the Paddington Corps 
paid one shilling to travel to their exercise ground at Epsom, race goers on the same 
train paid half fare . Tennant was repeatedly asked whether he would allow Volunteers to 
travel to drills on reduced fares and always replied that as the cost would fall on the 
public purse, it would run contrary to the principle by which the Central Association had 
been recognized .43 When the question was raised again , Tennant 'completely out of 
touch with public sentiment' and in 'language singularly inappropriate to the occasion', 
once more declined to amend the official stance. 44 Entirely frustrated by the 
Government's refusal to assist them either financially or to offer them legal protection , 
and believing themselves to be considerably less favoured than the Rifle Volunteers of 
old , the Gazette warned readers to find 'courage and patience'.45 
In June 1915, the Government did ma~e a concession and allowed those 
Volunteers travelling to work on the London defences free fares . Nevertheless, when 
they arrived at the defences to begin work they were provided with no refreshments of 
any sort and had to provide their own food and drink. The authorities remained resolute 
in their determination not to assist the movement any further with public funds . The 
summer saw another period of recrudescence of public criticism in the press and 
elsewhere. Much of this criticism was accused of being 'misinformed ... self-
contradictory .. . and based on complete ignorance of the corps and its work'.46 The 
hostility and sarcasm was fuelled by reports which suggested a recruiting meeting at 
Guildhall had netted only seven members at a cost of £60, and of disagreements 
between the War Office and Treasury over funding .47 Several attempts to counter the 
criticism by nationally known figures such as the former prime minister Lord Rosebery, 
who told the Glasgow VTC they offered a 'real, unostentatious but substantial way' of 
aiding the country, and a public announcement by Lord Harewood that he had changed 
his mind about the movement, were given wide publicity, but the unorchestrated 
43 lbid., Vol.71 .1654, 12/05/15. 
44 VTC Gazette Vol.1 No.25, 22/05/15, p.468. 
45 Ibid., Vol.1 No.23, 8/05/15, p.430. 
46 Ibid., Vol.2 No.27, 5/06/15, p.8. 
47 E.Potton (ed) , A Record of the Unites Arts Rifles 1914-1919, op.cit., p.16; C.Gerring , A Record of 
the Early Volunteer Movement, (Sherwood Foresters}, op.cit., p.9. The Times carried a story which 
claimed the War Office wanted Volunteers to undergo some form of attestation and agree to a week's 
consecutive service each month. They would serve as Class II National Reservists . The Treasury was 
apparently unwilling to provide the necessary funds. Times, 14/06/15. 
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campaign against the Volunteers continued.48 The gist of the criticism centred upon the 
belief that Volunteers were doing little to help the war effort and that the Government, not 
wanting to concern itself with a group of enthusiasts who swore no attestation and were 
virtually laws unto themselves, was quite correct largely to ignore them .49 There were 
also occasional reports of friction between some Volunteers thought to be displaying 
rather too much enthusiasm when on duty, and the police.50 There were others in 
Parliament and the press who continued to suggest the very existence of the VTC 
constantly hampered recruitment to the army. 
In his annual report the chairman of the Hampshire County Territorial Association 
condemned the VTC for 'militating against recruitment' to the regiment's Fifth and Ninth 
Battalions as well as to the county's National Reserve. Corps offered a 'colourable 
substitute' and he suggested that any man who wanted to join a VTC should have to 
apply through the Territorial depot to ensure he was ineligible to join the Regulars or 
Territorials .51 The Gazette declared such sentiments were 'much in opposition to the 
general experience' and demanded to know o_n what evidence the report had been 
based . To underline what it considered to be unjust criticism, the editorial cited a recent 
letter from the Adjutant-General, General Sir Henry Sclater, to Percy Harris 
congratulating the Volunteers for their army recruiting work. 52 But the damage had been 
done and even a partial retraction by the Hampshire chairman, a vigorous defence of its 
enrolment policy by the Gosport VTC and the assertion by Brigadier-General Bridgeman 
that the authorities were no longer 'jealous' of the VTC, failed to ameliorate the 
criticism. 53 
Further poor publicity came with two incidents widely reported in the national 
papers. Volunteers were accused of contravening the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) 
by drinking in public houses during restricted hours. The War Office ruled that as 
Volunteers were not members of HM Forces the law did not apply to them . General 
Woolcombe, GOC 2nd Army Central Force, then confused the issue by announcing that 
publicans should not serve even civilians in uniform during the restricted hours. The 
issue again highlighted the Volunteers' difficulty: they wanted to be regarded as soldiers 
but even the War Office and its subordinates gave out conflicting messages as to their 
48 VTC Gazette Vol.2 No.27, 5/06/15, p.8; Vol.2 No.28, 12/06/15, p.24. 
49 Another contemporary epithet was 'Bank Holiday Stalwarts'. 
50 VTC Gazette Vol.2 No.31 , 3/07/15, p.72. 
51 Hants RO 37M69/3, Chairman's Report, March 1915. 
52 VTC Gazette Vol.1 No.23, 8/05/15, p.431 . 
53 Times 26/07/15; Hants RO 37M69/3, Chairman 's Report, May 1915; VTC Gazette Vol. 1 No.26, 
29/05/15, p.490. 
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legal status. The second celebrated and notorious incident involved a uniformed 
Volunteer officer's ejection from a London theatre by the Provost Marshal. 54 
The War Office's allowance in November 1914 that Volunteers would be 
permitted to wear uniform when drilling had done little to assuage the membership's 
feelings on the matter. Tennant replied with incredulity to suggestions that a volunteer 
force should be allowed to wear a uniform in character with that of the Regulars or 
Territorials and further added that, even if Volunteers were permitted to purchase their 
own, there was insufficient khaki available and the price would inevitably increase still 
further.55 Opinions varied within the movement: some members recalled the Boers had 
not required a uniform to become a potent force, others thought the grey-green uniform 
sanctioned by the Central Association 'undignified ' and 'unsightly' , and some preferred 
the green to khaki because it offered improved camouflage. 56 
Many corps opened clothing funds immediately upon formation and had 
succeeded in providing their men with khaki serge before the War Office introduced the 
further restriction of prohibiting the use of wo~l in Volunteer suits . Any suit ordered or 
made after this regulation was condemned as unserviceable, cold and sloppy.57 The 
fabric and colour further accentuated the 'invidious' distinction between the army and 
the Volunteers and , when combined with the compulsory brassard , afforded the enemy 
easy identification of its opposing forces. The Government was persistently criticised for 
allowing a 'lot of leeches' to make 'fortunes' 58 at the expense of privately funded corps 
and for its insistence that uniform could only be worn when drilling: 
Thus is a repetition of the old prejudice against and discouragement of, the Volunteers , 
now Territorials. Red tape evidently still clings with tenacious persistency to the War 
Office officials, and this proposal. .. is received with feelings of disgust and is calculated 
to have a detrimental effect on the movement. .. lf the parsimony and objection to a proper 
military uniform is persisted in by the War Office it will result in a very considerable 
number of men leaving. 59 
The disappointment felt by many Volunteers did not prevent them from 
54 The officer, who was also the chairman of the company which owned the theatre, was told 
'peremptorily to leave'. He declined to do so and the issue was subsequently raised in the House. Lord 
Athlumney, the Provost-Marshal, defended his staff by explaining the policy was designed to put a 
stop to the increasing practice of Volunteers appearing in public in uniform but without the brassard . . 
Times 17/08/15; HansardVol.74.154, 16/09/15; VTC GazetteVol.2 No.32, 10/o?/15, p.80; Vol.2 
No.38, 21/08/15, p.184. 
55 Hansard Vol.69.96, 3/02/15; Vol.69.1 02, 3/02/15. 
56 VTC GazetteVol.1 No.319/12/14, p.46; No.4, 26/12/14, p.62. 
57 E.R.Cooper MSS, IWM Dept.of Documents, p.3. 
56 T.Murray Ford, Memoirs of a Poor Devil, op.cit., p.189. 
59 VTC Gazette Vol.1 No.6, 9/01/15, p.95. 
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harnessing their resources to provide their own uniforms: London 's National Guard 
supplied themselves with a dark blue uniform in keeping with their day time City wear, 
wealthy benefactors sometimes donated sums to clothe a corps' original members, 
and secretaries invited local gentlemen to make donations in return for being made 
honorary members.50 Tailors, found in abundance in many corps, ran up the often 
locally obtained cloth at minimal cost and, by Whitsun 1915, corps across the country 
were seen parading in their own, largely green, but also occasionally khaki , uniforms. 
Tennant did not reiterate his earlier accusation of Volunteers posing as 'dandies' 
but refused to grant further concessions. It was a 'mistake' for Volunteers to parade 
about during the day 'as if they were serving soldiers ' and continued to insist that the 
only legal way for a man to be regarded as a member of a corps was not the display of a 
uniform but possession of the brassard . The officially sanctioned uniform with its 
Austrian knot was likened to that of a 'German band ' and arguments that as the War 
Office had achieved its apparent object of dissuading men from joining the Volunteers 
as a screen to excuse themselves from enlist!J1ent it should now be prepared to 
abandon some of the restrictions, received predictable responses . Even an 
impassioned plea that as naval bombardments and Zeppelin raids on the East coast 
had turned the area into a war zone its Volunteers should be treated as a special case 
and be uniformed at public expense, similarly failed to persuade Tennant.51 
Of equally emotive concern as the right to wear a uniform, was the Volunteers' 
ability to acquire arms. There was a general and widespread acceptance that until the 
Government had enough weapons for Regular troops and the Volunteers had 
undergone a degree of training, corps would have to wait or provide themselves with 
any antiquated or obsolete rifles that might become available. As the War Office was 
confident the Volunteers had neither the money nor the ability to compete seriously with 
the authorities for the limited number of rifles being manufactured, it was somewhat 
embarrassed to discover that groups such as the Birmingham Rifle Reserve and the 
Buckinghamshire Volunteers had managed to acquire .303 weapons months before 
many Territorial and New Army battalions. 52 Consequently, the Government prohibited 
60 Gloucester RO 05627 7/6, 28/09/15. At least one corps, Gainsborough, required a man to perform 
40 drills before he was entitled to wear a uniform. E.J.Martin, 'VTC 1914-1918', IWM Dept.of Printe;J 
~~. . 
61 HansardVol.70.624-634,1/03/15; Vol.71.492-527, 24/04/15. Isle of Man Volunteers engaged in 
guarding the aliens' camp were provided with uniforms by their own government. 
62 E.J.Martin, 'VTC 1914-1918', IWM Dept.of Printed Books, Warwickshire Volunteer Regiment; 
!.Beckett, 'Aspects of a Nation in Arms: Britain's VTC in the Great War', Revue ln ternationale d'Histoire 
Militaire, No.63, 1985, p.31 ; VTC Gazette Vol.1 No.1, 5/12/14, p.16. The journal reported that 
Rothsch ild and Astor each contributed £1000 for the purchase of arms and equ ipment. 
Volunteers from buying service pattern rifles and ruled that any corps wishing to 
purchase weapons would first have to be cleared by their GOC District. 63 Most corps, 
though , were not so fortunate and did not have a Lord Rothschild or William Astor to 
provide for them. 
The majority of corps drilled with whatever pattern or dummy rifles they managed 
to borrow or acquire. Gainsborough Corps were loaned rifles by the Church Lads' 
Brigade, the London County Council Corps used dummy weapons formerly belonging 
to Carson's protestant Volunteers and the North-Eastern Railway Corps at Goole 
borrowed two air guns from the local Scouts. However, the United Arts scorned the use 
of what they called 'neolithic flintlocks' and bought several hundred Martinis which were 
then sold or hired to members. Some corps entered into leasing agreements with local 
rifle clubs for use of weapons and ranges, while others tried to provide their own by 
raising funds and constructing a range.64 The East Riding Volunteers announced plans 
in January 1915 to raise £7000 for arms and , among others, Hereford Town Council 
awarded the local corps £35 by increasing th~ mayor's salary. Corps which affiliated to 
the Central Association from December 1914 were exempted from gun licence duty, 
which meant obsolete weapons could sometimes be bought for as little as £1 . 
However, the cost of serviceable rifles soon increased from a prewar price of £4 to over 
£6. Many corps from poorer areas could not, of course, afford to buy weapons at this 
price, even if they did become available. Consequently in February 1915, the Gazette 
declared it was time to launch a campaign for a national weapons' fund .65 
Tennant's negative reply to Sir Henry Craik's question about whether the War 
Office would eventually reimburse those corps which had bought weapons, repeated 
Government assurances that there was no hoarded stock or reserve of obsolete 
weapons and the knowledge that the War Office had been forced to acquire thousands 
of Japanese rifles in order to equip at least some of the second line Territorial 
battalions, ensured the national campaign never really began. Funds might well have 
been collected but the possibility of finding weapons to spend them on was too remote . 
This specific appeal was soon lost within the wider one for greater municipal and 
63 This was rescinded by W020/Gen/3604 (AG1) of 26/08/15. 
64 E.J.Martin, 'VTC 1914-1918', IWM Dept.of Printed Books, (Gainsborough report); M.Yearsley, IWM 
Dept.of Documents DS/Misc/17, p.77; VTC Gazette Vol.1 No.5, 2/01/15, p.76; E.Potton (ed) , A Record 
of the United Arts Rifles 1914-1919, op.cit., p.12; Cheadle Hulme Corps fought a protracted battle 
with landowners, contractors and a rifle club over the rights, costs and rents of their self-built range. 
Stockport Archives D1697,DDND, Minute Book 1914-15; Deptford Corps opted to contract for the use 
of the local swimming bath as a miniature range. VTC Gazette Vol.1 No.5, 2/01/15, p.79. 
65 VTC GazetteVol.1 No.7, 16/01/15, p.103; Vol.1 No.17. 27/03/15, p.310; Vol.1 No.12, 20/02/15, 
p.206. 
private participation and in a more realistic campaign to improve corps ' training in case 
an emergency did demand their mobilization. 66 
The movement's leadership retained an abiding faith in its potential as a vehicle 
for home defence but until that potential had been realized and moulded into a shape 
which corresponded vaguely to a disciplined and trained body, Volunteers would remain 
more of a danger than a help to the Regular forces. Those corps which had National 
Reservists as members probably did have an advantage over those who could not draw 
on a reservoir of military experience, but even they were often drilled in anachronistic 
fashion .67 There was a national shortage of instructors but by offering a fee to NCOs at 
nearby camps, corps often obtained their services for one night per week.68 Once partial 
recognition had been achieved and the Central Association established , there were 
immediate calls from the membership for it to lay down regulations as to what might be 
considered an 'efficient' Volunteer and for a programme of training. 69 Until the 
committee produced such a scheme, the Gazette ran articles on drill , defensive tactics, 
communications, transport and of the necesstty of knowing the geography of their 
district. 7° Corps did as they were asked but members soon grew bored with the lack of 
equipment and variety in their drills. Furthermore, from the movement's inception there 
had been frequent and regular objections to drilling on Sundays. Knowledge that the 
Regulars and Territorials had always trained at weekends made little impression on 
some members and solutions could not always be found .71 Attempts , such as the offer 
of shooting prizes, were made to persuade men they should attend more regularly and 
some corps began to insist upon a required number of drills per month :72 
Gainsborough, for example, insisted on four. 73 Easter, Whit and summer camps were 
organized by some corps as morale and esprit-building measures but participants had 
55 Hansard Vol. 70.804, 3/03/15; Vol. 71 .838, 29/04/15. 
67 One corps was trained in the practice of 100 yard volleys by a former colonel of the Indian Army. He 
had the front rank kneeling and the rear standing. T. Murray Ford, Memoirs of a Poor Devil, op. cit., 
p.199. 
56 Gloucester RO 05627 7/6, June 1915. 
59 VTC Gazette Vol.1 No.5, 2/01/15, p.78. 
70 A leaflet published by the Central Association in July 1915 was almost identical to that prepared by 
the Surrey County Association when it campaigned for the creation of a Corps of Guides in 1909. . 
Another of 30/05/15 wanted commandants to take their men out to study their locality. No number, but 
found in W0.161/105. VTC Gazette Vol.1 No.18, 3/04/15, p.337. 
71 Hunslett Corps drilled on Wednesday afternoons to allow shopkeepers to attend on their half day 
closing . 
72 Preston VTC required 6 per month , at least 2 of which had to be on a Saturday. Lancashire RO 
D.DX/11/1 , 14/07/15. 
73 E.J.Martin, 'VTC 1914-1918', IWM Dept.of Printed Books. 
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to pay for their own transport and food .74 Even then, the War Office sometimes contrived 
to make life difficult and raised objections on where the camps could be sited .75 
One enthusiastic Devonshire officer bought his platoon their rifles , uniforms and 
a disused chapel as a drill hall, 76 but some VTC did have difficulty in acquiring the use 
of a suitable building where they could drill, especially during the winter months. Most 
corps eventually seem to have managed to find and rent a building, although they could 
range in style from Herne Bay pier to a disused orphanage. Parades with Protection 
Companies and Territorial battalions did occasionally occur but, in general , the 
uniformed forces held themselves apart from the Volunteers. When they could be 
arranged, VTC parades addressed by senior officers did provide good propaganda 
opportunities. One such gathering in Regent's Park, which attracted Volunteers from 
Birmingham, Liverpool and London , was used by General Lloyd, GOC London District, 
to tell the men how his conversations with Desborough about their future use were 
progressing . This was followed in July 1915 by the first conference of county 
association presidents and regimental commqndants , meeting under Desborough's 
chairmanship, to discuss how the movement could be developed. 77 Successful 
resolutions urged the Government to make more use of corps and to agree to a form of 
attestation whereby any man called up for duty fell under military law and was thus 
legally protected . The suggestion to enrol Volunteers as Class II National Reservists, 
which would allow them to be called out as recognized soldiers under Section 12 of the 
Reserve Forces Act, 1882, was made again, and the persistent issue of legality was 
raised once more when Tennant admitted that the possible use of Volunteers was 
'constantly present' in Kitchener's mind.78 
Although the Government remained opposed to spending money on the 
Volunteers it was thinking about possible future uses for the movement. Staff officers of 
Southern Command were sent on tours of inspection to ascertain whether Volunteers 
might be capable of releasing some Regular troops from certain guards, and a 
delegation of representatives from the North Riding and the North-East reported that 
Tennant had expressed 'some sympathy' with the concept of public funding. 79 In 
September, the War Office went a stage further and announced it was willing to accept 
74 Essex Volunteers paid between 25 and 30 shillings each for a winter camp in Epping Forset. VTC 
GazetteVol.1 No.3, 19/12/14, p.38. 
75 One such occurrence caused a question to be raised in Parliament. Hansard Vol. 73.2456, 28/07/15 . 
76 J.Tindall, The Sidmouth Volunteers, op.cit., p.18. 
77 VTC GazetteVol.2 No.33, 17/07/15, p.104. 
78 /bid., Vol.2 No.31 , 3/07/15, p.72; HansardVol.73 .2277, 28/07/15. 
79 Times, 13/09/15; VTC Gazette Vol.2 No.32, 10/07/15, p.80. 
the services of a minimum of 500 men of the London National Guard for one month 's 
work in France. Tennant had previously mentioned the Secretary of State was 
considering the use of a small number of men on overseas engineering duties but 
some reports suggest it was the Central Association which first proposed the scheme 
to the War Office.80 Although the Gazette was never 'widely enthusiastic' about the 
proposal, arguing the movement would be better served by retaining its existing identity 
as purely an organization for home, it did accept the idea as another link in the chain 
towards full recognition. 81 When published, the conditions under which the men were to 
serve in France were clearly prohibitive: there was to be no pay, separation allowances, 
clothing, arms or pension; only tools and transport would be provided . Four hundred 
men did, nevertheless volunteer, but the scheme was abandoned when Sir John 
French was apparently informed that as Volunteers had sworn no attestation they could 
not be brought under military law. 82 Amused by the confusion and lack of coordination 
between War Office departments, Punch printed an 'advertisement' for volunteers: 
.. . In case of being passed for the Front, Volunteers must deposit a sum in advance to 
cover all hospital expenses. They will, however, be buried without charge. The 
applications of members wishing to offer themselves as subjects for vivisection or other 
dangerous experiments at the hospitals will be considered in rotation . The War Office 
will consent to accept men of good character from the Volunteer Corps to act as live 
targets for musketry practice; also as cover to save the expense of sandbags. Public 
school and University men preferred . Entrance fee, two guineas.83 
Examples of a rather more encouraging Government attitude came when Lord 
Derby publically decided Volunteers were not 'shirkers', and with Kitchener's affirmative 
reply to the GOC Western District's question of whether he should consider the VTC 
when formulating defence plans. 84 Furthermore, in November 1915, Kitchener agreed to 
inspect three battalions of the National Guard at Wellington Barracks, another move 
heralded by Volunteers as a further step towards full recognition . The event was widely 
reported in the press and, although Kitchener was no admirer of amateur soldiers and 
the parade itself was something of a shambles, the Secretary of State appeared 
.. 
80 HansardVo1.74.154, 16/09/15; Times, 9/09/15; VTC Gazette Vol.2 No.46, 16/10/15, p.307. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Cancellation of the scheme came with W020/Gen/4016 AG1 of 8/10/15. The Lord Mayor called a 
parade of the 400 who did volunteer to thank them for their offer of service. Times, 9/10/15. 
83 Punch, 26109115 . 
84 VTC Gazette Vol.2 No.34, 24/07/15, p.120. 
interested, amicable and praised them for their 'soldier-like appearance'. 85 
While acquiring the use of local halls for drills was usually not an insurmountable 
difficulty, securing sufficient money to pay for their hire and the purchase of uniforms did 
provide a constant source of anxiety for both the local and national leaderships. 
Subscriptions could generally pay for the weekly essentials but additional sums were 
required for equipment which corps believed were essential to achieve a degree of 
efficiency. 86 Public appeals brought both surprising benefits and disappointment. 
Strachey launched a Spectator appeal almost immediately recognition had been 
gained, and personally contributed the first £200; by June the fund stood at £3000. One 
local beneficiary offered to pay the entrance fees for his corps ' first 100 members and 
Lowestoft's Ladies Sea Angling Association raised £75 for the town's corps. In contrast, 
an appeal in Essex brought in only £43 3s for an estimated 7000 members, an 
insignificant sum when compared to the £1259 raised by Nottinghamshire's VTC. Whist 
drives, matinees and other fund-raising activities were organized and subscriptions 
sometimes reduced in an attempt to attract m~mbers . In addition to their own corps' 
funds, members were expected in 1915 to contribute to their county HQ. 
Nottinghamshire's Volunteers agreed to pay ten shillings annually for every 1 00 
members but when Kent asked for 5% of all units receipts to be paid to a county fund , 
very few corps responded. 57 
Born of necessity, corps soon began to investigate the possibility of raising 
contributions from local businesses and councils. Electric and gas companies 
sometimes offered to provide free light during drills and Keighley Council was among 
the first to suggest that its Gas and Tram Committees might award grants to cover the 
cost of lighting and travelling to drills. Unfortunately it was soon discovered to be illegal 
for councils to award grants of this nature. Bradford's Volunteers were more favoured 
than most because a special Act of Parliament allowed the City Council to give grants 
for any movement deemed beneficial to the city; this allowed the council legally to vote 
monies to provide administrative staff, accommodation and ranges. The accepted 
85 Times, 4/11/15. One participant thought the parade, 'the worst I have ever seen. The line was a very 
long one and only about one quarter heard the order; the rest saluted when they saw their neighbours 
presenting arms. The ragged effect was dreadful, and must have set Kitchener's teeth on edge. But he 
took it all with calmness and perhaps even made allowances for us.' T.Murray Ford, Memoirs of a ~oor 
Devil, op.cit., p.196. "' 
86 The only items of equipment bought for some months by the Cheadle Hulme Volunteer Defence 
Corps were two torches and two whistles. Stockport Archives, D1697,DDND, 21/09/14. 
87 VTC Gazette Vol.1 No.23, 8/05/15, p.431 ; No.1?, 27/03/15, p.312; Gloucestershire RO 05627 7/6, 
28/09/15; !.Beckett, 'Aspects of a Nation in Arms: Britain's VTC in the Great War', op.cit., p.31 ; 
C.Gerring , A Record of the Early Volunteer Movement {The Sherwood Foresters) 1914-1919, op.cit., 
p.6; Kent Volunteer Fencible , No.18, September 1915. 
method for other councils and corporations was to follow Hereford 's lead and award the 
mayor a 'purse' or salary which could then be donated to the Volunteers . Those local 
authorities which did adopt the procedure then had to make decisions about which of 
their sometimes several local corps should benefit. 88 
Other councils refused to acknowledge they had any moral obligation to award 
grants, arguing that if the Government wanted the Volunteer movement, it should 
finance it. Whilst there was widespread sympathy with this view among the VTC, it was 
accepted that as the Government was in no position to help even if it wanted to , the 
movement would have to continue to rely upon its own resources. Herbert Samuel , 
President of the Local Government Board , declined to present legislation which would 
have allowed councils to use rates to finance corps but did offer the concession that any 
local authority which fell under his department's audit would be permitted to use rates to 
build ranges and other facilities on its own land.89 
Apart from regular questions by supporters of this new auxiliary, throughout 1915 
the Government also had to deal with difficulti~s concerning the running , finance and 
pay of the National Reserve and those of its members who had been called up or 
volunteered to join the protection companies. Those Reservists who had enlisted as 
supernumeraries to Territorial units were entitled to the usual Territorial pay and 
allowances and, if not in a position to draw rations, were awarded extra pay in lieu . 
County associations were responsible for administering separation allowances but it 
was not long before complaints were aired nationally about inequities and inefficiencies 
in the payment of these men. 
National Reservists employed on the Humber Defence Scheme were reported to 
be underpaid by 3d per day and, to heap insult upon injury, having had to provide their 
own kit, shirts and underwear, were not receiving anywhere near their full billeting 
allowance. In similar vein , the pay of Hornsey National Reservists was cut by 1/6d a day 
and the men of an Oxfordshire company had their pay deducted in addition to not 
receiving their full separation allowances. The difficulty which frequently compounded 
the issue was a man's entitlement to proficiency pay. For example, Reservists at 
Lancaster detention camp were receiving recruits' pay, while other guards doing the 
same job were earning an additional 3d per day. The reason fo the difference lay 'in the 
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men's previous service. An argument developed over what type of former service could 
be counted as contributing towards eligibility for proficiency pay. The War Office ruled 
that ex-Regulars, ex-Militia and former Territorials with two years' experience and 15 
days' camp attendance, would be entitled to draw it but, as former Volunteers and 
Yeomanry were deemed to be less proficient than ex-Regulars and ex-Territorials, 
these members did not warrant the additional pay. This meant that ineligible privates 
drew 3d a day less than those who qualified , while former Volunteer sergeants 
instructing the New Armies would earn 6d per day less than their former ex-Regular and 
ex-Territorial colleagues doing the same job. Calls to allow ex-Volunteer National 
Reservists with seven years' experience equality with Reservists who had served two 
years in the Territorials were rejected by the War Office.90 
More difficulties arose once the War Office's ruling was communicated to 
commands. All National Reservists throughout Southern Command had been paid the 
3d a day extra but, in April 1915, former Volunteers and Yeomanry soldiers were 
informed that the payment would cease and t[le money, which had been paid for seven 
months, would be deducted from their pay. Weekly pay would thus be reduced from 8/9d 
to seven shillings; a further two shillings refund was then also to be removed . Once the 
allowances to married men had also been deducted (and until the excess money had 
been clawed back by October), a soldier would be left with pocket money of two shillings 
a week. The War Office insisted that it was a general principle to recover over-payments 
but did later make the concession that the amount might not be recla imed in its 
entirety. 91 
The question of a man 's right to his mobilization bounty also developed into a 
significant political controversy, with accusations and counter-accusations flying to and 
fro across the floor of the House. Regulations allowed bounties to be paid when men 
were called but, as many Reservists had not bothered to wait but simply enlisted in their 
local Territorial unit or Special Reserve battalion , in the eyes of the authorities, they had 
forfeited their right to the gratuity. 
Despite one chairman's confident assertion in August that 'the question of the 
bounty is now quite clear and there should be no further misconception in the matter', 
there remained understandable confusion .92 When Tennant expressed uncertainty as to 
90 HansardVols . 69.721, 11/02/15; 68.1493, 27/11/14; 71 .708, 28/04/15; 71.1115, 5/05/15; 74.527, 
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whether those who did not wait to be called would eventually receive their bounty, Sir 
John Dewar was among the first to take up the cause of the auxiliaries. Dewar urged 
Tennant to consider the case of Class Ill Reservists who, having never accepted the 
honourable obligation, claimed to be unaware they could re-enlist and consequently 
had eschewed their right to the gratuity. Lord Charles Beresford also demanded that 
Class Ill men should be given what he believed was their rightful reward .93 Dewar and 
Beresford were, like several MPs and Reservists themselves, clearly confused as to 
who should receive a bounty and in what circumstances. 94 Baker, the Financial Secretary 
to the War Office, clarified the issue in early September when he announced that men 
who enlisted of their own volition would not get their £10 or £5. He argued that the 
promise of the bounty had been made in order to establish who would be available if an 
emergency arose. When the call came, he stated rather tenuously, the men were not 
there and so the purpose of the bounty had been frustrated .95 The consequences of men 
enlisting on their own initiative gave rise to a number of seemingly unfair anomalies. 
One MP claimed he knew of a tent containing 16 men, 15 of whom were Special 
Reservists: they, he conceded were not entitled to a bounty but the remaining man was 
a National Reservist who had waited to be called and thus drew his £10.96 
The crucial factor for those who did not present themselves until they were 
officially instructed to do so, was the date by which they had signed the so-called 
classification cards. If they had signed before 11 August, they should have been secure. 
But even the supposedly simply act of signing the card created unexpected problems. 
Arthur Henderson complained some county associations were refusing to pay the £5 
because the card had apparently not been counter-signed by an appropriate officer.97 
Moreover, many men of the Cambridgeshire reserve had been unable to sign because, 
when mobilization was ordered , the secretary and the necessary cards had been at 
lpswich.98 As a delay of three vital days had followed before the cards were eventually 
made available, the association petitioned the War Office to extend the qualifying date to 
14 August. Initially the War Office refused , but in December, after some sustained 
pressure, it eventually agreed that men who had attempted to take the obligation before 
93 Hansard Vol.66.41, 26/08/14. 
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11 August but were prevented from doing so, would receive special consideration .99 
This decision did not help about 50 men from Mere and Westbury who had never been 
accorded the opportunity to join Class I or II . Their own association described their case 
as 'well founded ' but the War Office insisted it would not award a bounty to the men.100 
Unsurprisingly, arguments continued. 
Some MPs maintained many of their constituency Reservists had never even 
been informed that it was necessary to sign an obligation in order to qualify for a bounty. 
Others, it was claimed , had inadvertently neglected to sign the declaration. Douglas Hall 
urged the War Office to treat all Reservists in an identical manner and give each of them 
a bounty.101 He was supported by Walter Long, a frequent critic of the Government's 
neglect of the Reserve. Long asked if there could be 'anything more contemptible ' than 
the way in which the War Office was dealing with the issue and accused it of making 
'enormous sums out of the pockets of these hardworking men' .102 Baker continued to 
insist that that there had been considerable relaxation in the interpretation of the 
regulations and that the bounty had nothing to do with enlistment but was in respect of a 
man's undertaking during peace time. 
No doubt many associations discussed the thorny issue of their men's bounties 
at their committee meetings but only one example of a detailed , minuted debate 
remains . The Sussex Association insisted that most of its Reservists had registered 
before issue of the 1913 Regulations (which introduced the concept of the bounty) . Many 
men certainly did re-register but the association believed many others had not read or 
understood the regulations and therefore had either not bothered to re-register or had 
not realized they were supposed to . Other members, it was assumed, had moved 
house and had thus never received the letter. These assumptions were compounded 
when , owing to a lack of money, the association had not succeeded in interviewing each 
man about the revised regulations. In a letter to the War Office, the association pressed 
the case of Private Sainsbury, formerly of the 9/Lancers. Sainsbury had joined the 
National Reserve in December 1912 but, as he had subsequently moved house, he did 
not receive a copy of the new regulations. He gave up a good job to re-enlist on the 
outbreak, leaving his wife and child to move into a one-roomed flat as she was in 
receipt only of a separation allowance. The association wante .. d the War Office t" grant 
the bounty to all members who had registered , but not necessarily in Classes I or II , 
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prior to the date of mobilization and who had subsequently been accepted for service.103 
The War Office remained unmoved , but as late as January 1918, Colonel Wilfred 
Ashley championed the case of two Reservists who had taken the honourable 
obligation on 4 August 1914 and who were still awaiting payment. Seven months later 
he again urged the War Office to pay the bounty to Reservists who had failed to 
undertake the obligation through, he insisted, 'no fault of their own'. 104 
Another aspect of the controversy involved the apparent inequity over the 
entitlement to claim either the £10 or the £5 bounty. The Government was accused of 
splitting hairs: National Reservists in the Regulars and Territorials were fighting 
alongside each other and undergoing identical privations overseas, so both groups, it 
was argued , deserved the same gratuity. One specific case involved men of the 
5/Manchester, a Territorial unit of the 42nd (East Lancashire) Division . This division had 
been the first complete Territorial unit to sail overseas and had arrived in Egypt in 
September 1914. The battalion of Wig an Territo rials had received a sizable draft of 
Class I Reservists six days before the division sailed for the Mediterranean.105 These 
men received only the £5 rather than the £10 bounty which they would have been 
awarded had they been posted to a Regular rather than a Territorial battalion . The 
commanding officer (CO) had asked a Mancunian MP to request the War Office to pay 
these men what he considered to be their rightful reward .106 
Yet another bone of contention was the non-payment of bounties to National 
Reservists who had joined the navy. Although ex-naval men were fully entitled to enrol in 
the Reserve, the War Office ruled that if they rejoined the navy rather than enlisting in the 
army, they would forgo their bounty entitlement. Rather unhelpfully Dr Macnamara, the 
Financial Secretary to the Admiralty, decided that if a reservist who had rejoined the navy 
was allowed to resign and join the army, he would probably be able to claim his gratuity. 
Members claimed such indecision and confusion was causing widespread 
dissatisfaction and was having detrimental effects on recruiting. 107 One association even 
103 East Sussex RO, TER8/1, 17/03/15. 
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went so far as to guarantee the bounties of two of its Class I Reservists who had joined 
the navy. It complained to the War Office that it had been forced to do so because by 
denying them their money, the authorities were 'breaking faith ' with the men.108 
Tennant and his colleagues grew increasingly weary of questions which were 
frequently merely repetitions of those asked before. One of the most persistent and 
frustrating questioners was Admiral Lord Beresford . Having already received several 
explanations from the Under-Secretary of State and the Financial Secretary about why 
and how bounties were paid, Beresford finally demanded the Army Council itself should 
make a statement on the issue. With infinite patience, Baker assured Beresford that the 
Army Council had been carefully monitoring the situation for many months. 109 
The row over the non-payment of bounties continued undiminished well into 
1915. Class I Reservists of the Homsey National Reserve Battalion attached to the 7th 
Reserve Battalion, Middlesex Regiment, had their disquiet expressed in the House and , 
shortly afterwards, Beresford again thundered against men being 'swindled out of £5'. 
Ronald McNeill complained of the 'inequitable treatment' meted out to patriotic 
Reservists whose desire to serve their country was rewarded with nothing but 
parsimony and official humbug. 110 At the same time as these accusations and 
explanations were being aired in the House, the War Office was considering how those 
Reservists who were a little over the age for front line active service could be used 
overseas, thereby releasing more able-bodied men for France or other theatres. 
In the early summer of 1915, a decision was taken to reduce the supernumerary 
companies by combing out officers and men fit enough to march ten miles with rifle and 
150 rounds. Class II Reservists serving in such companies who fulfilled this 
requirement were subsequently invited to volunteer for service in seven new Territorial 
Force Provisional Battalions then in the process offorming at Halton Park.11 1 Volunteers 
were required to be below 44 years of age and fit enough for garrison duty overseas. 
Throughout August, drafts of former National Reservists arrived with a quota of officers, 
NCOs and a complete issue of personal equipment. Despite the specified age limit it is 
evident that many Reservists in excess of 44 years volunteered to join these battalions. 
The units were given titles which accorded roughly to the territorial origins of the 
108 Hants RO, 37/M69/3, 6/11/14. 
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National Reserve companies from which they were raised . Thus, the 18th Battalion , 
which took Reservists largely from the Queens, Royal Sussex, London and Middlesex 
Regiments , became the 18th(London), and the 20th , which enrolled men from the 
Northumberland Fusiliers, Durham Light Infantry, West Yorks and other north country 
regiments, became the 20th(Northern) Battalion. 112 The problem of deciding to which 
regiment these battalions should belong was finally achieved by a process of 
elimination . Only three regiments of infantry did not possess Territorial battalions: the 
Guards, the King's Royal Rifle Corps and the Rifle Brigade. It was agreed that as just 
about every other regiment in the British army was represented by auxiliary reservists , 
the battalions would have to be affiliated to one of those which had no recognized 
territorial district. It was inconceivable that the Guards would ever accept responsibility 
for seven battalions of aging soldiers fit only for garrison duty, so the choice rested 
between the 60th Rifles and the Rifle Brigade. Time has obscured the arguments which 
finally decided upon the Rifle Brigade, although it was probably connected to the City of 
London Territorial Association 's decision to accept responsibility for the administration 
of the new units. 113 No records have yet been discovered to explain whether any attempt 
was made to associate them with existing units of the regiment but, in the early weeks 
of their existence at least, no Rifle Brigade officers were appointed to any of the 
battalions. By December 1915 the former Reservists had swapped their own regimental 
badges for those of the Rifle Brigade, complete with 'T' on the shoulder flash , and had 
been officially transferred to their new regiment. One writer later claimed that the Rifle 
Brigade was not given the opportunity to bring them up as 'foster children ', but that if it 
had , it might have prevented 'an heretical weakness for drums which appears in the 
later history of some of the battalions' .114 
The battalion which saw most action, and the one which probably remained 
112 The 19th Battalion was formed on 1/11/15. It left for line of communication duties in Egypt on 
30/12/15. On embarkation the battalion consisted of men from Supernumerary Companies of the 
following regiments, with numbers of men in brackets: South Lancashire (204), Loyal North Lancash ire 
(127) , Scottish Rifles (130) , King's Own Royal Lancaster (1 03) , Manchester (77), East Lancash ire (32) , 
Royal Scots (70) , Cheshire (60) , West Yorkshire (56) and Border (34). Smaller numbers came from 
several other regiments. The men were described as 'mainly National Reserve' with some Terri torials 
and a few others rejected by the army for 'various reasons '. W095.4719. 
'
13 Two of the City of London battalions, the London Rifle Brigade and the Post Office Rifles, were 
affiliated to the Rifle Brigade. · 
114 The regiment seemed somewhat ambivalent about its offspring. The Rifle Brigade Chronicle of 
1918 lists the strength of all its battalions, except the Territorial units, for 1916, 1917 and 1918. The 
only acknowledgement that the battalions actually existed is an extract taken from the Army List. This 
shows that the great majority of the officers were 'Temporary'. Several of the COs were retired 
Lieutenant-Colonels of the Indian Army. Most of the battalions had between 20-25 officers, with no 
MOor chaplain. See Appendix 1. 
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most purely a unit of former National Reservists, was the 22nd . It was formed largely of 
Reservists from the South-West and, after spells in Alexandria , Cyprus, Lemnos and 
Mudros, arrived at Salonika in November 1916. With the exception of a draft of 85 men , 
some of whom had seen action in Gallipoli and France, the battalion consisted entirely 
of ex-National Reservists. The new arrivals from the King's (Liverpool) Regiment, were 
described as 'young', but as not possessing the 'same physical strength as the 
remainder of the battalion' . The 'remainder' were apparently 'exceedingly strong and 
very fit'. Seventy-five per cent of them were ex-Regulars and 'able to stand the hard life 
and bad weather' of a Balkan winter. The men worked hard digging defensive lines on 
the Doiran Front, being allowed only one day off a fortnight. Despite their age they were 
well suited to the task. The War Diary describes them as men who were 'very skilled at 
their own trades ... there is a large percentage of miners; also steelworkers, plate layers, 
engineers, mechanics, iron moulders, carpenters, boiler makers and labourers'.115 
At about the same time as it was contemplating raising these battalions of 
National Reservists, the War Office acted to clear up the contemporary confusion over 
what the 1914 and 1915 National Reserve Protection Companies should be called . The 
confusion had been exacerbated by the appearance of the VTC and so, in March 1915, 
the National Reserve companies were designated Supernumerary Companies of the 
Territorial Force. They became known as, for example, Number 1 Supernumerary 
Company, followed by the number and name of the Territorial battalion to which they 
were attached. The men were allocated Territorial Force numbers and associations 
were warned that future references to them should avoid the words 'National 
Reserve'. 116 The companies remained under the administration of the county 
associations but this very British ad hoc arrangement was unlikely to remain 
permanent. In November 1914, Tennant had replied to a question about a current 
rumour that National Reservists in such companies were to be transferred from their 
original units but the Under Secretary of State stated there was no intention of 
amalgamating the supernumeraries into a separate corps or of detaching Territorial 
National Reservists from their own companies. At the time of his response, Tennant 
probably did not have such a scheme in mind but, within a few months it became 
apparent that the home defence auxiliaries were to undergo a major reorganiz:ation .117 
11 5 W095.4924. Demobilization commenced in December 1918 and by late January 1919 the last 80 
men were sent to the 2nd Garrison Battalion , King 's (Liverpool) Regiment. All of the 80 were over 41 
years old and at least 50 of them were certainly former National Reservists. These included the RSM 
and 4 other warrant officers. 
116 Army Council Instruction 249 of 1915. 
117 Hansard Vol.68 .807, 23/11/14. 
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Once the decision had been made to form the seven Territorial Provisional 
battalions of the Rifle Brigade, 118 and county associations were granted permission to 
release their unused Class Ill men to the VTC, the life of the National Reserve as a 
distinct organization was almost at an end . There had been a final flurry of activity in 
June 1915 when Western and Northern Commands announced they wanted local 
associations to raise more Supernumerary Companies for home defence purposes. As 
the fit Class I and II Reservists who were available for overseas duty had long since 
departed, the new units were necessarily formed from Class Ill men. An earlier similar 
request by Southern Command had met with a disappointing response. Kent 
Association gloomily reported it could not raise any more companies and was doubtful 
if it could manage the secondary War Office request of recruiting an additional 10% for 
existing companies to allow for wastage.119 When the associations within Western 
Command attempted subsequently to raise the extra units it was discovered so many of 
their Class Ill men had left their registered addresses and could not now be traced , that 
the East Lancashire Association was compelled to advertise in newspapers for its 
disappeared men to come forward . Within a few days, 127 Reservists from in and 
around Oldham had responded to the advertisements and were formed into a company 
for bridge and prison camp duties. As so many of its men in existing units were 
returning home to munitions production, Hampshire also resorted to press adverts in 
the spring of 1915 in order to keep the companies up to establishment. 120 
In 1916, Protection Companies were to undergo a further reorganization but 
throughout 1915 the home defence auxiliary which attracted most of the press' and 
public's attention was the VTC. Unhappy as most corps were with the continuing 
Government denial of complete legal recognition and financial assistance, the 
movement retained its self confidence and trained with whatever weapons and facilities 
118 Under ACI 271 of March 1917, an eighth battalion, the 25th, became the depot unit for the 7 
overseas battalions. It received 81 men from Territorial units, especially the London Reg iment. Many 
of these appear to have been former National Reservists, although the supply of such men would have 
dried up by late 1916. The War Diary regularly complains of the excessive work demanded from an 
inadequately staffed depot. W095.5460. 
11 9 Kent RO, MD/TA 1/2, 16/04/15. 
120 TAVR (Liverpool) East Lancashire Association Records , no ref, 18/06/15; Oldham Standard, 
12/07/15; Hants RO, 37/M69/3, National Reserve Report, May 1915. Scottish Command had 
requested Perthshire to raise a second protection company in February .. 1915. The county was still 
placing press adverts for men in the following September. W09/Reserve/3151 (AG3) of 20/03/15 had 
raised the establishment of the protection companies from 100 to 110 and W09/Reserve/3580 (AG 1) 
of 27/05/15 allowed former suitably fit soldiers to enlist directly into the Supernumerary Companies 
without first having to register in the National Reserve. In August, the War Office acknowledged the 
difficulties faced by the associations in attempting to raise further companies and announced that no 
new units would be formed . 9/Res/4892 (AG3) of 3/08/15. 
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it could procure. A degree of optimism that the Government would eventually feel 
obliged to embody the VTC into a Reserve Army, and the belief that it was largely the 
presence of a vibrant Volunteer body which was enabling the Government to avoid 
conscription, persisted .121 Several corps viewed themselves as unofficial Officer 
Training Corps, (OTC) running special classes for men of military age who were later 
likely to enlist. In July 1915, the Central Association decided that as there were 
sufficiently trained officers available to inspect groups, it removed the requirement of 
having to send one of its own officers to inspect provincial corps. 122 Standards were 
improving but in September 1915 at least one corps declined as 'premature' an 
invitation to be inspected. 123 Efforts to raise the quality of instruction resulted in the 
production of a Syllabus of Training by the Central Association and by one corps 
running classes for officers in order to make Saturday drills 'more interesting and 
useful'. 124 As Lords Lieutenant issued commissions125 (or deiegated others to do it for 
them), and exerted more control and influence over their county corps, organization , too, 
improved. Although it was repeatedly em~hasized that Territorial associations held no 
responsibility for raising or administering the VTC, Lords Lieutenant requested that 
association chairmen and secretaries be allowed to sit on Volunteers' committees. 
They could also bring some influence to bear on the Government. For example, the Lord 
Lieutenant of Durham insisted he would make no attempt to organize his county until he 
was satisfied that the War Office was prepared to give the movement full legal status.126 
In counties where the Lord Lieutenant was not prepared actively to support the 
movement, numbers remained low: Lincolnshire's poor membership was thought to be 
a consequence of its Lord Lieutenant's ambivalent attitude.127 
Volunteers were also finding their services were in increasing demand. Those on 
the Scilly Isles were taken over by the Admiralty and the huge expansion in the 
munitions industry meant there were many more factories requiring guards. The Station 
Companies of the London National Guard increased their presence at most of the main 
line termini and the expanding motor sections conveyed leave men between them. 
121 Review of Reviews, Voi.LII, October 1915, p.294. 
122 VTC GazetteVol.2 No.33, 17/05/15, p.104. 
123 Gloucestershire RO D4277/6, 6/09/15. 
124 Lancashire RO DDX/11/1 , 4/01/16. 
125 The United Arts Rifles organized a dinner at Frascati 's in December 1915 where the Lord 
Lieutenant's commissions were handed out. E.Potton (ed) , A Record of the United Arts Rifles 1914-
1919, op.cit., p.18. 
126 Manchester Archives, M73/3.24, 16/07/15. Lord Durham did later modify his stance and agreed to 
accept the presidency of the county regiment on the condition that recognition would not be 'unduly 
delayed'. VTC Gazette Vol.2 No.45, 9/10/15, p.291 and No. 52, 27/11/15, p.413. 
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Volunteers were used as weekend labour at the Didcot ordnance works and those 
members of the Birmingham Electrical VTC ineligible for military service were loaned to 
the navy's electrical school at Portsmouth for up to three months to work on anti-
submarine measures. 128 
Useful as much of this work was, the Government continued to assert that 
Volunteers could not expect to be treated as members of a home army or as an integral 
part of the Crown's forces. Few pre-1916 registers have survived but those which have 
can probably be accepted as representative examples. At the end of 1915 there were 
thought to be about 300,000 registered men, roughly one in 13 of all men aged between 
40 and 60 years. 129 The Government ruled that only British born citizens were allowed to 
join but expatriates of the Allies living in the UK could be made eligible by enrolment as 
honorary memberS.130 The average age of members in those corps which have left 
registers varied between 43 and 51 years . Of the 570 in the Blackburn Volunteers , only 
60 were of military age, in Sidmouth the figure was 15 of its 82 members and in 
Cheshire, it was 2416 or 28% of the 8675 registered .131 Deal, in one of the most 
threatened areas, provides one of the fullest extant registers for this period . Of the total 
of the corps' 91 men, 24 were of military age. Eleven of these claimed to be unfit (two 
had already been invalided out of the army); other reasons given for not enlisting 
included 'could not be spared' and 'insufficient pay'. Only 27 men were employed in 
manual trades, nine in the legal or medical professions and nine in education , banking 
or insurance. The remainder were very largely artisans. Eighty were married , 15 had 
spent some time in the Rifle Volunteers, seven were former Regulars, two had fought in 
South Africa and two were National Reservists . Of the Cheadle Hulme Corps' 99 
members, 80% were married and from the professional classes. Of this total, seven 
had served in the old Volunteers, three had been rejected by the army and there were 
three under military age. The existing evidence suggests that in 1915 well under a 
quarter of members were of military age and a much smaller fraction had had any 
previous military experience. 
By the end of 1915 the majority of men in the thousands of corps were members 
128 E.J.Disbrowe, History of the Volunteer Movementin Cheshire 1914-1920, op.cit., p.33; Journal of 
the RUSI, Vol.62 , 1917, pp.812-13; Hansard Vol.77.37, 20/12/15; VTC Gazette Vol.3 No.60, 
22/01/16, pp.115-16. 
129 VTC Gazette Vol.3 No.5?, 1/01/16, p.69. 
130 The War Office sanctioned the formation of a colonial infantry battalion for men who were or had 
been associated with the dominions and colonies. Its HQ was at Shepherd's Bush. 
131 Figures are calculated from East Kent Archives U924/01 ; J.Tindall , The Sidmouth Volunteers 1914-
1918, Exeter: Culverwell & Sons, nd., p.11 ; Blackburn Times, 15/05/15; E.J.Disbrowe, A History ofthe 
Volunteer Movementin Cheshire 1914-1920, op.cit., p.14; Stockport Archives D1697 ,DDND, Roll. 
because they felt they were doing what their class , church , company and country 
expected them to do. Many of those who had joined during the first rush of excitement 
had left during the first months of 1915, bored with the drills, frustrated at the lack of 
provision and annoyed by the press and public ridicule . However, contemporary reports 
suggest membership was to remain fairly constant during the second half of 1915. 
There were attempts to recruit, helped occasionally by articles in local papers 
comparing them favourably with the eighteenth century Volunteers, and some waverers 
might have been swayed by posters which claimed Volunteers carried a: 'mandate from 
humanity to rid the world of the oppression , the tyranny and the cruelty of the Hun '.132 
Most members undoubtedly believed in what they were doing and wanted the 
Government to grant them greater responsibility and, above all , legal and financial 
recognition . However, there remained others who chose not to wait or rely upon a 
recognition that might never come and advocated instead the traditional means by 
which auxiliaries had equipped and prepared: 
In the teeth of all the red tape bureaucratic officialism that we had to meet we men, with 
set teeth, determined that we would be in such a position that if the only arms we could 
secure were those dropped from the hands of dead soldiers, those arms and 
cartridges should be between the German brutes and our wives and children . What 
does a man who has this main point in his mind care for any petty finicking insult to his 
uniform or the precise military value of his position in the defensive forces of the Crown? 
Let us, by all means, boldly fight for our due recognition, but let us not take 'the hump' 
and 'down tools'. We Volunteers- trained , weeded down, realizing our full 
responsibilities - may yet be suddenly recognized and petted and , if not, here we are, 
ready in any event to make the utmost of conditions as we find them at the time. If we 
cannot get 'forward' we will sullenly 'mark time' but there should be no 'dismiss' until all 
danger to England is over. 133 
There were, albeit unofficial and independent, moves already in being to attempt 
further progress and, largely at the personal initiative of the Marquis of Lincolnshire and 
Lord Desborough, a Private Member's Bill was introduced to the Lords in October 1915. 
Its aim was to revive the Volunteer Act of 1863 and its subsequent Amending Acts in 
order to allow the Army Council to pass any new regulations which it might think 
necessary to recognize and utilize under military law the services of any affiliated VTC.134 
132 The Hackney & Stoke Newington Recorder ran such a series in June t915; Recruitment poster for 
1st Volunteer Battalion . Shropshire RO 1681/198/6. 
133 Letter in the Retford, Worksop, Isle of Axholme & Gainsborough News, 10/10/15. 
134 Clause 1 of the Bill read : 'It shall be lawful for His Majesty to accept, for purposes in connection with 
the present war, the services of any Volunteer corps, being a corps which is duly affiliated to the 
Central Association Volunteer Training Corps, as recognized and approved by the Army Council, and 
whose services are offered through that Association '. 
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The Marquis of Lansdowne, the Government's spokesman in the Lords, and Lord 
Newton, the War Office representative in the chamber, both accepted the Bill in principle. 
However, during the committee stage the Government moved several allegedly 'friendly' 
amendments which were aimed primarily to extend the provisions of the Bill to the 
whole of the UK. Sensing the Bill might get no further, General Sir H.Smith-Dorrien 
threw his weight as GOC First (Home) Army behind the calls for full recognition . In a 
letter to The Times he explained how his 'anxiety' at the insufficient number of troops 
available had compelled him to appeal to the VTC and how: 
... right nobly did they respond with the result that I have latterly been perfectly happy as to 
the efficiency of my plans. If, in view at their non-recognition, any VTC decline to continue 
these patriotic duties, I certainly shall not blame them, but at the same time I should like 
it explained to them that any cessation of their duties must have a very detrimental effect 
on the efficiency of my plans for concentrating troops on any part of our coast in the 
event of invasion. When asking for official recognition, I have never ceased to impress 
upon the authorities the most valuable aid the VTC are giving me .. . and I have reason to 
believe the time will yet come when official sanction will be accorded .135 
The Bill passed the Lords but deliberate Government delay caused it to fall in the 
Commons. Pleas that the House and the country were 'overwhelmingly' in favour failed 
to persuade Asquith of the need to 'star' the Bill. He accepted its popularity but excused 
the Government's hesitation on the grounds that as it was a contentious and divisive 
proposal it required further consideration. 136 Protests that the movement was again 
being snubbed caused Tennant to respond that he had no wish to discourage the 
Volunteers but if the Bill was not to be proceeded with before prorogation , the 
membership should apportion blame not to the War Office but at 'quite another door' .137 
Tennant's disingenuity was not at the time entirely transparent. His statement 
caused astonishment throughout the movement but his attempt to blame others was 
generally accepted. It was not yet readily apparent that within the context of the likely 
failure of the Derby scheme and the consequent probability of compulsion , the 
Government was tentatively investigating uses to which the VTC might be put. By 
widening the scope of Lincolnshire's Bill the Government knew Sir Edward Carson and 
the Ulster Members would raise fatal objections for, if the Bill was enacted , it would 
guarantee recognition not only to the Ulster Volunteers but a1so to the National ' 
Volunteers in the South . That unpalatable outcome was sufficient for Carson to do the 
135 Times , 20/11/15. 
136 Hansard Vol. 76.1389, 8/12/15. 
137 Ibid., Vol.78 .895, 24/01/16. 
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Government's bidding and allow Asquith to sanction the Bill 's delay. The time gained 
during the Parliamentary recess would be utilized to examine an alternative solution . 
Predictably, the delay caused consternation and recrimination . The Gazette decided 
once again, 'Ireland blocks the way' but was also scathing of Tennant: 'It can only be 
inferred that Mr Tennant has signally failed to translate his own good intentions towards 
the Volunteers into War Office practice. '138 
Unaware of the Government's real motive for the delay, the movement resolved to 
maintain pressure when the House reassembled . Encouraged by leaders in The Times 
and the Daily Telegraph, and by provocative statements from Lords Charles Beresford 
and Rosebery, the quarterly conference of county presidents and regimental 
commandants supported a resolution proposed by the Marquis of Lincolnshire and 
Strachey condemning the Bill's failure and urging its reintroduction .139 A committee of 
friendly cross-party MPs was created to monitor and publicize the progress of any new 
bill and a Volunteer Field Day was held in the Palace of Westminster to educate MPs in 
the national benefits of VTC recognition. 
The middle year of the war was to signal profound changes not only to the 
character and identity of the VTC, but also to the auxiliary movement as a whole . The 
change in Government policy and attitude had much to do with the appointment of Sir 
John French as Commander-in-Chief Home Defence and to the realization that the 
demands of the Western Front could only be met by a fundamental rationalization of 
manpower resources . The introduction of co,mpulsion and the advent of the tribunals 
opened up new possibilities for the VTC and allowed the removal of more trained 
divisions overseas. The National Reserve was to be placed in a state of suspension 
and from its husk emerged a new auxiliary entirely designated for home defence. A plan 
was evolving whereby the defence of the British Isles would rest not in the hands of the 
Territorial Force and Regulars but in those of auxiliary forces supported by a minimum 
number of underage and low category Regulars. 
138 VTC GazetteVol.3 No.54, 11/12/15, p.19; No.61 , 29/01/16, p.131. 
139 Statements and letters quoted in VTC Gazette Vol.3 No. 59, 15/01/16, p.1 00; No.62, 5/02/16, 
p.158. 
CHAPTER IX: CONSOLIDATION 
The appointment of Sir John French to the new post of Commander-in-Chief Home 
Defence marked an advance in the way the war in Britain was to be conducted . Until 
December 1915 home defence had been the responsibility of the Secretary of State 
who, in turn, entrusted it to a succession of generals, none of whom had remained long 
in the post. French was to become head of a systematic, unified command , charged 
with drawing up plans for the land (and later air) defence of the UK and also for the 
development of an expanded and rationalized procedure for training recruits . Sir John 
inherited 'absolute chaos' and believed that 'if we are attacked tonight, no one would 
know what to do'.1 His priority was to inject some order into that chaos primarily by 
improving coastal defences and a reorganization of the available land forces . 
Some six months into his post French told a parade of Volunteers he had first 
noticed their existence on his return from France and had immediately considered they 
might be of use in his formulative plans for home defence.2 At that time the existing 
scheme had developed little from Kitchener's original intention of holding a landing on 
the beaches until reinforcements from the Central Force arrived . French was, and 
remained, convinced that the threat of a serious invasion was a 'remote possibility' but 
when denied his two preferred subordinates by the Army Council , French considered 
their expertise so essential to his plans that he obtained Asquith 's personal assistance 
in securing their appointments. 3 Embarking on tours of his command to authorize the 
expansion of beach defences, the Commander-in-Chief Home Forces (C-in-CH F) was 
regularly perturbed by the number of unfit and unarmed men, poor coastal artillery, a 
lack of machine guns and the regular replacement of trained men by raw Derby 
recruits. 4 Even the king expressed concern over Lowes toft's inadequate defences but 
Sir Francis Lloyd did give some encouragement to French with reports on the 
Volunteers' progress in digging London's defences. 5 
The findings of the latest inter-service commission into the possibility of a 
German landing had concluded the enemy might appear with 160,000 men ; within that 
, R.Holmes, The Little Field Marshal: Sir John French, London : Cape, 1981 , p.315. French to 
Winifred Bennett, 3/01/16. 
2 Times, 19/06/16. 
3 J.French, diary, 28/02/16. Cited in Holmes, op.cit. pp.315-16. 
4 G. French (ed) , Some War Diaries, Addresses and Correspondence of FM The Right Hon. Earl of 
Ypres , London : Cassell , 1931 , pp.242-43. 
5 Ibid., p.248. 
context the existence of London 's developing trench system to the east and south of the 
capital was considered by French to be of significant strategic importance. A more likely 
scenario than an outright invasion , however, was thought to be a raid with about 20,000 
troops north of the Wash . Sir William Robertson , who had only recently been appointed 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) , informed French that if the Germans did land 
he could assume the assistance of 108,650 infantry (principally nine full strength 
Territorial divisions), 16,500 cavalry and 440 guns. 6 Agreeing that the Germans were 
unlikely to force the Straits and land in the South-East, French decided to concentrate 
his troops on the East coast and use the trench defences to protect London . He outlined 
how the existing mobile and garrison formations could be improved and reorganized , 
and then considered how the lines of communication would be protected . While the 
Protection Companies remained under the administration of the separate Territorial 
associations, the constant demand for guards for munitions works and railways created 
severe problems of management and coordination. In order to ease these difficulties, 
French wanted the 39,000, largely National Reserve, troops in the Supernumerary 
Companies to be formed into a separate corps. By creating a new, unified corps, it 
•. 
would not only improve efficiency but would also make their reinforcement by the 
Volunteer Training Corps (VTC) palpably easier. It is probable that French had seen a 
copy of a scheme drawn up by the Director-General Territorial Force (DGTF) some 
weeks earlier which advocated the creation of a Royal Defence Corps (ROC) , 
administered by one Territorial association and under one paymaster. The principal 
difficulty in attempting such a proposal was in the necessity of securing the consent of 
Territorial soldiers to transfer from one battalion to another. 7 
French was clearly attracted by the scheme for a new corps. In January he had 
accepted Kitchener's invitation to address Territorials on the matter of transfers 8 and , 
given the opportunity, wanted to expand the concept of using additional auxiliary forces 
still further. Although he noted that it had not yet been possible to conduct an official 
enquiry into the VTCs' potential, and accepting for the time that it was 'quite without 
organization' , he nevertheless did believe they could be utilized to assist the proposed 
ROC in railway protection duties, manning the London defences and general fatigue 
work.9 A subsequent meeting of the Army Council broadly approved of French's 
6 W032/5273 (1A) , Possibilities of a German Invasion, 4/02/16. 
7 W032/5273 (26A). Memo from Director-General Territorial Force to Deputy Oi1ief of the Imperial 
General Staff, (DCIGS) 22/02/16. 
6 G. French (ed), Some War Diaries, Addresses and Correspondence of F-M the Right Hon.Earl of 
Ypres , op.cit., p.337. 
9 W032/5273 (3A). Memo by French to CIGS, 13/02/16. 
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suggestions but the legal problems posed by the possible use of Volunteers in a 
military capacity, which had been shelved by the Government's decision not to proceed 
with Lord Lincolnshire 's bill , remained for the present unresolved. 
The success of the Volunteer Bill in the Lords, the creation of the all-party 
pressure group of supportive MPs and the clamour of the movement in general , 
ensured that the Government would not be allowed to ignore the VTC issue. Tennant 
did consult with the Army Council during the recess but, when Parliament reassembled , 
the Government remained unsure how next to proceed . The area Commands of the C-
in-C Home Defence were in favour of a reorganization of the Protection Companies and 
the utilization of the Volunteers, but the Prime Minister and Tennant elected to offer the 
House their 'usual, futile, stereotyped cliche' that the issue was still 'under 
consideration ' .10 The growing frustration and annoyance manifested itself during the 
debate on the King's Speech. In a calculated effort to force the Government's hand, an 
amendment was moved regretting the absence of any provision within the Royal 
Address to improve the status of the VTC. Speeches condemned the Government's 
procrastination, dilly-dallyings and vacillation, the 'disgraceful ' manner in which the 
movement had been treated and how the Government had thrown 'every difficulty' in the 
Volunteers' way. In a torrent of passion, testimonials to the Volunteers' patriotism , their 
work during air raids , at guarding munitions factories and vulnerable points, canvassing 
for National Registration and the Derby Scheme, and once again from the Adjutant-
General (AG) himself, echoed around and across the chamber. In the face of the 
constant Government prevarication members were reported to be growing tired of their 
officers' promises that recognition was about to be achieved . This great, democratic 
organization wanted the right to swear an attestation , legal protection , an 
acknowledgement from the Government that it would accept their offers of service and 
an appreciation of the costs they had already expended in the effort to achieve some 
degree of efficiency. 11 
Although he expressed sympathy with the Volunteers' demands, and anxious not 
to be seen to be discouraging these 'loyal and earnest men', Tennant appeared 
unmoved by the pleas. He did not wish to be accused of 'discarding something which is 
of capital importance' or of being 'dilatory' in accepting their services, but to cries of 
laughter and dismay, insisted he had still not finished his consultations. 12 
10 VTC Gazette Vol.3 No.65, 26/02/16, p.195; HansardVol.80.63 , 16/02/16; Vol.80 .244, 17/02/16. 
11 Hansard Vol.80 .371 , 367, 364, 356, 371, 17/02/16. 
12 /bid., Vol.80 .377, 378, 17/02/16. The amendment was withdrawn but its supporters gave notice that 
they would continue to press the Government on behalf of the Volunteers. 
2.1 1 
The reception accorded Lincolnshire's Bill in the Lords and the swell of cross-
party opinion made it inevitable that the Government would have eventually to agree to 
recognize the legal status of the movement. Unfortunately for Tennant and Asqu ith , the 
consultations had thrown up an unexpected difficulty. A War Office conference at which it 
had been decided to apply the 1863 Act to the VTC had not been attended by the 
Director-General Territorial Force (DGTF). The Directorate discovered the meeting 's 
outcome by chance and subsequently submitted a paper which described the War 
Office's proposal as 'cumbrous', and urged that unless 'absolutely necessary' the 
'dead Act' ought not to be resuscitated . It could see no reason why the VTC could not be 
adequately provided for under the provisions of the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act, 
1907. Haldane's Act had been deliberately designed in broad terms to constitute a 
permanent framework upon which the control of all irregular forces could be built. The 
Territorial associations, which the Directorate believed would be required to administer 
a reconstituted VTC, could accept the responsibility under Section II of the Act. Moreover, 
Staffordshire was already working with Lord Desborough on a scheme whereby the 
association was to administer the County Volunteer Regiment. The Directorate 
advocated the retention of some power in the hands of the Central Association but 
envisaged it becoming more of an advisory than a regulating body to the Army Council 
and the associations. There would have to be some modification in the conditions 
under which Volunteers would be expected to serve, but these too could be secured 
under the provisions of the 1907 Act. In conclusion, the DGTF pointed out that it would 
certainly be more expeditious to apply the existing Act than create a new one based on 
the old Volunteer Act of 1863. The Territorial and Reserve Forces Act allowed for 
auxiliaries to be called up for duty and , while so employed , were under military law. They 
could even be called out by Lords Lieutenant on the requisition of the General Officer 
Commanding (GOC) a particular Command. The simplest and easier solution was, 
stressed the Directorate, to incorporate the VTC in the proposed ROC as a separate 
section and divide it into two classes: those who could serve for certain minimum times 
at intervals, and those who could only serve in a national emergency. 13 
How seriously Tennant and his advisors viewed this paper is uncertain . While not 
wishing to antagonize the county associations whose help would be needed to 
administer the Royal Defence Corps and the VTC, and also on Kitchener's persona! 
.. 
recommendation , Tennant had already resolved that the revival of the 1863 Act was the 
13 W032/5273 (26A). Memo from DGTF to DCIGS, 22/02/16. 
line of least resistance.14 In order to expedite proceedings and avoid further delays, the 
Government on this occasion took advice and decided not to apply the measures to 
lreland .15 As the momentum gathered, the Volunteer movement both inside and outside 
Parliament, clamoured for acceptance, the press advocated recognition and even 
Walter Long, a long time opponent of the VTC and now a Cabinet member, spoke 
publicly in favour of the scheme.16 Tennant and the War Office had contemplated long 
enough yet the decision to grant recognition still came with dramatic suddenness. A hint 
was made to the pro-Volunteer committee suggesting they ask the Prime Minister 
whether the Government was any closer to awarding recognition . Substituting for 
Asquith at question time, Lloyd George announced on 29 February that the 1863 Act 
was to be applied to the VTC. Under its provisions, they would be properly constituted 
as a military force solely for home defence; corps would therefore receive military rank 
and status and fall under the supervision of the Lords Lieutenant who would become 
responsible for their provision and maintenance.17 
The announcement was received with relief but even in its jubilation the Gazette, 
foresaw difficulties and cautioned patience. Echoing the DGTF's earlier report, an 
.. 
editorial described the Act as 'very long and cumbrous' and predicted much would 
depend on how skilfully and sympathetically it was to be applied. 18 A later memo by the 
DGTF himself, while accepting that application of the Act had now become Government 
policy, could not resist drawing attention to the rejection of his recommendation that the 
Act should not be applied to the VTC. He did perhaps later draw some satisfaction from 
the difficulties subsequent experienced by the authorities in their attempts to frame 
adequate regulations under the authority of the old Act. 19 
It is conceivable that Tennant and his advisors had not entirely foreseen or 
understood the difficulties to be encountered when applying the 1863 Act. Several 
Amending Acts had complicated the original provisions but it is probable that the 
Government, at least for the time being, was satisfied they did provide an adequate 
framework. If events were to prove otherwise, alternative measures might need to be 
utilized. It may have annoyed the DGTF not to have been fully consulted , but the War 
14 CAB 37/143/19, 23/02/16. At the meeting Kitchener explained a plan by which he thought 
adequate organization would be given to the Volunteers by administrative action under the 1863 Act 
rather than recourse to fresh legislation. 
15 An editorial in the Irish Times, 5/02/16, admitted that the only way forward for the movement on the 
mainland was for the Government to exclude the Irish corps in any forthcoming 1egislation . 
16 W0161/105. 
17 Hansard Vol.80.876, 29/02/16. 
16 VTC Gazette Vol.3 No.68, 18/03/16, p.243; No.66, 4/03/16, p.212. 
19 W070.43. W020/Gen/4234 of 8/04/16. 
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Office, and more importantly the Government, felt they had gone far enough to both 
appease the auxiliary movement and lay the foundation, if it became necessary, for a 
future expansion. Of particular satisfaction to the Government was the knowledge that 
recognition had incurred only minimal financial liabilities and no obligation to provide 
the movement with arms and equipment. 
Nineteenth century administrations had eventually awarded capitation grants to 
the Rifle Volunteers and sections of the VTCs' membership certainly believed the 
current Government would ultimately do the same for them. It did not expect the War 
Office to provide them with Lee Enfield rifles but assumed it would provide them with 
funds to purchase Martinis from non-Governmental contractors. When it realized the 
Government had no intention of providing either arms or uniform, those members felt 
betrayed. They had supported the Government's intent to invite the Lords Lieutenant to 
offer the services of their county Volunteers in preference to an Order in Council, and 
were prepared to wait for a War Office committee to formulate a set of regulations. They 
had also accepted the eventual decision to give the administration of the auxiliary to the 
Territorial associations, 20 rather than following the preferred option of allowing the 
county regiments to continue under the existing system. Moreover, the membership 
went along, despite serious reservations, with the Government's insistence that until 
approximate numbers were known, no organization above battalion level would be 
considered, a ban on the appointment of HQ staff and only vague promises on what the 
future role of the Central Association might be. 21 One unhappy commandant 
complained about War Office delays in accepting offers of service and how, whilst one 
of its departments was anxious to employ them, another frustrated that very employment 
by refusing to issue conditions of service. He warned that men were drifting away and 
that many would regard the regulations as 'illusory' .22 Percy Harris admitted to a good 
deal of unrest and agreed the delay in awarding the desired status would undoubtedly 
lead to resignations. But he believed the technical difficulties causing the problems 
would soon be mastered and the War Office would then be able to complete the 
necessary formalities. The Times, too, wrote sympathetically of the 'neglect' of the 
Volunteers and urged the War Office to act with boldness and clarity. 23 
20 W020/GN/4240 (AG1) of 19/04/16. 
21 VTC Gazette Vol.3 No.74, 29/04/16, p.339. In May, Tennant announced that as a temporary 
measure corps would be assigned to the DGTF working under the Adjutant-Gen·eral. Decisions had not 
yet been made on whether corps would go to the War Office for administration and discipline or 
through the Central Association . Hansard Vol.82 .1972.23/05/16. 
22 Times, 23/05/16. 
23 VTC Gazette Vol.3 No.74, 29/04/16, p.344; Times, 24/05/16. 
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As the weeks following Lloyd George's announcement passed , disillusion and 
frustration continued to grow. When it was suggested the process might be speeded up 
if the C-in-C Home Defence was allowed to compile a set of regulations or, alternatively 
simply to impose the old code, Tennant insisted 'prolonged and careful consideration ' 
took time and , besides, the War Office was a 'progressive institution' .24 Percy Harris 
continued to put a brave face on it by arguing that once the new system was in 
operation, changes could be made, omissions and anomalies would be corrected and , 
now that the Government had entrusted them with definite military duties, he predicted 
the movement's membership would shortly double. Grass roots sentiment was not so 
optimistic. Letters to the Gazette questioned the justification of enrolling in the scheme 
when there was no prospect of securing arms or equipment. 25 
The wording of the terms under which the Volunteers could be called out, the 
chief purpose of their claim for recognition, aroused further discontent and confusion 
amongst the membership. The 1863 Act had the authority to call out auxiliaries in the 
event of 'actual or apprehended invasion ', whereas the 1900 Amending Act stated they 
could be mobilized in the advent of 'imminent national danger or great emergency' . The 
War Office took advice from the Parliamentary Counsel and the Lord Privy Seal , both of 
whom concurred that the Prime Minister's statement in the House on 4 August 1914 
was sufficient legally to constitute the declaration of a 'great emergency'. Under Section 
17 of the 1863 Act this meant that the Volunteers could be called out for service without 
any further consultation with , or approval of, Parliament. Despite this assurance, the 
War Office elected to use the wording of the 1900 Amending Act and asked the Lord 
Chamberlain's office to prepare documents needed for a Royal Proclamation .26 The 
retention of the 1900 Act's wording caused many Volunteers to believe they might be 
called out to suppress strikes or food riots . The point was taken and revised regulations 
resolved the ambiguity by stipulating 'only if and when it becomes necessary for the 
purpose of repelling an enemy in the event of an invasion being imminent'.27 This did 
much to quell the natural concern of working men that they might be expected to act with 
arms against their striking work colleagues. Furthermore, if their consciences were still 
insufficiently calmed, the 1863 Act carried the provision that any Volunteer could resign 
from his corps with 14 day's notice. For a force with military ambitions this was, of 
24 HansardVo1.81 .24 , 21/03/16; Vol.81 .2202, 18/04/16. ~ 
25 VTC Gazette Vol.3 No.74, 29/04/16, p.344; No.75, 6/05/16, p.367. 
26 9NF/24 (C2) of July 1916. The Privy Council also printed a draft Order ready for despatch to the 
King should the 'emergency' ever arise. W032/1855, Procedure for Calling out the Volunteer Force, 
1916. 
27 VTC GazetteVol.3 No.74, 29/04/16, p.340; VTC & VF, op.cit., p.17. 
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course, a nonsense. Nevertheless, the Government chose to ignore the implications 
largely because it had no real intention or expectation that the Volunteers would ever be 
called upon to defend their shores. 
The regulations granted Volunteers the right to wear, without the hated brassard , 
the green uniform sanctioned by the Central Association in 1915. The Workman 's 
Compensation Act, 1906 had earlier been extended to cover any man injured while 
mounting guard on a munitions factory and a ration allowance was to be provided while 
he performed the duty. Work such as digging defences, mounting guard on factories 
and vulnerable points remained entirely voluntary but the Government did express the 
hope that members would continue to perform these tasks. There was, throughout the 
announcements, an explicit guarantee that unless an invasion was imminent the men's 
ordinary avocations would not be jeopardized. 28 
In return for what really amounted to only minor concessions, the War Office had 
gained the free services of an estimated quarter of a million men. They could be used to 
supplement the work of the other new auxiliary, the Royal Defence Corps, and would in 
addition be considerably cheaper to employ. Ori their part, the members were to swear 
an oath of allegiance to defend Britain 'according to the conditions of my service', had 
been given permission to wear a uniform for which they themselves had paid and which 
bore no resemblance to service dress, had no prospect of being armed or equipped at 
public expense, had every likelihood of losing their county organization and were 
allowed no conventional military rank. Yet, despite these disappointments they had 
achieved their principal ambition of acquiring legal status. The Government was 
certainly content with the outcome and although it was to revise the regulations in the 
light of changing circumstances, its actions were calculated to appease this politically 
important and sizable proportion of the electorate. It had yet to persuade the generally 
reluctant Territorial associations to take on the administration of the VTC but the 
Government rightly perceived that if granted certain guarantees, the associations would 
be prepared to shoulder the responsibility. 
By the spring of 1916 it was evident the war would not be over within the 
foreseeable future. There were hopes that the Allied summer offensives might prove 
decisive but there was a stark realization that the conflict was developing into one of 
A 
attrition . The 1915 failures at Laos and Gallipoli , and in Artois and Champagne, had 
emphasized the need for a complete mobilization of the nation's industrial and 
28 Letter from Lloyd George to the Central Association , 27/12/15. VTC Gazette Voi.3.No.67 , 11/03/16, 
p.227. 
manpower resources. The outcome of the German onslaught on Verdun was unknown 
but what was accepted was the necessity for Britain to undertake a more significant role 
on the continent. Kitchener's New Armies were slowly taking the field but some 
divisions were still arriving in France without full equipment, many of their infantry being 
issued with modern arms only as they embarked . As Lloyd George's radical and much 
needed reorganization and expansion of the munitions industry was still in its 
developing stages, the Expeditionary Force remained short of just about everything . It 
was also apparent that the voluntary system had failed to provide the army with sufficient 
recruits. The Volunteers had provided a useful service in offering to drill Derby recruits 
and now, with universal conscription about to be introduced, the Government thought 
the VTC might provide a means of ensuring men exempted by the tribunal system could 
receive compulsory military training . Work in a reserved occupation was thus no longer 
to be an excuse for avoiding the acquisition of basic military skills . It was the advent of 
compulsion which finally convinced the Government that the Volunteers might have a 
useful part to play in the greater scenario. 
One of the few aspects of the war about which the Government was rather more 
relaxed was its growing confidence in the diminishing threat of a German invasion. 
Although The Times declared 'all risk of an attack ... has not been removed' , O'Moore 
Creagh telling Volunteers the Germans, 'like so many mad dogs .. . [would] take a bite 
wherever they can', General Paget, GOC Southern Army, expressing his concerns to the 
C-in-C, and even French himself warning about the unexpected in war becoming fact, 
the reality was that in 1916 Germany did not have the manpower to attempt an 
invasion .29 Even if they attempted a raid in strength there were more men in Great 
Britain than French estimated would be required to defeat it. That did not mean , 
however, that the C-in-C Home Forces was entirely satisfied with the composition and 
preparedness of his armies. 
Sir John French readily accepted that the prime function of the British Army was 
the defeat of the Germans on the Western Front. The responsibility for training that army 
fell within his sphere of command and so he knew better than any that he was in effect 
commanding an eternal transit camp.30 As battalions and batteries of the Regular Army 
or overseas service units of the Territorial Force became efficient they were posted to 
.. 
29 Times, 17/04/16; E.J.Disbrowe, A History of the Volunteer Movement in Cheshire 1914-1920, 
Stockport: Hales & Sons, 1920, p.33; G. French (ed), Some War Diaries, Addresses and 
Correspondence of F-M the Right Hon.Earl of Ypres, op.cit., p.242 ; French to Norfolk Volunteers, 
22/10/16. 
30 R.Holmes, The Little Field Marshal: Sir John French , op.cit., p.317. 
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the Expeditionary Force; until that time they were allocated to home defence. With the 
coming of conscription , the Provisional Battalions of home service Territorials were 
either to be disbanded or become draft finding units and , once they had been filled up 
with trained conscripts, the second line Territorial divisions would be despatched 
overseas. The existing plans for the coastal defence of Britain relied upon the efficiency 
and existence of these Provisional and second line battalions. Unfortunately, the 
Provisional brigades and the nine second line Territorial divisions were all very under 
strength and armed only with Japanese rifles or carbines, for which there was limited 
practice ammunition . These divisions were generally considered to be of little fighting 
value and could not be relied upon to repel an invasion.31 If the Germans did land , only 
the New Army divisions training at Aldershot and Salisbury could be expected to offer 
any serious opposition and they would not become effective for at least 48 hours. 
Having assessed the position and problems, in April1916 French aired his 
concerns about the state of the home army. He concluded the forces under his 
command were inadequate for their intended role as front line troops required, if not to 
repel, at least to hold a German invasion on the-coast. The Army Council countered by 
emphasizing again that as the total number of available troops was considerably in 
excess of the estimated requirement, the C-in-C should expect no reduction in the 
numbers and regularity by which men were posted from the home to the overseas 
armies.32 When General Paget again complained bitterly about his depleted battalions, 
French could offer no succour. 33 It was this concern about the constantly changing 
nature and composition of his forces which compelled French to contemplate 
introducing the recently recognized VTC to a planned scheme of home defence. The 
outcome of his deliberations would be the evolution of a system whereby a mixed force 
of Regulars, Territorials, former National Reservists in the ROC and the part time 
auxiliaries of the VTC, would jointly protect the UK from raids or invasion. 
The creation of the Royal Defence Corps was born of necessity and military 
expediency. The organization and control of the Supernumerary Companies under the 
county associations had proved difficult, if not unworkable. There was little coordination 
of objective or purpose between counties and their fluctuating strength and varying 
degrees of efficiency made many of the companies unreliable or certainly of dubiou$ 
31 Kitchener had talked in very gloomy tones of the worth of these divisions to the War Council in May 
1915. CAB22/1/21 , 14/05/15. Although they had made some progress in equipment and training , the 
units remained very understrength . 
32 W032/5273 (1A). French to War Office, 12/04/16. 
33 G. French (ed) , Some War Diaries, Address and Correspondence of F-M the Right Hon.Earl of Ypres, 
op. cit., p.258. 
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quality. The War Office wanted to centralize the companies' administration and to be in a 
position to exert greater control over their composition and organization. A royal warrant 
to permit the creation of the new force auxiliary was signed in March 1916 and an Army 
Council Instruction followed in April. 34 
Organized into Protection Companies of between 150 and 250 all ranks , the ROC 
was to become responsible for local defence duties hitherto performed by the 
Supernumerary Companies and those which had been allocated to the recently formed 
Observer Companies. It was intended that men in a particular Supernumerary Company 
would be posted to its replacement Protection Company and , in addition, there was a 
widespread assumption that those companies would remain in the districts in which 
they were originally raised . As most of the men in the ROC were at the outset National 
Reservists, technically they remained Territorial soldiers; their officers were to be 
commissioned into the Territorial Force before being posted to companies. To facilitate 
control the City of London Territorial Association was charged with administering the 
ROC and the corps thus came under the authority of one paymaster who dealt with all 
accounts and separation allowances. 
It was anticipated that most personnel from the Supernumerary Companies 
would accept transfer to the ROC. They would be joined by men too old for overseas 
service from some of the currently disbanding Provisional battalions, but entry to the 
corps was available to any suitably fit man aged between 41 and 60. Previous military 
training was required but, in June, it was decided that men with an unspecified period of 
VTC experience would also become eligible. The Military Service Acts had removed the 
option of voluntary overseas service so any National Reservist young and fit enough to 
go abroad was drafted from his Supernumerary Company to a foreign service battalion . 
Their pi in th new corp were taKtJn by som Gla Ill National Re er\Ji t na 
also by soldiers whose wounds or disabilities meant they would not be returned to 
fighting units. Most associations optimistically believed there would be little difficulty in 
finding sufficient suitable candidates for the ROC despite the knowledge that a 
considerable number of the remaining Class Ill men, ttr cted by th high r r t of 
3
' AC I 84 1 of 1916 of 19/04/16. Little contemporary attention was paid to the announcement of the 
new body's creation, The most extensive newspaper coverage was probably that given by the Ogi/y 
Express of 20/03/16. It simply explained the ROC was a means of giving forme~ National Reservists a 
fu ller recognition and the benefit of the title 'Royal', venturing no opinion of its futur . Som months 
1 t r t W r Commltt m tlng, v n Lloyd G rg m d l.m w r f th corp ' p Li r . r n h 
duly explained its role and Roberston added that the War Office would try to replace its men with 
Volunteers as soon as possible. The men, he suggested , would then return to civilian employment. 
This declaration of intent was Immediately supported by Montagu the Minister of Munitions, who 
complain d of th 'appalling w nt of labouri, OAB42/18/8, 30/08/16. 
pay, were enlisting in the newly formed overseas Labour Companies.35 
Records detailing the numbers of men who did transfer from the Supernumerary 
Companies are very rare . The few extant sources indicate that nearly 300 of 
Hertfordshire's 500 and 954 of Shropshire's 1 040 National Reservists went, but only 30 
of Wiltshire's 322 appear to have agreed to make the switch .36 The Army Council was 
clearly concerned about the numbers who were declining to go and issued a letter in 
September 1916 which stressed how much it relied on the county associations to 
induce their remaining National Reservists to join the RDC.37 The reluctance amongst 
the men to enlist in the auxiliary was probably a result of some adverse publicity and 
unflattering questions in the House of Commons. There were several occasions when 
MPs complained about the accommodation and conditions under which men of the 
ROC were working . One tented camp was said to be on ground heavily contaminated by 
industrial pollution and men at another were reported to be very discontented at their 
'unreasonably hard treatment'. Furthermore, although they served under a Territorial 
Force attestation and could thus· be transferred without their consent to another corps , 
many members had been under the illusion thaf they would serve in a Protection 
Company stationed in their locality. During the time they had been with the 
Supernumerary Companies many had developed gardens and allotments; when the 
men were moved to another area, these were lost. Forster repeatedly insisted no 
promises about keeping them in their locality had ever been made and the terms of 
their service were unconditional. The absence of regular leave was another cause of 
complaint, as was the clawing back of over-payments in their wages. 38 
Finding sufficient officers for the corps was not quite so problematic. The City of 
London Association circulated all counties with a request for nomination of suitable 
gentlemen . There were some delays in interviewing applicants and the disbanding of 
some Observer Companies meant that eligible officers from those units had first to be 
absorbed by the ROC before direct applicants could be considered . But, by November, 
most of the applications had been processed and gazetted39 and by that time the 
companies were dispersed around the country, guarding docks, munitions factories 
35 Buckinghamshire RO T/N1/1 , 4/11/15. 
36 Another 101 ORs had already gone to 24/Rifle Brigade in the previous NoverT).ber. Herts RO TAFA/2, 
15/12/15; Shropshire RO 1988/35, 6/05/16; Wiltshire RO L 1/101/2, 24/06/16. 
37 W09/Reserve/6612 (TF2) of 6/09/16. 
36 Hansard Vol.82 .1141, 15/05/15; Vol.85 .1842, 16/08/16; Vol.87 .226, 8/11/16; Vol.91 .381 , 7/03/17; 
Vol.87.604-6, 16/11/16. 
39 City of London Association , General Purpose Committee Minute Book, Vol.2 . Guildhall Library, 
MSS 12,606, 23/11/16. 
and other vulnerable points.40 Although there were some complaints of over-zealous 
troops, most of the work was dull and uninteresting. Their less than onerous duties led 
to accusations of care free sublimity and of spending their days playing cards. However, 
their deployment on these tasks meant other troops could be more usefully employed 
elsewhere. 41 
With their men gone to the Rifle Brigade units, the ROC Protection Companies 
and the home service Provisional Battalions of the Territorial Force, those National 
Reserve battalions which had been able to run a social club suffered a severe drop in 
income. Some clubs, such as that run by the Lewisham Battalion, are known to have 
made men of their local VTC honorary members, granting them free use of the 
clubhouse and associated facilities . Other club committees viewed the Volunteer 
companies as a means of easing the financial worries brought about by the loss of 
members. In March 1915 the Hackney Club, for example, considered whether it should 
hire out its building to the Volunteers, the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association or 
the Belgian Refugee Committee. The committee decided to approach the two local 
Volunteer units with a view to offering their members use of the club's facilities for two 
shillings per man per annum, with an additional one penny for every ten rounds fired on 
the range. To the committee's disappointment the Hackney Volunteers considered the 
club was unsuitable for their purposes. By 1916, the club was running so perilously 
short of money that it reopened negotiations with the Volunteers and accepted them as 
tenants on much worsened terms.42 As so few National Reserve companies had ever 
possessed their own facilities, Volunteer units generally used drill halls or acquired 
their own buildings. This did not prevent liaison and fraternization between the two 
organizations as records exist of joint parades and shooting competitions.43 
While the National Reserve clubs began to feel the pinch of diminishing returns 
across the bar, the commandants and secretaries turned their attention to wind ing 
down the administrative structure of their units. The experience of the East Lancashire 
Association was typical of many. The first real indication that things were slowing down 
came in October 1915 when a payment of £10 for three months' work was made to a Mr 
~o When the Neutral European Ports Scheme was implemented, arrangements were made by MIS with 
GHQ Home Forces to provide guards to intercept spies and agents landing at ports. Up to 2000 ROC . 
personnel were employed by local commands in th is capacity. PRO KV1/34, p.Y1. I owe this reference 
to Chris Northcott. 
41 Hansard Vol.85.289, 2/08/16; E.Potton, A Record of the United Arts Rifles, op.cit., p.32 . 
42 Hackney Archives, D/S/1 0/-1, 5/03/15 and 1/09/16. 
43 For example, a shooting match between the Westminster Volunteers and the Westminster National 
Reserve on 21/04/16. 
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Simpson who had been employed to deal with the clerical work connected with the 
Reserve. When sanctioning the payment, the secretary minuted 'it was not anticipated 
that any further assistance would be required from Mr Simpson' .44 By December 1915, 
the money paid out to the county's 11 commandants had fallen significantly and , in the 
following September, the War Office announced associations were no longer required 
to maintain the National Reserve register. By that time, only Class Ill men remained 
and , as they had little to do, did not warrant public money.45 At the end of 1916 the War 
Office informed the counties that no further grants for the Reserve would be forthcoming 
and it was implied that any future expenses incurred by the dwindling Reserve should 
be covered by the counties' General Purpose Fund. 
There remained the question of how to dispose of any surplus National Reserve 
funds. When the War Office requested associations to transfer the Reserve 's fund to 
their general balances, the East Yorkshire Association objected to this appropriation . It 
resolved instead to spend the surplus on clothing and equipping the Volunteers 
because these units were 'now fulfilling the purpose for which the National Reserve 
was originally raised'. 46 The East Lancashire Association opted for a more official 
course. It decided to place the £1274 surplus into the general fund but resolved to 
spend an equivalent amount on the encouragement and development of the National 
Reserve if it was reconstructed after the war. 47 Following a period of hesitation the War 
Office finally agreed to allow one association to dispose of its £500 as a gift to the 
county's cadet detachments. 48 
The East Lancashire Association next turned its attention to the accommodation 
occupied by its National Reserve detachments. It had rented three premises for its 
Reservists and with the end of government financial support these tenancies had to be 
terminated . Local branches were next required to close their accounts and to return any 
rifles and equipment to the Ordnance Department. From 1917 there are very few 
references to the organization which in its heyday had registered former soldiers 
principally from the Lancashire Fusiliers and Manchester and East Lancashire 
Regiments. Not all of its former clerical officers, however, claimed their expenses or 
44 Territirial , Auxiliary and Volunteer Reserve HQ (Liverpool) East Lancashire Association Records, no 
ref, 29/10/15. 
45 ln December 1915 Wiltshire still had, in theory, 3137 men on its register but the grant for the 
.. 
Swindon secretary had been slashed from £26 to a little over £4. Wiltshire RO, L 1/101/2, 5/02/16 and 
24/06/16. By the middle of 1916, local secretaries had agreed to continue their tasks without pay. 
46 The National Reserve band had already donated its instruments to the 1st Volunteer Battalion , East 
Lancashire Regiment. 
47 Manchester RO, M73/3/21 , 31/03/15. 
46 Kent RO, MD/TA 1/3, 31/08/22. 
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settled their accounts with the alacrity which might have been anticipated . For example, 
in September 1919 the former secretary of the 8th Manchester (National Reserve) 
Battalion submitted a claim for £2 3s 6d for expenses incurred in 1914. In addition , 
several of the men known to have been responsible for the administration of the 
Reserve within their county association were found other employment when National 
Reserve grants ceased . Major Etherington managed to increase his salary from £150 to 
over £200 a year on securing his transfer from secretary to the West Lancashire 
National Reserve Committee to the association 's Separation Department. 49 
The closure process was not quite so straight forward for those clubs which had 
elected to register as limited companies. With nominal capital of £2000, divided into 
8000 five shilling shares, the Hull National Reserve Company had registered as a 
limited company in June 1915. It had six directors, four of whom were colonels in the 
Reserve. The Companies Registration Office wrote to the club in October 1916 
enquiring whether it was still in business. The premise had been taken over by the 
army, who did not forward the club's mail, and with most of its directors away on some 
form of military servive, the Board had not met for some months. Similar official 
enquiries, followed by several solicitor's letters, were made in 1917 and 1918. The 
club's legal representatives blamed its military tenants for administrative 'blunders' but, 
in mid-1919, the Board reconvened and successfully applied for the company's official 
liquidation.50 
The Government's success at overseeing the winding up of the National Reserve 
and in securing the assistance of the City of London Association in the administration of 
the Royal Defence Corps was reflected in its desire to reorganize the Volunteers in a 
manner more suitable to its own needs. Once the first months of frenzied activity of 
mobilizing and equipping their units had passed , many Territorial associations 
abandoned their monthly or quarterly meetings; too many committee members were 
serving soldiers and consequently overseas with their units. Besides, once the first line 
battalions and batteries were up to establishment and deployed, there was little else for 
the committees to do. In the spring and summer of 1916 the associations lost the 
responsibility of administering the second and third line Territorial and Yeomanry units, 
49 TAVR (Liverpool) East Lancashire Association Records, General Purpose Committee, no ref, 
10/11/17. 
so BT31 /21562/129781. Despite an exceptionally distinguished Committee, the Kensington National 
Reserve Club appears simply to have disappeared. As several official letters to its address in Ladbroke 
Grove were returned with 'gone away', in January 1933, the Companies Registration Office 
announced it had compulsorily liquidated the club. BT31/32180/135184. At the time of writing , the 
Sunderland National Reserve Club, complete with Roll of Honour, continues to function . 
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the Provisional Battalions and the Protection Companies. When separation allowance 
payments were also centralized, they were largely denuded of their power and 
responsibilities . By requesting them to undertake the administration of the VTC, the 
Government saw the means of maintaining the organization and function of the 
associations for a possible postwar use. The Army Council considered the counties 
were ideally suited to the task51 but there was a reluctance by some County Volunteer 
Regiments to place themselves under the Territorial associations. For their part, there 
was also a reluctance by some associations to undertake the VTCs' administration . 
The reservation among the Volunteers was usually either a concern about the 
intended position of the Central Association in the reorganization , or a belief that the 
existing arrangements were already entirely adequate. 52 These problems were to be 
resolved in July and the solution persuaded those in need of reassurance to accede. 
However, throughout the summer the movement remained in a state of 'restlessness 
and discontent'.53 The Government had not printed or distributed enrolment forms and 
an open letter signed by six MPs deploring the continuing delay in organizing the VTC 
into a comprehensive force for home defence appeared in the press.54 The Gazette 
drew the gloomy conclusion that by the time the Army Council made up its mind about 
how the Volunteers were to be administered, there would be no force left to administer. 55 
Matters were not improved when the Secretary of State told the House of Lords he 
believed it would be difficult to find part time military work for the Volunteers to perform 
and doubted whether an expansion of the movement could be justified.56 Complaints 
about Kitchener's 'cold douche' once again revived memories of past Governments' 
treatments of the Rifle Volunteers and the Territorials . One discontented member 
queried whether 'we should take Lord Kitchener's palpable hint and chuck it' . The 
Cambridge Association minuted how the Secretary of State's speech had had a 'very 
damaging effect' on the movement and wanted a clear statement of fact that the 
51 W020/GN/4240 (AG1) of 19/04/16 claimed : 'The Territorial Force Associations are clearly marked 
out for this duty'. 
52 VTC Gazette Vol.4 No.84, 8/07/16, p.83. 
53 E.Potton (ed) , A Record of the United Arts Rifles 1914-1919, London: Alex Maring , 1920, p.20. 
54 Times, 25/05/16. 
55 VTC Gazette Vol.4 No. 79, 3/06/16, p.13. 
56 Hansard House of Lords Vol.22 .212-3, 30/05/16. Kitchener was responding to .. a guestion from Lord . 
Charnwood enquiring about whether the Government was considering making more use of the VTC. 
The question provoked a considerable discussion between the Secretary of State and Lords 
Desborough , Lincolnshire and the Duke of Rutland. Kitchener concurred with Lincolnshire that a 
Volunteer's military responsibilities should take precedence over his civil. A phlegmatic official in the 
Home Office recorded : 'It would appear that in present circumstances confusion in the event of an 
emergency is more than probable'. H045/272.183 (108) . 
Volunteers were accepted as 'essential to the welfare of the country'. 57 Reports from 
corps across the country reported a falling off in drill attendance: Cheadle Hulme failed 
to stop the decline despite introducing rifle competitions; Lydney tried by reducing drills 
to one per week; Rugby talked of 'lamentable apathy', and corps in Chester-le-Street 
and Colne disbanded .58 The one encouraging aspect amongst the despondency was 
the emerging knowledge that FM French at least was taking the movement seriously. At 
Strachey's invitation the Central Association 's leading members lunched with the C-in-
e and his staff to discuss how the Volunteers could be best utilized, and French 's later 
attendance at a huge Volunteer parade in Hyde Park offered a visible sign of the fuller 
recognition of the force by the War Office. The C-in-C told 10,000 Volunteers, most of 
whom were wearing uniform, that he was determined to use them. He reiterated the 
message two weeks later by assuring the Cambridgeshire Volunteers that he was 
working 'to give them a well-understood status in the fighting forces of the Empire' .59 
French no doubt deliberately timed his statements to coincide with the 
announcement that the VTC was to be reconstituted as the Volunteer Force and that the 
composition and responsibilities of the new organization hi3d been defined. 60 The 
Territorial associations were to become the channels of communication between the 
War Office and the corps on matters of principle and procedure but they would not be 
concerned with training unless it involved the expenditure of public money. Lord 
Desborough was to become the Honorary Deputy Director of Volunteer Services in the 
department of the DGTF, with Percy Harris as Honorary Assistant Director. In effect this 
meant that the Central Association would remain in being, albeit in an altered guise, 
and would serve as the familiar and identifiable organization through which the county 
regiments would operate and seek advice.61 In the face of the disappointments of recent 
months, the retention of the executive committee of the Central Association provided 
tangible relief to the movement's leaders who had feared its instigators would be 
submerged in the faceless machinery of the War Office.62 This decision also convinced 
several hesitating Territorial associations to accept responsibility for the new force. 
The principal reasons why many associations were reluctant to take on the new 
auxiliary was that, wary of past difficulties in obtaining funding for their Territorial units 
57 VTC Gazette Vol.4 No.81 , 17/06/16, p.47; Cambridge RO R68/11 , 3/06/16. • 
58 Stockport Archives D1697,DDND, Minute Book, July 1916; Gloucestershire RO 05627 7/6, 8/06/16; 
VTC Gazette Vol.4 No.90, 19/0816, p.192; No.91 , 26/08/16, p.204. 
59 Cambridge Independent, 29/06/16. 
80 W020/Gen/421 (TF2) of 29/07/16. 
61 W020/Gen/4241 (TF2) of 17/08/16. 
62 VTC Gazette Vol.4 No.84, 8/07/16, p.83. 
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and the National Reserve, the Government would similarly fail to finance adequately the 
Volunteer Force.63 Many associations considered it impossible to make a decision 
based on the information given in a War Office letter of April 1916 attached to a copy of 
the tentative regulations. 54 East Lancashire thought the proposals failed to establish the 
precise status of the force or what the legal power of the associations would be to 
enforce any decisions made. Moreover, they did not give definitive statements on 
whether the force would be armed and, above all , there was no provision by which 
expenses for clothing, equipment or administration costs could be met. The association 
declined to undertake responsibility until those matters were resolved . It did , however, 
agree temporarily to act as the communication link between the Volunteers and the War 
Office. 65 Nottinghamshire also refused to agree to the proposal until the Government 
guaranteed to provide adequate financial assistance and Durham agreed to form a 
Volunteer Committee only on the explicit understanding that sufficient money would be 
forthcoming .66 Northumberland was equally concerned about the financial implications 
and, in addition, feared the Government would gradually increase the amount of work 
.. 
expected of the association. This, it was predicted would inevitably create excessive 
bureaucratic demands upon its existing facilities and personnel. Leicestershire was 
prepared to accept the challenge but stressed that as it was 'impossible' to raise funds 
locally, central funds would have to be provided.67 Similarly, Nairn declared the VTC had 
found it very difficult to raise funds themselves and decided it was 'impracticable' for 
them to attempt to take on the Volunteers without Government finance ; 
Clackmannanshire agreed to try but foresaw difficulties in enticing men to join owing to 
the War Office's prohibition of the khaki uniform.68 Entirely erroneously, Cumberland and 
Westmorland assuming a uniform would be provided, recorded they would have no 
difficulty in raising 500 men for railway duties and criticised the War Office for not having 
listened to their advice 18 months earlier.69 
At a meeting of the Lords Lieutenant of Northern Command in June 1916, 
Bethune explained that the force's recent expansion had convinced the Government it 
63 Hansard House of Lords Vol.22.209-1 0, 30/05/16. The Duke of Rutland stated that the War Office 
had asked the Territorial associations to take on the administration in a 'most courteous fashion ', but 
he told the House that county committees were already demanding to know why there was to be no 
government financial assistance. Kitchener (212-13) replied that the Government could not afford to 
finance the Volunteers. 
s• W020/GN/4240AG1 of 19/04/16. 
65 Manchester Archives M73/2/3, 12/5/16; M73/3/22, 23/06/16. 
66 Nottinghamshire RO DDT/A1/1, 25/07/16; Durham RO D/TA/3, 9/05/16. 
67 Northumberland RO NRO 408/5, 5/05/16; Leicestershire RODE 819/2 , 6/07/16. 
68 NAS MD8/16, 16/06/16; MD6/48, 4/05/16. 
69 Cumbria RO TTAF/2, p.27/04/16. 
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could be of use to the state and, as a result, the Army Council was now formally asking 
the county associations to administer the new home defence auxiliary in the same way 
as they had done for its predecessor, the Territorials .70 Northumberland remained 
unconvinced , but under pressure from the Army Council , the Lord Lieutenant and 
officers o f No rthe rn C omma nd, it g r d to accept r s pa n ib ility o n c rt in cond it io ns : 
the co unty w o uld not be re q u ire d to ra ise f unds throug h p ub lic appeals , w o uld not be 
held responsible for the supply of any equipment that had already been obtained 
through private sources, and that the Government must guarantee to cover the costs for 
any additional lighting, cleaning and wages. At the Lord Lieutenant's insistence a 
committee was eventually established. To express its discontent and assert its 
independence, the committee immediately proceeded to raise questions about the 
eligibility of Lord Grey's nominee for the post of county commandant_?, 
Other associations, far from showing the hesitancy common probably to the 
majority, accepted the responsibility with alacrity . In March, even before the request had 
gone out to the Lords Lieutenant, Stirlingshire, which had earlier been reluctant to 
become involved in the prewar auxiliaries, minuted it would administer the Volunteers if 
ever or whenever a request was made. So confident was the committee that it could 
make a success of the task that it turned down the offer of a more financially viable joint 
approach from Clackmannanshire.72 Ignoring his association's earlier accusation that 
the VTC had damaged army recruiting, the Lord Lieutenant of Hampshire declared his 
committee would be 'delighted ' to take on the work and Lord Scarbrough 's motion to the 
Sussex Association to accept the responsibility was carried unanimously. Oxfordshire, 
like several other counties, noted the proposal was 'feasible and convenient' and 
accepted without minuting any reservations.73 The records of the East Yorkshire 
Association display almost a relish when detailing its dealings with the Volunteers . It 
was clearly pleased to be again involved in measures for local defence and was later 
heralded by the authorities as an example of how county Volunteers should be run and 
organized .74 
In contrast to other counties, the Cheshire County Volunteer Committee decided 
to retain the administration of the Volunteers itself rather than hand it over to the 
Territorial association . The association agreed , a decision later CO!)firmed by the War 
7° F. H. Reynard, A Brief History of the Territorial Force Association of the County of York (North Riding) 
1908-1919, Northallerton: Joseph Walker, 1919, p.24. 
71 Northumberland RO NRO 408/5, 4/08/16. 
72 NAS MD6/20, 31/3/16. 
73 VTC Gazette Vol.3 No.76, 13/05/16, p.372; Oxford RO 0/11/1/A1/3, 29/04/16. 
74 East Riding RO, East Yorkshire Territorial Association , Annual Report 1916-17. 
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Office, with the result that the Cheshire Volunteer Regiment became 'affiliated ' to the 
county Territorial association. The secretary of the Territorial association became an ex-
officio member of the Volunteer Committee, whose secretary was empowered to 
communicate directly with the War Office.75 
With the obvious exception of Cheshire, by the time of their July meetings all 
county associations had agreed to oversee the administration of the new Volunteer 
Force. The absence of any definite regulations for the associations to apply, however, 
caused complaints that men were enrolling without any concrete information about their 
liability to serve. Claiming that his department was still to come to grips with its new 
responsibility, Bethune, as DGTF, appealed for patience. Members were told to expect 
announcements about transport, separation allowances and uniform but his very 
vagueness about the provision of clothing and equipment was stretching Volunteers' 
patience to the limit. The Gazette regretfully informed its readers that in the fashion of 
auxiliaries of the past, Volunteers should again 'evidently continue to rely upon 
themselves for the future'. 76 
•. 
Part of the delay was undoubtedly the difficulties of securing the active 
cooperation of the variously involved departments of the War Office. It was generally 
accepted that Bethune was a supporter of the movement, as indeed he had been of the 
National Reserve, but reaching agreement between the Adjutant-General (AG) and the 
Quartermaster-General (QMG), and among the Legal Department, the Ministry of 
Munitions and the Treasury, required time and diplomacy. 
Probably the most important of the regulations which appeared gradually over the 
summer months of reorganization was the one which reconstituted the VTC as the 
Volunteer Force. The movement now officially became a recognized component of the 
Crown 's forces. This instruction was greeted with genuine satisfaction but there was to 
be little more immediate comfort for the corps as a succession of subsequent 
regulations failed to provide the Volunteers with the concessions warranted by what 
was now publicly accepted as an integral part of the forces for home defence. 
Other early regulations concerned the appointment of County Commandants and 
regimental officers, the force's organizational structure and some concessions and 
announcements involving allowances. Lords Lieutenant were requ .. ested to forward 
names of 'gentlemen of standing and suitable military experience' as potential 
Commandants but it took some weeks before the post's role was finally defined .77 
75 E.J.Disbrowe, A History of the Volunteer Movement in Cheshire 1914-1920, op.cit., pp.SS-56. 
76 VTC Gazette Vol.4 No.91 , 26/08/16, p.208; No.90, 19/08/16, pp.179-80. 
77 The request was formalized by W09NF/227 (TF2) of 14/11/16. 
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Eventually it was decided Commandants should become responsible under the GOC 
Command for the coordination of training and to act as the intermediary between the 
military authorities and the Territorial association on the one hand , and his Group 
Commandants on the other. To facilitate the exercise of control in counties which were 
expected to raise a large number of battalions, County Commandants were allowed to 
command groups of battalions, each of which were to be no larger than 1600 men.78 
The power of Lords Lieutenant to sign commissions under the 1863 Act had 
been withdrawn in 1871 but because the numbers involved in the new force were 
potentially very large, and thus likely to entail a heavy work load, the Army Council 
decided to restore the privilege.79 In turn, County Commandants were able to nominate 
the Commandants of corps within their command and Corps Commandants would 
then appoint their subordinates without the necessity of having to refer them to the Lord 
Lieutenant for approval. Furthermore, it was thought that the Territorial Force Reserve 
and the unattached list of Territorial officers might provide pools from which experienced 
officers for the Volunteers Force might be drawn.80 In view of the paltry number of 
•. 
officers who had ever enrolled in the Territorial Force Reserve, this proved to be 
something of a forlorn hope. 
There were not only difficulties in attracting sufficient officers but also, when 
found, in getting them gazetted. One corps submitted eight applications in May 1916 
and by August only one, a second lieutenant, had been gazetted.81 This delay was 
frustrating and , in addition, posed problems of legality for officers attesting their men. 
The first batch of commissions in the Volunteer Force was not listed in the London 
Gazette until September, the War Office blaming the tardiness on the number of 
inaccurately or carelessly completed forms, and the wish of the busy King to give the list 
close scrutiny.82 To improve the quality and training of officers, schools of instruction 
were opened at several universities and a home study scheme was also subsequently 
initiated. All the courses were validated by the Central Association . Officers were also 
allowed to dispense with the despised Austrian knot on their sleeves and to wear the 
same badges of rank and uniform as Regular soldierS.83 This was a major concession 
and gratefully received. Its aim was clearly to encourage potential officers to join but as 
78 9NF/12 (TF2) of 23/05/16; ACI 590 of 9/04/17, or Volunteer Force Order No.L..VI ; ACI1571 of 
11/08/16. 
79 9NFIB (TF2) of 4/05/16, but it was not enacted until August 1916. 
60 9/Res/6754 (TF2) of 25/07/16 and 2/09/16. 
61 M.Yearsley, Imperial War Museum Dept.of Documents DS/Misc/17, p.89. 
82 VTC Gazette Vol.4 No.93, 9/09/16, p.227. 
63 9NF/236 (TF2) and ACI 2417 of 1916. 
they were obliged to purchase their own uniform and kit, there were immediate calls for 
the Government to award them an annual grant.84 
The provisional regulations, which had rested general control with the War Office 
and administration with the Territorial associations, were confirmed during the summer. 
Training was to come under the auspices of the GOC Command and the power to call 
out the Volunteers for military service lay in the Field Marshal (FM) C-in-C Home 
Defence.85 If their services were required , Volunteers were to receive the same rates of 
pay, separation allowances and non-effective benefits as Regular soldiers, but unlike 
the Regulars, would not be entitled to a gratuity. Volunteers were undoubtedly gratified 
to learn that if mobilized they would be treated almost equally to the Regulars, but what 
remained particularly unclear was what, given the wide disparity in the provision of 
equipment and arms possessed by Volunteer corps, the War Office might actually 
expect them to do. 
Buckinghamshire had at least prepared and addressed mobilization envelopes 
but the 2nd Oxfordshire Volunteer Regiment went a stage further in June 1916 by 
•. 
issuing all members with a set of mobilization instructions. If the call came, all men 
were to report immediately to the adjutant's house armed with a gun or a heavy stick, 
food for 24 hours, two empty cans connected by a piece of string and , presumably in 
case anything went wrong, some white rags. Anyone fortunate enough to possess a 
gun was warned not to load it in case it went off.86 Nationally by July, almost 230 
battalions had been formed and their services accepted but, in the House, Forster 
acknowledged they were far from fully equipped .87 Apart from infantry battalions, several 
other types of units had also offered their services to the Army Council. French ordered 
Lords Lieutenant to submit these offers to their GOC Commands, who then passed 
them on to the War Office.88 They included artillery, engineer and transport units, as well 
as a telephone company in the East Riding formed to liaise with anti-aircraft defences.89 
Other counties , too, did maintain or raise some specialist units but the War Office 
refused to grant recognition to these ambulance, engineer and signal companies until 
1917.90 
84 For example, VTC Gazette Vol.4 No.102, 11/11/16, p.347. 
85 9NF/128 (TF2) of 21/09/16 and ACI183 of 1916. 
86 Buckinghamshire RO T/N1/13, 4/08/16; Circular in IWM Dept.of Printed Books, 316.338, K5616. 
87 Hansard Vol.84 .1513, 25/07/16. 
86 9NF/43 of 15/06/16. 
89 F. lock, Records of the East Yorkshire Volunteer Force 1914-1919, Hull : Eastern Morning & Hull 
News, 1920, p.13. 
90 See Appendix II. 
Volunteers' complaints against the War Office for failing officially to acknowledge 
their existence, as well as a general discontent with the slow pace of progress, 
continued to be heard : Lord Aberconway spoke of the 'antiquated Panjandrums' of the 
War Office, one member riled against the dilatory methods and negative attitude, while 
another appealed for the force to be treated as a 'necessity and not as a plaything '. 91 
When the Gazette asked the new Secretary of State for War to use his influence to 
secure more favourable treatment, 92 Lloyd George responded with a soothing and 
placatory speech which, although vague in content, hinted at change: 
There is an increasing appreciation in the War Office of the value of this new 
force ... Whatever scheme may be evolved as a result of consultation amongst military 
authorities, it will be one which redresses all the obvious grievances [and give] a sense 
of satisfaction , strength and confidence to the whole country ... ln a very short time there 
will be change.93 
This speech did offer some encouragement to frustrated Volunteers but realists 
amongst them did not expect the Government suddenly to find sufficient weapons and 
equipment to redress their grievances.94 Most corps remained hopelessly under-
equipped . For example, in its desperate search for weapons, at least one group wrote 
to farmers and gentlemen inquiring whether they could loan the Volunteers any sporting 
guns. Official restrictions on who was permitted to acquire a weapon further 
exacerbated the general problem and annoyed individuals. When one officer was 
refused permission to obtain a revolver through the usual channels, he resorted to 
buying one from a shop in the Strand and, after much difficulty, a local committee 
eventually arranged for a Regular soldier to inspect on their behalf a miniature rifle 
advertized for sale. By the time the arrangements were finalized, the weapon had been 
sold. One exasperated Lord Lieutenant complained his Territorial association could not 
even obtain shot guns on behalf of his Volunteers .95 
Some corps though , were rather better supplied. The Nottinghamshire Volunteer 
Regiment guarded lines of communication with a total of 70 carbines and 60 shot guns, 
Buckinghamshire's four battalions had 2000 rifles and over 100,000 rounds and the 
91 VTC GazetteVol.4 No.93, 9/09/16, p.228; No.103, 18/11/16, p.360; No.99, 21/10/16, p.311. 
92 /bid., No.98, 14/10/16, p.288. 
93 Hansard Vol.85.156, 11/10/16. 
94 In fact, in August, when French told the War Committee the Volunteer Force would require 170,000 
rifles, Montagu , the Minister Minister of Munitions, replied they would be available by November. 
CAB42/18/8, 30/08/16. 
95 Circular of June 1916. IWM Dept.of Printed Books, 316.338 K5616; M.Yearsley, IWM op.cit., p.80; 
Gloucester RO 05627 7/6, 8/06/16; NAS MD8/31 , 16/06/16. 
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East Yorkshire Regiment managed to purchase nearly 3000 specially manufactured 
Martinis. The East Lancashire Association granted permission to its Volunteers to 
purchase any weapons that came on the market and the Durham Emergency 
Committee obtained a substantial number of modern .303 rifles. The committee then 
optimistically but unsuccessfully wrote to the War Office for reimbursement of the money 
spent. An Army Council Instruction (ACI) allowed any corps fortunate enough to acquire 
weapons the opportunity to buy ammunition from the Army Ordnance Department at 
cost price, but there were constant calls for the Government to release the supposedly 
thousands of dummy weapons and Ross rifles taken from Canadian troops wh ich 
some MPs believed the War Office was hoarding.96 
Even if they could obtain weapons, many Volunteer corps had only limited 
opportunity to fire them. Ranges were still in short supply and the varied assortment of 
buildings used as drill halls generally offered little scope for musketty. Officers at 
Territorial drill halls were instructed to offer 'reasonable' facilities to Volunteer bodies, 
who were to be responsible for any resultant damage.97 The Territorials generally did 
what they could but most could not offer the unrestricted access demanded by some 
VTC because the buildings were still required for their own use: one company of 200 
men had to share a small drill hall with two administrative centres and the local 
National Reserve. The London County Council did allow the use of its schools for drill 
but, as many of the buildings lacked blackouts, winter time evening drills had frequently 
to be abandoned.98 
As a consequence of these and other obstacles, training remained haphazard. 
Undoubtedly, the more efficient, attractive and financially sound corps did organize 
useful weekend exercises, and camps were becoming more of a regular occurrence. A 
Government announcement that it would cover travelling expenses for Easter camps 
and for some other spring manoeuvres was considered belated, but was well 
received. 99 Around 500 United Arts, Inns of Court, Pharmacists and London Engineers 
subsequently camped at Otford during Whitsun 1916 and the Bury Volunteers were 
96 C.Gerring, A Record of the Early Volunteer Movement (The Sherwood Foresters} , Nottingham: 
Sisson & Parker, 1920, p.15; Hansard House of Lords Vol22.218-9, 30/05/16; F.Lock, Records of the 
East Yorks Volunteer Force 1914-1919, op.cit. , p.9; Manchester Archives M73/3/22, 21/07/16 ; Durham 
RO D/TA3, 1/02/17; ACI1837 of 21/09/16 or VFO No.XVI ; VTC Gazette Vol.4 No.103, 18/11/16, 
p.360; HansardVol.80.1717, 9/03/16; Vol.84 .1602, 25/07/16. 
97 W09/Gen/6189 and ACI1922 of 7/10/16. 
96 Sussex RO TER 8/1 , 20/12/16; Cumbria RO TTAF/2, 26/10/16; VTC Gazette Vol.4 No.107, 
16/12/16, p.26; No.67, 11/03/16, p.228. 
99 ACI No.1652 of 24/08/16 or VFO No. IX; Hansard Vol.81 .2295, 19/04/16. 
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allowed to use a Territorial training ground at Holcombe.100 Nevertheless, facilities at 
most camps remained minimal and comforts extremely limited. Some groups 
organized their own vehicular transport to the sites and opened wet canteens but 
acquiring tents and the means of cooking hot food were often insurmountable 
problems. 101 
Weekend activities were frequently hampered by recreational crowds thronging 
the public parks used as training areas and by a lack of imagination on the part of 
officers.102 There remained opposition in some quarters to Sunday drills and there was 
the genuine difficulty of men attending the weekend sessions if working shifts or long 
hours. Scattered rural corps suffered especially badly. When their men did manage to 
assemble for a company route march, there were complaints of 'piteous formations ', 
with no march discipline straggling through villages and towns. The Fleet Street 
Company of the Corps of Citizens was one of several compelled to drill during daylight 
hours, an elasticity in the means of fulfilling obligations being a prerequisite for the 
survival of many corps. 103 The record of one semi-urban corps was probably typical : its 
128 parades between October 1915 and September 1916 attracted an average 
attendance of well under 50% of its enrolled strength . Bucking hamshire recognized the 
difficulties of its rural formations and ruled that members resident in villages need 
attend only half the drills expected from town dwellers. The lack of variety in drills, the 
ignorance of many officers and NCOs in military matters and the lack of weapons, 
remained strong disincentives to turn out after a long day at work. Appeals for the 
appointment of permanent staff, a feature of the old Volunteer system, went unheard at 
the War Office. 104 
So, too, for most of 1916 did calls for the Government to remove the restrictions 
on the wearing and style of the uniform. In January 1916 it was estimated that about 
50% of enrolled Volunteers had a uniform of some description. More precise figures 
100 M.Yearsley, IWM, op.cit., p.84. When observing the parade of the 'Devil's Own', the strongest corps 
at camp, Yearsley comforted himself by realizing , 'never before had [I] seen so many lawyers doing 
something really useful'; Manchester Archives M73/2/3, 7/07/16. 
101 Keighley Reference Library, 6th Voi.Battalion papers, Bk34/17. Standing Orders for a battalion 
camp during July 1915 warned members that 'in case of any disturbance the canteen will be 
immediately closed ... Owing to the foolish behaviour of one or two individuals the whole battalion 
may suffer'. 
102 T.Murray Ford , Memoirs of Poor Devil, London: A.M . Philpot, 1926, (eg) p.202 is particularly critical • 
of Volunteer officers. 
103 As late as December 1916 a group of Non-Conformist ministers talked of organizing a petition 
against Sunday drill and presenting it to French . VTC Gazette Vol.5 No.1 06, 9/12/16, p.14; No.85 , 
15/07/16, p.111 ; No.91 , 26/08/16, p.201. 
104 Stockport Archives, 01697, DDND, Secretary's Report, 5/10/16; Buckinghamshire RO T/A/1 /13, 
2/11/16; VTC Gazette Vol.4 No.1 03, 18/11/16, p.359. 
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existed for 24 counties and their 80,212 members. It was calculated that 53% of these 
possessed a uniform, the percentage varying from between Oxfordshire's 91% and 
East Yorkshire's 86% to a mere 8% for Cornwall. 105 Those corps which had supplied 
themselves with uniforms before November 1914 continued to dress in their original 
khaki, others wore woollen cloth or a mixture of part wool and part cotton, and some 
adhered to the Central Association's officially sanctioned green suit. To improve this 
chaotic situation the movement wanted the removal , en bloc, of all the limitations and 
prohibitions which had emerged piecemeal and permission for each corps, as had 
been granted to the Rifle Volunteers , to decide upon their own uniform. Regulations 
which insisted cloth and uniforms had to be obtained either from the Army Clothing 
Department or through recognized contractors and made up locally, 106 led to 
accusations of undue government interference and private profiteering at the expense of 
men eager to perform their patriotic duty. 107 Furthermore, the green uniform remained 
almost universally despised. Conan Doyle wrote of it being 'associated with all our 
honourable work', but most Volunteers could not understand why, when even the Boys' 
Brigade was allowed to wear khaki and the old Volunteers had worn infantry scarlet and 
silver buttons, the Government prevented them from parading as soldiers. Some corps 
dyed their green uniforms and although some talked of recruitment being at a standstill 
because potential recruits were either unable or unwilling to buy their own suits , other 
corps had enough money collected or promised to purchase khaki if allowed. 108 
Jonathan Samuel termed it a 'disgrace' that his constituents, living in the 'war zone' of 
the North-East, should be expected to purchase their own suits, and the Hampshire 
Association announced it would decline responsibility for any consequences visited 
upon men made prisoners in clothing not recognized by the enemy.109 Letters to the 
Gazette opined that if Volunteers were considered good enough to release Regulars for 
overseas, they were good enough to wear khaki. If changes were not forthcoming, some 
members threatened to resign or to discard their green uniform and parade in mufti. So 
voluminous did the correspondence become that in October the Gazette's editor 
declared he would publish no more criticalletterS. 110 
H.W.Forster, the War Office's Financial Secretary, employed the usual delaying 
105 H045/272.183 (40). 
108 Stirlingshire Association ruled that no officer or man would be allowed to have his uniform made up 
by his personal tailor. NAS MD6/20, 3/07/17. 
107 HansardVol.87 .17 , 7/11/16. 
106 VTC Gazette Vol.4 No.8?, 29/07/16, p.143; F. lock, op.cit., p.9. 
109 HansardVol.85.155-6, 11/10/16; Hampshire RO 37M69/3, Chairman 's Report, September 1916. 
110 VTC GazetteVol.4 No.92, 2/09/16, p.223; No.100, 28/10/16, p.323. 
tactics and responded to questions about uniform and equipment with a stock answer 
that everything remained under consideration . Eventually, in December 1916 when the 
whole Volunteer issue was again undergoing a radical review, a previously 
unsuspected ACI permitted Volunteers to wear regulation style service dress made 
from 'serge Volunteer Force'. 111 The concession was received with both acclamation 
and cynicism: it was viewed as a justified yet long deferred recognition of the Volunteer 
Force's value and, at the same time, as a War Office acknowledgement that events on 
the Western Front were forcing it reluctantly to seek assistance from an organization 
which it had hitherto tried hard to ignore. 
Allowing Volunteers to wear service dress was not the great panacea which 
many members had anticipated . Restrictions on when it could be worn continued in 
place and for those corps who could not afford to buy their own uniforms, the problem of 
raising sufficient funds for day to day expenses had not altered. Committees ran whist 
drives and organized flag days, appealed to local worthies and raised what they could 
from subscriptions. Some chose to invest their money in short term securities while 
others did sufficiently well from their own immediate sources they could afford not to 
make public appeals.112 Surprisingly, in another unexpected announcement, Forster told 
the House that as the Volunteer Force was designated solely for home defence, it would 
not be inappropriate for local bodies to provide financial assistance. 113 Unfortunately, 
because payments from some local authorities and publicly run organizations still 
required the sanction of the Local Government Board, the legal position was not quite 
as simple as Forster's statement implied. City councils such as Leeds, which had 
recently given its corps £2000, could legally award money and Bradford, with its special 
Act of Parliament, had already spent £3650 on its Volunteers. But, Poor Law Guardians 
and Urban District Councils were not entitled to give grants. The loop hole by which 
town councils 'paid' their mayor was widely exploited but the UDCs had no mayors and 
were prevented from awarding their chairmen a purse or a salary. Nevertheless, some 
had been allowing the use of their land and others were thought to be making 
surreptitious and illegal payments directly to corpS.114 The movement, of course, wanted 
the Government to award even a token capitation grant as an encouragement to 
recruitment but, in the autumn of 1916, such a move remained far.Jrom the 
111 ACI No.2417 of 23/12/16. 
112 See, for example: Gloucester RO 04277/6, 24/01/16; Keighley Reference Library, BK34/22 , 
September 1916; NAS MD7/38, 15/12/16; NAS MDS/22, 24/10/16. 
113 Hansard Vol.87.16-17, 7/11/16. 
11 ~ VTC Gazette Vol.4 No.93, 9/09/16, p.228. 
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Government's agenda. However, the 800 UDCs discovered that if the Military Lands Act, 
1903, by which municipal county councils had acquired land for the Rifle Volunteers , 
was extended to cover UDCs, they too could help the Volunteer Force . Pressure for an 
order in council grew, and in late October, Walter Long announced that he was prepared 
to entertain applications from local authorities under the Local Authorities (Expenses) 
Act, 1887, to the payment of reasonable contributions to assist the Volunteers. 115 The 
principal credit for achieving this significant concession went to Percy Harris. Despite 
opposition from Thomas Gibson Bowles, an established politician , Harris had won the 
Parliamentary by-election for Market Harborough in March and subsequently took his 
seat as the 'Volunteers' Friend' .116 The importance of Harris's work and of the 
Government's decision were seen immediately: dozens of UDCs awarded grants, 
permitted the use of their council buildings and allowed the development of their land 
for the benefit of the Volunteers .117 These moves did ease the financial positions of 
many corps and money which had been spent on keeping the companies in existence, 
could in rural areas, for example, now be spent on travelling expenses for sergeant 
instructors and paying for occasional battalion parades.118 It also meant that 
commandants who, like their National Reserve counterparts in earlier years, had spent 
considerable sums of their own money or personally guaranteed corps' overdrafts , 
could now reclaim their outlay.119 
These gradual, and apparently grudging , concessions were granted piecemeal 
but they were, in fact, part of a developing and formulating government plan . If the 
Volunteers were ever to be of any practical use, regulations which allowed members to 
leave with 14 days' notice clearly had to be rescinded . From October onwards , various 
hints that the issue was about to be addressed were being dropped by leading figures 
within the administration and the military hierarchy. Lloyd George spoke of change 
being on the way and Bethune mentioned the possibility of the force being split into two 
sections, one more efficient and active than the other.120 Sir John French had also been 
suggesting the Government would demand a quid pro quo on the part of the movement 
115 Long 's announcement was published in the VTC Gazette Vol.4 No.1 01, 4/11/16, p.325. 
116 Harris, who had been defeated on two previous occasions in 1906 and 1910, was officially a 
Liberal. However, he also stood partly as a VTC candidate, referring to the movement in his election 
addresses. He defeated Gibson Bowes, who had been a Conservative MP between 1892-1906 and a 
Liberal between 1906-1 0, with a majority of over 4000. 
11 7 See VTC Gazette Vol.4 No.1 04, 25/11/16, p.36. 
116 In some counties , officers and instructors had to pay their own fares when travelling to out-lying 
stations. This meant the scattered platoons were not visited as often as they should have been. 
119 Durham RO D/TA/3, letter to War Office, 2/02/17. 
120 VTC Gazette Vol.4 No.99, 21/10/16, p.302. Lloyd George in an answer to Jonathan Samuel 
(Stockton) and Bethune to the Edinburgh Volunteers on 9/10/16. 
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if it in turn was prepared to arm, finance and equip them. The Gazette carried a lengthy 
editorial which talked of 'drastic changes' and thought that a Bill whereby Volunteers 
would agree to serve for the duration in return for government assistance had already 
been drafted. Lord Harewood told the West Riding Territorial Association that French 
had recently remarked, 'the time is coming .. .when we should have to depend entirely for 
the defence of this country from invasion on the Volunteer Force'. This suggestion 
appeared to be confirmed a few days later when General Sir Frank Lloyd told the City of 
London Volunteers 'a great future awaited' them. 121 
The speculation was not misplaced. A draft Bill had indeed been drawn up by the 
end of the second week of November and was circulated to Cabinet members a few 
days later. Lloyd George had received no comments upon it by the time Cabinet next 
met and he proposed to introduce it to Parliament 'probably one day next week'. Lord 
Derby had nothing further to say about the draft some days later except, rather 
pessimistically, that although the Bill's purpose was to allow the freeing of some 
Regular troops for overseas posting, he did not entertain 'any great hope of being able 
to do much in this direction' .122 
Much of the encouraging talk about new legislation and a seemingly more 
positive attitude towards the Volunteer Force was undoubtedly the result of French's 
personal enthusiasm for the movement and his belief that a greater responsibility for 
the defence of the British Isles would inevitably soon fall upon its shoulders. Lord Derby 
and later Lloyd George were both more prepared to view the Volunteers' potential as an 
asset than had their predecessor at the War Office. Furthermore, official support for the 
movement was again apparent at a conference of Lords Lieutenant and County 
Commandants, attended by Derby and French at County Hall in October, where the 
issue of the 14 days' notice was aired freely on all sides.123 In a circular sent two days 
after the meeting, Bethune asked County Commandants to suggest what Volunteers 
might be prepared to do in return for extra grants. He wanted to know how the 
movement might react to the authorities' idea that a man should be expected to perform 
20 drills in his first eight weeks and ten per month once he had passed an efficiency 
test. 124 A later circular to Lords Lieutenant indicated that the War Office was prepared , 
'under certain circumstances to arm and equip' Volunteers in retur.n for guarantees that 
members should undergo a medical and agree to perform an agreed number of drills 
121 /bid., No.98, 14/10/16, p.288; No.100, 28/10/16, p.314; No.102, 11/11/16, p.343 and p.346. 
122 CAB 37/159/35, 25/11/16; CAB 42/26/4, 30/11/16. 
123 W0161/108. 
124 9NF/194 (TF2) of 21/10/16. Found in W032/18566, Conditions of Service in the Volunteer Force. 
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for the duration. The object of the circular was: 
.. . to give effect to the desire so often expressed by the Volunteers themselves that they 
shall be definitely incorporated in the Defensive Forces of this country, and in return 
receive pecuniary assistance from the Government. 125 
French, too, had been increasing Volunteers' expectations. During his regular 
Sunday addresses to Volunteer parades he repeatedly told his audiences the 
'ridiculous ' and 'mischievous' rumours' that the Volunteers were not wanted had to be 
dispelled 'once and for all' . His constant theme was to warn the movement that it 
should 'look forward to the day' when the defence of the country would be 'entirely 
entrusted' to them.126 He invariably explained , however, that in return for arms and 
equipment, the Volunteers would have to reciprocate . 
The Gazette regarded French as a keen supporter and friend, calling him the 
movement's 'recruiter-in-chief' and devoting a whole page to him in tribute when the C-
in-C was laid up in bed . The movement as a whole also appreciated his enthusiasm , 
bluntness and the manner in which he addressed them as soldiers, seeming to take 
the men into his confidence. He still proclaimed invasion was no 'impossibility', 
warning against imagining it as a 'fable or fairy tale', but repeatedly reassured the 
membership that unless or until it occurred, their private interests and avocations would 
not be threatened or jeopardized.127 
The C-in-C's interest in the Volunteers was partly the result of his concern over 
the state of some coastal defences and also his determination to send every fit man to 
France. He was growing happier with the defences on the Thames and Medway and 
acknowledged the Northern Army was improving its efficiency and organization. 128 
Nevertheless, French knew that the regular removal of trained men for foreign service 
would inevitably result in a heavier dependence on the Volunteers. With this in mind, his 
Sunday tours of the provinces were targetted at preparing the movement for its future 
responsibility. He excused the paucity of Volunteer rifles on Britain's industry having to 
supply not only the British Expeditionary Force but also the armies of the Allies , and 
promised the men grenades and machine guns in abundance once the problems with 
munitions production had been resolved. He appeased their frustrations by assuring · 
125 9NF/194 (TF2) of 24/10/16. Ibid. 
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them that the King valued the Volunteers as much as any other arm of the Crown 's 
services129 but French realized that unless he could depend upon an adequately trained 
and armed Volunteer Force, the continued denudation of his Regular and Territorial 
troops would leave the shores perhaps fataly exposed . The strident warnings of the 
possibility of invasion were aimed for public consumption and as a means of providing 
a sense of purpose to the movement but, in truth , French took succour from the findings 
of the invasion conference between representatives of the Admiralty and War Office 
which, in August, came to the same conclusion as the investigation which had sat 
earlier in the year. The report's breakdown of available troops made no specific mention 
of Volunteers but the conference believed that while the Germans were heavily engaged 
on the Somme and on the Eastern Front, it simply did not have the manpower to attempt 
an invasion; if the naval and military situation changed in the enemy's favour, it was 
estimated the Germans could probably assemble a force of about 160,000 troops.130 
While the Somme ground on, therefore, the country was safe but, in the mean time 
troops serving with the Provisional brigades and _the second line Territorial divisions 
would continue to be withdrawn to fuel the overseas campaigns. 
French did have a genuine regard and sympathy for the part time auxiliary. His 
diary refers regularly to his admiration at their appearance, spirit and resilience : 'The 
more I see of them ... the more impressed I become with their value for home defence'; 
'their energy, zeal and soldier-like bearing ... won my deepest admiration . I feel sure they 
will prove to be a most valuable force' .131 French enlisted the support of Lord Northcliffe 
by inviting him to accompany him on a tour of inspection in mid-November, and he 
talked warmly of their potential to George Von at least one occasion .132 One of his 
typically encouraging speeches which suggested changes were being considered was 
addressed to a gathering of Northamptonshire Volunteers: 
The time will shortly come when the Government will be able to do much towards 
supplying your wants and placing you in an efficient condition .. . [Referring to the 14 days' 
notice] Knowing the chequered history of the movement, nobody, and you least of all, 
will be surprised to hear that in return the Government will demand a pledge of 
continued service until the end of the war ... We are not all constituted in the same way: 
some are weaker, some are stronger and under that tremendous stress it cannot be 
doubted there are people who might be inclined to give way and take advantage of tlie 
terms of their agreement. .. I am certain that if I asked any of you whether you were going 
129 Times, 20/11/16. 
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to leave in the course of the war you would indignantly deny it. You would even feel 
insulted .. . You must remember war is a very hard school , and it is very difficult to get to 
the depths of any individual man's patriotism until he has been tried in the fi re of that 
stern discipline without which any armed force is useless.133 
The Inns of Court Reserve Corps debated this and other speeches and , in the 
democratic manner which remained a feature of many corps, voted unanimously to 
accept, if ever it became a requirement, service for the duration in return for arms.134 
The War Office too was doing its part to convince the Volunteers that its attitude 
was changing. A report intended as a press release, full of self justification for not 
having earlier done more for the force, was prepared in October. Claiming that the 
country had never fully appreciated the potential damage to army recruiting official 
support for the VTC might have caused, it explained the Government's change of mind 
in November 1914 as a desire to shame younger men into joining either the Regular 
Army or the Volunteers; the sight of older men drilling was thought to be enough to 
embarrass these 'shirkers' to enlist. Its intention of developing the movement was 
evidenced by its willingness to allow the formation of the county regiments and in the 
encouragement it gave to distinguished soldiers such as General Sir Richard Harrison 
and General Sir J.H.Wodehouse to take an active part in the VTC. But, of course, it had 
the national well-being to consider and the prudence and priority which it displayed 
prevented the authorities from giving the movement financial assistance. The report 
stressed that the Government, unlike some contemporary cynics, had never doubted 
that the membership would accept the provisions of the 1863 Act because it understood 
and empathized with the spirit that inspired the force. The paper finished with a 
sweeping assertion that none of Britain's enemies were capable of organizing such a 
valuable force independently of the state. So confident was the War Office in its past and 
present policies with regard to the Volunteers, 'the issue of the war cannot be much in 
doubt' .135 
French's speech at the Lord Mayor's banquet in November once again praised 
the force for its 'zealous ardour' and , following his later visit to Manchester, queues of 
would-be Volunteers revived memories of scenes in the city two years earlier when men 
waited to join the New Army battalions.136 After Lloyd George had r eferred to 'this 
133 Northampton Independent, 20/11/16. 
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admirable body' and expressed the opinion that a better use could soon be made of it,137 
corps up and down the country were reported to be discussing and already accepting 
the provisions of a Bill, the announcement of which was daily expected. The Gazette 
speculated that when it came, the Bill itself would be short, entailing only the repeal of 
the section in the 1863 Act which permitted the 14 days' notice of resignation and its 
replacement with service for the duration; other important points could come later with 
the publication of a new set of regulations. Bethune's address at Newcastle offered the 
first public announcement the authorities were expecting a Volunteer to perform an 
initial programme of 20 drills, followed by ten per month to maintain the skills acquired . 
They would would also have to be of C1 medical category, capable of marching five 
miles with a 431b pack. 138 
In addition to his public appearances and encouraging statements, behind the 
scenes French had been giving further consideration to the possible advantages to be 
gained from granting the movement improved status and recognition . In the preamble to 
a scheme for their future employment, French in~isted that any increased funding and 
deployment would have to show a gain to the State either in the prospective release of 
men for overseas or in provision for reinforcing the Home Defence forces. In a less than 
entirely fair assessment, French wrote of how efforts to persuade the Volunteers to 
accept permanent duties and responsibilities 'before an emergency occurs' had 'met 
without any appreciable success', and warned that any attempt to force such liability on 
battalions coud lead to resignations and the disbanding of units. On the other hand , 
French believed that if battalions were allocated specific tasks, the majority of 
Volunteers would accept the need to perform drills and sign for the duration. Acutely 
aware of the need to keep battalions as close to their territorial origins as possible, the 
C-in-C HF outlined their potential deployment. Priority for arms and equipment should 
go to those battalions earmarked for coast defence and the protection of London. The 
physical defences were prepared and the men only needed to know precisely where 
they would be sent. French wanted to attach either one or two battalions of Volunteers to 
each brigade of the Home Forces and suggested that as they became more efficient, 
Volunteers might be able actually to replace some of the units within those brigades. 
Although he placed a lower priority on protecting the lines of communication , French · 
was concerned over the inadequate number of men currently guarding the railways . The 
accepted minimum during an emergency was 15 men to each mile of track. As the ROC 
137 Hansard Vol.88.508, 30/11/16. 
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did not have the manpower to furn ish the required number of guards, they would have to 
be supplemented by Volunteers . French also raised again an earlier scheme whereby 
all railwaymen serving the East Coast zone should be enroled as Volunteers and 
brought under military control. He also wanted a decision on whether key Post Office 
telegraph and telephone personnel should be forced to enrol. Like the railmen , they 
were specialist and would only need a uniform to give them protection as belligerents.139 
Bethune considered French's priority scheme to be wasteful of time and money. 
Instead, he proposed that one company in each battalion should comprise the most 
reliable and best trained and equipped men; this would save the expense of equipping 
a whole battalion, the majority of whose men might be of questionable dependability 
and efficiency. Disregarding the significance of communal pride and commitment which 
had driven many of the men to enrol , Bethune suggested that should an emergency 
arose, the most reliable company in each battalion could be amalgamated with those 
from other units.140 The Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff (DCIGS) , Major-
General R.D.Whigham, considered Bethune's s~heme to be hopelessly complicated 
and drew up his own tentative proposals as to how the Volunteers might be employed. 
His paper was sent by the Director of Staff Duties DSD) to GHQ Home Forces several 
days later. The plan outlined a force of about 150,000 Volunteers , divided between 
those who would be used to bring the Home Forces up to the equivalent of nine 
divisions, and those to be utilized on lines of communication . At least 47 ,000 efficient 
men resident near or on the East Coast were to be deployed swiftly to augment the 
Home Army, 60,000 used alongside the ROC on the roads and railways , and the 
remainder deployed as a general reserve behind the coast. Whigham echoed French's 
earlier advocation of the enrolment of railmen and other indispensible specialists in 
separate classes but, he also suggested the authorities should not for the present 
press too far the principle of Volunteers releasing Regular troops. He did think several 
full-time 'Service' battalions might be raised from 'leisured' men and those over military 
age who would 'be glad to avail themselves of such an opportunity'. The DCIGS 
presumably believed that if the military age was in the future to be extended , these men 
would already have received some training. The suggestion again underlined how little 
the War Office understood the commerical and occupational difficl:llties and pressure's 
confronting most Volunteers . This lack of appreciation of the Volunteer mind was again 
demonstrated by Whigham's understandable, yet less than politically adriot assertion , 
139 W032/18567, Scheme for the employment and allottment of the Volunteer Corps, 1/11/16. 
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that the movement's organization must be founded on efficiency rather than on its 
existing territorial basis. 141 
French seized upon the DCIGS's insensitivity to denounce the scheme. He 
declared that the 'destruction ' of the movement's territorial basis would decrease rather 
than increase efficiency and that even if the suggested 'Service' battalions could be 
raised , they would offer no financial or operational advantages over the existing system. 
With more than one eye on the possible political implications of the DCIGS's scheme, 
French's arguments held sway. His staff submitted a slightly amended plan for the 
Volunteers' allottment, stressing that the scheme must remain provisional until it was 
known how many men would both accept the conditions about to be heard in the House 
and pass the intended medical examination.142 
By means of a November memo, almost servile in tone, the War Office had 
managed to secure sceptical Treasury sanction for the expansion of the Force. The 
paper emphasized how useful the Volunteers were, and how their expansion would 
allow more troops to be posted overseas and ot~ers returned to civil employment. Its 
fawning conclusion suggested that, 'In view of the large savings in men and money 
accruing from any such schemes of substitution ... their Lordships will find no difficulty in 
giving their consent' .143 Consent was given, but not before a Treasury official with an 
obvious sympathy for the Volunteers' past treatment at the hands of the Army Council , 
had cast doubts on the War Office's sincerity in promising to return the 'very costly' 
home defence soldier to civilian life. He calculated that, excluding arms and equipment, 
it would cost nearly £400,000 to meet the War Office's proposals. He therefore wanted 
the military authorities to give a definite assurance that they would release troops, 
especially older soldiers of, for example the ROC, who were in receipt of various 
allowances, and a statement about how many others could be sent abroad .144 
The months of agitation, public speculation and inter-departmental consultation , 
141 9NF/212 ($02) of 11/11/16. The paper is signed by Brigadier-General W.D. Bird , the DSD, but it 
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ended with the Bill 's introduction to the Lords and with its Second Reading on 30 
November 1916. Lord Derby explained that by their patriotism and energy the Volunteers 
had attained a pitch of efficiency which enabled them now to be accepted as 'part and 
parcel' of the defensive forces of the crown. If that was to be the case, the Government 
needed to be able to rely upon them on all occasions and be sure that their efficiency 
was maintained. They would not be expected to leave their employment or locality 
unless invasion was deemed imminent and all employers were urged to encourage 
their eligible men to enrol. In return for signing for the duration, a Volunteer would , after 
performing 40 drills to become efficient, be uniformed and equipped. He would then be 
expected to do another ten drills per month , be free of organic disease and be fit 
enough for garrison work at home. When efficient, a £2 grant would be paid to a man's 
Territorial association . The associations were to retain the administration of the county 
regiments and each of their battalion was to have a paid, full-time adjutant, sergeant-
major and colour-sergeant. When finally moving the Bill, Derby warned against any 
attempt by either the Lords or Commons to modify it, especially in regard to the required 
number of monthly drills.145 
French spoke in favour of the Bill and in favour of the movement. 146 His personal 
knowledge of the state of the scores of battalions he had inspected, of the men's 
motivation, the months of weekend digging and the regular guarding of vulnerable 
points, had already allowed him, he said, to sanction a slight reduction in the 
establishment of the ROC. He praised the dedication and service of Britain 's principal 
auxiliary, the Territorial Force, and predicted it would 'ill become us as a nation to repeat 
the mistakes we made some 40 or 50 years ago, when we held lightly the use and 
value of large bodies of Volunteers' . 147 He spoke of his work in convincing the 
membership that they were needed and appreciated and of how he hoped an efficient 
force would be able to relieve yet more men for overseas service. 
Welcoming the Bill on behalf of the movement, Lord Desborough said Volunteers 
would be willing to abandon their right to give 14 days' notice, but foresaw difficulties in 
getting men in rural districts to perform the stipulated number of drills and suggested 
the creation of a second class of Volunteer who would still do 'valuable work' but be 
allowed a reduced attendance. The Duke of Rutland , speaking for ·he Territorial 
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associations, also thought it would be difficult for men working long hours and in 
scattered battalions to attend the required drills. Other speakers, notably Lord Harris, 
the Marquis of Lincolnshire and the Duke of Norfolk, congratulated Derby on the Bill and 
looked forward to Volunteers becoming uniformed in khaki , armed, fully equipped and 
able to take on responsibility for guarding many of the factories and lines of 
communication currently protected by serving soldiers.148 
The Gazette was jubilant. It thought the 40 drills 'strong but not unreasonable', 
the medical requirements and the £2 grant 'reasonable' and permission to wear khaki , 
of 'universal satisfaction'. The Bill was 'momentous' and ensured that neglect of the 
movement was now a 'thing of the past'. The change of government was not thought to 
present a handicap to the Bill's progress for both Lloyd George and Derby, as, 
respectively, Secretary and Under Secretary of State, had been intimately involved in its 
drafting, a theory proven correct when the Bill passed to the Commons on 15 
December. 149 The new Under Secretary, lan Macpherson, recapped Derby's earlier 
arguments and described the object purely as an Enabling Bill. It would empower the 
Army Council to invite Volunteers to enter into agreements, to which they would be 
'strictly' held, for the duration; any breach would involve military penalties and fines . He 
announced a modification to the number of drill required for a man to become efficient 
to 14, but the rest of the provisions remained as presented by Derby in the Lords. 
Rather extravagantly, Macpherson also claimed the War Office had always 'very fully' 
recognized the movement's potential, 150 but while welcoming the Bill , Colonel Yate , one 
of the movement's strongest supporters, could not resist remarking that the force would 
have been considerably stronger if the Government had listened to advice and 
responded to their potential at least a year earlier. 151 Colonel Sir H.Greenwood went a 
little further by describing the Bill as a 'measure of justice that should have 
been ... [awarded] one and a-half or two years ago' .152 He predicted difficulties for men 
attempting to fulfil their quota of drills, an opinion shared by many contemporary letters 
to the Gazette which accused the Bill of defeating its own object. Correspondents 
thought members would not walk for miles to attend drills and officers would not have 
the time to hold several of them on different days in scattered areas. 153 
During the Bill 's third reading Jonathan Samuel complained .. that the £2 grant 
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was inadequate yet, in contrast, Sir George Agness, himself a Volunteer, thought 30 
shillings would be sufficient and if it was not, members should do what they had 
traditionally done and seek funds from those communities they protected .154 Percy 
Harris, who had not been present during the second reading , used the opportunity to 
make a lengthy justification of the movement's existence in the face of two years' of 
government denial , and an explanation of how and why the authorities were now keen to 
foster its development.155 The speech was an attempt to pacify and reassure those 
members who still believed the War Office was really only tolerating the force and an 
appeal to those men who had left in frustration to return . He wanted at least one million 
men to attest and emphasized they could be employed more cheaply than the B3 and 
C1 men then being called up for home service. It would be of greater benefit to the 
country if those men were returned to agriculture and industry and Volunteers directed to 
take on more of the duties done by the ROC. Harris had 'great hopes' that with the 'new 
blood' at the War Office the force would receive a more sympathetic and cooperative 
administration. He told the Letchworth Volunteers .a few days later, 'the British Volunteer 
movement will be be the turning point of the war, in as much as it will enable the last 
man and the last rifle and gun to be sent to the front'. 156 
The Bill received the Royal Assent on 22 December and during the next five 
months, as new regulations were published, the force's new structure emerged . 
Volunteers were not required to undertake guard duties but if they did accept the tasks, 
as the Government intended they would , they fell under military law. It was hoped the 
new Act would entice many suitable men who had never joined and those who had 
previously left to join or return. The number of pure volunteers , as opposed to those who 
had been sent by the tribunals, had certainly declined sharply and some corps were still 
described as being on the 'verge of collapse' .157 At least one corps' historian thought the 
Act put the 'nebulous and semi-official life' to an end , and another welcomed the 
recognition which had, it recorded, been achieved through its 'perseverance and 
imperviousness to ridicule'.158 Yet, not all were pleased . The revised regulations were 
still to come but one member complained of already 'growing sick of the invidious and 
insulting' regulations, claiming the movement was in danger of becoming 'snowed 
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under by piecemeal regulations as thick as leaves in Vallambrosa'.159 The War Office 
was confident that despite protests by some, the spirit within the movement remained 
strong and that with positive nurturing and , with the addition of an increasing number of 
men sent by the tribunals, it could achieve its object of using an efficient, and above all a 
reliable and disciplined body of Volunteers in place of men who it could more profitably 
use on the Western Front. 
159 VTC GazetteVol.5 No.111 , 13/01/17, p.83. 
CHAPTER X: NOT SO MUCH VOLUNTEERS 
During the course of 1917 the Volunteer Force was to undergo profound changes in 
character and composition. The transition had begun in 1916 with the coming of 
conscription and the appearance of the military tribunals; in 1917, the impact of these 
developments provided the driving force for a major reorganization and reclassification 
of the movement. These changes were designed to shape, utilize and discipline the 
growing number of members who had joined not by their own volition but because they 
were obliged to. The influx of what amounted to a flood of often reluctant conscripts was 
a phenomenon which many of the original Volunteers resented, and they resigned in 
significant numbers. Those who remained out of loyalty to their comrades or duty to their 
country were compelled to drill and train with men whose reason for membership was 
often diametrically opposed to theirs. The originals continued to worry about their own 
efficiency, finance and potential use, while their new comrades were frequently more 
concerned about performing a stipulated number of drills to avoid having their 
exemption certificate withdrawn . 
The contentious question of who should or should not join the Volunteers had , of 
course, been raised continually since the Volunteer Training Corps (VTC) were fi rst 
established . The initial War Office recognition in November 1914 had come with 
conditions, notably the insistence that all men of military age should have an acceptable 
reason for not joining the army. Gradually the demands of total war necessitated more 
extensive government involvement in the field of manpower resources and certain 
occupations were starred or badged: the younger men in these starred occupations 
became the target for VTC recruiters. As many were already accustomed to giving and 
receiving drill, recruits from the teaching profession, one of the earliest occupations to 
be badged, were especially prized, but within the clergy there was early controversy 
between those sections who thought they should become involved in the movement 
and those who believed the Churches should stand aloof.1 
There was also concern within the ranks of the Civil Service. Huge numbers of 
Territorials and National Reservists working in local and central government, as well as 
fellow employees with no previous military experience, had enlisj ed at the start of the 
1 VF Gazette, Vol.1 No.6, 9/01/15, p.89; The Bishop of Colchester thought clergy should join 
ambulance sections, whereas the Bishop of Winchester believed the church should only go as far as 
allowing the use of church halls. VF Gazette Vol.1 No.15, 13/03/15, p.271 . 
war. The resultant shortages in staffing caused government departments to impose a 
strict regime by which only those whose managers could spare them were allowed to 
go. A Cabinet memo was circulated later to establish a similar procedure for those 
wishing to join the VTC. It suggested that Rule 1 should be modified so that the head of 
a man's department would be asked by the War Office if he could spare him . As it was 
widely believed that Rule 7 would not actually be enforced within the Civil Service, the 
decision was made to allow civil servants within the principal departments to enrol in a 
VTC if they first obtained permission from their departmental head. This ruling does not 
seem to have immediately percolated down to the lower tiers of management for, in late 
February, an official in the Board of Trade informed his staff they would not be permitted 
to join a VTC. In Scotland , a retired major had earlier suggested that civil servants in 
Dundee who were not allowed to enlist in the army should combine to form their own 
VTC, while in London the corps which certainly attracted a good proportion of civil 
servants was the Old Boys. Staff at the Inland Revenue appear to have formed a 
separate corps of about 800 men. When asked how the department would function if 
800 employees were suddenly called away to meet the threat of invasion, a 
Commissioner replied the 'matter was so far from anybody's mind that it had not been 
considered.' Once the issue had been raised, and in case Rule 7 was in the end to be 
applied, the Treasury decided that in general only those of its officers not of military age 
should be allowed to join a corps. Other cases were to be considered individually on 
merit. 2 
In March 1915 Walter Runciman, President of the Board of Trade, endorsed a 
memo from within his department which called for clarification from the Committee of 
Imperial Defence (CID) and an assurance that civil servants of military age joining a 
corps would not be forced by the appliance of Rule 7 to enlist in the army. He wanted the 
CID to acknowledge that if the VTC were ever called out, the small military gain of 
allowing his civil servants to go would be entirely outweighed by the resultant 
disorganization of the War Office, Admiralty, General Post Office, Customs and Excise 
and the Board of Trade. The memo further sought guarantees that any civil servant in a 
VTC must accept that he had not been released from his 'paramount obligation' to his 
department and that even in an emergency, the department would retain first call on his 
services. If these guarantees were met, the department would bEi prepared to allow its 
members to enrol. In reply, the Secretary to the CID, M.P.A.Hankey, suggested that if the 
2 CAB37/122/184, 8/12/14; BT13/60/7, 5/12/14; BT13/63/11 , 29/01/15; BT13/60/7, 25/02/15; NAS 
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matter could not be resolved inter-departmentally, it was, in fact , an issue for the War 
Office and not the CID.3 
There was similar early confusion in other trades and industries, notably those 
involving the running of the railways . Some pitmen and railway workers alleged their 
companies were forbidding, or strongly discouraging, them from joining a VTC. Their 
employers apparently argued that rather than parading and drilling when off shift, the 
men could better aid the war effort by resting at home. 4 In time, the Government would 
attempt to clarify and regularize the position of key workers and the VTC but, whilst there 
was confusion about the legal status and degree of Government recognition , some 
corps certainly struggled for numbers. Until late 1915, all members were genuine 
volunteers but by the end of the year a new type of member, albeit still having joined on 
his own volition, began drilling with those originals who had despite the brick bats, 
remained loyal to the movement. 
The appearance of those men who had attested their willingness to serve under 
the Derby scheme was seen by many corps as the means of expanding their 
membership and, more importantly, of making a clear demonstration that they were 
fulfilling one of their essential roles as organizations in which men could receive 
preliminary military training. Unsurprisingly, almost as soon as the scheme was 
launched, corps announced they would be willing to train the Derby men, a proposal 
which was accepted in a letter to the Central Association by the Adjutant-General (AG) , 
Major-General Sir Hugh Sclater. To attract these potential new members some corps 
declared they would not be required to pay subscriptions, some held 'smokers' and 
others promised Derby men separate shooting competitions. Percy Harris was later to 
propose that the Government should require all Derby attesters to join a local corps but 
such a policy would probably have overwhelmed the corps for the influx of voluntary 
Derby men was sufficient to stretch severely the demand for instructors. 5 
Harris' call for compulsory membership of attested men was endorsed by others. 
Conan Doyle thought it was the only way to make the men recognize their duty and take 
3 BT13/63/11 , 2/03/15 and CAB2/3, Minutes of CID, 23/02/15. The issue of allowing civil servants to 
enlist in the army rumbled on into 1916. A spate of correspondence in The Times prompted the 
newspaper to publish an official return of those who were technically able to serve still working in each 
government department. It remained a sensitive and critical subject. Times, 25/06/16. 
4 The secretary of the Doncaster VTC wrote to the Central Association complaining of the 'most 
illogical' decision whereby railway companies were 'forbidding, or at least strongly discouraging' their 
employees to join. Letter of 16/03/15, E.J.Martin, 'VTC 1914-1918', IWM Dept. of Printed Books. 
5 VF Gazette Vol.2 No.52, 27/11/15, p.403; E.Potton (ed), A Record of the United Arts Rifles 1914-
1919, London: Alex Maring, p.17; VF Gazette Vol.3 No.69, 25/03/16, p.258, No.71 , 8/04/16, p.292, 
No.60, 22/01/16, p.123; Keighley Reference Library BK34/17. 
250 
their training seriously. It is known that at least one branch of an organization called the 
Union of Derby Recruits announced they had no wish to train with the VTC but in many 
corps the original members appear to have been swamped or, had at least the 
composition greatly altered , by the enrolment of the Derby attesters. Precise numbers 
are rare but in one company of the Kent Fencibles, 53 of the 68 members were 
apparently men attested under the Derby scheme and in the Keighley Battalion , 45% of 
the nearly 1 000 members had similarly registered their agreement to serve.6 
The appearance of the Derby men caused a fall in the average age of many 
corps' membership. In 1916, the introduction of compulsory military service also led to 
another influx of younger men. However, unlike their voluntary Derby colleagues, many 
of these men had no desire to be members and were directed to the VTC by military 
tribunals working under the provisions of the Military Service Act. Tribunals had been 
created following the introduction of the Derby scheme but a new set of regulations 
provided for important differences between the originals and the later ones designed to 
operate within the system of compulsion. Tribunals were now to be of a judicial nature, 
possessing the power to make decisions rather than merely recommendations . As the 
War Office had been critical of the Derby tribunals' practice of exempting attested men 
on dubious, or what it considered to be frivolous grounds, the new versions were to 
more clearly represent the authorities' wishes. Military Representatives were to be 
appointed who, although instructed not to ride roughshod over legitimate local 
employment concerns, would closely examine all proposed cases of exemption . 
Under the revised regulations an individual could claim exemption if his 
employment was considered to be of national importance, for reasons of ill-health or 
infirmity, on grounds of conscientious objection , or if he could prove that military service 
would jeopardize his business or domestic responsibilities . If a tribunal was convinced 
that a man's deferment was in the national interest it could grant either absolute, 
conditional or temporary exemption .7 
Predictably, there was much initial uncertainty about how the tribunals would 
6 Times, 20/03/16; VF Gazette Vol.3 No. 59, 15/01/16, p.1 01 . 
7 Most work on the tribunal system has concentrated on the narrow issue of conscientious objection . 
See, for example, J.Rae, Conscience and Politics: The British Government and the Conscientious 
Objector to Military Service, 1916-19, Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1969; T.C. Kennedy, The Hound 
of Conscience: A History of the Non-Conscription Fellowship, Fayetteville: University of Kentucky 
Press, 1981 and K.Robbins, 'The British Experience of Conscientious Objection', in H. Cecil and 
P.Liddle , Facing Armageddon, London: Leo Cooper, 1996, pp.691 -706. For how the tribunals 
functioned in their day-to-day business and their impact on local communities, see K.W .Mitchinson , 
Saddleworth 1914-1919: The Experience of a Pennine Community during the Great War, 
Saddleworth: SHS, 1995, pp.56-66 and K.R.Grieves , 'Military Tribunal Papers: The Case of Leek 
Tribunal in the First World War', Archives, 16, 1983, pp.145-50. 
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operate and how they would interpret the exemption regulations Of immediate concern 
to the leadership of the Volunteer Force was the question of whether men brought 
before the tribunals should be merely encouraged or compelled to join their local 
Volunteers as a condition of their exemption . As the Government, too, was at first 
uncertain, many tribunals took the matter into their own hands and made joining a 
Volunteer group an obligation for exempted men. Once one tribunal in an area had 
begun the practice, others tended to follow suit. In the early weeks, men from two 
tribunals were reported to be 'readily' and 'willingly accepting ' the stipulation . However, 
this apparent acceptance of their lot was, in the case of many tribunal men , to be very 
short-lived. 8 
The introduction of conscription also gave the Volunteers the opportunity again to 
demonstrate their public worth . Amidst more calls for clarification about who should be 
allowed , encouraged or compelled to join, Percy Harris used the conscription debate to 
publicize the work already done by the Volunteers and outline their future potential. The 
Earl of Ronaldshay, for example, advocated that of those of military age, only men who 
had already attested or who had been rejected by the army should be permitted to enrol , 
.. 
and Alan Sykes MP, a strong supporter of the movement, wanted a Government ruling 
on whether munitions workers and rail men were eligible to enrol under the 1863 Act. 
Government spokesmen usually responded to these questions and points with the 
familiar statement that everything remained under consideration.9 
Doubts about the legality of compelling men to enrol in the Volunteer Force as a 
condition of exemption persisted during the summer months. Although most tribunals 
accepted the 'reasonableness' of the Central Associations suggestion that exemption 
should be conditional on enrolment, Walter Long , as President of the Local Government 
Board (LGB) , had finally to issue a circular in July explaining the position . Ruling that 
men could only be exempted on grounds of their trade or occupation, he did , 
nevertheless, believe it was 'reasonable to require' exempted men either to join the 
Volunteers, become a Special Constable or assist the local fire service. The War Office 
decided that as the circular's explanation was unambiguous, the matter of compelling 
men to enrol was entirely at the discretion of the tribunals and it could not, even when 
approached for guidance or appeal ask tribunals to reconsider cases.10 
The movement thought Long 's decision was 'wise and se!)sible' and hoped that 
8 VF Gazette Vol.3 No.69, 25/03/16, p.258; Times, 22/05/16. 
9 Hansard Vol.81761 , 29/03/16, Vol.82 .2708, 31/05/16. 
10 VF & VTC in the Great War, op.cit., p.13; Times, 10/06/16; LGB Circ.R.95, 6/07/16; W070.42 . 
9NF/83 TF2 of 15/08/16. 
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all tribunals would follow his ruling .11 When supporters continued to question the 
Government on whether it had reached any decisions about prohibiting munitions and 
railway companies from banning their members from joining , Ministers and Secretaries 
invariably prevaricated. Several Government departments were , however, cautiously 
hedging towards a decision about whether to allow their civil servants to enrol : staff in 
the Board of Trade were told they could take the oath provided Heads of Departments 
were assured that the 'absolute minimum' requirements of the service would not in an 
emergency be impaired. The numbers involved were not significant, one department 
having received only two applications from would-be Volunteers and , on the 
understanding that no paid substitute would be needed to replace them, it was agreed 
they would be released in an emergency.12 This appears to have contrasted with 
regulations existing within the Treasury where, it was reported , the Commissioners had 
required their officers to resign from their corps because their departure on mobilization 
would have interfered with the collection of taxes. The Government did, however, agree 
to discuss the issue with the War Office with a view to withdrawing the instruction. 13 
Despite Walter Long's attempt in July to provide clarification, and indeed Lloyd 
. 
George's announcement in October that it would not be 'reasonable' to expect 
munitions and railway workers to join ,14 during the late summer and autumn there were 
accusations that while some tribunals were compelling men to enrol as a condition of 
their exemption , others were not. To exacerbate the anomalies, several tribunals within 
the same county exhibited this awkward and confusing inconsistency. Some of their 
chairmen were prepared merely to advise or suggest that exempted men should join , 
and met with varied responses, others appealed to the men's patriotic consciences,15 
whilst several tribunals, for example those sitting at Mutford and Lothingland , ordered all 
men who were deemed able to attend drills to do so. For their refusal to implement a 
similar policy, chairmen in nearby Bulcamp and Beccles were accused of 'failing in their 
duty' . 16 The City of London Tribunal had all exemption certificates marked 'shall become 
and continue to remain an effective member of a recognized VTC'; the men were told 
their attendance would be carefully monitored and their record consulted when they 
11 VF Gazette Vol.4 No.82, 24/06/16, p.52. Long wrote to Harris on 1/06/16: 'My Department is now 
advising Tribunals that a Tribunal may impose any condition which is reasonable , and I think that the 
condition to which you refer [ie. exemption on condition of joining a VTC] is one which may be 
imposed'. 
12 BT13/88/7, undated memo. 
13 Hansard Vo1.84.1659, 26/07/16. 
14 /bid., Vol .. 85.286, 12/10/16. 
15 VF Gazette Vol.4 No.92, 2/09/16, p.218, No.93, 9/09/16, p.228. 
16 E.R.Cooper MSS., p.8. IWM Dept. of Documents. 
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applied for further exemption .17 Moreover, each exempted man was given a letter for his 
employer explaining that the employee had a responsibility to become efficient and 
urged his employer to release him for perhaps one day per month . Finally , because the 
Volunteer Force was required to do more in order to release additional Regular 
soldiers, the employer was warned that if he refused to grant the man short periods of 
absence, he ran the risk of losing him altogether. 18 
In October, Walter Long made another attempt to resolve some of the 
inconsistencies. In a further circular, which partly ignored his July ruling , he explained 
that several tribunals were 'unreasonably' imposing a condition of undertaking some 
form of voluntary service as a condition of exemption. He insisted he did not want 
tribunals to 'enforce' this practice unless it was 'advisable in the national interests and 
fair to the man'.19 As their attendance often entailed long walks to the drill centres after 
many hours of work, agricultural workers were singled out as a group who were 
unreasonably being expected or forced to drill. To disabuse the idea that membership 
of a corps was an alternative to military service, Long again stressed that tribunals had 
to understand that service in the Volunteer Force was not in itself a reason for 
.. 
exemption . If that had been the case, the familiar arguments of the Volunteers being a 
refuge for shirkers would have again surfaced . Long was not opposed to the imposition 
of conditional exemption but did not want tribunals to impose the condition 'when it 
would be unreasonable' on the individual. To support Long 's decision , the War Office 
issued an instruction reinforcing the rule that service in the Volunteer Force was not in 
any way to be considered an alternative to full time service in the army. It also 
announced that Volunteer officers were not permitted to communicate directly with the 
Military Representatives either on behalf of an appellant with a view to obtaining 
exemption, or to seek a tribunal's ruling that an exempted man should be compelled to 
join. 20 
Long's October circular accepted there had been mistakes and 
misunderstandings in the application of tribunals' powers and clearly intended that this 
latest attempt to clarify the situation would prove successful. It does seem to have had 
some effect but, as 'reasonableness' could be variously interpreted, the paper clearly 
did not immediately resolve all disputes. Only a few days after the circular was issued , 
17 VF Gazette Vol.4 No.95, 23/09/16, p.253; IWM Dept. of Printed Books, 316.338 K876. 
18 IWM Dept. of Printed Books, 316.338 K851 . 
19 LGB Circ.R. 102, 6/10/16. 
20 Army Council Instruction (ACI) 2447 of 1916. The Instruction did not go far enough for at least one 
area. South Shields despatched a resolution to the War Office demanding all exempted men under 
30 years of age be compelled to join. Durham RO, D/TA/3, 14/11/16. 
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Sir Henry Dalziel accused the Government of 'blunder'. He complained , erroneously, 
that while Ministers had been instructing tribunals to make enrolment a condition of 
exemption, the Director-General Territorial and Volunteer Force, (DGTVF) General 
Bethune, was changing the policy by advising Scottish tribunals not to force exempted 
men to join .21 Another example of the near chaos that the inconsistency of interpretation 
and application had caused was a 'misunderstanding' by the Nantwich Rural Tribunal : 
the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries complained to the War Office that despite Long 's 
circular, exempted agricultural workers in the district had been ordered to join the 
Cheshire Volunteer Regiment.22 Similarly, the Military Representative on the Wells 
Tribunal was accused of ordering a railway worker in possession of an exemption 
certificate and a company war service badge to join a corps. If the accusation was 
founded, the Military Representative had clearly overstepped his authority: he had no 
power personally to compel a man to do anything. 23 In contrast to the Nantwich case, 
and despite an agreement among all tribunals in the County of Aberdeen that they 
would compel men to perform some form of voluntary service, to the dismay of the 
county's Volunteers their chairmen had done little to enforce the policy. 24 
Some private companies remained reluctant to allow even those of their 
employees over military age, and thus not liable to a tribunal's decision , to enrol in a 
corps. Certain banks in London and Hampshire, the railway companies and the heads 
of several municipal departments of Doncaster Town Council, were among those 
rumoured to be preventing their men from joining.25 In view of the continuing confusion , 
the Government undertook the formulation of plans by which men in certain essential 
industries who wanted to join a corps would be able to do so but would not be liable to 
call out as a Volunteer if an emergency occurred . 
The means by which a more efficient and differentiated Volunteer body might be 
achieved was unveiled during the first months of 1917. Although there were later to be 
further amendments and divisions, the force was, by the spring of that year, to be 
divided into six sections. Section A comprised men over military age, of at least C 1 
medical category who, if faced by an emergency, were able to leave their civilian 
occupation. They would sign on for the duration of the war and be provided with kit and 
equipment. Section B was to consist of men of military age and those who had been 
21 Hansard Vol.85.284-49, 12/10/16. 
22 W070.42. 9NFI168 TF2, 25/11/16. 
23 HansardVol.86.749, 19/10/16. 
24 National Archives of Scotland MD4/72, 9/10/16. 
25 VF Gazette Vol.5 No.1 05, 2/12/16, p.1; No.1 07, 16/12/16, p.26; Hampshire RO 37/M69/3, 16/06/16. 
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sent by the tribunals to undertake some form of military service. These men, too, would 
be able to leave their jobs if the Volunteer Force was mobilized. Section R was for 
Volunteers employed by government departments, those in possession of a war service 
badge, and railway employees. Men in this section would not be mobilized without the 
consent of the department or company concerned. The final three categories were C, for 
youths over 17 years but under military age, P, reserved for Special Constables and D, 
intended for any man who was unwilling to commit himself to any other section . Men in 
Sections A and B, which were to comprise the bulk of the membership, would be 
required to perform 14 drills per month until they became efficient, and then another ten 
per month . In return for this commitment, and when a man was passed efficient, the 
Territorial association would receive a £2 grant to clothe and administer him.26 
This new classification appealed to the bulk of the movement and was 
recognized as a belated but probably genuine attempt by the War Office partly to atone 
for its earlier less than committed support. The Volunteer Force had, in effect, replaced 
the Territorial Force but members of this new organization were to be expected to 
perform more drills than had been expected from their usually younger Territorial 
counterparts and, moreover, receive less financial assistance. 27 Furthermore, the drills 
themselves were to contain a harder physical element than those required by the 
prewar Territorial Force. There were early questions about how sufficient instructors 
were to be acquired , complaints that the £2 grant would be totally inadequate and 
some, albeit limited, criticism that the very classification would in itself prove detrimental 
to the movement. Section D was in particular singled out as providing a means by which 
a man could claim to be contributing to the war effort without making any real 
commitment. Men in D were certainly in an anomalous position for they continued to 
enjoy the right of giving 14 days' notice of leaving their corps. 28 
With some reservations, and not withstanding reports of longer serving members 
resigning rather than sign yet another form or face yet further reorganization, the 
classification was thought to be sufficiently extensive and rational to secure the 
movement's future. Those who signed for Section A naturally tended to be the original 
volunteers of the VTC era whilst, as the regulations demanded, the sometimes more 
reluctant men who had been sent by the tribunals signed for Section B. The perceived 
26 Sections A, B, c and D were formed under ACI 84 of 13/01/17, Volunteer Force Order (VFO) XXI 
and ACI 765 of 12/05/17, VFO LXVI Sections P and R were formed under ACI 66 of 11/01/17, VFO 
XXX. 
27 Territorials had been required to perform only 40 drills per year. 
28 VF Gazette Vol.5 No.113, 22/01/17, p.98. 
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hostility of tribunal personnel towards the Volunteers continued to attract criticism from 
within the movement but, conversely, there were also those who believed tribunals were 
displaying a pro-Volunteer bias. Some tribunals were accused of insisting upon 
exempted men joining a battalion without first offering them the option of enrolling in a 
Voluntary Aid Detachment (VAD) or the Special Constabulary. In response to this 
particular inconsistency, Recruiting Officers and Military Representatives were 
instructed to refrain from pressurizing a man to join the Force if he was already a 
member of one of the other voluntary bodies. One association went so far as to 
recommend that men should not be permitted to belong to both a VAD and the 
Volunteer Force, but there were still accusations that tribunals in Oxford , 
Buckinghamshire and Essex, were not 'playing the game' in encouraging exempted 
men to join .29 In applying Volunteer conditions to certificates of exemption the chairman 
of the Thorne Tribunal, who also doubled as commandant of the local Volunteers , was 
thought to be so over-reaching his authority that the Local Government Board was 
asked to consider if it would not be in the public interest to force the man's resignation . 
The chairman was certainly not alone in attempting to apply this policy as one member 
of the Lincolnshire Association continued to urge that Military Representatives should 
recommend certain men be ordered to enrol as a condition of their exemption. Several 
men in Stoke Newington were reported to have had their exemptions cancelled having 
defaulted on their subscription payments but, when Rawtenstall's tribunal men objected 
to having to pay subscriptions, the War Office ruled in their favour. The authorities 
decided that charging Section 8 men a subscription was not unreasonable, but as the 
force was now in receipt of public money, corps should no no longer insist upon it. 30 
It was not, however, only the Military Representatives and tribunal chairman who 
were accused of over-stepping the mark. The Folkestone Tribunal warned that any 
employer who encouraged his men not to attend drills or who threatened them with the 
sack if they did, would be reported to a senior authority. The authorities were, in fact, 
becoming increasingly concerned at the numbers of men of military age who were not 
only supposedly serving in the Volunteers but who were doing so with apparently little 
commitment to their training . A strength return of May 1917 underlined the problem. 
Almost 200,000 of the total of just under 300,000 were Volunteers of military age: 'This', 
. 
2'W070.43. 27/Exemptions/2905, January 1917; W070.43. 9NF/187, 12/12/16; !.Beckett, 'Aspects of a 
Nation in Arms: Britain's Volunteer Training Corps in the Great War', Revue lnternationale d'Histoire 
Militaire, No.63, 1985, p.34. 
30 W070.43. 27/Exemptions/2905, 22/03/17; Lincolnshire RO T A 1/1 , p.396; Hackney Archives D/S/49-
10, Stoke Newington Volunteer Gazette , 1917; W070.42 . 99/U21 TF2, 27/02/17. 
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according to the War Office, 'was neither the expected nor intended result' of the recent 
reorganization .31 Of the 198,000 men of military age, 102,000 had been sent by the 
tribunals as a condition of their exemption but, of these, only 63,000 had joined Section 
B. This meant that despite being tribunal men, 39 ,000 members of military age had an 
obligation under the 1863 Act to perform only ten drills per year and could leave with 14 
days' notice. In addition to those 39,000, there were another 44,000 of military age in 
Section D who had undertaken no obligation to become efficient. Opting by their own 
volition to become Volunteers, these men thus avoided the possibility of being forced to 
join by the tribunals , thereby incurring definite obligations. Many of them were thought to 
have subsequently secured exemption by stating that they were already members of the 
Volunteer Force. When the strength of all sections was added together, the total number 
of members was 292 ,951 . Of that total , the number of men in Sections A and B came to 
only 136,176, or a disappointing 46%.32 
Within the counties there were some fairly wide differences in the numbers 
registering in Sections A and B. They ranged from 67% in Stirlingshire, 61% in West 
Lancashire and Stoke Newington, to 41% in H~rtfordshire . It rose from that same last 
figure in Surrey in June 1917 to 48% in September, largely as the result of men 
transferring from Section D. Almost 150 made the transfer but nearly 600 D men simply 
resigned from the corps rather than remain in D or make the switch. This meant that 
47% of the county's Volunteers remained in Section D. There were similar, significant 
figures in other counties: 37% in Hampshire, 45% in Warwickshire and 52% in Ayr. 
When appraised of figures such as these, the War Office came to the obvious 
conclusion that as Section D allowed men to escape with only a minimal commitment, it 
served no useful purpose and should be abolished .33 
Another War Office paper, The Present Position of the Volunteer Force , was 
published in June and attempted once again to regularize the current position of the 
tribunals with regard to their powers of exemption . It decided that the creation of Section 
B had worked to the War Office's advantage because it gave the tribunals power to 
enforce a man who was fit enough to fulfil his obligations. However, there was also an 
31 W032.5058, Future Policy as Regards the Volunteer Force , July 1917. 
32 lbid. The Liverpool Daily Post, 1/03/17, estimated that the number of men of military age in the 
city's 18 battalions amounted to over 80% of the tota l. .. 
33 Figures calculated from extant strength returns. NAS MD6/20, 3/07/17; Liverpool RO 356WES/65, 
14/08/17; Hackney Archives D/S/49/8, 25/05/17; Herts RO TAFN1 , 24/02/17; Surrey RO 60811/2, 
16/07/17, 15/10/17; Hants RO 37M69/3, June 1917, Chairman's Report; Warwicks RO CR1141/4, 
4/07/17; NAS MDS/22, 21/08/17; W032.5058, Future Policy as Regards the Volunteer Force, July 
1917. 
258 
element of conflict in the War Office's desire to have both an efficient and a strong 
Section B. The Local Government Board , through the tribunal system, could force men 
to join and thus swell the numbers, but it also meant that more money would be needed 
to finance the growing force . The Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff (DCIGS) 
foresaw this danger when it was announced that the proposed maximum number of 
grant earners should be 300,000. It was originally intended that the majority of grant 
qualifiers would be members of Section A rather than men of military age enrolled in 
Section B. The DCIGS, Major-General Sir Robert Whigham, warned that the proposal to 
increase the overall number of grant earners would 'almost certainly' lead to further 
exemptions, thereby depriving the army of potential recruits. He believed a firm and 
binding reiteration of the instruction which ruled that service in the Volunteers would not 
exempt a man from military service elsewhere would have to precede any authority to 
increase grants and numbers.34 
The Adjutant-General (AG) , Lieutenant-General Sir Nevil Macready, expressed a 
similar lack of faith in the ability of the tribunals to refrain from sending men suitable for 
the army to the Volunteers. He restated his long held belief that the creation of the 
Volunteer Force had, in itself, been a 'mistake, seeing that it was a voluntary 
organization superimposed upon conscription ' and remained convinced that it had 
'militated considerably' against recruitment for the army. 35 Furthermore, he believed the 
contemporary theory that an efficient Volunteer Force would release Regulars from 
home defence duties was fallacious, and criticised the tribunal system for being 'only 
too anxious' to exempt men for personal and family reasons . Their willingness to 
exempt men on the argument that membership of the Volunteer Force entailed a form of 
military compulsion, and their alleged failure to enforce the Local Government Board 's 
circulars had, he believed, cost the army about 100,000 men. He remained opposed to 
any increase in grants and to the expansion of the Volunteer Force 'unless or until ' a 
corresponding decrease in the strength of the troops allocated to home defence could 
be guaranteed . He closed by urging his political masters to reissue the instructions to 
tribunals which stated 'on no account will service with the Volunteers be coupled with 
exemption from military service'. The points raised by the AG's memo were considered 
'difficult' enough for the paper to be brought before the Army Council. 36 
34 W032.5048 (6) . 
35 ln May 1917, Macready had described the Volunteers as a 'body of men who were useless from the 
military point of view' and told a GOC District, 'I fear we can do nothing [but] if I saw my way I should 
bag the lot'. C.F.N.Macready, Annals of an Active Life, London: 1924, Vo1.1 ., pp.281-2. 
38 W032.5048 (1 0) , 22/06/17. 
That consideration was eventually to be delayed but the Earl of Scarbrough, who 
had replaced Bethune as DGTVF, wrote a reply three days after receiving the Macready's 
paper. He admitted little had been done by the Volunteers to release Regulars for 
overseas and accepted that the Force was at the present time immobile and incapable 
of offering any degree of reliance. However, he blamed the inadequacies not on 
inherent faults within the Force itself but on the difficulties it had experienced in trying to 
procure arms and equipment. He insisted a force of 300,000 was essential and that 
unless a modified system of grants was adopted , the Force would never become 
efficient and thus never be in a position to release more Regulars. He defended the 
tribunals, stating that it had been made clear on several occasions, with the full and 
public support of the Director of Recruiting, that membership of the Volunteers was not 
an alternative to military service. Using evidence gathered from reports by Military 
Representatives, he discounted the opinion that tribunals had been acting too leniently, 
arguing instead that conscripts who had been Volunteers were sent overseas more 
quickly than those recruits who had had no previous military experience. Macready's 
claim that the Volunteer Force had cost the arrl)y 100,000 recruits was similarly 
dismissed .37 
The intimacy of these arguments which so dominated the thoughts of those 
responsible for the administration, purpose and possible expansion of the Volunteer 
Force, were not within the public domain. Those members who had an interest in more 
than the mere performance of their drills knew significant issues were under debate, 
but so had they been since the start of the VTC. The newspapers and the Gazette 
carried reports on any arguments which were made public but, apart from the 
continuing equipment shortage, the issue which most absorbed the original 
membership was the quality and attitude of the men sent by the tribunals . 
In October 1916, the Gazette asked its readers to comment on the attitude of 
men sent by the tribunals to join their companies. The response was mixed. Some 
letters offered the tribunal men 'unstinted praise' and told how, after a few parades, they 
acquired the 'spirit' and threw themselves into their tasks with 'intelligence and vigour'. 
Others considered the directed men's relative youth gave them a greater sprightliness 
which , according to some, inspired older men to improve their own physical condition 
and thought overall , the incomers proved a 'useful ' addition to strength and unit 
37 W032.5048 (16A), Future Policy as Regards the Volunteer Force: Notes on the AG's Memo, 
26/07/17. 
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morale. 38 However, in general , the contemporary replies and later personal memoirs 
were hostile. This may have been caused by the resentment that the tribunal men's 
arrival undoubtedly aroused or, in the case of postwar writers, a reflection of the general 
bitterness which many original members harboured both towards the state's lack of 
appreciation and, indeed, to anyone who had not been involved from the start. There are 
several reports of a tailing off in attendance on the part of the older, efficient members, 
and oftheir discontent at having to perform drills with the new men when they could 
have been spending their time doing more interesting things. Some of the older 
members refused to acknowledge the tribunal men as 'proper' Volunteers , being 
reluctant to accept them until or unless they proved themselves worthy, and wanted the 
tribunals to act more positively in withdrawing exemption certificates from those who 
were not taking their duties sufficiently seriously. One member of a Lincolnshire 
battalion thought the tribunal men were 'far from enthusiastic' and recalled how difficult 
it was to get them to attend the required number of drills. Similarly, the commanding 
officer (CO) of a West Riding battalion thought the tribunal men were a 'curse' because 
they weakened esprit, possessed little or no enthusiasm for military matters and 
displayed a general air of slackness and disinterest. Ford believed they did as little as 
possible and feared becoming efficient in case they were sent to France. Their alarm 
grew as more exemption certificates were rescinded. The quality of their marksmanship 
was thought to deteriorate in proportion to the increasing number of unrenewed 
exemptions. 39 
Those men who resented the powers of the tribunals to make them enrol in the 
Volunteer Force were sometimes supported by trade unions and other, similar 
organizations. The Nuneaton Labour Party registered its 'emphatic protest' against the 
practice of compelling appellants to join the Volunteers as a condition of exemption and 
there were reports of 'considerable unrest' in northern towns where it was reported men 
who had refused to enrol had had their exemption withdrawn . Littleborough Trades 
Council in Lancashire wanted tribunals to order men to be released for paid half-day 
38 VF Gazette Vol.4 No.98, 14/10/16, p.299; F.Lock, Records of the East Yorkshire Volunteer Force 
1914-1919, Hull : Eastern Morning & Hull News, 1922, p.5; Percy Harris in Daily Telegraph , 19112119. 
39 VF Gazette Vo1.4 No.99, 21/10/16, p.302; No.100, 28/10/16, p.323; E.R.Cooper, MSS, IWM Dept. of 
Printed Books, p.5; E.J.Martin, 'VTC 1914-18', (papers of 4th Voi.Bn.Lincolnshire Regt) , IWM Dept.of 
Printed Books; VF Gazette Vol.5 No.108, 23/12/16, p.45; E.J.Disbrowe, History ofthe Volunteer 
Movement in Cheshire 1914-1920, Stockport: Hales & Sons, 1920, p.65; T.Murray Ford , Memoirs of a 
Poor Devil, London: A.M .Philpot, 1926, p.197; One of the Dover Companies of the 1st Voi.Bn.7th 
Buffs claimed that a waiting list of genuine volunteers wanting to join allowed it throughout the war to 
refuse admission to tribunal men . J.B.Firth , Dover and the Great War, Dover: Leney & Co., nd ., pp.96-
97. 
drills in order to allow them some rest and leisure on Sundays and the Yorksh ire 
Federation of Trades Councils talked of the 'foolishness' of forcing men to join. It 
prophesied darkly of 'trouble' if the 'peacock-style swank' of young Volunteer officers, 
who had themselves secured exemption , was not quickly and efficiently curtailed .40 
There was a general acceptance within the movement itself that tribunals and 
Volunteer officers should act with care and treat each case on merit. The Gazette 
argued in July 1917 that it saw no reason why manual workers should not be treated in 
the same way as agricultural labourers, and criticised the prosecution and the military 
authorities in several cases where agricultural labourers were accused of not fulfilling 
their obligations. In their own defence the workers pleaded they had not realized they 
would be required to perform 14 drills per month. The editorial supported their plea and 
went further by castigating both the prosecution for not telling the courts that the men 
could have been excused the necessity of enrolment, and the army for not having 
clarified the situation by the issue of an Army Council Instruction (ACI) .41 
The Gazette also periodically turned its attention to persistent but unfounded 
rumours that the Government was considering ~xtending conscription to cover the 
Volunteer Force. In May 1917, Percy Harris asked lan Macpherson if the War Office had 
considered the detrimental impact that extending army compulsion to men of 50 years 
old would have on the Volunteers42 and, in August, the Gazette condemned the threat of 
introducing conscription to the Force itself as the 'remedy of the incompetent' . It 
complained that the earlier period of governmental neglect was now being replaced by 
one of excessive regulation and restriction . This policy, it argued , was already decisively 
and adversely affecting recruitment and efficiency. It warned that any attempt to introduce 
compulsion would spell the end of the Volunteer Force and herald the creation of what 
would amount to a new, conscripted , Army Reserve. Not only would such a move 
necessitate establishing the 'paraphernalia ' of an appeals system, but the idea of 
compelling men aged 41 to 60 years to join the force would destroy its unique esprit and 
work against the very efficiency the policy was intended to improve. Opinion within the 
movement seems to have supported the editorial but correspondence illustrated the 
reality of the situation . One contributor predicted that as only the 30 members of Section 
A in his company of 250 could be relied upon to do anything in an emergency, the 
company would be unable to fulfil its allotted responsibilities. The officer concluded with 
40 VF Gazette Vol.6 No.135, 30/06/17, p.56; No.138, 21/07/17, p.86; No.144, 1/09/17, p.167; No.141 , 
11/08/17, p.130. 
41 VF Gazette Vol.6 No.138, 21/07/17, p.86; No.144, 1/09/17, p.158. 
'
2 Hansard Vol.93.1768, 17/05/17. 
the gloomy assessment that 'we either need compulsion or admit that we are not 
needed'.43 
The number of exempted men joining the Volunteers through the tribunal system 
naturally had a very clear impact not only on unit morale and attitude, but also on unit 
composition. Cooper calculated that as early as September 1916, 43% of the 3rd 
Suffolk Volunteer Battalion were exempted men, a figure matched in March of the 
following year by the Cheshire Volunteer Regiment. Almost half of the 2nd and over 50% 
of the 3rd Bucking hamshire Volunteer Battalions were B men, and In Northamptonshire, 
where many men of military age were working in the boot trade, in February 1917 the 
figure was 74%. In Leicestershire the proportion had grown from 49% in January 1917 
to 83% by July, a figure which mirrored that for Clackmanshire, a county which had more 
members under 17 years than it did members over 38. 44 
Contemporary opinion within the Volunteer movement believed the tribunals 
could do more to assist them in their recruitment campaigns and in advertizing the 
worth of the Force. In particular it was concerned over the number of men who, when 
given the opportunity, were choosing to becom~ Special Constables rather than 
Volunteers. Owing to the widespread belief within the movement that the corps had 
replaced the Specials in most of their duties, Volunteers considered any exempted man 
who chose to join the Specials was thus selecting the easy option . They argued that as 
there was therefore no longer the need for a Special Constabulary, it should be 
disbanded and the men be compelled to join a local Volunteer company. The idea that 
the Specials were hardly used was not entirely correct but, in rural areas in particular, it 
did have more than a grain of truth. In contrast, Chief Constables in some urban areas 
continued to complain they had too few Specials for the tasks required and , in an effort 
to induce more to enrol , advocated disbanding any Volunteer corps which had not 
affiliated to the Central Association. 45 
The uneasy relationship with the Special Constabulary which had developed in 
some counties since the appearance of the VTC continued throughout 1915 and 1916. 
Some Chief Constables were finding it easier than others to resolve the potential 
conflict of interests, and the Home Office ruling of December 1914 which had made it 
clear that the first responsibility of a man who served in both auxiliaries was to the 
43 VF Gazette Vol.6 No.143, 25/08/17, p.146, p.154. .. 
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45 VF Gazette Vol.5 No.1 07, p.48; H045/272.183 (39) . 
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Specials, had certainly helped .46 Nevertheless, it appears that some Specials 
themselves were questioning the purpose and character of their organization. One man 
in Surrey pestered his Chief Constable and the Home Office to provide him with drill , the 
opportunity to shoot and a uniform. His original six month term of service was about 
complete and he threatened that unless the Specials were developed into more of a 
quasi-military force, he would terminate his engagement and join the Volunteers 
instead. The Chief Constable of East Sussex decided rather than have Specials who 
wanted more than the force was prepared to provide or allow, he would only permit 
those men to enrol as Specials who could not join the Volunteers . In addition , any 
existing Special who wished to resign in favour of joining the Volunteers was granted 
permission to do so. This decision upset the county's Lord Lieutenant who, as 
chairman of the Emergency Committee, complained to the War Office. When General 
O'Brien, the acting Secretary of the Sussex VTC, then declared he would not allow his 
men to double as Specials, the Chief Constable of West Sussex warned that such a 
policy would make it difficult for him to raise sufficient Specials. He appealed to the 
Home Office for guidance but, anxious to continue its policy of distancing itself from VTC 
affairs, Sir Edward Troup diplomatically avoided taking sides and suggested the matter 
would best be resolved locally between the Duke of Norfolk and his Chief Constables. 47 
Troup was rather more decisive when replying to a enquiry from the Central 
Association about an order allegedly issued by the Chief Constable of Durham which 
required those of his Specials who were also Volunteers to attend a parade in their 
Volunteer uniform. The issue underlined the confusion and contradictions which existed 
during 1915 and 1916 over the question of Volunteer uniform and the brassard. Until the 
Army Council resolved the matter in late 1916, a Volunteer could not wear his corps ' 
uniform without a brassard. As the brassard made him a combatant, he could not wear 
it when on police duty. For the purposes of a parade as a Special, a Volunteer was 
therefore required to wear his police brassard and civilian clothes. When Troup 
informed the Chief Constable his Volunteers could not parade in their uniform, the Chief 
Constable described it all as a terrible mistake and disclaimed any responsibility for the 
original order.48 
Whilst Volunteers claimed the tribunals were permitting too many men to take the 
perceived soft option and enrol as a Special Constable, Sir Robert Fox, Town ClerK of 
Leeds, viewed it from the other perspective. He thought the existence and attraction of 
46 H045/272.183 (31a) and WO letter 7916637 (NT1) of 17/12/14. 
47 H045/272.183 (35) , H045/272.183 (45) , H045/272.183 (49) . 
48 H045/272.183 (80) . 
the Volunteers prevented many men from becoming Specials and bel ieved the rul ing 
which gave precedence to the civil power was dissuading many Volunteers from 
enrolling as Specials. He wanted to know how the 1863 Act would affect the situation 
and who, if the Volunteers went off to fight , would do their protection work. The Home 
Office requested the Army Council to reconsider the role and purpose of the VTC in the 
light of the 1863 Act and, by way of assistance, suggested that Volunteers might be 
used to aid the Specials in their tasks under the Emergency Committees of the 
destruction of property in threatened areas. It also opined that Volunteers might be able 
to release the Specials from their duty of guarding vulnerable points by taking on more 
of those responsibilities themselves. What the Army Council needed to do, the Home 
Office thought, was to make decisions about whether they were expecting the 
Volunteers to take the field immediately invasion threatened or whether they would allow 
them a period of immediately local mobilization and deployment.49 
Despite the alleged attraction of the Special Constabulary to exempted men, the 
Home Office clearly did have a problem. By May 1916 it was estimated 9000 Specials 
had already joined the army and the Military Service Act was expected to take another 
40% of existing strength. 50 A letter from the Commandant of the 2nd Mid-Kent Fencibles 
underlined the difficulty of the civil power retaining the first call on those Specials who 
were also Volunteers . The issue affected 33% of his other rank members and 66% of 
his officers. If responsibility to the civil power took precedence, his battalion would 
virtually disappear and potential members, he claimed, were not joining because they 
saw no point in buying a uniform until the matter had been resolved . The Commandant 
concluded: 'It would be a serious matter to break up ... an organized military unit of 600 
men merely to hand over to the civil power 200 men and 16 officers. '51 The Chief 
Constable of Huntingdon pulled the Home Office in the opposite direction. He urged 
Troup to resist what he had heard was the 'anxiety' of the military to requisition the 
services of the Specials in order to release more Volunteers for work elsewhere. The 
Chief Constable warned that he was already short of the number of men required by the 
Emergency Committee and that any change in their responsibilities would involve the 
Home Office in 'breaking faith with promises already given' . 52 
In reply to these and other, similar enquiries, the Home Office consistently 
adhered to the decision it had taken in December 1914. However, pressure from Chief 
49 H045/272.183 (91 ). 
so H045/272.183 (99). 
51 H045/272.183 (102). 
52 H045/272.183 (104). 
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Constables, as well as Lord Kitchener's unhelpful statement in the House of Lords,53 
were sufficient to force the Home and War Offices to reconsider the position. In May 
1916, the Home Office welcomed advice from the War Office that the War Committee 
was shortly to study the issue, warning in reply, 'both forces are likely to suffer materially 
unless the relations between them are speedily put on a definite basis'. 54 
The War Office conference to review the matter convened at the end of June. All 
agreed that as the existing position was affecting membership of both the Volunteers 
and the Specials, an urgent resolution was essential. Representing Field Marshal 
Commander-in-Chief Home Forces (FM C-inCHF) , Colonel Sir Douglas Dawson told 
the meeting that probably 40% of Volunteers were also Specials and of the 55,000 
Volunteers who would be required for line of communication duties in an emergency, 
the majority also doubled as Specials. The meeting decided that resolving the dilemma 
by banning dual membership was not the answer because the most dedicated 
Specials were usually also the most efficient Volunteers. Dawson was not enthusiastic 
about proposals which suggested that French should take over responsibility for the 
Emergency Committees, and that the work preYiously expected of the Specials should 
be undertaken by the Volunteers . This, it was thought, would leave those Specials who 
were not Volunteers able to assist in ordinary police duties. Dawson agreed to take the 
proposal away but warned that it was unlikely to be accepted by his superior. His 
prediction proved correct, French and the War Office declining to undertake the 
considerably extended role. They inclined instead to an alternative proposal which 
agreed the military authorities should arrange to allocate to Chief Constables a 
sufficient number of special category Volunteers to carry out the work of the Emergency 
Committees. Of even greater importance to the movement as a whole, however, was 
the decision to allow all Specials who were also Volunteers to act as Volunteers if the 
two auxiliaries were ever called out. 55 
A Revised Instructions to Emergency Committees was issued in August and the 
new Section P of the VTC came into existence. Section P was to comprise those special 
category Volunteers who, as serving Special Constables, were to come under the direct 
authority of their Chief Constable. VTC Commandants were instructed not to include 
these men in any lists or scheme of military duties such as line of communication work 
which were to be undertaken by Volunteers . With the creation of this special section, an 
53 Hansard House of Lords Vol.22.218-19, 30/05/16. Kitchener told the Lords that a Lord Lieutenant 
could order Volunteers who were also Specials to put their military duties before their civil ones. 
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uneasy calm settled for the next few months but, the passage of the Volunteer Act, 1916 
was to reawaken interest in the issue and provide the opportunity for further 
complication . 
Calls to amalgamate the two auxiliaries continued to be made. Within Volunteer 
circles the twin beliefs that the very existence of the Special Constabulary provided an 
obstacle to Volunteer recruiting and the conviction that there were just too many 
Specials, persisted . Town authorities were accused of favouring the Specials at the 
expense of the Volunteers and many Volunteers who were also Specials complained 
that their duties as part-time policemen were adversely affecting their efficiency as 
Volunteers . 56 Many Chief Constables were making efforts to improve the relationships 
between the two forces , several of them, in fact, encouraging any of their Specials not 
already in Section P to enrol in Sections A or B. Furthermore, provided he could find a 
replacement, any Kent Special in P was allowed to transfer to Sections A or B. Several 
counties issued circulars which appealed to both forces to work together and settle their 
differences; another proposal suggested Chief Constables might exchange fitter C 1 
Specials for C2 or C3 Volunteers. A later ruling-even allowed men in Section P to remain 
in the section but also to register in A or B, thereby qualifying for the £2 equipment 
grant. 57 Although problems did persist, for example the Metropolitan Force unilaterally 
decided to ignore the Volunteer Force Order which allowed dual membership of 
sections, in general relations between the two forces do seem to have improved . The 
growing acceptance that a full scale invasion was unlikely removed some of the urgency 
of the Emergency Committees' expectation of the Specials and it was anticipated that 
their future role in the defence of the country would probably be limited to more usual 
police duties. 
Unfortunately, relations between the War Office and the Local Government Board 
remained less cordial. Despite Walter Long's regular circulars and reminders to the 
tribunals about the circumstances under which men might be exempted from army 
service, the War Office remained convinced that the alleged practice of allowing 
exemption on the condition that a man joined the Volunteers was denying the army a 
significant number of recruits . It argued that in spite of the instructions, tribunals were 
accepting the Volunteer option and granting exemption in cases where the grounds 
. 
submitted were, in its opinion, entirely inadequate to warrant a certificate . The War Office 
acknowledged it would be difficult to prove the contention without a detailed examination 
56 VF Gazette Vol.6 No.135, 30/06/17, p.58; No.122, 31/03/17, p.209. 
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of individual cases but the military authorities wanted the Local Government Board to 
express its opinion on the matter and , if it felt it had the evidence to do so, refute the 
military's charge that the Volunteer Force had again become a 'shelter' for men trying to 
avoid enlistment.58 
The Local Government Board issued a strong denial of the accusation, arguing 
that it had no reason to believe tribunals were granting exemption simply because a 
man was a member of or promised to join the Volunteers. Tribunals were said to 
thoroughly understand that membership of a corps was not sufficient reason for 
exemption, a fact the LGB argued, confirmed by the 'remarkably small number of fit 
men, relatively, who now hold tribunal exemptions'. The majority of the fit men of military 
age who remained in civilian occupations were, said the Board, employed in protected 
industries, over whom the tribunals had no control. Further evidence that tribunals were 
adhering stringently to their instructions came, said the LGB, with the number of 
complaints it was receiving from men who had been refused exemption . The tendency 
was, it argued, not to award a certificate to a man simply because he offered to join the 
Volunteers, but to impose the condition even when the man was fully employed in 
essential work and where there existed doubt about whether he would have sufficient 
leisure for rest and recuperation let alone have the time to attend drills.59 
Throughout the autumn of 1917 considerable confusion and inconsistency in the 
application of the Volunteer condition remained: in September, one London tribunal 
began to work on the assumption that the War Office was about to introduce 
imprisonment for Section B men in default of their obligation; a Volunteer officer 
complained to his local tribunal about its alleged policy of never imposing the condition ; 
in Manchester, 'scores' of exempted men were reported to be simply ignoring their 
obligation to drill; and a North Riding tribunal chairman insisted that without an Act of 
Parliament to instruct him otherwise, he would continue to suggest, but not compel, 
exempted men to enrol. In some areas when defaulters were summoned to the tribunal 
to explain their absence, men claimed they had been attending drills and blamed 
bureaucratic mistakes and incompetence on the part of their battalion for not registering 
their attendance; others admitted having failed to sign and return the appropriate form to 
the tribunal. Most appellants, however, claimed the amount of overtime worked 
prevented them from performing the drills, although in one celeorated case the Mayor of 
Daventry argued it was beneath the dignity of his office to enrol in the Volunteers . When 
58 W032.5048. Letter 991431 TV2 of 30/11/17. 
59 W032.5048. Letter from I.E.Gibson , Secretary to the LGB, to War Office, 3/12/17. No ref. 
questioned by the East Ham Tribunal about his irregular attendance at drills a school 
caretaker claimed he was simply too busy. Having established that one of the man's 
jobs included 'arranging the drop curtain for a Girl Guides' tattoo', the tribunal revoked 
his exemption and ordered him to join the army.60 
Several newspapers, among them the Manchester City News, published leaders 
demanding that exemptions for non-drillers should be cancelled . The News argued that 
a significant number of men just above the military age still needed to be 'roused to a 
sense of duty', but believed that although imprisonment and fines might 'awaken 
defaulters to a sense of their obligations', the withdrawal of exemptions would be the 
most 'effective remedy for slackness' .61 In nearby Oldham, and despite each man 
having , 'This man is expected to join the Volunteer Regiment' stamped on his 
exemption card, only 14 of the town's 430 exempted men had actually enrolled . The 
Deputy Mayor defended the men by arguing that engineers and cotton operatives were 
already working in excess of a ten hour day for the nation's benefit and claimed it was 
men from the 'higher strata' who were not pulling their weight. Although sympathizing 
with the workers, he next, rather unhelpfully, suggested it might serve as an inducement 
to regular attendance if men were told that when called up they would probably be 
excused recruits' drill . Coverage in the Press did prompt some men to attend rather 
more regularly, but this in itself caused problems for their officers. A Lancashire tribunal 
heard that when these men, and the equally irregular Section D attenders, did turn up, 
their lack of skills and knowledge caused the parade to degenerate into farce.62 
In yet further attempts to secure consistency the War Office issued three 
additional ACis. These granted Military Representatives extra powers to oppose 
exemptions, and tribunals were given authority to revoke exemptions granted on the 
basis of the Volunteer condition. 63 But, in the same manner as earlier efforts had 
contained flaws, the new ACis too included a significant loophole. The regulations 
allowed that certain classes of men, for example, those vouched by an Agricultural 
Executive Committee as fully employed on the land, as well as dockers, miners and 
railway workers, could not be compelled to enrol. Such groups of workers could join if 
they so wished but the tribunals continued to have no powers over them. Nevertheless, 
60 VF Gazette Vol.6 No.146, p.183, p.187; No.148, 29/09/17, p.194; Times History of the War, Chapter 
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the new instructions do seem to have spurred some tribunals to use their increased 
authority. Bridlington Tribunal imposed the Volunteer condition on almost all of its next 
40 cases and withdrew exemption on several others; Morley warned 50 men who had 
not joined to enrol within 14 days and start drilling or they too would have their 
exemption cancelled .64 The CO of the 1st Battalion Northamptonshire Volunteer 
Regiment tried a different approach. He reported to his tribunal that the exemption of 60 
men had technically lapsed through non-attendance and that another 140 were also 
likely to default on their obligation. In the search for a solution, he suggested that the 
men's employers should be warned that if they could not persuade their men to drill 
they would lose them altogether and, because so many of the exempted men had 
enrolled in both Section D and were of low medical category, they should have the 
Volunteer condition removed. This would allow, he argued, those men to put in more 
hours at work and thus release for regular drill those men who remained under 
obligation. The tribunal was not convinced by the argument, preferring to accept the 
explanation made by one of the large local employers that his men had not realized they 
had to drill. As soon as they were told they were required to perform a specific number, 
they apparently expressed a 'willingness' to oblige. This acceptance did little to 
repudiate the Gazette's theory that tribunals were too often biased in favour of 
employers and regularly ruled against the interests of the Volunteers .65 
Although he agreed that a man exempted on the Volunteer condition and who 
subsequently failed to join a unit made himself liable for military service, the Under 
Secretary of State was similarly less than entirely sympathetic to the movement when he 
went on to rule that if the man complied for a time but then ceased attending, rather than 
have his exemption automatically revoked he could apply to the tribunal to have it 
renewed or altered .66 On receiving this opinion and although acknowledging 
Macpherson as a significant improvement on his predecessor, H.J .Tennant, the 
Gazette could not refrain from calling for R.B. Haldane's reinstatement to the War Office. 
Only he, with his proven empathy and understanding of auxiliary forces it thundered, 
could 'bring an end to the chaos which reigns everywhere'. 67 
From March until November, many corps continued to conduct recruitment 
campaigns and tried to persuade their Section D men to transfer to A or B. 
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Correspondence in the Daily Telegraph complained of too many starred and exempted 
men of military age ignoring their responsibilities and of younger civilians 'jeering ' at 
Volunteers as they performed drills.68 Some areas reported increased interest: there 
were proposals to form new corps in Boston and on the Sandringham Estate, the City of 
Warwick was able to revive its disbanded corps, Nairn announced its three companies 
would be extended to three battalions, Liddell Hart claimed he increased his battalion 
strength from 750 to 900 and the Liverpool Association was told not to raise its intended 
Liverpool Irish Battalion. In contrast, one battalion of the West Riding Volunteer 
Regiment lost 29% of its strength in only three months, Lydney Corps disbanded , the 
Carmarthenshire Association enquired of the War Office whether it thought it was worth 
attempting to keep its corps in existence, and recruitment campaigns in Bristol and 
Northumberland netted only insignificant numbers of men. Campaigns in Hertfordshire 
and Dumbartonshire met with similarly 'negligible' effect. In their attempts to increase 
numbers Cambridgeshire decided to write to the county's banks urging their staff to 
enrol, Surrey approached the County Education Committee in an effort to attract more 
young men for Section C and the City of Aberdeen appealed to the clergy to help through 
the pulpit.69 
Reports from across the country spoke of a reluctance, in fear of the perceived 
consequences, to accept the obligations of Sections A or B. The Gazette explained it as 
'natural feelings of suspicion and distrust' caused by previous War Office treatment of 
the Volunteers and also as the consequence of the 'extreme complexity' of the 
registration form. Buckinghamshire Association ascribed the reluctance to the number 
of drills required of rural dwellers, a lack of ranges and of drill halls , lighting restrictions 
and travelling problems. The Gazette attempted to reassure doubters by explaining that 
the penal clauses would not be harshly applied and, by attending several large 
Volunteer parades, the King reaffirmed royal recognition of the movement. Field Marshal 
French accused the local authorities of not encouraging the movement, a theory 
68 See, for example, Daily Telegraph , 20/09/17. 
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MD4/2, 19/06/17; An attempt to recruit 215 Mancunians for a new Volunteer Engineering Company in 
September 1917 met with a very poor response . Manchester City News, 29/09/17. 
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endorsed by Liddell Hart who called the Stroud politicians' decision not to invite the 
Volunteers to the third anniversary parade of the commencement of the war a 
'contemptible slur'. French also turned his invective on the Volunteers themselves. He 
made several very uncompromising speeches in which he told the parades it was 
'perfectly miraculous' what the Government had done for them but that they were not 
reciprocating . They would not be asked to 'go and stand for days and nights in trenches 
full of ice and water to be shot at' or to 'go in a charge from which they returned leaving 
half their comrades dead', but merely to attend a few drills each month. He told them it 
was 'no use my coming here if I do not tell you exactly what I think', an attitude followed 
by Lord Harris when he riled at the Kent Volunteers for their poor turnout. He called it a 
'very bad compliment' to their County Commandant and threatened to report absentees 
to their local tribunals. 70 
A conference of the West Riding 's Commandants decided that it was principally 
the varied enforcement of the Volunteer condition which was hampering their attempts 
to increase numbers and efficiency. They resolved to urge the LGB to instruct tribunals 
not to exempt men for periods of less than three months and to encourage those they 
did exempt to join Section B. 71 Some tribunals were evidently more willing than others to 
help their Volunteers : Oxford decided its citizens could more properly help the war effort 
by undergoing military training than serving for a time with the city's fire brigade and 
directed its exempted men to 'Godley's Own' .72 The War Office did make some effort to 
assist recruitment efforts by issuing an ACI which laid down which classes or 
categories of miners were not allowed to enrol in Sections A, B or C.73 Munitions 
workers were also a recruitment target for many battalions and the inequity which 
allowed them to remain untroubled by the tribunals whilst other factory workers fell 
subject to their authority, prompted the several Oldham tribunals to formulate a joint 
policy whereby a degree of consistency of exemption and obligation was accepted 
70 VF Gazette Vol 5 No.115, 10/02/17, p.126; No.119, 10/03/17, p.174; Bucking hamshire RO, 
T A/1 /13 , 1 /03/17; VF Gazette Vol 5 No.128, 12/05/17, p.287; Liddell Hart Papers, 8/200, newspaper 
cutting of 19/08/17; G. French ( ed) , Some War Diaries, Addresses and Correspondence, of F-M the 
Right Hon. Earl of Ypres, op.cit., p.289; VF Gazette Vol 5 No.127, 5/05/17, p.275, No.128, 12/05/17, 
p.293, Vol 6 No.145, 8/09/17, p.180. 
71 Yorkshire Post, 8/12/17. 
72 VF Gazette Vol.6 No.1 59, 12/12/17, p.326. It was estimated the City of Oxford had about 5000 men 
over military age but the Volunteer Company was only 150 strong . VF Gazette Vol.6 No.146, 
15/09/17, p.183. A.D.Godley, the 'Public Orator', had been promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel. 
73 ACI 1495 of 1/10/17 laid down which specialist mining trades could not enrol in a corps. Miners 
without a particular skill or trade were allowed to join . 
')12 
across the borough .74 
Although they wanted to increase the numbers on their muster rolls , Volunteer 
battalions realized that enrolling men who were physically unable to perform the tasks 
required of them would add nothing to unit efficiency. An ACI which allowed exempted 
men with the Volunteer condition and classified below A 1, B 1 or C 1 to ask the tribunal to 
remove their obligation was acknowledged as a piece of well meaning pragmatism , 
and the publication of Model Rules for Volunteer Corps was viewed as a useful 
contribution to improving unit esprit. These rules, which in a throw back to the original 
democratic days of the early VTC required a vote of acceptance by the membership , 
allowed battalions to impose fines on non-tribunal members for non-attendance at 
drills. 75 The War Office had decided to frame a set of rules largely because it was being 
inundated by complaints and queries from individuals and corps. Sometimes one 
battalion might accept a local code but its sister battalion might reject it, and there were 
occasional objections from members to proposals drawn up by their COs. Once 
debated and agreed by the corps the regiment forwarded the decision to the War Office 
for the King's approval and signature.76 A typical set of rules adopted by units was that 
agreed by the Northants Volunteer Regiment. For offences such as wilful damage, 
failing to notify change of address and failure to attend drills, fines ranged from 5 
shillings for the first offence to £2 for a third . 
At a time when there were further rumours of the Volunteers being asked to 
replace work currently performed by the Royal Defence Corps (ROC), the means of 
securing an improved level of discipline and reliability within the auxiliary was generally 
well received and understood. What did still rankle with the rank and file was the 
persistent belief that the War Office only showed an interest in the Volunteers when it 
recognized the development of a new situation for which the military authorities had no 
other immediate resources . One Volunteer probably expressed the thoughts of many 
74 Oldham Chronicle, 22/12/17. ACI632 of 1917, VFO No.LIX replaced ACI 66 of 1917. This change 
allowed badged munitions workers living within 20 miles of the East Coast to enrol in either Section A 
orB rather than in R. This meant they would undertake recognized training. It was assumed that if the 
Germans did land, industrial production within that zone would be so disrupted that the workers would 
better serve as trained Volunteers. Durham Association estimated the alteration would add another 5-
6000 men to its coast defence units. Durham RO, D/TA3, 1/03/17. 
75 ACI 1708 of 21/11/17, VFO No.CXXIII ; ACI 1649 of 5/11/17, VFO No.CXVII, Model Rules for 
Volunteer Corps. 
76 This was a tactic designed to make the Volunteers feel appreciated as, 'In the old Volunteer days 
the Soverign was not bothered with these'. Minute by the Secretary to the War Office,W070.43. 
99/U220, 15/01/18. At least one battalion saw no need for urgency in putting the proposed set of rules 
to its membership. The 5th Voi.Bn.Devon Regiment waited until its General Meeting in October 191 8. 
Devon RO Z19/46/14, 4/10/18. 
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when he complained that the continuing speculation over the possibility of Volunteers 
being asked to replace some ROC units was little short of an insult. 77 There were no 
suggestions amongst the rumours as to what new tasks a partially relieved ROC might 
be expected to undertake, but as ROC men were likely to be of a lower medical category 
than most Volunteers and were thus unable to perform even vaguely strenuous work, 
the only real advantage in employing Volunteers in their place was cost. It was certainly 
cheaper for the state to employ voluntary labour, an argument often used by the 
movement's leadership in the past to further their case for expansion . 
This summer and autumn sparing between the War Office, the LGB, the tribunals 
and the Volunteers themselves, should be viewed within the context of a continuing 
review of the worth and purpose of the Volunteer Force. Although it had succeeded in 
creating the different categories of membership and had secured an obligation on the 
part of a growing number of members, the Army Council remained concerned that too 
many Volunteers would prove of little military value and that too many others who might 
be of some use had, for selfish motives, enrolled in Section D. A further example of the 
number of men who still managed to avoid a full commitment came from Scottish 
Command in early November. A report noted that of the 66 men exempted with the 
Volunteer condition by Scottish tribunals, only four had joined Section B. By opting for 
Section 0, the remaining 62 undertook no obligation to train or become efficient_l8 
In his continuing efforts to establish a force upon whose numbers and efficiency 
he could rely, Field Marshal French suggested tribunals should be instructed to order 
only those men of military age who had been granted a long period of exemption to join 
Section B, and that no badged man should be accepted in that section unless it was 
clear that in an emergency he could be spared from his civilian occupation . In addition , 
French believed the existence of Section 0 was entirely pointless and he, like others in 
the War Office, wanted it abolished . Those men of military age in Section 0 should then 
be forced to join B or be discharged and those members above military age, of which 
there were estimated to be approximately 26,000 , should be forced to join A. The only 
exceptions to this, French argued, were those men whose civilian employment could be 
'conclusively shown' to prevent them from accepting the full obligation. 79 
The FMC-in-C Home Forces' suggestions were intended to overcome problems 
which had arisen as a result of the army's manpower shortages and the continuing 
acceptance within the War Office that while Germany was fully occupied on the Western 
77 Letter printed in Liverpool Daily Courier, quoted in VF Gazette Vol. 7 No.162, 5/01/18, p.1 0. 
78 W070.42. WO letter 99/420 of 12/11/17. 
79 W032.5048 (348) . Letter from FM French, 21/11/17. 
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Front, she lacked the resources to offer a serious threat to Britain's shores. French 
remained less convinced than the War Office about the supposed diminution of the 
German threat and was privately pessimistic about the ability of his home defence 
forces to resist an enemy landing. In February 1917 he dramatically informed the War 
Office that the withdrawal of so many of his Regular troops allowed him to absolve 
himself entirely of the responsibility for home defence. To underline his chief's concern , 
when questioned on how many Germans his forces would be able to oppose, French's 
Chief Staff Officer replied '450'.80 The bulk of the home defence forces were 
concentrated on the beaches but if the Germans penetrated the defences and worked 
inland, French believed his 100,000 mobile troops would be unable to prevent them 
from wreaking havoc. Of the approximately 400,000 men designated for home defence, 
only about 150,000 were Class A Regular or Territorial soldiers. Furthermore, these 
were mainly yeomanry, cyclists or garrison Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers. Of the 
230,000 infantry available to French, 180,000 were either in the early stages of their 
training or were 18 year old boys. When Charles Repington warned Lloyd George how 
perilous the manpower situation was and how 'dangerously weak' the defences were , 
the Prime Minister, who was firmly convinced that Germany was more likely to invade 
Italy than Britain, confidently offered to eat one sausage for every German over 50,000 
landed. 81 
French accepted the impact the manpower crisis in France was bound to have on 
his home army and remained convinced that an essential element of any solution was 
a viable Volunteer Force. The proposals drawn up in November 1916 on how the 
Volunteer Force was to be utilized82 remained the basis for the auxiliary's deployment 
throughout 1917. Those plans had been formulated when it was still entirely unknown 
how many men might accept the terms of the, as yet, unpublished Volunteer Bill. In 
January 1917 the War Office had speculated that the number of required Volunteers 
might reach 198,000, 141 ,000 of whom would have to be 'efficients'. It was thought that 
perhaps an additional 37,000 men of uncertain quality might also be available.83 
French's scheme to attach one or two Volunteer battalions to the Home Army's divisions 
and its Independent and Composite Brigades remained, but by mid-1917 the C-in-C HF 
was considering a severe reduction in the number of battalions required on the lines of 
8
° C.Repington, The First World War. Personal Experiences, London: Constable 1920, Vol. I, p . 46~. 
81 1bid. , p.501 . .. 
82 See Chapter X, p. 
83 9NF/212 (S02) of 18/01/17. The proposed allocation was: 61 ,000 for coast defence, 35,000 for the 
London defences and 45,000 for a General Reserve. The 57,000 for lines of communication would be 
of the lowest standards of training and equipment. 
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communication.84 Despite the original intention of stimulating commitment and 
enthusiasm by allocating the Volunteers specific tasks and areas, the actual scheme of 
deployment was kept very confidential. 85 French did, however, remain convinced that the 
great majority of the Force must be infantry: there were to be no Volunteer cyclist, 
machine gun, cavalry, field or heavy artillery units, no Field Companies, a limited 
number of signal companies and only one horse transport company. He did , 
nevertheless, accept the need for motor companies to transport the infantry and for 
about 30 Field Ambulances. His primary concerns were to ensure the infantry battalions 
were adequately trained and equipped, that they contained a sufficiently large number of 
younger men to allow them mobility and stamina, and to test whether the seemingly 
haphazard means employed by some battalions would actually get their men mobilized 
quickly enough to be of use.86 
The issue of the potential uses and utility of the Volunteers again arose during 
the Army Estimates debate in early March when Brigadier-General Croft demanded the 
Volunteers be made into 'a real thing'. Croft spoke of the present 'sham ... and delusion ' 
of the force, arguing that there was no reason, save for lack of Government interest and 
commitment, why the Volunteers should _not become even more efficient than the 
prewar Territorial Force. At that moment, he continued, there was no organized force 
and the Volunteers themselves believed they were not being taken seriously. Croft 
wanted the force to be raised by compulsion and to have its name changed from the 
'vicious' Home Defence Army to the more grandiose Imperial Reserve Army. Croft 
concluded his remarks with : 
One touch of imagination with the compulsory element behind it and you are going to 
find this Volunteer Force the great solution of this manpower problem, and then you can 
get rid of the hobbling men who are disguised as soldiers and you can send them back 
to civil employment. 87 
Percy Harris replied to Croft's strident criticism of the existing state of the Force by 
84 lt is unclear why FM French was contemplating this reduction and the idea does not reappear in 
later proposals . 
85 W0161/107. Evidence from Territorial Force Directorate, 24/07/17. Volunteer battalions arranged 
their own assembly points , usually drill halls but, unlike the prewar Territorials, do not appear to have 
known their war stations. 
86 Some battalions had a procedure by which officers contacted non-commissioned officers (NCOs) with 
the order to mobilize. The NCOs were supposed to maintain up to date lists of names and addresses of 
their men and would then visit them at their homes to give the order to .. mobilize. There are few 
examples, however, in the survivng records of the method employed by most units. 
87 HansardVol.90.2212-3, 1/03/17. Henry Croft, MP for Christchurch , had commanded the 1st 
Hertfordshire in France, 1914-15. 
declining the suggestion of the name change and by the cogent argument that the 
brigadier's views were rather out of date. Harris insisted that the Force was indeed very 
well organized , training was progressing and equipment arriving . He rejected the idea 
that battalions should be made into full time units, arguing that by so doing the Force 
would lose its justification, industry would be disrupted and it would cost the Treasury 
considerably more money. This, insisted Harris, was the crux of the issue. The 
Volunteers themselves understood that their most persuasive argument was to 
demonstrate a capability of developing into an economic force which gave value for 
money.88 lan Macpherson supported Harris' onslaught on Croft, describing the 
'extraordinary progress' made since the beginning of the year. Within six weeks , he 
estimated, practically every man in Section A was expected to possess a rifle and went 
on to describe how the appointment of paid and experienced adjutants was already 
producing 'wonderful' results in training and organization.89 Later in the debate Croft 
claimed he had intended only to deride their organization and not the Volunteers 
themselves, denied he had ever argued for it to become be a full time force , but did urge 
the Government to take compulsory powers to ensure every able bodied man performed 
routine and regular drills. He then ruined his case and plea of contrition by suggesting 
that with such powers this new army would be able to take over parts of the line in 
France!90 
In late March 1917, what reports describe as either a planned test mobilization or, 
alternatively, an invasion panic caused by a schoolmaster and a squire in Broadstairs, 
suggested that vital sections of the Volunteers Force remained ill-prepared to meet an 
invasion threat. Equinoctial tides and stories that the Germans were massing shipping 
and over half a million men at Zeebrugge caused the declaration of a 'period of 
vigilance'. Regular troops were summoned from theatres and told to report to depots, 
Volunteers were recalled from trench digging and some spent a night manning coastal 
defences. The Billericay National Guard was mobilized and the United Arts Rifles 
managed to get about one third of its strength assembled within two hours. A little later 
the City of London Volunteer Regiment succeeded in getting only 1300 of its men out of 
their homes thousands of others having never rec"eived the call. Amidst the tumult, Will 
J 
Thorne asked the Leader of the House if the Government was aware of the widespread 
rumours of German landings in both Scotland and East Anglia. Bonar Law 
acknowledged the 'universal commotion' , ascribing it to an official mobilization 
88 /bid., Vol.90.2223-26, 1/03/17. 
89 /bid., Vol.90.2234-35, 1/03/17. 
90 Ibid. , Vol.90.2234, 1/03/17; Vol.91 .79-81 , 5/03/17. 
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rehearsal for home defence units. The Gazette attempted to play down the Volunteers' 
unconvincing responses but on hearing stories of a mass exodus of the Kentish 
population, Repington ruefully pondered, 'What will it be like if one Boche lands?'91 
The March scare coincided with another inter-service conference set up to 
discuss the invasion issue. It was prompted by an alarmist letter from Admiral Fisher to 
Lloyd George expressing concern about the growing U-boat threat and French's 
pessimism about the ability of his diminishing number of Regular troops and the 
Volunteers to deal with a landing. Fisher outlined seven reasons why he thought a 
German invasion possible, not least of which was his theory that the High Seas Fleet 
was effectively under the command of Hindenburg who, as a soldier, would think 
nothing of sacrificing it in a major but futile demonstration. The Admiralty was not as 
concerned as its former chief but did revise its August 1916 conclusions by extending 
its estimation of the time the Grand Fleet would need before being able to intervene 
effectively in an incursion. It still believed the Germans had the shipping and probably 
the men to make an attempt, but considered it 'possible' rather than 'probable'. French 
accepted that the recent addition of machine guns to coastal defences had improved 
their capability but still argued that a 'considerable proportion' of his divisions was of 
poor quality and that he was about 60,000 men short of the number required to meet an 
invasion of 160,000.92 It appears likely that French, with thoughts of forthcoming 
negotiations with the War Office in mind, ordered the test mobilization on 25 March in 
the expectation that it would reveal considerable inadequacies. 
Concerned as he was at the diminishing number of Regular troops at his 
disposal, in March 1917 the C-in-CHF was reasonable content with the number of 
Volunteers who were thought to be registering in Sections A and B. This early 
satisfaction was soon to dissipate but as the reported figure of enrolments approached 
the 150,000 mentioned by the Secretary of State when the Volunteer Bill was introduced 
to the Lords, French wrote to the War Office requesting the Army Council agree to an 
91 E.R.Cooper MSS, p.16, IWM Dept. of Printed Books; E.Potton (ed) , A Record of the United Arts 
Rifles 1914-1919, op.cit., p.22; 1st City of London Voi.Regt. Monthly Orders, May 1917. IWM Dept. of 
Printed Books, 316.338; VF Gazette Vol.5 No.124, 14/04/17, p .237; Hansard Vol.92.39, 26/03/17; 
C.Repington, The First World War: Personal Experiences, op.cit. , p.497. The uncertainty caused by 
the March alarm prompted the Mayor of Deal and the Chairman of Walmer UDC to issue a leaflet on 
what the population should do in the event of a German landing. Its understated preamble read : 'It 
has come to the notice of the Military Authorities that there is some doubt on the part of the civil 
population ... as to the preparations which have been made for the co t;~duct and movement of the civil 
population in case of invasion'. East Kent Archives, U924/06, 1/05/17. 
92 W032.5274, The Invasion of Great Britain 1917-1919: Extract of Minutes of the War Cabinet on 
15/03/17; Fisher's evidence to War Cabinet on 28/03/17, 2A (79/9707) ; Admira lty and French's 
evidence on 16/03/17, (79/9707) . 
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increased figure of 300 infantry battalions, each with an establishment of 1000. 93 A 
meeting of the Volunteer Force Committee at GHQ Home Forces accepted French 's 
proposal and, because it was thought the target would be achieved and accepted by the 
War Office, Scarbrough wrote to Lords Lieutenant instructing them to decline any further 
offers of infantry units. 94 French received further help for his efforts to justify an increase 
in the number of Volunteers when the report of the Vulnerable Points Committee was 
published in April. The committee reclassified existing sites and made 
recommendations as to the troops required to protect the hugely increased total of 
establishments. It was obvious to any reader that the available number of Regular and 
ROC soldiers were entirely inadequate to furnish sufficient guards.95 
An increase in Volunteer establishment was, to French , essential if his Regular 
and Territorial home defence troops were to be continually withdrawn for foreign service. 
However, he was under increasing pressure to justify both the size of the Volunteer 
Force he believed was essential and, above all, the costs incurred in raising and 
maintaining such a body. It was noted earlier that in November 1916, as a condition to it 
financing an increase in size of the Volunteer Force, the Treasury had requested Army 
Council answers to questions about the number of Regular soldiers it estimated might 
be replaced by Volunteers. 96 The War Office successfully ignored the request until July 
1917 when Scarbrough wrote to the Director of Staff Duties (DSD) , Brigadier-General 
Wilkinson Bird, pointing out that as the Treasury had agreed to fund the Volunteers on 
the understanding they would be able to replace Regular troops, their Lordships were 
justified in knowing what their money had achieved. A somewhat desperate Scarbrough 
also sought urgent details on how far Volunteers had succeeded in replacing ROC 
guards. 
I know that up to present this has not been found to be practicable on any large scale, 
but the returns of [Volunteer] temporary service doubtless provide the basis upon which 
to give some information to the Treasury. It is a fair assumption that the guard and other 
93 W032.5048 (2A) Letter from FM French to War Office, 31/03/17 . A strength return for 31/03/17 in the 
same file gives 136,176 enrolled in Sections A and B. The total strength was given as 292,951 , of 
whom only 8099 were in Sections P and R. This left 148,676 as still 'unclassified'. Of this total, 40% 
were either above or below military age, 32% had been sent by the tribunals and the remaining 28% 
were simply described as 'Others' . 
94 WO letter 991132 TF2 of 4/04/17. 
95 CAB3/3/89A, Report of the Vulnerable Points Committee, 20/04/17. The committee, a sub-
committee of the War Cabinet, had been formed by the direction of the PM in July 1916 with the 
purpose of peridically revising and updating the schedules of vulnerable points drawn up by earlier 
committees. The full report can be found in W033.871 , with other reports and correspondence in 
W033.792, W033.793 and W032.5279. 
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duties .. .would , if the Volunteers were not in existence, have to be performed by full-time 
troops. 97 
The reply to his request for information brought Scarbrough little succour in his efforts to 
pacify the Treasury. GHQ Home Forces informed him bluntly that apart from a very 
limited number of garrison battalions relieved by ROC units, the supposed Army 
Council plan to replace Regular with auxiliary troops had 'not been found possible'. 
Neither, the memo continued , was the situation likely to improve. The essence of home 
defence, it explained , consisted of garrison troops, supported by a strong mobile 
reserve, permanently watching and guarding the coast. These forces needed to 
comprise trained, Regular troops and not Volunteers. Lest the Treasury use this as an 
excuse to limit the number of Volunteer units, auxiliary troops would , the memo 
emphasized, be required in considerable numbers to protect the lines of 
communication, man the London defences and, if ultimately necessary, re inforce the 
mobile reserve. The 'utilization of a properly trained and equipped Volunteer Force' was, 
it concluded , therefore 'a military necessity'. 98 
Although the DGTVF was satisfied with this endorsement of his Force's worth , it 
was clear the General Staff had little real confidence in his men and equally little faith in 
French 's plans to deploy and utilize them. An Assistant Principal at the Territorial Force 
Directorate complained : 
It is not easy to see how [Volunteers] can relieve [Regulars] to any great extent. GHQ HF 
seem to regard the Volunteers rather as a final reserve .. . There is no systematic policy of 
reducing the HD Army as the Volunteers increase in strength and efficiency has yet 
been entertained ... The official attitude towards the Volunteer Force [is] inclined to be 
apathetic.99 
With proper encouragement, he went on, the Volunteers claimed they could undertake 
practically all the ROC duties and many of those performed by Regular troops. He 
believed that 250 ,000 men: 
.. . imbued with that esprit de corps which comes from local association , must represent 
a military asset expressible in terms of more highly trained full-time troops. In view of 
the insignificant cost of the Volunteers compared to the full time soldier, the release of a 
very small number of full-time troops in consideration of the existence of the Volunteer 
97 W032.5048 (15A). Scarbrough to DSD, 19/07/17. 
96 W032.5048 (15A). Memo from GHQ HF to Scarbrough , 24/07/17. 
99 W0161/107 (3) . Volunteer Force: Organization and Administration. Record of a talk with Assistant 
Principal TF Directorate, 24/07/17. 
280 
Force would at once enable that force to take its place as a paying proposition .100 
Only the day before this memo was written , the Director of Military Operations 
(DMO), Major-General F.B.Maurice, decided to investigate the role and function of the 
Volunteers. After a preliminary perusal of the facts he succeeded in identifying few 
reasons to justify the continued existence of the Force in its current form. In the light of 
these findings he suggested the creation of a committee, assembled under the 
presidency of the DSD, with representatives of the AG, Home Forces and himself, to 
examine the whole Volunteer issue. 101 The idea of an investigatory committee was 
overtaken by a larger conference in September on Volunteer policy which was attended 
by the Secretary of State, the DCIGS, the AG and the DGTVF. In his opening remarks the 
Earl of Derby stated that the AG, Lieutenant-General Sir C.F.N.Macready, had raised 
questions about the Force which essentially challenged its continued existence. The 
lack of firm decisions on how the Force was to be used was, he said, exercising a 
paralysing effect upon the movement and had to be resolved . Macready denied he had 
any desire to destroy the Force but admitted he did not want any further expansion in the 
number of grant earners. He frankly accepted· he had no faith in the Force and regretted 
he had been unable to persuade GHQ HF to accept the substitution of one Regular 
Home Force soldier by a Volunteer. Finally, he rehearsed the by now common War 
Office argument that the existence of the Force had allowed the tribunals to exempt 
100,000 eligible men from army service. The DCIGS too, Major-General Sir Robert 
Whigham, doubted the utility of the Force and wanted a definite statement from the FM 
C-in-CHF as to its intended services and military value. 102 
In his defence of the auxiliary, the DGTVF stated that the prescribed 
establishment of 300,000 grant earners had almost been achieved and that the earlier 
order to cease accepting offers of new units was in force . He explained that the 
significant numbers enrolled in Section D were not necessarily men unwilling to serve, 
but were there largely because they feared court martial if they enrolled in A or B and 
subsequently failed to fulfil their drill obligations. As a concession to this somewhat 
unconvincing argument it was agreed that battalion drill programmes could be altered 
from monthly to quarterly schedules. When pressed for his views on the utility of the 
Volunteers, the Secretary of State spoke confidently about their future and rejectep the 
A 
100 W0161/107 (4) . Memo from TF Directorate, 31/08/17. 
101 W032.5048 (15A). Memo from DMO to DCIGS, 30/08/17. 
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military's argument that as it had little to offer, the Force should be disbanded.103 
There were indeed many within the Army Council who remained convinced that 
despite the recent reorganization and allocation of public funds, the Volunteer Force 
could never be converted to an effective military body. They resented the money and 
resources devoted to the auxiliary and made little attempt to hide their desire to see it 
either abolished or reduced to a fraction of its proposed strength. The argument that the 
Force provided an opportunity for men likely to be called up to undergo a course of 
preliminary military instruction was dismissed as irrelevant. 
While the War Office could afford to be concerned purely with the military value, or 
otherwise, of the Volunteers, the politicians had other considerations. It was widely 
acknowledged that given the number of public bodies and influential people in 
practically every county and borough of the British mainland who had been involved in 
raising the Force, the sums of money already contributed by private subscription and 
local government and the fact that since the introduction of conscription it was the sole 
remaining voluntary organization of military character in the country, any attempt 
suddenly to scrap this example of patriotic endeavour would create an uproar in 
-· 
Parliament and the country. Mindful of the public's temper as losses during Third Ypres 
mounted remorselessly, the Government could not afford to strike at what to many had 
come to represent the epitome and heart of middle class Britain . The Secretary of 
State's refusal to accept the consensus of military opinion was made entirely on 
political and propagandist grounds but he did, nevertheless, agree to the proposal that 
GHQ HF should issue a definitive statement about the Force's strength, deployment 
and use. 104 
Whigham, the DCIGS, produced the requested paper three days later.105 Its 
preamble pointed out sanction to raise a large Volunteer Force had been granted on 
two assumptions: first that it would allow reductions in the number of Regulars on anti-
invasion duty and, second, that it would also release a number of lower grade troops 
currently locked up in garrisons and other guard duties. With regard to the first 
assumption, the DGTVF had been told Home Service troops would not be replaced by 
Volunteers as long as invasion was considered possible and, as for the second, fewer 
than 400 ROC soldiers had been relieved by Volunteers . It was 'doubtful', the DCIGS 
103 Ibid. 
104 W032.5058 (30) . Memo from Scarbrough , 10/11/17. 
105 W032.5048 (18A). Notes on Employment of Volunteers , 7/09/17. 
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thought, whether it would ever be possible to increase that number. 106 A break down of 
existing Volunteer battalions107 and their intended deployment gave a total of 291 ,226 
men. Of the 312 units, 84 were allocated to line of communication , 71 as mobile troops 
and 70 as a General Reserve. The paper refrained from offering much in the way of 
criticism of the quality of the units but pointed out that 75% of the guards performed by 
Volunteers on vulnerable points were considered unnecessary. It concluded that in view 
of the fact that no Regulars had been released, 'the objects of the Volunteers have 
hitherto not been realized' and consequently, the entire Volunteer issue 'requires 
scrutiny' .108 
Having studied the DCIGS's paper, Major-General Maurice wrote a crushing 
analysis of the numbers of Volunteer units which might be of any use and where they 
might be utilized. He fell short of advocating the disbanding of the Force but believed 
that nearly 150 battalions could be dispensed with and training substantially improved 
for the survivors. Citing the example of Germany, who maintained only 68 battalions on 
lines of communication throughout hostile France and Belgium, he recommended a 
mere 24 of the allocated 64 battalions needed to be deployed for such duties in Britain. 
Five battalions currently allotted to garrison and coast defences could be disbanded but 
he did accept that Volunteers might usefully assist some Royal Garrison Artillery and 
Royal Engineer units in both technical and non-technical coastal work. The 42 
battalions allocated to the London defences should be equipped only as Pioneer units 
and be used purely to complete the capital's entrenchments. The DMO saved his 
harshest criticism for the General Reserve and the mobile formations . He could not 
understand why the number of units allotted to assist the Regular mobile force had 
been raised from 38 to 71, and predicted that in an emergency they would prove more of 
an. encumbrance than a help. They should be reduced to 33 battalions and, as if to 
underline their futility as a mobile reinforcement, should possess no transport. The 
General Reserve of 70 battalions, thought the DMO, was simply a convenient term 
dreamt up by Home Forces to embody all those units for which it could find no genuine 
employment. In the event of a landing they would be of no use at all and should be 
reduced to 20. This ferocious analysis concluded that only 117 battalions of the existing 
force of 312, (42 of which were to be the Pioneer units), could be usefully employed. 
106 W070.43. French reported that as of 25/12/17, only 218 RDC personnel had been replaced by 
Volunteers. This figure is attached to an earlier letter, 991392 TV2, dated 2/11/17. 
107 Non-infantry units, viz Volunteer Engineer, Signal and Ambulance sections, had gradually been 
approved during 1917. See Appendix II. 
108 W032.5048. Memo by DCIGS, 7/09/17. 
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Quite apart from the already large and increasing cost to the state, Maurice argued the 
Volunteers were absorbing training cadres, material and transport which could be better 
employed in bringing the mobile units to a higher state of efficiency. He wanted more 
intensive training for those units which survived his recommended cull and hoped that 
the Force might then become a 'quantity to which some definite value can be assigned 
in the scheme of Home Defence, which at present is not the case'. 109 
Given the hostile attitude within the War Office, it served the purposes of those 
senior officers who had a genuine regard for the Volunteer Force, and who were, of 
course, determined to retain as many Regular troops at home as possible, to play up 
the idea that an invasion could not be discounted. During the autumn of 1917, while the 
Army Council was in the process of conducting its very thorough and generally 
unsympathetic examination of the function and existence of the movement, Volunteer 
assemblies were warned by several General Officers that invasion or raids in force 
remained distinct possibilities. 110 Parades were told that if the Germans did make an 
attempt, the military authorities estimated their assaulting force would survive for only 
one week. By that time the fleet, the Regulars and the Volunteers would have starved it 
of reinforcements and either have hurled it back into the sea or accepted its surrender. 
This theory was accepted by, among others, Lord Errol in Cumberland, who decided 
that if the invading force had not been defeated within seven days, 'they'll be all over 
us'.111 FM French himself was not above adding to the speculation. His 'alarmist views' 
and 'pessimistic utterances' caused one MP to question publicly his retention as C-in-
e, and made the editor of the Gazette's flesh 'creep' with apprehension .112 The difficulty 
facing French and his staff was to find and maintain the balance between what he 
believed was the minimum number of Regulars required for home defence and the 
number of efficient Volunteers which the country could afford to arm. If he advocated an 
unrestricted number of auxiliaries, the War Office might use it as an excuse to reduce 
109 W032.5048 (79/8) DMO to DCIGS: Notes on Distribution of Volunteers for Home Defence, 
25/09/1 7. 
110 See, for example, 1/9th (Stoke Newington) Battalion Orders November 1917. Hackney Archives 
D/S/49-11 and VF Gazette Vol.6 No.134, 23/06/17 , p.48 for a report of Lord Leconfield 's speech to 
Sussex Volunteers . In September General Sir Frank Lloyd spoke of the possibility and, in December, 
General Sir Edward Hutton announced that an invasion might be expected before the end of April 
1918. VF Gazette Vol.6 No.146, 15/09/17, p.182; No.1 58, 8/12/17, p.314. 
111 Major E.H.Coumbe's report of a conference, 7/06/17. A Regular officer had told the assembled 
Volunteer officers that a 'raid in force is considered quite probable' and encouraged them to 'press on 
with your musketry, entrenching and field exercises'. Hackney Archives D/S/49/10; Cumbria RO 
TTAF/2, 25/01/17. 
112 Hansard Vol.99 .381 , 14/11 /17 ; VF Gazette Vol.6 No.1 54, 10/11/17, p.266, p.278. Strangely, Percy 
Harris offered the contrary view: 'Even the most severe critic of the Bluewater School will admit now 
that invasion on a large scale is quite out of the question '. Hansard Vol.98.1379, 30/10/17. 
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his Regular garrisons even further. On the other hand, if he accepted the reductions 
proposed by the DMO and the DCIGS, there was the strong possibility of a political 
backlash . 
In the face of War Office antipathy, Lord Scarbrough even struggled to secure the 
acceptance of a reduction in the maximum number of grant earners to 250,000. He 
argued that the steady decline in the number of men securing exemption was inevitably 
leading to a progressive loss of men in Section B, thereby adversely affecting the 
Force's general efficiency. 113 However hard the military authorities might pressurize the 
politicians to abolish or drastically reduce the force, Scarbrough knew there would 
ultimately be limits to any further reorganization . No matter how convincing the War 
Office arguments might be, the Government would be politically unable to tolerate the 
breaching of those final parameters. Furthermore, any significant changes would 
inevitably take considerable time, a disincentive in itself for the authorities. What was, 
however, of greater importance than debates about the length of time any possible 
restructuring might take was Scarbrough's certain knowledge that Lloyd George and lan 
Macpherson would ensure any changes which were agreed would be conducted with 
more than a sympathetic nod towards local and public sentiment. 
Despite this underlying assurance Scarbrough was forced to endure another 
uncomfortable meeting in early November when the DCIGS kept up the pressure for a 
reduction in the Force's size. The meeting concluded that the only real opportunity for 
Volunteers to relieve Regulars rested in the replacement of a handful of garrisons and 
administrative services which would, in any case, only be required in an emergency but, 
to Scarbrough's satisfaction, it did accept that Volunteers might eventually be used 
along the lines of the old Territorial Force Special Service Sections and act as 
substitutes for some coastal Royal Artillery, Royal Engineer and Royal Army Medical 
Corps units. It also advocated the development of the Volunteers' own transport 
capabilities, something for which the movement had been pressing since 1915. 
Scarbrough was less enthusiastic about the re-endorsement of the earlier decision not 
to attach Volunteers to existing home service divisions and brigades, the ruling that 
those few Volunteer units which were to be allowed transport would have to provide it 
themselves and the DCIGS's desire to effect a reduction of the Force's total strength to 
1 05 battalions. Whigham wanted the number of qualified 'efficieots' to increase from its 
current 40,000 but insisted the total number of grant earners should not, at least until 
February 1918, exceed 150,000. Finally, in a pointed criticism of the way Volunteer 
113 W032.5048 (25A). Minutes of A Conference in the DSD's Room, 19/10/17. 
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matters had previously been decided without 'adequate' consultation with the General 
Staff and the AG's department, the DCIGS demanded that all proposals concerning the 
Force must be submitted to the DSD and DMO for approval. 114 
Scarbrough was clearly unhappy with several of these War Office conclusions 
and, while accepting it was no part of his duty to criticise the proposals from the view 
point of military requirement, objected to the fact that the War Office had only now 
formulated a firm policy. He complained that such a policy should have been drawn up 
either immediately following the official recognition of the Force or at least as soon as 
the Volunteer Act 1916 had become law. Warming to his theme, he criticised the Army 
Council for not indicating that it might need to limit the number of battalions when it was 
first agreed to spend public money on the Force and, if it had always intended to restrict 
the size of the force, condemned it for allowing FM French to stump the country urging 
Lords Lieutenant and local organizations to do all they could to encourage its growth. 
Even the King's name, he protested, had been frequently invoked to emphasize the 
movement's importance. He accused the War Office of resolutely failing to provide a 
response to his query in May whether it would agree to an increase in establishment 
and now, he wrote , Whigham was not only blocking an expansion, but arguing for a 
huge reduction in its size and composition . To Scarbrough: 
It would appear to be exceedingly difficult to defend a policy which at one stage of the 
war [before the introduction of compulsory service- annotation] encouraged the 
formation of as large a number of battalions as possible and at a later, more critical 
stage, when the drain on the country's manpower was becoming increasingly severe, 
deliberately disband and throw on one side nearly half of the units which for months 
have been steadily training and improving in efficiency.115 
Scarbrough predicted that if the War Office proposals were accepted , the bulk of the 
original Volunteers, as opposed to the tribunal men in Section B, would ask to be 
relieved of their obligations and those who had not already accepted service in Sections 
A orB would leave in disgust. 'Under such conditions' , he wrote, 'it cannot be supposed 
that County Commandants and Battalion Commanders would willingly retain their 
appointments and the whole organization would be in danger of collapse' .116 
A succession of memos further added to the dispute about the intended size of 
the Force and, in another paper written two weeks later, Scarbrough again laid the· 
114 W032.5048 (28) . Appendix of the meeting of 8/11/17, and letter from Army Council to FM French , 
November 1917. 
115 W032.5048 (30) . 991145. Memo from Scarbrough , 10/11/17. 
116 Ibid. 
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blame for indecision at the door of the War Office.117 He complained that real progress 
would not be secured until the General Staff produced firm proposals about the number 
of Volunteers it needed and how it was to use them. He predicted any further delay 
would cause yet more uncertainty and discontent in the ranks, give grounds to fears that 
reorganization was an indefinite process, and would prevent the formation of an efficient 
force until at least the autumn of 1918. While he seems to have accepted the inevitability 
of unit cuts, he insisted they could only be justified 'if based on a properly conceived 
military plan' . Finally, he condemned as 'altogether fallacious' FM French's accusations 
that too many men of military age were continuing to shelter behind their Volunteer 
engagement.118 
The squabbling officials of the War Office and Adastral House119 achieved what 
amounted to an imposed compromise just before Christmas. The advantage lay very 
much with Scarbrough. With the knowledge that consideration of 'public sentiment1120 
would ensure the politicians' support, he succeeded in securing a force of 27 4 infantry 
battalions with over 267,000 all ranks, and a maximum establishment of all arms of 
almost 286,000. He had no real grounds for objecting to the proposal that all men 
-· 
currently in Section D had to accept service for the duration and a commitment to drill by 
the end of February or be struck off, and welcomed the agreement whereby the number 
of drills might be modified if a man could prove a genuine difficulty in fulfilling them . 
Scarbrough enjoyed further success when the War Office sanctioned the formation of 
more Volunteer Engineer, Fortress and Signal units. These were to comprise men over 
military age and were intended in the same way as the prewar Special Service Sections 
to supplement and perhaps eventually replace Regular troops.121 The General Staff's 
proposal to reduce the number of infantry battalions to 175 and French's option of 
_defining no fixed establishment until Section D men had decided either to switch 
sections or to resign, were rejected .122 One crumb of comfort was thrown to the War 
Office by the tacit acceptance of the DGTVF and his civil masters that as only 1 05 of the 
27 4 infantry battalions were allotted specific duties, their military potential remained 
somewhat dubious. 
While Scarbrough could express satisfaction at the outcome of the recent spate 
117 W032.5048 (41). Memo from Scarbrough, 3/12/17. 
118 Ibid. • 
119 Under authority of ACI 700 of 1917 the Central Office for the administration of the Volunteer Force 
moved to Ad astral House, Victoria Embankment, in May 1917. 
120 W032.5048 (39A). Future Policy as Regards the Volunteer Force, 27/11/17 
121 W032.5048 (42A) . Memo from Scarbrough following a conference on 21/12/17. 
122 W032.5048 (39A). Future Policy as Regards the Volunteer Force , 27/11/17. 
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of conferences and at the degree of Governmental support, until the issues of the 
tribunal men's commitment and confirmation of Section D resignations were resolved, 
the auxiliary would remain in a state of flux. Despite the enthusiasm of thousands of its 
members, the Force's reliability remained questionable, its training unconvincing and 
its equipment supply patchy. French's Sunday tours of the country had important 
benefits as far as morale of existing members was concerned , but he and the DGTVF 
had to play for time. If they could retain the support of the politicians to continue 
successfully resisting the War Office's swingeing ambitions, establish an acceptable 
degree of reliability in membership and efficiency and improve its organization and 
administration, the Volunteer Force had a chance of survival. 
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CHAPTER XI: 'A SHAM OR A REAL THING'?1 
In a blatantly propagandist and less than balanced assessment of the Volunteer 
movement in late 1917, a contemporary writer described how the Government had 
'unostentatiously' and 'without any fuss or furore ... created for themselves by the work 
and devotion of others' a new reserve force with an established role in the defence of 
the country. This 'integral part of the armed forces ', which was said to be regarded in 
'official quarters as the worthy successors of the old Territorials', had been nearly three 
and a half years in the making.2 However, two years after Field Marshal (FM) French had 
been appointed General Officer Commanding-in-Command Home Forces, (GOC-in-
CHF) and a full 12 months since the passage of the Volunteer Bill, French himself, who 
in public continued to give the movement support and encouragement, remained , like 
Brigadier-General Croft, disappointingly unconvinced of the Force's utility. 
In January 1918, French produced another paper which returned to his earlier 
theme of quality rather than quantity for the Volunteer Force. He suggested the existing 
Force be replaced by a smaller body centred on the East Coast and organized on a 
militia basis. This reduced total of battalions would require a comprehensive training 
regime designed to include a seven day compulsory camp and attendance at drill rigidly 
enforced. French assumed that in an emergency they would be needed only for some 
three to four days but believed that a small number of inland units should be retained as 
a reserve to the coastal forces. Finally, French wanted the name 'Volunteer' abolished 
as a misnomer: home defence should, in the Field Marshal's opinion, be regarded not 
as an option but as a duty.3 For reasons of political expediency rather than military 
practicality, French was not to achieve his desired reduction in strength. Indeed, with the 
extension of compulsion in the Spring of 1918, the Force was to undergo a previously 
unanticipated increase in size and another fundamental change in composition . 
When making these recommendations in January 1918, French drew upon the 
knowledge gleaned from his many personal tours of inspection. In addition , he studied 
reports and returns submitted by the full-time adjutants and the Travelling Schools of 
Instruction, as well as assessments by Regular officers of Volunteer camps and 
attendance at courses. The picture French built up was of a force which despite having 
made great strides in efficiency, training and equipment, remained in essence tl:le body 
.. 
1 Brigadier-General H.P.Croft, HansardVol.90.2212-23, 1/03/17. 
2 W .C.Price, 'The Spare Time Force', The Fortnightly Review, January-June 1918, pp.769. 
3 W070.42. Letter 991721 . No date but January 1918. 
of amateurs it had always been. Percy Harris' claim that the Volunteers were as efficient 
as the prewar Territorials was hardly a ringing endorsement of their worth and the 
reluctance with which some county associations had undertaken the responsibility of 
administration continued to be mirrored in their attitude towards the Volunteers. There 
remained no compulsion to have a Volunteer representative on associations' 
committees and some counties had not even bothered to establish a Volunteer 
Committee. The City of London Association angrily condemned the movement for 
having 'no history, no continuity and consists of those too old or too young for active 
service, or of exempted men who, for the most part, at any rate , are not the keenest 
fighting men'.4 When , having been in a state of suspension for nearly three years the 
Central Council of Territorial Force Associations was resurrected to act as a clearing 
house and advice centre for counties on Territorial and Volunteer issues, it tended to 
show little interest in the latter's affairs. It did sometimes agree to press for Army 
Council Instructions (ACI) on certain Volunteer matters but in response to many 
enquiries it often replied that it had no opinion or knowledge to offer.5 
In some county associations there was a definite distrust of the Volunteers. 
There were accusations of Volunteers purloining Territorials' equipment and of using 
the petrol ration for their own private use. Some were so distrustful they perceived the 
necessity of drawing up rules to warn of a £5 fine should any Volunteer attempt to pawn 
his kit and there were regular complaints, perhaps paradoxically from a force which 
contained so many white collar workers and small scale businessmen, that its local 
administration was inadequate. The Volunteers' ignorance of military procedure and 
their refusal to follow instructions often resulted in company and platoon commanders 
ignoring the correct channels and writing, much to the dismay of senior officers, directly 
to their Command area. Too many members appeared to have an obsession with 
either obtaining their own release or at least securing exemption from drills at certain 
times of the year. They were not trusted to take their weapons home or to receive duty 
free tobacco, and one of its keenest supporters wanted the Government to give 
advanced warning of mobilization (and thus of course of a German raid or invasion) to 
• The Secretary of the Newent Corps indignantly refused the offer of a £2 honorarium insisting he did 
not do the job for monetary gain. Gloucester RO 04277/6, 25/01/17; Hansard Vol.98.1380, 30/1 0/1 7; 
WO letter 9/GN/6608 TF2 of 5/04/17; London Metropolitan Archives AfT A/15, 14/06/17; Liverpool RO 
356WES/65, 28/04/17; Guildhall Library Ms.12.606/2, 15/11 /17 ; 
5 Duke of York's HQ, Council of County Territorial Associations, Minutes 1908-22. 
enable Volunteers to attend to their business and family affairs before marching away.6 
Some battalions contained holders of the Indian Mutiny Medal, and Rifle Volunteers who 
had joined in 1863; its leadership could squabble over the denomination of battal ion 
chaplains, and had members who suggested hare-brained schemes such as forming 
a Volunteer Royal Flying Corps to fly obsolete machines.7 They endured the invidious 
distinction of being the only element of the armed forces required to buy their own boots, 
wore their civilian greatcoats over the uniform many had bought themselves and , unlike 
the Territorials, were not even awarded the right of exemption from jury service. Only on 
very rare occasions were Volunteers allowed to draw government rations and , in 
contrast to members of the Territorial Force, could not claim separation allowances 
when away on courses or camp.8 They could be fined for wearing their uniform at the 
wrong time or in the wrong place, were allowed to use Territorial rifle ranges but might 
not be permitted to enjoy their adjacent social facilities, were expected to devote a 
considerable amount of their leisure time to corps' activities and were supposed to 
improve their military skills in spite of a shortage of qualified instructors.9 Battalions still 
had to rely on a combination of local authority benevolence, subscription income and 
the generosity of individuals to supplement what they perceived as an inadequate 
6 Lancashire RO DDX/11/1 , 5/01/17; W070.43; IWM Dept.of Printed Books 316.338 C.6051 , 19/01/18; 
Ibid., 18/05/17; Manchester Archives M73/3.22, 8/08/16; IWM Dept.of Printed Books 316.338 C.6051 , 
13/07/17 and ACI 287 of 1917 (VFO No .XLIV); Hansard Vol.82.1994, 23/05/16. It was thought old 
soldiers would abuse such a privilege by selling on the tobacco; Hansard Vol.1 01 .684, 21/01/18. 
7 Cllr-Sgt Lewis, 13th Battalion WR Volunteer Regiment, holder of the Indian Mutiny Medal attended 
camp in 1917, aged 82 years. VF Gazette Vol.6 No.142, 18/08/17, p.140. One man on a digging 
parade in January 1917 had joined the Rifle Volunteers in 1863. W0161 /11 1; NAS MD6/48, 
11/12/17; Letter to the Yorkshire Post cited in VF Gazette Vol.6 No.149, 6/10/17, p.206; 
8 W070.42. Letter 991411 TV1 of21/11/17. Funerals of Volunteers killed in connection with air raid 
duties were paid for out of the public purse but those who died in the course of other duties came 
under the Workmen's Compensation Act. ACI 860 of 1918, Volunteer Force Order (VFO) No.CXCII ); 
When Lieutenant-General Sir E.Bethune inspected the Northumberland Volunteer Regiment in 
November 1916 the men were deemed to be on 'temporary service' and could claim rations allowance 
at a rate of 5d for 8 hours' duty. This was a very rare concession . W070.43; WO letter 991243 TV1 of 
27/08/17 told the Cornwall Association that it could not give separation allowances to men away on 
courses no matter what their home circumstances. Macpherson explained that the Volunteers went on 
such courses voluntarily. It had been an obligation for Territorials. Hansard Vol.92.1487, 5/04/1 7. 
9 An invalided army instructor attached to a Volunteer unit was fined one guinea for wearing his army 
uniform in public. His corps wore a green suit but he claimed he could not afford to buy one. VF 
Gazette Vol.5 No.105, 2/12/16, p.2; Manchester Archives M73/3.23, 25/05/17. The East Lancashire 
Association ordered that all movable items, including beer pumps in canteens, should be removed 
before allowing Volunteers to use its drill halls. Ibid., 19/04/17; Cogper claimed he did not have a 
Sunday at home for 8 consecutive weeks. E.R.Cooper MSS, p.8, IWM Dept. of Printed Books. One 
signaller attended 124 from a possible 129 sessions, none of which was counted as an official drill. 
J.Tindall , The Sidmouth Volunteers 1914-1918, Exeter: Culverwell & Sons, nd., p.35; Colonel 
Bamford, OC 8th Manchester Vol. Battalion was one of many who complained to the Gazette about 
the dearth of instructors. VF Gazette Vol.5 No.121 , 24/03/17, p.205; 
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government grant.10 One corps even contemplated a street collection until it was told by 
the War Office that it was inappropriate for an arm of His Majesty's Forces to beg on 
street corners .11 Officers, many of whom were not in their first flush and were fully 
engaged in running civilian businesses, were expected to pay for themselves to go on 
residential courses or when studying a home-based programme. 
The apprehension felt by French and most of Britain's military hierarchy about the 
Volunteers' worth is perhaps understandable. The war had already forced the 
authorities to accept many unpalatable erosions in the way the army was raised , 
organized and officered : the appearance of the New Armies and their 'temporary 
gentlemen' and the promotion of some Territorial officers to Brigadier-General to name 
but two. The old army had held the prewar Territorials in little regard and, to the 
establishment, that body's apparent successor, the Volunteer Force, warranted even 
less acknowledgement. The Territorials had been amateurs and volunteers but the TF 
had a tradition, an esprit and was composed of men of military age who wanted to be 
part of its battalions and batteries. Most Volunteers who really wanted to be corps 
members were over military age, maintained an alarmingly unmilitaristic wish for 
independence and, while they might have criticised the War Office for a lack of support, 
generally resented the authorities' attempts to impose organization and discipline. The 
Force did contain many sincere enthusiasts but by 1917 almost the majority of 
members were there because they had been sent by the tribunals . If they chose to 
default on their obligations there was little in practical terms the authorities through the 
exercise of military or civil law could do about it. The military could claim with some 
justification that it had tried to meet the demands of the eccentric and very unfamiliar 
force half way but, having granted concession after concession, they were still accused 
of throwing every conceivable obstacle in the Volunteers' path and of refusing to take 
them seriously. Since recognition, the Government had spent progressively more on the 
Force, money which the movement's supporters claimed was justifiably spent because 
a Volunteer cost the state only £2 per year whereas it cost £84 to maintain a Regular. If 
the 250,000 Volunteers did the work of only 25,000 Regulars, they would, therefore , 
have saved the state £1 .6m, formed an organized army for home defence and allowed 
the release of the equivalent of nearly one and a half divisions for overseas duty. 12 
. 
10 WO letter 9NF /215 TV1 of 27/04/17 stressed the role that local a uthorities were still expected to 
play in financing corps. 
11 W070.42. WO letter 99/M/83 TV1 of 1/03/18 refused permission for the CO of the 5th Bn. Middlesex 
Vol. Regiment to hold a street collection . 
12 VF Gazette Vol.3 No.72, 15/04/16, p.308. 
The Government wanted, of course, to ensure its money was being spent wisely. 
At the same time as French wrote his memo suggesting cuts in the size of the Force, 
the Select Committee on National Expenditure reported it had discovered no firm War 
Office conclusions as to how it proposed to use the Volunteers .13 The implication of the 
committee's findings was that despite recognition , Acts of Parliament and state 
expenditure, the War Office could find no purpose for the auxiliary. The financial outlay 
had thus produced no military advantage. On behalf of the Government, Bonar Law 
justified the expenditure but it was evident that apart from some planning as to where 
certain units might be required on mobilization, the Volunteer Force had made little 
impact on the War Office's thoughts and schemes of home defence. 14 Having studied 
the evidence the Army Council had come to the stark conclusion that the Volunteer 
Force was of no conceivable military worth . 
Supporters of the movement quite naturally held an alternative opinion of the 
Force's potential. They could point to the numbers of battalions acquiring modern 
weapons, the supply of enough equipment for all Section A and 8 men, the increasing 
numbers of men qualifying as 'efficient', the appointment of RSM and Sergeant 
Instructors and the encouraging attendance at camp. Unfortunately this veneer of 
improving efficiency covered some still very unsatisfactory blemishes. 
In the same manner as the county associations had complained that government 
grants for the Territorial Force and the National Reserve were inadequate for their 
purpose, the associations, although grateful for the £2 grant awarded for each efficient 
man, argued throughout 1917 that the sum was insufficient. The Government estimated 
that once the amount for the cost of providing a uniform had been deducted there would 
be nearly one quarter of the grant remaining; this residue was to be spent on general 
expenses and the administration of the County Regiment. The Durham Association was 
among the first to appeal to its County Council, local boroughs and Urban District 
Councils (UDCs) to supplement what it considered would be a substantial shortfall 
between income and expenditure. It met with some success but two of the county's 
boroughs declined to spend rate payers' money on the Volunteers. The East 
Lancashire Association was considerably more confident than its Durham counterpart. 
Even with the County Commandant's 'wild over-estimation ' of the number of men 
expected to qualify as efficient, the association calculated that after uniforms had been 
purchased, the financial position would still be 'satisfactory'. Individual corps or 
13 Hansard Vol.101 .534, 17/01/18; VF Gazette Vol.? No.169, 23/02/18, p.86. 
14 Hansard Vol.1 01 .1493-94, 29/01/18. 
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companies were not supposed to make their own appeals but were allowed to accept 
grants if offered directly from within their locality. When approached by its battal ion for 
assistance, Hackney Borough Council agreed to give £3 (up to £300) for every £2 ra ised 
in subscriptions and Exeter Town Council voted £1 for every new recruit to a maximum 
of £250. 15 
Despite the renewed activity and interest in the Volunteers , the summer of 1917 
witnessed a falling off in municipal grants. This disconcerting phenomenon was 
blamed on the holiday recess and the rule which insisted monies had to pass through 
Territorial associations instead of going directly to individual corps . Oxford Town 
Council, for example, wanted to give £250 to the HQ Company of its 1st Battalion but the 
County Committee insisted it had to go through the association . The simple solution 
was for local authorities to earmark the money solely for the use of the Volunteers and 
the Territorial associations were supposed to pass it on . Nottinghamshire was one 
association which guaranteed that local detachments would reap the full benefit of any 
contribution made by a UDC: donations from the County Council had a proportion put 
aside for HQ expenses and the remainder shared equally between the county's 
battalions. If there were no strings attached to contributions from individuals or 
businesses as to how or where the grants should be spent, associations normally 
allowed commanding officers (COs) to spend it where they thought appropriate. Several 
councils did make grants over the summer months: the City of Nottingham gave £250, 
the City Corporation of London awarded £6000, and 14 of London 's 18 boroughs also 
voted sums. Yet the knowledge that it would soon receive additional income did not 
assuage the constant worries of the Inns of Court Reserve Corps over the non-payment 
of members' subscriptions. 16 The War Office, too, remained sufficiently concerned over 
the amounts being awarded to write confidentially once again to associations urging 
them to make yet greater efforts to raise funds locally.17 The authorities were , therefore , 
presumably unhappy to learn in December that as the movement was now under state 
finance the Surrey Association felt justified in repaying some unspent funds donated 
earlier from the Lord Lieutenant's Fund. It did this in the knowledge that its financial 
15 W0161/107; Durham RO D/TA3, 3/04/17; ACI548 of 1917 (VFO No.LIII) ; Durham RO D/TA3, 
15/05/17; Manchester Archives M73/3.22, 23/03/17; VF Gazette Vol.5 No.129, 19/05/17, p.294 and 
No.137, 14/07/17, p.74. 
16 Oxford RO 0/11/1/A1/3, 5/03/17; Nottingham RO DDTA1/2, 31/07/17; Wiltshire RO L 1/101 /2, 
21/07/17; Nottingham RO DDT/A1/1, 31/07/17; VFGazetteVol.6 o.135, 30/06/17, p.50; Guildhall 
Library Ms.14.516. 
17 There were accusations that some Territorial Associations were not spending the money voted by 
boroughs but letting it lie in their coffers. VF Gazette Vol. 7 No.179, 4/05/17, p.206; WO letter 9911 02 
TV1 of 30/06/17 pressed associations to do all they could to raise funds locally. 
position was sound and in the expectation that future expenses would be met by the 
Government. In contrast, the Perthshire Volunteers had fallen into such desperate 
financial straits that they were only prevented from having to make a Christmas publ ic 
appeal by the timely benevolence of £200 from Lord Mansfield . 18 
Although most corps and battalions kept a tight rein on their expenditure, some 
certainly had a rather cavalier attitude towards their finances, spending money which 
they either did not have or for which they had no authority to spend . While one corps 
arranged an auction of antiques to keep itself solvent and a second suggested captured 
German guns could be given to the Volunteers to raise desperately-needed funds , a 
third was in the habit of hiring what was considered by its association to be 
unnecessary motor transport.19 Many COs were reprimanded by their associations for 
presenting bills for work done without first getting the required permission from their 
Finance Committee and certain businesses clearly tried to exploit the Volunteers' 
supposed profligacy by submitting excessive invoices for their services or materials.20 
The number of men whom a corps could class as efficient and thus earn the £2 
grant was crucial to its financial security. In August 1917, the 1st Battalion Devonshire 
Volunteer Regiment was £169 in debt: several of its officers were guarantors to the 
bank, its members paid only a small subscription and , of the 600 men in the battalion , 
only 52% were in Sections A or B. It had little hope of avoiding financial embarrassment 
unless the Territorial association was prepared to bail it out. The Buckinghamshire 
Association noted dryly that as barely half of its men had qualified as efficient by early 
1918 it was not earning enough money to make the corps self-supporting . Difficulties in 
gaining access to ranges meant that in some counties men failed to qualify because 
they could not fire their course. 21 Poor administration might have added to battalions' 
financial difficulties but if any unit wanted to employ orderly room staff their pay had to 
come from Territorial funds. Such requests were usually rejected by the county 
associations. Some counties were clearly more successful than others in keeping a 
tight rein on their subordinates' spending: West Lancashire insisted its battalions 
18 Surrey RO 608/3/6, p.3/12/17; NAS MD7/38, 2/11/17. 
19 Devon RO 1262M/L 125, letter of 1 0/08/17; VF Gazette Vol.4 No.89, 12/08/16, p.175; Cornwall RO 
DDX.295/12, 2/08/17. 
20 WO letter 99/U78 TV1 of 10/05/17 laid down the procedure for sanctioning expenditure of 
associations' funds. There are many minuted instances of COs spend ing without authority. For 
example: Durham RO D/TA3, 3/07/17, Manchester Archives M73~3.23 , 7/12/17; A local builder 
submitted a job estimate at over £32: the Association 's Surveyor said it could be done for £8. In 
another case a solicitor accepted payment equivalent to only one-fifth of his original invoice. 
Manchester Archive M73/2/4, 10/05/17, Essex RO Buildings and Ranges Committee, 10/04/18. 
21 Devon RO 1262M/L 125, letter of 10/08/17; Buckinghamshire ROT/A /1/22 , Annual Report, 
31 /03/18 ; Lincolnshire RO TA 1/1 , 24/08/17. 
present quarterly returns for their postage and stationary accounts and of East 
Lancashire's 20 battalions, only four were slightly overspent in 1917.22 
In an effort to get sufficient money into its coffers before the arrival of invoices 
from uniform manufacturers, Cambridgeshire Association proposed that the £2 grant 
should be paid in two stages. It wanted an initial payment of 30 shillings to be followed 
by the remaining 25% when the individual had passed his musketry course and had 
attended ten drills. Monmouthshire went a stage further and circulated all associations 
with a proposal that the £2 grant should be given when the man signed for Section A or 
8 rather than to have to wait until he had become efficient. 23 The consensus of opinion 
in the several counties who recorded their discussion on the Monmouthshire resolution 
was divided: West and East Lancashire rejected it while Shropshire and the City of 
Aberdeen supported the idea as a practicable means of securing adequate money to 
meet expenses. If it thought a county was likely to earn sufficient extra grants within a 
short time, the War Office was sometimes prepared to defer payments to the Clothing 
Department, but its unrelenting flow of regulations and instructions were often 
characterized by contradiction and obfuscation. It could also be frustratingly pedantic. It 
took officials two months to decide that the War Office should not pay for the installation 
of a telephone in a County Commandant's office. The issue hinged upon mobilization 
procedure but the bureaucrats finally ruled that because the County Commandant had 
not actually been mobilized, the association should pay.24 
One association sought clarity on what the War Office actually thought it should 
provide for its Volunteers. It pointed out the dilemma between the military authorities' 
stated desire of financing an efficient auxiliary and their refusal to pay, for example, for 
landscape targets which would assist in developing that efficiency. Consequently it 
wanted to know whether, in view of the shortfall in earned grants, it could spend the 
surplus realized from Territorial grants since 1908. The War Office did allow association 
funds and reserves to be used on behalf of the Volunteers mainly because by late 1917 
it tacitly accepted that delays in getting men passed 'efficient' were resulting in lower 
22"fhe WO repeatedly reaffirmed that pay for any orderly room staff had to come from associations' 
funds . Nottingham Association paid a Boy Scout 6 shillings a week to act as an orderly to the Staff 
Sgt-Major at HQ. Nottinghamshire RO DDTA4/4, 13/12/17; Liverpool RO 356WES/65, 18/05/17; 
Manchester Archives M73/3.24, 28/04/18. 
23 The County of London Association also sent a motion to the Arm_.y Council requesting the £2 grant 
be paid when the man signed on. Unlike the Monmouthshire resolution it appears not to have been 
widely circulated . London Metropolitan Archives (LMA) AfT A/2, 7/11/17. 
24 Cambridgeshire RO R.68/11, 3/02/17; Liverpool RO 356WES1/1 , 17/11/17; Manchester Arch ives 
M73/3.23, 1 0/01/18; Shropshire RO 1988/34, 3/11/17; NAS MD4/3, 7/1 1/17; Leeds Archives WR 
Co.Association , Book 2, 29/04/18; Liverpool RO 356WES/65, 12/03/18. 
than anticipated payments. Until it could decide upon an alternative system, in January 
1918 the War Office resorted to circulating associations urging them to make 'provision 
for the full maintenance of the Volunteers' . The Nottinghamshire Association 
considered this plea amounted to almost a breach of agreement and tersely minuted its 
discontent with Central Authority. The often difficult relations between London and the 
county associations was sometimes exacerbated by numerous petty disputes such as 
who should pay for chevrons, who should pick up the bill for the removal and 
replacement of greatcoat buttons and who should pay for the cleaning of drill halls used 
by Volunteer detachments. This bickering between the associations and the War Office 
was merely a continuation of the often strained relationship which had existed since the 
formation of the Territorial Force. War Office parsimony had always to compete with 
what it viewed as the desire of associations to spend , if not irresponsibly, with 
insufficient thrift. On its part, the War Office thought the Volunteer Force was of little use 
and therefore naturally resented the money being spent on it. The Volunteers interpreted 
the reluctance to provide them with what they considered an adequate grant as yet 
another example of War Office antipathy to auxiliary forces. In similar vein, the movement 
was reluctant to acknowledge what the authorities considered to be a major concession 
in allowing Volunteers to wear service dress as anything other than one more 
suspicious ploy to give with one hand and take away with the other. 25 
The matter of uniform had continued to be an emotive issue within Volunteer 
ranks: they appreciated regulations which allowed them to wear the same badges of 
rank as the Regulars, to retain their old corps shoulder flashes , the replacement of the 
old despised brassard by a less obvious drab version and even to claim a refund of up 
to £1 for the expense of having bought their own uniforms.26 They remained annoyed , 
however, because the War Office would not issue each man with a greatcoat and , more 
25 Manchester Archives M73/3.23, 1 /02/18; Nottingham RO DDTA 1/1 , 30/10/17. In April 1918, the 
Association minuted that despite its correspondence with the War Office, its financial position 
remained far from secure. It was dipping heavily into its own funds in order to subsidize the deficit in 
its Volunteer Account. DDTA 1/1, 30/04/18; Liverpool RO 356WESL65, 12/03/18; Cornwall RO 
DDX.295/6, 7/02/18 and NAS MD7/38, 30/11/17. W070.42. WO letter 99/356 TV1 of 9/10/17 
informed associations that the War Office would supply new buttons for the Canadian greatcoats but 
would not cover the cost of sewing them on. 
26 ACI1936 of 1916, (VFO No.XX); ACI49 of 1917, (VFO No.XXVII); VFO Lll . Refunds were not given 
for uniforms bought from Local Authority grants. 
especially, by the retention of the restrictions on the wearing of khaki .27 Nevertheless, 
when the Army Clothing Department announced it was unable to give even approximate 
delivery dates for completed uniforms, the authorities responded quickly by allowing 
associations to buy the Volunteer serge and have it made up locally. Those corps which 
did wait for the Clothing Department to produce their uniforms found they came only in 
stock sizes: an unfortunate discovery as they were intended for men of advancing age 
and girth. Uniforms were only to be officially supplied for men in Sections A and B but 
those in D were granted permission to purchase their own and members who had paid 
for the previously officially approved green suit could have theirs dyed at corps' 
expense.28 
In another conciliatory move, the War Office also acknowledged associations' 
grievances over the rule preventing them from providing a uniform until a man became 
efficient. When Kent clothed not only its 1700 efficient men but also its 1800 unqualified 
members, the War Office accepted the 'error' and informed the association that the men 
had clearly been clothed 'in anticipation'. Similarly, when the Secretary of the 
Nottinghamshire Association was told in December 1917 by the Director-General 
Territorial and Volunteer Force (DGTVF) that the authorities were considering a change 
in the rule, he took the obvious hint and quickly ordered cloth for an additional 2000 
uniforms. The change came in February 1918 when the Government again bowed to 
association pressure and allowed corps to clothe men when they joined rather than 
wait until they had become efficient. 29 This announcement was well received by the 
associations because it meant that men in Section B with three month's exemption 
could now be issued with a uniform. However, shortages of cloth caused delays and 
there were complaints well into the summer that battalions were being prevented from 
27 ACI1881 of 1916 and 1094 of 1917, (VFO No.XVIII and LXXXV). Greatcoats were issued for the 
number of guards required per post; HansardVol.92 .1799, 17/05/17. Macpherson said that the 
regulations required a man to remove his uniform when he arrived home from drill , Hansard 
Vol.97.1138, 15/08/17. He was referring to ACI 2417 of 1916, (VFO No.XXIII) which had not been 
altered but was being enforced with differing degrees of severity in different parts of the country. 
Inconsistencies as to when uniform could be worn remained : Volunteers on duty during air ra ids and 
working under the authority of the GOC District could wear uniform but those assisting the pol ice cou ld 
not. HansardVol.99.1168, 21/11/17. 
28 Durham RO D/TA3, 1/02/17. ACI 308 of 20/02/17 allowed cloth to be made up locally; 1st Bn . 
Perthshire Vol. Regiment had 170 suits with 34" chests delivered. l:hese were 'gradually' returned to 
the makers. NAS MD7/38, 25/01/17; the Stoke Newington Battalion paid for its members to have their 
uniforms dyed . Hackney Archives D/S/49-11 . 
29 Kent RO MD/TA3/4, 30/11/17; Nottingham RO DDTA4/4, 13/12/17; WO letter 99/529 TF1 of 
15/02/18 authorized the issue of a uniform when a man joined rather than when he became efficient. 
It was formalized by ACI 373 of 1918, (VFO No.CLXXI) . 
holding daylight parades because so many of their men remained without uniforms .30 
Despite Forster's insistence that the authorities were actually trying to help 
Volunteer officers, War Office timing had clearly not been at its best when it announced 
the green uniform could be replaced by khaki. Many officers were former Regulars and 
Territorial officers who could now revert, Forster explained , to wearing their original 
service uniforms. If the Government had thought the issue through and announced at 
the same time, rather than two months later, that it would also provide a grant for 
officers to buy their own uniforms, it would have saved considerable ill-feeling .31 The 
authorities also made errors in the anticipated cost of providing the material for 
uniforms. The Contracts Department was certainly deceived by the manufacturers but 
the method used in the attempt to recoup some of its over-expenditure raised a storm of 
protest. In April 1918 the Government announced the £2 grant would be increased by 5 
shillings but, at the same time, it also announced that the cost of serge cloth was to 
increase by 42% per yard. As this meant the price of each uniform would rise by about 
1 0 shillings, associations complained that they were approximately 5 shillings worse off 
per uniform than they had been before. The War Office did subsequently allow that any 
association having difficulty in finding the increased cost could apply for additional 
central assistance but, again, the damage had been done.32 
Even the issue of 1914 pattern weapons did not meet with the universal 
acclamation the War Office might have expected. The new rifles were considered heavy 
and awkward for drill and there were immediate suspicions, promptly denied by 
Macpherson, that the Government was to charge for the use of practice ammunition .33 
The increase in the number of sets of equipment issued to each battalion from 200 to 
1000 in May 1917 was certainly welcomed . The supply progressed so rapidly that by 
early August the 4th Lincolnshire Battalion actually held a considerable surplus. 34 
However, this War Office munificence brought with it unexpected problems: the Gazette 
30 Hansard Vol.1 01 .2079-80, 5/02/18. 
31 Forster explained the wearing of khaki was not compulsory but that the WO had made the 
concession following 'numerous representations' from ex-Regulars and TF officers. Hansard 
Vol.92 .776-7, 30/03/17; ACI 794 of 1917, (VFO No.LXV) awarded officers £10 as a uniform grant. 
32 W0161/1 07 (3) ; VFO No.CLXXI. The sums were calculated on the requirement of 3 yards of cloth 
per uniform. VF Gazette Vol.7 No.177, 27/04/18, p.182; W070.42. WO letter 99/01186 of 24/05/18 
allowed associations to apply for supplemental grants. 
33 E.R.Cooper MSS IWM Dept.of Printed Books, p.7; HansardVol.90.1588, 23/02/17; ACI 547 of 191 7, 
(VFO No.LII) laid down regulations for the issue of ammunition. It was modified by VFO No.CLXXXI in 
May 1918. 
34 ACI 827 of 1917, (VFO No. LXIX) authorized 1000 sets per battalion ; 4th Bn.Lincs Voi.Regiment, 
IWM Dept.of Printed Books 316.338 C.6051 , 3/08/17. Equipment was also occasionally acquired 
through non-official channels. When the 2/6 Cheshire Battalion was broken up it gave sundry 
oddments to the local Volunteer battalion. E.R.Cooper, MSS, p.20, Dept. of Documents, IWM. 
appealed for anyone who knew how to assemble the Canadian pattern webbing to 
contact the journal and the Bucking hamshire Volunteers decided to dispose of 500 
purchased bayonets because they did not fit their new rifles. 35 
It was the responsibility of the Territorial associations to ensure the security and 
maintenance of the Volunteers' weapons but this did not mean that weapons had to be 
stored in conventional armouries. Some associations allowed the hire of premises 
away from drill halls for the use of company armouries but those associations which did 
insist upon weapons being returned nightly to a central store after guard duty or practice 
were particularly unpopular with members living in rural areas. 36 
Supporters in Parliament had repeatedly asked when modern rifles would be 
issued to replace those bought by corps or to provide weapons for those men whose 
battalions had not succeeded in acquiring them through private means. Macpherson's 
prediction in early March 1917 that practically all Section A men would have a weapon 
within six weeks was not unduly optimistic. The first regiment to be fully equipped and 
armed at private and public expense was thought to be the East Yorkshire , but two 
illustrations of how much still needed to be done in the field can be seen in the 
Hampshire and City of Aberdeen Corps: for an inspection by FM French , only 39% of the 
Hants Volunteers paraded with a rifle and a mere 19% of the Aberdeen Corps were in 
possession of a weapon by April. 37 
The situation improved significantly over the summer. In July 1917, an official at 
the Territorial Force (TF) Directorate noted there was little difficulty in providing the 1914 
pattern for all Section A, B or C men and sufficient Hotchkiss for their battalions' 
machine gun establishment. By October, several more regiments reported they were 
fully armed but some, for example the Buckinghamshire and Shropshire Volunteers , 
35 VF Gazette Vol.5 No.127, 5/05/17, p.279; Buckinghamshire RO T/N1/13, 1/03/17. 
36 WO letter 991107 TF2 of 4/04/17 compelled Territorial Associations to ensure the security of 
armouries used by Volunteers. Armouries took many forms: the 2/2 Essex Battalion hired 3 rooms of a 
disused shop at Harwich and the Oldham battalion used schools, houses and a public house. Essex 
RO Buildings and Ranges Committees, 11/04/17, Manchester Archives M73/3/23, 5/1 0/17; VF Gazette 
Vol.6 No.133, 16/06/17, p.25. In February 1918 Western Command ordered units not to keep rifles at 
small out-lying detachments but pointed out the danger of keeping too many together in one building 
unless it was properly guarded. Trusted .individuals were allowed to retain their own weapons but 
where large numbers were stored together, bolts had to be kept separately. Shropshire RO 1681/198/7, 
20/02/18; Associations also had to insure Volunteers' weapons, the Surrey Association , for example, 
paying an annual premium of almost £62. Surrey RO 608/3/6, 30/07/17. 
37 Hansard Vol.90.1471-72, 22/02/17, 2235, 1/03/17; VF Gazette Vol.5 No.127, 5/05/1 7, p.280; Hants 
RO 37M69/3, Chairman 's Report March 1917; NAS MD4/2, 4/04/17. 
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remained considerably undersupplied until later in the year.38 Despite these few 
exceptions, the Government had kept its promises well: men were receiving uniforms 
and equipment, finance , while not over-extravagent was, generally sufficient for 
responsible associations, modern personal weapons were becoming increasingly 
available, the number of Hotchkiss guns for battalions on the East Coast was doubled , 
and the Government, in public at least, spoke with confidence and encouragement 
about the developing Force. 39 However, it was not enough merely to equip the corps 
with uniforms and weapons. The Government had also to keep its promises about the 
provision of training and administrative staff and, for its own satisfaction, to ensure that 
these appointees were capable of securing a return for the financial investment by 
moulding an efficient force . 
Full time adjutants with a rank no higher than Captain were appointed to 
Volunteer battalions for periods of six months. They were originally intended to have 
been wounded Regular and Territorial officers who later, when fit, would return to 
normal duties. As the demand for suitable men was high , it was decided Volunteers 
already in the job could be appointed provisionally and, once they had passed a course, 
would be gazetted out of their Volunteer commission and into the Territorial Force 
Reserve (General List).4° Further regulations in May allowed for the appointment of a 
Regimental Sergeant Major (RSM) and Colour-Sergeant (CIIr-Sgt) for each battalion and 
also provided the opportunity for existing Volunteer non-commissioned officers (NCOs) 
to enlist as Privates in the Territorial Force, qualify as instructors, and then be attached 
as Acting/RSM or Acting/CIIr-Sgt Instructor to his Volunteer battalion . These men were to 
serve on a part-time basis - attempts in at least one county to appoint them as full-time 
staff having failed because the men concerned were unwilling to give up their civilian 
occupation. Later in the year, battalions were allowed to appoint a Regimental 
Quartermaster Sergeant (RQMS) who, if unwilling to do the work voluntarily, could be 
38 W0161/1 07/3; In June 1917 all West Riding units were reported to be fully equipped apart from gas 
masks, Cumberland and Ayr's battalions by July and Surrey's by October. Leeds Archives, WR TF 
Assoc. Book 2, 25/06/17, Cumbria RO TTAF/2, 26/07/17, NAS MD5/22, 3/07/17 , Surrey RO 608/1/2, 
15/1 0/17; In July Shropshire's two battalions had arms for only about two-thirds of its men and 
equipment for one-third and Buckinghamshire reported it was still 1600 rifles short of establishment. 
Shropshire RO 1988/35, 28/07/17, Bucking hamshire RO T/A/1/1, 5/07/17. 
39 Cambridgeshire RO R.68/11, 28/04/17. Handbooks for the Hotchkiss did not always arrive with the 
guns. As late as July 1918 one 2Lt. was advised to buy a manual from Gale & Polden . SHropshire RO 
1681/198/6, 17/07/18. 
40 WO letter 99181 TF2 of 17/02/17. In addition , Group Adjutants, responsible for a 'brigade' of 3-4 
battalions, and County Adjutants were also appointed; WO letter 991109 TV1 of 23/05/17. The 'TF 
Reserve' was removed in August by 991200 and left simply as 'General List'. Officers drew their pay 
through Messrs Cox & Co. 
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paid from TF funds .41 In appreciation of the difficulties faced by Permanent Staff in 
scattered units, the War Office occasionally allowed them a motorcycle and also 
replaced the informal arrangements by which Regular and Territorial instructors from 
nearby camps had been employed as instructors with an official , permanent structure.42 
There is little surviving evidence to suggest how the appointment of the former 
Regular or Territorial officers and senior NCOs was received by the Volunteers . It might 
be expected that the genuine Volunteer in Section A, a member because he wanted to 
be, viewed it as a welcome opportunity to be trained by men with active service 
experience. To the tribunal men, many of whom merely wished to have their names 
registered as having attended a drill, and to the former Rifle Volunteer or Regular army 
CO, the Permanent Staff might be seen, respectively, as a threat to their otherwise 
casual manner, or to their authority. When he was appointed adjutant to the 4th 
Gloucestershire Volunteer Battalion, Basil Liddell Hart was struck by the lack of 
discipline and its 'disorganized and slack ways.' He endured an uncomfortable few 
weeks of opposition from the local press, critical anonymous letters to the CO and the 
less than full support from his Colonel. Liddell Hart maintained his stance and 
eventually won the respect of all concerned and claimed to have turned the battalion into 
one of the finest in Southern Command .43 
Liddell Hart enjoyed his time at Stroud and used the experience to develop 
several theories about the training and discipline of Volunteer battalions. However, he 
made no recorded reference to the quality of the battalion's junior officers. Although 
disputed by the Government, justified accusations of inordinate delays in gazetting 
commissions continued throughout 1917. Of the more than 8000 nominations for 
commissions submitted between September 1916 and April1917, 6700 had been 
gazetted by May but only a further 2673 were granted in the following five months 
period .44 In spite of this discouraging evidence, the take up and success rate of the 
41 Permanent Staff were appointed under ACI 333 of 1917 and Volunteers as instructors under ACI 757 
of 1917, (VFO No.LXIV) . 
42 The wo was reluctant to authorize motor transport for Permanent Staff. WO letter 99/D/127 of 
24/07/17 allowed the Adjutant of the 1st Bn Dum barton Volunteer Regiment a motorcycle but made it 
clear this was an exception . W070.42. When his counterpart in the 2nd Bn requested the use of a car, 
the War Office refused . NAS MD9/1, 29/01/18. Similary, the Lincolnshire Association wanted the War 
Office to provide at least one motorcycle and sidecar for each of its battalions' HQ. Without adequate 
transport, training staff were having to stay out overnight at dispersed company assembly points and 
were consequently unavailable for duty at HQ on the following moming. Lincolnshire RO T A'l/1 , 
12/07/18; ACI 36 of 1918, (VFO No.CXLII) allowed the part-time employment of Regulars and TF 
instructors. 
43 Liddell Hart Papers 7/1920/17-38. In terms of his later career and fame, BLH was by far the most 
celebrated serving member of the VF. 
4
" HansardVol.93.1044, 9/05/17; VFGazetteVol.6 No.140, 4/08/17, p.110. 
302. 
Central Association 's schools and correspondence courses suggest that enthusiasm, 
knowledge and standards within the officer corps were all improving. The War Office, 
and in particular FM French, needed to know whether the appointment of adjutants and 
instructors, the provision of arms and equipment, the use of most Territorial facilities 
and the gazetting of junior officers, was having a significant impact on the training and 
acquisition of Volunteers' skills.45 
Attendance at drills, especially for those Volunteers resident in rural areas, 
remained a contentious problem throughout 1917. Cambridgshire's early declaration 
that it would be 'impossible' for those living in outlying areas to attend was echoed by 
several other associations.46 In January 1917, Cumberland had announced it would 
allow its members to do three drills in one night and in the following month Nairn 
minuted the need for the provision of some form of transport to carry its men to the drill 
centres. 47 When informed by concerned supporters that Sunday drills were adversely 
affecting Volunteers' leisure time and opportunities to work on their allotments, 
Macpherson retorted that weekend drills were not supposed to 'appreciably interfere' 
with weekend activities. He declared an understanding of the problem but insisted the 
required number of drills was already so low it precluded any further relaxation .48 
Although contrary to regulations, a degree of pragmatism seems to have been applied 
at least in Sussex. 49 Articles suggested the need for radical changes in the working 
hours of bank, office and shop employees to allow more leisure time and opportunity to 
drill , and there were again demands for a reduced drill commitment during the 
forthcoming harvest. Volunteers in many Wiltshire companies were excused drills for 
the whole of July and Earl Albermarle assured Volunteer farmers in Kent that their 
predicament would be viewed sympathetically. The War Office produced no Volunteer 
Force Order to sanction official exemption from drills but it did delegate authority to 
45 Liddell Hart revelled in having no real senior officer with in 80 miles, the use of a car and unlimited 
petrol and the power and authority that came with being the battalion's only Regular officer. He had 
eulogies written about him in the local press, was a regular guest at school OTCs and enjoyed much 
kudos with senior officers at Southern Command. In addition he received pay of 12/6d per day and 
could claim 5/6d allowances. Liddell Hart Papers 7/1917/2 ; HansardVol.93.1044, 9/05/17 , 
Vol.96.210, 17/07/17. 
46 Cambridgeshire RO R68/11 , 3/02/17. 
47 Cumbria RO TTAF/2, 25/01/17; NAS MD8/16, 2/02/17. 
48 HansardVol.92 .776 , 30/03/17 and Vol.92.214, 27/03/17. One CO attempted to ease both his men 's 
commitments and increase the numbers volunteering for Sunday d~ging parades by cancell ing al l 
Saturday drills for one month. The scheme failed as 'too many' regarded it as an opportunity to enjoy 
free weekends. Monthly Orders for July 1917, 1st Bn City of London Volunteer Regiment, IWM Dept.of 
Printed Books 316.338. 
49 In Sussex Volunteers were reported to be tending their gardens and allotments as an alternative to 
or in addition to their weekend drills. VF Gazette Vol.5 No.120, 17/03/1 7, p.186. 
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General Officers Commanding (GOC) Districts to allow absence during the harvest 
period. Yet, while it might appear on the one hand to be generous and understanding, 
the War Office could be frustratingly insensitive and arrogant. When the debate over drill 
attendance was at its height, the authorities chose to publish new regulations 
announcing that completion of obligations would be enforced with greater severity than 
had been the case for either the Rifle Volunteers or the Territorial Force. This led to 
further concerns regarding the lack of instructors and , more importantly, that the 
regulations would inevitably discourage Section D men from transferring to Section A or 
B. This theory was supported by reports which suggested some COs were ignoring 
members' business commitments by demanding their Section A men attend certain 
drills on specific days. 5° Macpherson continued to assert that COs were , when 
possible, to use 'elasticity' in their demands, but reiterated his earlier statements that 
the country's increasing reliance on the Volunteer Force for home defence necessitated 
regular and uniform attendance. He did, however, appreciate the problems and in 
conciliatory mood announced that from January 1918, efficient men in Sections A, Band 
C could do 30 drills in each quarter rather than ten drills per month. 51 
Few drill returns have survived so, apart from anecdotal evidence (much of which 
frequently refers to the poor attendance of B men), it is difficult to know with any real 
accuracy how regular or consistent attendance was. A register for the 25 'efficient' men 
of the Broseley Platoon of the 1st Battalion Shropshire Volunteer Regiment is extant but 
how typical it is of a platoon from a small town remains speculative. In January 1918 the 
platoon had the opportunity to perform 24 drills. The average number on parade was 18, 
with the company sergeant major, one sergeant and one private present at all drills. The 
platoon officer attended exactly 50% of the drills. Only two men did not fulfil their required 
10 drills for the month and a remarkable total of 17 members paraded on more than 16 
occasions. These men probably had shifts or family commitments to contend with , but 
Volunteers who lived in rural areas had the added difficulty of travelling often significant 
distances to their company drill stations. In some of the dispersed villages of 
Rutlandshire there were as few as two or three members. If, after a long day in the fields 
they were to drill, they had the option of either walking or cycling the several miles to 
their drill stations at Langham or Oakham, or of relying on an infrequent train service. 
50 VF Gazette Vol.6 No.133, 16/06/17, p.30; VF Gazette Vol.6 No.139, 28/07/17 pp.98 and 101 ; 
No.142, 18/08/17, p.134; ACI 1143 of 1917, (VFO LXXXVIII) ; VF Gazette Vol.6 No.143, 25/08/17, 
p.145. 
51 HansardVol.103.597, 19/02/18; Times 10/12/17 reported the decision to allow quarterly drills . 
There were still complaints because Territorials had been allowed to complete their drills annually. 
For fit and younger men this might not have proved too much of a disincentive and even 
the older, enthusiastic Section A men might well have overcome their perhaps natural 
reluctance to turn out on a cold winter's evening. The resentful tribunal men in Section B 
and the less committed members of Section D were probably more likely to take the soft 
option and stay at home. 52 
Those members who could attend regularly in 1917 probably did witness an 
improvement in the quality of training schedules. As the year progressed , the 
Permanent Staff should have injected an added purpose to drills and established a 
progressive programme of training. In January, the Gazette considered too much time 
was being devoted to physical work, such as bayonet practice and musketry, rather than 
to basic drill. The editor appears to have misjudged his readership for he was 
immediately inundated by complaints about the lack of opportunity for weapons' firing . 
There were also complaints about poor supervision and instruction at ranges and , a 
little later, at apparent irregularities and inconsistencies when firing qualification 
courses. Reports suggest the authorities wanted the Volunteers first to become 
competent in basic drill and company and battalion exercises before devoting time to 
more specialized training in bombing, machine gun work and map reading . However, 
they did acknowledge that Volunteers, in the same manner as the Territorials before 
them, soon grew bored with elementary drills and wanted to get involved in more 
interesting aspects of training. As rifles became more readily available, standards did 
improve. The Commandant of Bisley reported that compared to the School's usual 
intake, fewer Volunteers qualified as First or Second Class shots but, only 8.1% of 
Volunteers actually failed their course whereas 8.4% of army recruits could be expected 
to do so. 53 Unfortunately, this proficiency seems not to have been universal. It became 
necessary to remove the railings behind the Stalybridge Drill Hall because Volunteers' 
shots regularly missed the butts and ricocheted off the ironwork into the nearby streets. 
Moreover, as the committee of the Inverness Association noted, it was very difficult to 
train 1600 men scattered over 26 drill stations with only 940 rifles .54 Problems such as 
52 Figures calculated from Shropshire RO 1681/198/12; G.Phillips , Rutland and the Great War, 
Oakham: Padfield, 1920, pp.177-179. 
53 VF Gazette Vol. 5 No.113, 27/01/17, p. 98, No.121, 24/03/17, p.198; IWM Dept. of Printed Books 
316.338 C.6051 , 17/08/17 and VF Gazette Vol.6 No.1 51 , 20/10/17, p.229. The Worthing Company 
complained about several inconsistencies which led to a high proportion of them failing their test. The 
editor criticised the authorities' lack of concern. In August 1917, the..Central Association had arranged 
with the National Rifle Association to hold musketry classes under their joint auspices; W0161/111 , 
report of a talk with Major Tredennick, GHQ Home Forces, 30/07/17. 
54 Manchester Archives M73/3.23, 20/07/17. One equally unconvinced observer at the Purfleet Ranges 
thought the Volunteers were lucky not to require the use of stretchers. T.Murray Ford, Memoirs of a 
Poor Devil, London: A.M.Philpot, 1926, p.203. NAS MD8/24, 18/10/17. 
these meant that by July 1917 only 10,000 of the approximately 140,000 men in 
Sections A and B had qualified in musketry. Volunteers were reported to be reluctant to 
fire their course in case of failure and of being nervous about firing even their 
classification practices. Some units were thought to be up to the standard of prewar 
Territorial battalions, but that was not saying much. The abundance of training facilities 
in the capital and other large centres were thought to be producing satisfactory results 
but the authorities were warned not to judge all Volunteers' standards by those 
achieved in the London area.55 
The practice of attaching Volunteer battalions to Regular units had begun in 1915 
and was to continue throughout the war. This was particularly important in those areas 
where it proved most difficult to find Permanent Staff: in June 1917, Scottish Command 
reported that 18 of its battalions were still without an adjutant and 17 without a musketry 
instructor. There were said to be either no suitable Volunteers available for training and 
appointment or, those who were suitable, refused to forego their civil employment. Staff 
Officers (many of whom were retired Territorial colonels), employed in the army's large 
training camps could be appointed to nearby Volunteer units to supervise and organize 
training. Suffolk's Volunteers, for example, had the benefit of the 3/Suffolk Regiment's 
'patient and attentive' instructors, the Huddersfield Volunteers were affiliated to the 
4th(Reserve) Battalion of the Seaforth Highlanders and the 1st Kent Volunteers were 
attached on occasions to 202 Brigade. A report on the Essex Volunteers found very few 
'old, white-bearded men' and stressed what they needed above all was the help and 
encouragement of the nearby home defence troops. There was a diffidence on the part 
of the Volunteers to ask for help but, offered advice, they proved keen to learn . The skills 
of the Essex men and the junior NCOs was estimated at being about the same as the 
prewar Territorials but they were assessed as being superior in aptitude, intelligence 
and education to the average Regular soldier. This aspect was particularly evident in the 
specialist units such as signal companies, where Volunteers were thought capable of 
working alongside Regular units.56 
There does not seem to have been too much official concern about the physical 
state of the non-commissioned ranks. Despite known examples of very elderly men in 
Section D, there were few men in Section A who were significantly above the military 
age. Furthermore, the average age of a battalion's merrfbers would inevitably reduce as 
55 W0161/111 . 
58 W0161/111 , Inspectors' Reports; E.R.Cooper MSS, p.7, IWM Dept. of Printed Books; VF Gazette 
Vol.5 No.128, 12/05/17, p.284; East Kent Archives U924/06, letter to Brigade Major 202 Brigade; 
W0161/111 , Inspectors' Reports and interview with Major Tredennick, 30/07/17. 
the number of tribunal men enrolling increased. While some inspectors did suggest 
physical drill and elementary bombing should not be compulsory for men over 40 years 
because it might do them 'more harm than good ', the Superintendent of London 's PT 
and Bayonet Training School reported that of 140 Volunteers aged between 38 and 60 
who attended his course, only two had found it too strenuous to complete. Most of the 
men made 'remarkable' progress. At another school within the London District there 
was a 100% pass rate for officers and other ranks in PT skills, and some Volunteer 
units were known to have taken enthusiastically to Swedish Drill. There were occasional 
reports of how poor eye sight and a lack of physical strength might militate against them 
in the field but it was thought the men's enthusiasm might make up for their occasional 
physical shortcomings.57 
The military authorities emphasized the work and quality of the Travelling Schools 
of lnstruction58 but, to many genuine Volunteers, the most effective and enjoyable 
element within their training syllabus was camp. The East Yorkshire Volunteers had 
camped with the 1st Hull 'Pals' in 1915 and in subsequent months there were many 
other examples of units attaching themselves to battalions of their local regiment. Camp 
was not compulsory but several corps could afford to make it so; others had easy 
access to land owned by local benefactors or businesses. Schemes and exercises 
were taken fairly seriously but one of the weekend's afternoons was usually devoted to 
a social reception for local dignitaries and one battalion appears to have allowed its 
camp 'followers' to remain on site throughout. There was so much interest in the 1917 
Easter camp for one London battalion that numbers were restricted and those who 
were chosen paid 4 shillings for the privilege. Corps raised in poorer areas did not have 
the benefit of members paying for themselves so the Government's decision to provide 
seven day's rations and free rail transport to camp was greeted as a very considerable 
concession. 59 To confront the grievances over compulsory drills and ease the situation 
at harvest time, the authorities additionally ruled that each 24 hours at camp counted for 
five monthly drills; two days at camp could therefore account for a whole month 's drills. 
Employers generally responded quite well to appeals from lan Macpherson and local 
57 W0161/111 , Inspectors' Reports. 
58 W0161/111 (1) 
59 F.Lock, Records of the East Yorkshire Volunteer Force 1914-1919, Hull : Eastern Morning & Hull 
News, 1920, p.14; IWM Dept.of Printed Books, 316.338 C6051 , Battalion Orders 13/07/17; Devon RO 
Z19/46/14, Camp Regulations 1917; IWM Dept.of Printed Books, 319.338 K876, Monthly Orders May 
1917; ACI 968 of 1917 (VFO No.LXXVII) . 
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civic leaders to permit men leave to camp.60 
Corps across the country took advantage of the Government's munificence and 
went off to camp during the summer. Most units went only for the Bank Holiday weekend 
but a far more ambitious programme was arranged for the London battalions. Tadworth 
Camp was made available for the City and County of London Regiments and 
approximately 6000 men turned up for the first week. The men were not bound to stay 
for a definite period but the weather, which was described as 'parallel to conditions in 
Flanders', and the eight hour day took their toll. 61 Numbers fluctuated daily but during 
the first week about two-thirds of the men went home. The weather did not improve and 
it was decided to abandon the camp after ten days instead of the intended three weeks. 
The Gazette blamed the weather, the poor medical facilities and the excess demands 
made upon the Volunteers, for the failure. Deciding that 'it will probably have done more 
harm than good to the .. . movement', returning members were reported as saying 'no 
more camps like this for me' .62 Strangely, the official report interpreted the event a little 
more positively.63 It praised the men for their 'striking behaviour' during the wet weather, 
their good discipline and the very short sick list. Although orderly room NCOs were 
'unreliable', the report thought the general camp administration was good and that the 
men took notice of and learnt well from the Guards camping nearby. The majority of 
Volunteers were uniformed and armed with 1914 pattern weapons and apparently very 
keen to learn. The report drew attention to the democratic and egalitarian character of 
battalions, noting that a battalion might comprise dentists, doctors and navvies. One 
platoon included a chauffeur and his employer serving as privates and , in another 
company, ten King 's Counsel served as rank and file . Discipline was 'strictly but 
sensibly enforced ', and very different in character to that exercised in most Regular 
units. The report acknowledged the necessity of employing such alternative methods 
and recorded the only 'unpleasant incident' as the refusal of an eminent London editor 
to rernove his hat at mess. 
Despite the atrocious weather the camp sick list amounted to an average of only 
seven men per day. Doctors who attended earlier camps of the County of London 
Volunteer Rifles reported similarly low numbers on sick parade and so too did the 
Medical Officer of the Bradford Volunteers' camp in 1918. During the two week period a 
60 ACI 983 of 917 (VFO No. LXXVIII) ; Liverpool Corporation allowed its Volunteer employees an 
additional week's holiday to attend camp. VF Gazette Vol. 7 No.1? 4, 30/03/18, p.146; Hansard 
Vol.94.1972, 21/06/17. 
61 Times, 7/08/17. 
62 VF Gazette Vol.6 No.144, 1/09/17, p.163. 
63 W0161/111 (10) . 
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total of 343 treatments were administered , more than a third of them for sore or 
blistered feet. The remainder complained of sunburn , diarrhoea, rheumatism and minor 
cuts and bruises. The nature of these ailments and the small percentage of men who 
reported sick suggests good unit esprit and individual commitment.64 
The aspect of efficiency and training which most concerned the reports written by 
those senior officers inspecting Volunteer units during 1917 was the quality of Volunteer 
officers. There were acknowledged to be 'serious' problems in finding suitable COs 
and Group Commandants and those in post were generally considered to be very much 
below the standard of the prewar Territorial officer corps. 65 Some reports thought the 
officers displayed commendable aptitude and industry, applying themselves 
assiduously to expanding their, at times, considerable military knowledge. 
Nevertheless, the general tenor of reports suggested the officers showed little aptitude 
for the work and were too old for the task. The Commandant of the London Bombing 
School was particularly harsh on those officers who attended his courses: 
Volunteer officers are neither physically nor mentally fit for bombing ; they have lost all 
fighting instincts and as a rule are physically incapable of throwing a bomb far enough 
to pass the test. In trench clearing practice they are apt to lose their heads, slow to see 
an opportunity, lacking in judgement, given to panic and unnecessary self 
sacrifice ... They lack imagination and nearly always seem incapable of forming any 
accurate mental picture of what happens in action ... [They] show little signs of 
leadership ... [and are] a fortuitous collection of middle aged men anxious to do their 
best, rather lost, eager for praise and inclined to be querulous if they do not think they 
are being sufficiently encouraged ... They fail to realize how small their military knowledge 
is. ss 
Reports such as this from possibly biased, Regular officers, did nothing to convince the 
War Office that Volunteers would be capable of offering any decisive resistance to an 
enemy raid . 
When FM French wrote his January paper advocating a reduction in the size of the 
Volunteer Force he was, simulateneously, fighting a rearguard action against further 
moves to reduce the number of Regular and Territorial troops retained for home 
defence. The enormous losses involved in Third Ypres, the collapse of the Russian 
Provisional Government and the Austro-German success at Caporetto meant more 
troops had to be sent overseas. Lloyd George's policy of denying Haig sufficient troops 
64 VF Gazette Vol.5 No.117, 24/02/17, p.154; West Yorkshire Archives 0817 C43, Sick Parade return of 
21st Bn West Yorks Volunteer Regiment. 
65 W0161/111 (1) . 
66 W0161/111 (9) . 
to open another offensive delayed the posting of some but it was acknowledged that by 
the Spring of 1918, Germany would enjoy numerical superiority on the Western Front. If 
the enemy chose to launch its anticipated offensive, the need for substantial drafts 
would become inevitable. The fourth inter-Service conference on the prospects of a 
successful German invasion met in mid-December and concluded that the most 
Germany could do was to raid with a maximum of 30,000 troops. 57 This scenario was 
rejected by Jellicoe, the First Sea Lord , who resigned in controversial circumstances, 
but French was ultimately forced to agree to a reduction of four divisions in the home 
defence establishment. Pointing out to Lieutenant-General Sir William Robertson , the 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff, that the troops he was allowed to retain were largely 
of low medical category or 19 year olds, French did accept that should the need arise 
some of the draft finding units could be attached to his forces within a few days. In 
addition, and although he acknowledged they could never be regarded as 'immediately 
available' for anti-invasion duty, Robertson told French the '288,000' Volunteers should 
not be discounted. 68 The Commander-in-Chief Home Forces (C-in-CH F) was duly 
instructed to release as many men of high medical categories as possible and to 
inform the War Office of how he proposed to redistribute his remaining forces . 59 
Charles Repington 's recent dismissal by The Times did not prevent him from 
touring the country, observing and commenting upon the state of the defences, or from 
conferring with senior officers, many of whom were personal friends. Simultaneously as 
French was deciding how to cope with these latest reductions in strength , Repington 
toured General Sir Arthur Paget's Southern Army's defences. He concluded the wire, 
machine guns and men were spread too thinly, the artillery was poor and the officers 
indifferent. Communications between the coastal strong points were poor and the 
absence of reserves meant that 15,000 Germans could probably take Canterbury and 
raid the Inland Water Transport site at Richborough .7° French was more confident than 
Repington about Paget's dispositions but remained concerned over the number of men 
taken from his home army. Yet, in spite of this , French advocated a huge reduction in the 
number of Volunteers he wanted available in case of a German raid . If the C-in-C was, 
as he frequently and publicly restated, genuinely convinced of the worth and reliability of 
the Volunteer Force, he would not have pursued such a dissembling policy . 
. 
The War Office's continuing low opinion of the Volunteers was undoubtedly 
67 Adm 167/53, Official Copy of Meetings of the Board of Admiralty December 1917. 
66 W032.5274 (16A), Robertson to French 2/01/18. 
69 W032.5274 (23A) , letter of 8/01/18. 
7° C.Repington , The First World War: Personal Experiences, London: Constable, 1920, Vol.ll , p.185. 
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reinforced by the disappointing reports from the travelling inspectors. One of the central 
tenets of the auxiliary, viz its ability to release Regular troops, had not been achieved 
and the number of efficient men in Sections A and B remained well below the 
expectation .71 Despite its essential belief that the Volunteers were generally not worth 
the money currently being spent on them, the Army Council decided to grant yet more 
concessions to the seemingly ungrateful membership by addressing several of the 
grievances highlighted in the inspectors' reports . Staff Officers were instructed to 
convince COs that the Force was considered essential , some battalions were to be 
given specific areas of the coast to guard and the system of ration allowance, which the 
Volunteers found almost impossible to operate, was to be overhauled. 72 This decision 
was taken shortly before rumours of French's intention to cut the number of Volunteer 
battalions spread. The Surrey Association responded to the whispers by accusing the 
Government, rather than FM French , of not taking the country into its confidence and 
urged the authorities to make a 'special and definite pronouncement.. .regarding the 
necessity of a strong and efficient Volunteer Force'.73 With Brigadier-General Croft again 
talking of the Government's 'woeful neglect' of the Force, lan Macpherson eventually 
took the hint and used the Army Estimates debate in February to declare: 'If the hour of 
emergency should ever come, I feel these men would give a great account of 
themselves.'74 Unfortunately, Macpherson's expression of confidence came only a few 
days after an announcement by the GOC-in-C Eastern Command that he no longer 
required the services of Volunteer units on his lines of communication .75 
French's doubts about the utility of the auxiliary centred upon its reliability. He 
harboured no illusions about the Force's capability of ever developing into a fighting 
force of the first rank but continued to believe that a compact and trained Force could be 
of use. The enthusiasm of the genuine Volunteers in Section A counted for much but the 
age of many precluded them from undertaking prolonged hard , physical work . Those in 
Section B were a different matter. They were of military age and, with careful handling 
and training , could provide mobility and stamina . However, Section B contained many of 
the men sent by the tribunals and their reluctance to drill and the authorities' limited 
powers to do anything about it, proved a major handicap to efficiency. Furthermore, as 
71 CAB 3/3/90A, Troops required for Home Defence. Memo by CIGS, 15/01/18. The paper suggested 
there might be the possibility of replacing a limited number of Royal Defence Corps (RDC) men with 
Volunteers. 
72 W070.43. WO letter 991392 TV2 of 2/11/17. 
73 Surrey RO 608/1/2, resolution of 21/01/18. 
74 HansardVol.101 .117, 14/01/18, Vol.103.783, 20/02/18. 
75 W070.43. Letter from GOC Eastern Command, 991583 of 8/02/18. 
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increasing numbers of men were failing to have their exemptions renewed , the section 
was diminishing in size. As there were obvious limits to the number of useful new men 
who might be attracted to join Section A, the solution seemed to be to persuade or force 
the estimated 100,000 men, or 40% of the membership currently registered in Section 
D, to transfer to A or B. The problem was put succinctly in a report from Northern 
Command: 
In the Lancashire Volunteer Regiment there are 18,000 D men. They have no clothing , 
equipment or arms, they cannot travel on rail warrants and they have no obligation to 
drill. They could be sent to the front but they are not fit to go. Their battalions are 
suffering in their efficiency because of theses men. It is most unsatisfactory.76 
Unfortunately, the manner in which the authorities chose to adopt a policy of abolition 
provides another example of how an unnecessary lack of sensitivity and forethought 
inflamed Volunteer passions and, once again, convinced the movement that the 
Government failed to appreciate its commitment and assumed potential. 
The official announcement to abolish Section D was supposed to have been 
made by FM French at Chelmsford in late January. However, like other announcements 
concerning Volunteer matters, its content was prematurely leaked. French told the 
Essex Volunteers that if a man could prove he had difficulty in attending drills, their COs 
had been given powers to modify the number required. Section D members now, he 
said, had nothing to fear by transferring to either A or B. He also explained how 
membership of Section D was being used by tribunals to prevent men from joining the 
army. Abuses like that, said French, had to be 'stopped at once' .77 The speech and an 
associated circular created an immediate furore . The Gazette wrote of 'one more 
revolution' of 'summary execution' of 'a breach of faith ' and of 'unfair and ungenerous' 
treatment. It roundly condemned the 'impossible haste' imposed upon the movement 
by the circular which gave men in Section D five weeks to either transfer to A or B or be 
struck off.76 Forthright indignation from D members, many of whom had bought their 
own arms and equipment, pointed out that work commitments had originally prevented 
them from joining A orB and those circumstances had not altered. Correspondents 
suggested D men should be allowed to remain members but on a reduced number of 
fixed drills or, as the Spectator proposed, registered on a Reserve List. Others thought 
76 W070.43. WO letter 99/U199 of 19/01/18. Camp Orders for the 5th Voi.Bn. Devonshire Regiment 
required Section D men to pay 21/2d per day for their rations. Devon RO Z19/46/14, 30/07/17. 
77 Times ,28/01/18. Earl Albermarle was among several senior officials to echo French 's words. See his 
speech to the Sussex Volunteers reported in the Liverpool Post, 4/02/18. 
76 VF Gazette Vol.? No.167, 9/02/18, pp.61 -62. 
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0 men should become Specials, but the overall consensus was that large numbers of 
enthusiastic, but extremely busy, Volunteers would resign rather than make the switch 
to another section . There were, in contrast, those who were glad the Government had 
acted to rid the movement of an anomaly: 0 members were 'a danger to everyone else', 
caused 'instability and unreliability' and the abolition of the section was a 'military 
necessity'. 79 E.R.Cooper wanted the section retained as he would have 'enjoyed seeing 
the 0 men do fatigues' , and there were others who thought it was time the 'shirkers' 
were exposed and forced to undertake a firm commitment. so 
While COs encouraged their Section 0 men to make the transfer, and while 
French hectored parades with the necessity to switch, significant numbers of 0 men 
appear to have resigned .81 So concerned did the authorities become at this 
haemorrhage that they announced French and Scarborough would address a 
conference of Volunteer Regiments on the issue in late February. In the face of 
widespread Volunteer discontent, and also by way of preparation for the forthcoming 
conference, the War Office announced what it considered was a significant concession . 
It still intended to abolish 0 but declared that men of low medical category in the section 
could remain as supernumeraries. 52 In a remarkable vo/te face following the 
conference, the Gazette demonstrated it was not only the War Office that could. change 
its mind. Assessing the mood of the senior officers present as generally sympathetic to 
the changes, the journal wrote of the conference's 'great success' and of how the new 
arrangements possessed 'considerable merit' in the creation of a more 'coherent and 
homogeneous' body. It accepted the War Office argument that tribunals had used 
Section 0 to hinder army recruitment and welcomed a decision to extend the deadline 
for transfers to the end of March. Nonetheless, it did speak out against Scarborough 's 
announcement that the earlier decision to allow men of low medical category to remain 
as supernumeraries was to be limited to ten per battalion . 53 
. Other elements of the press were not so accommodating as the Gazette. The 
Daily Telegraph and the Daily Chronicle were amongst those who howled their 
79 Article from the Spectator cited in VF Gazette Vol. 7 No.169, 23/02/18, p.85, No.168, 16/02/18, 
p.82. 
80 E.R.Cooper Mss, IWM Dept.of Documents, p.8. 
81 COs often used the press to reassure their D men that if they transferred they would only be used for 
home defence. See, for example, Liverpool Post and Mercury, 91021-1 8. One CO suggested he would 
retain his D men, even if they were not fit enough or eligible for transfer, if they volunteered for anti-
aircraft duties. Hackney Archives D/S/49-1 0. Letter of 28/02/18. See VF Gazette Vol. 7 No.173, 
23/03/18, p.141 for a report of a parade addressed by FM French. 
82 VF Gazette Vol.? No.168, 16/02/18, p.73. 
83 Ibid., No.171 , 9/03/18, p.1 08 and No.173, 23/03/18, p.133. 
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disapproval at the disbanding of Section D. In a strong defence of D men, the 
Birmingham Post wrote of the 'invidious distinction of retaining a certain number' and of 
the 'vast amount of mischief' done in the bid to bring D men under military law. Partly 
shaken by the outcry but more because weightier matters were now coming into the 
equation, the Government responded by announcing in early April that it was 
suspending the discharge of D men until a longer review had been conducted . This 
decision led to yet more chaos and confusion. Thousands of men had already resigned 
or been struck off and it was unclear whether they could , if they wished , be re-enrolled . 
There was also uncertainty about what was to be done with those members who 
remained undecided. The apparent absurdity of the situation and its resulting 
contradictions persuaded the Gazette to abandon its recent pro-authority line. It urged 
friendly MPs to speak against the 'sheer muddleheadedness', railed against the 
'preposterous' actions of the War Office and spoke darkly of 'somebody' who had been 
hostile to the movement 'at every step'. 64 
Although it refrained from identifying the culprit , it was clear the editor laid the 
blame for the chaos at the door of the DGTVF. When Scarborough replaced Bethune in 
January 1917, the Gazette had welcomed his appointment. As Chairman of the West 
Riding Territorial Force Association, Scarborough was familia r with the workings and 
structures of auxiliary units and , more importantly, his recent appointment as DGTVF 
meant he was 'untrammelled ' by the contentious events surrounding the Volunteers ' 
struggle for recognition . Twelve months later the journal criticised Scarborough 's 
infrequent attendance at Volunteer parades, hinting that a 'lack of enthusiasm at the 
head of the body soon cripples an organization '. In April 1918, when confusion over the 
future of Section D men was approaching a climax, an exasperated editor declared 'a 
more able administrator is eminently desirable'.85 In truth, Scarborough was a good , 
although unappreciated friend of the Volunteers. It was he who had fought with success 
to resist the reduction in the number of battalions pressed for by the Army Council and 
he who had done much to persuade the politicians that an equipped and trained 
Volunteer Force was not only politically but also militarily advantageous. The Gazette 's 
editors failed or chose not to realize that the man who probably posed the greatest 
threat to maintaining the Force in the numbers and form which they desired was not 
. 
Scarborough, but FM French , the movement's 'friend '. French , a national hero, clearly 
cherished the Volunteers and admired the commitment and dedication of the originals. 
64 /bid. , No.176, 13/04/18, pp.168, 178. 
85 /bid., Vol.5 No.115, 10/02/17, p.126, No.169, 23/02/18, p.86, No.176, 13/04/18, p.178. 
However, as C-in-CHr , his task was to ensure the defence of the country agarnst enemy 
attack, With the limited number of Regular troops available he cou ld ill afford to be 
sentimental. If the auxi liary was to be counted as one of the Crown's forces it had to be 
efficient. That cou ld on ly be achieved if the dead and uncommitted wood was riven from 
the vital trunk. 
The chaos surrounding the Government's decision to suspend the abolition of 
Section D was intimately connected to its continuing concern with the number of men 
receiving exemption from the tribunals and with its intention to review the provisions of 
the Military Service Acts. In January 1918, the Local Government Board acted to tighten 
the application of the Volunteer condition by issuing a new memo which stated that 
tribunals must satisfy themselves there were adequate grounds for exemption before 
exercising the power to impose the condition. If the condition was imposed, and the 
man was in Grade I or Grade II medical category, he was to enrol in Section B; men who 
were already in Section B but who were not classified in either of the two medical 
grades could be discharged. The Volunteer condition was not to be imposed as a 
matter of course but each case was to be considered on its merits. If, for example, a 
man's occupation involved hard , physical work, and membership of the Volunteers 
would deprive him of sufficient rest and recuperation , the condition could not be applied . 
When the condition was imposed and a man failed to comply with the terms, he made 
himself liable for military service. The National Service Representative could apply to the 
tribunal for the withdrawal of his certificate but if this occurred , the man could appeal to 
the tribunal and the tribunal would either withdraw the exemption or issue a new 
certificate with or without the condition. If the tribunal decided to renew the man's 
exemption but did not re-apply the condition , the man was to be automatically released 
from his military obligations. Alternatively, if the man failed to train the tribunal could refer 
the man back to the Volunteer authorities to be dealt with as a defaulter. Finally, for 
those men who were not fit enough to join Section B, tribunals could direct them 
towards some other public service such as cultivating an allotment. 86 
This new policy statement had arisen from the contradictions and 
inconsistencies which still characterized the tribunal system and , in particular, of the 
attempt to apply the Volunteer condition to dock workers in Dundee. The CO of the 
. 
Dundee Volunteers was instructed by the Board of Trade not to prosecute dockers sent 
86 AC11888 of 1917 (VFO CXXXIX) modified ACI1578 of 191 7 (VFO CXII ). ACI 24 of 191 8 ruled that 
the Volunteer condition could only be imposed in the case of men who were fit enough for Section B. 
LGB Circular R184, which came into force on 2/05/18, allowed tribunals to direct men not fit enough 
for Section B to join the Specials or cultivate allotments. 
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to him by the Port Labour Committee for defaulting on their drill requirements . The 
Harbour Department of the Board of Trade argued the Volunteer condition should not be 
imposed on dockers but the Army Council , anxious to avoid a precedent being set for yet 
another group of workers , objected . This particular case was finally resolved but it once 
again illustrated the need for greater clarification of the regulations .87 There were , in 
addition , several other contemporary concerns: some tribunals were accused of over-
reaching their powers by exempting men from drills, and some Volunteer officers 
insisted they and not the tribunal possessed the authority to impose the Volunteer 
condition . 88 
Most genuine 'volunteer Volunteers' probably anticipated that this new LGB 
statement would force the more reluctant members to display a greater commitment 
and also draw in to membership men who had previously been content to remain aloof. 
Amidst conflicting opinion about the worth of the new regulations, tribunals began 
almost immediately to apply them. The Sunderland Trades Council welcomed them as 
a means of strengthening the local corps but its counterpart in Bradford condemned the 
application of the condition to any of its members. Furthermore, some tribunals were 
soon accused of sending too many younger and apparently suitable men to cultivation 
rather than to the Volunteers. Consequently, demands were made for the lowering of 
the medical qualification for the younger exempted men. There was yet further 
discontent when certain tribunals refused to revoke defaulters' certificates even if the 
men could prove their attendance at drills was difficult. 59 
In the face of continuing problems it was only a matter of time before a case 
came before the courts . 90 The first recorded incident of an application of military law to a 
defaulter was reported in March. A Welsh farmer was arrested while working his plough 
and marched away under escort. Shortly afterwards, several Section B men from 
Grimsby appeared in front of Stipendiary Magistrates for not having paid fines imposed 
on them by their company commander. The men were ordered to pay the fines and 
costs.91 In early May the Liverpool Echo wrote of 'a great sensation ' when members of 
87 W070.42. WO letter (TV2), no number, of 30/12/17. 
88 W070.42. wo letter 99/Y/32, no date; VF Gazette Vol.? No.169, 23/02/18, p.85. 
89 VF Gazette Vol. 7 No.172, 16/03/18, p.122; Oldham Chronicle, 19/02/18; Ashton & Stalybridge 
Reporter, 12/03/18. 
90 It seems likely some COs had wanted the matter brought to a head earl ier. However, one. recruiting 
officer told his local association that he had been instructed to be 'chary' over taking action against 
Volunteers who did not attend drills. Leicestershire RO DE819/2, 7/02/18. Cambridgeshire Association 
wanted defaulters to be fined instead of imprisoned. Cambs RO R.68/11 , 3/02/17. Similarly, the Duke 
of Marlborough had advocated fining defaulters in September 1917 but had been warned off by the 
County Commandant pending a War Office decision. Oxford shire RO 0 /11 /1 /A 1/3, 22/09/17. 
91 VF Gazette Vol. 7 No.1? 4, 30/03/18, p.146, No.175, 6/04/18, p.165. 
the Bangor Company were court martialled for failing to perform the requisite number of 
drills. The accused of military age were ordered to report to their exempting tribunal for 
punishment but the two men from Section A were given 48 hours detention at Conway 
Military Camp. 92 The different sentences were no doubt a consequence of the men's 
perceived varying importance to the war effort. The two men in Section A, who were 
probably genuine Volunteers, might have been doing work of crucial importance but they 
did not have a Protection Certificate to prove it. For the Section B men, the possession of 
an exemption certificate underlined the importance of their work. It would probably have 
been damaging to the war effort and potentially impolitic in the realm of labour relations 
to have sentenced those men to detention. 
While there is evidence to suggest some tribunals were prepared to enforce the 
Volunteer condition more rigidly than before and even to insist that exempted men 
become efficient within a stipulated period, it also seems that some Volunteer officers 
were seeking to take illegal advantage of the stricter attitude.93 The County 
Commandant of the Lincolnshire Volunteer Regiment was reprimanded for sending 
post cards to exempted agricultural labourers compelling them in a 'peremptory 
manner' to join their local corps, the County Commandant of Suffolk was told to 
withdraw a circular warning exempted men that if they did not enrol their exemption 
would be reviewed, and the CO of the 20th County of London Volunteers was instructed 
to apologize to a Section R man whom he had tried to arrest as an absentee.94 
The continuing contradictions in the application of the Volunteer condition came 
at the time of the uncertainty over the Government's eventual decision about the future of 
Section D and as the Military Service (No.2) Bill was making its way through Parliament. 
The principal object of the Bill was to increase the age of conscription from 41 to 51 
years. There was a widespread consensus that, of the 1.5 million men in the age range, 
only something like 7%, or approximately 100,000 men, would actually be called up. 
Even this, it was predicted, could cause serious damage to industrial output: to the 
Volunteers, it would mean the virtual end of Section A and a further diminution of Section 
B. Any man sent to a corps under the Volunteer condition would be sent to Section B 
and, as there were so few Volunteers over 51 years old, Section A would be practically 
wiped out. Many MPs believed raising the age limit was a futile , panic-stricken gesture 
92 Liverpool Echo, 3/05/18. 
93 VF Gazette Vol. 7 No.176, 13/04/18, p.170. 
94 W070.41. wo letter 99/U372 of 1 /05/18; W070.42. WO letter 99/S/168 of 3/04/18. The man 
concerned , Pte Verral , was reported to have been working between 75 and 85 hours per week at the 
General Motors plant. W070.43. 
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and advocated instead a universal application of the Volunteer condition to all men 
under 60 years . Colonel Hope95 spoke of how a few hours on the range or spent in field 
exercises would be 'almost a rest' from work and, holding a letter of endorsement from 
FM French, Colonel Royds similarly demanded 'equality of sacrifice'. 96 In contrast, A.J. 
Sherwell expressed concern about forcing allotment holders to enrol and W.Tyson 
Wilson predicted that if men in hard, physical occupations were compelled to join , 'more 
would be done to spread pacifism than any force at present at work'. The contemporary 
publication of the War Cabinet's Report for 1917, nicknamed contemptuously by the 
Gazette the Shilling Blue Book of Fairy Tales, was seized upon as further evidence of 
how the War Office's presumed policy of strewing obstacles in the movement's path 
reflected 'little credit upon the wisdom and judgement of our rulers and their officials'.97 
In accordance with his desire for 'equality of sacrifice', Colonel Royds, who was 
also the County Commandant for Lincolnshire, put down an amendment requiring every 
man with a Protection Certificate or Certificate of Exemption to join the Volunteer Force 
for the duration. 98 When the debate was guillotined in the Commons, Lord Desborough 
put down the same amendment in the Lords. Lord Peel for the Government rejected the 
idea of forcing holders of Protection Certificates to enrol but announced the authorities 
were willing to accept the proposal that all suitable tribunal exempted men should have 
to join . Desborough and his supporters saw the sense of this compromise and 
withdrew their amendment. When the Bill returned to the Commons the amendment's 
wording was altered to make it easier for tribunals to interpret the intent and the Bill 
received the Royal Assent. An attempt to persuade the Government to give preference 
against call up to Volunteers who had enrolled voluntarily in Section A over those who 
had 'consistently done nothing to render any assistance to the country' was rejected as 
'impossible' by Arthur Beck, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of National 
Service. Nevertheless, Beck hinted that the Government was investigating the possibility 
95 Lt. Col. John Hope was MP for Midlothian. He had served in France with the 9th King 's Royal Riffle 
Corps and was currently CO of the 111th Training Reserve Bn., formerly the 23rd (R) KRRC. 
96 Edmund Royds, a former major in the the Lincolnshire Yeomanry, was MP for the Sleaford Division 
of Lincolnshire. He was Co. Commandant of the Lincolnshire Volunteer Force. 
97 Hansard Vol.105.148-9 Vol.105.139,15/04/18; VF Gazette Vol.? No, 177, 20/04/18, p.182. 
98 Hansard Vol.1 05.18, 15/04/18. The Daily Telegraph had predicted -the amendment on 13i04/18, 
believing it to be part of a scheme to raise membership to 1 million; WO letter 99/671 TV3 of 
29/06/18 noted that the Ministry of National Service refused the War Office proposal that officers and 
NCOs in category Grade II and liable for service under the new Military Service Act should be retained 
by their battalions. A later attempt to secure them three months' exemption was similarly refused , 
9917 43 of 9/09/18. W070.43. 
of using groups of Volunteers for an , as yet, unnamed project. 99 
The Government's 'friendly' modification of Desborough 's amendment gave the 
Volunteer condition statutory authority. Whereas formerly it was applied under 
regulations drawn up by the Local Government Board (LGB) and the Ministry of National 
Service and open to varying interpretations, the new law meant that every tribunal had to 
attach the condition to every exemption unless some particular reason for non-
application could be made.100 All men of medical categories A 1, 81 or C1 would now 
know that if they were granted exemption they would have to join the Volunteer Force. It 
was accepted the new law meant Section A would shortly become all but extinct, but the 
movement expected that despite the contemporary rigorous combing out of men under 
43 years of age, Section B would expand significantly. The Gazette called the regulation 
a 'distinct improvement' but could not understand why it did not immediately receive an 
Order in Council to make it effective. There was a delay of seven weeks before the Order 
was made and, when it was finally issued it, contained an additional section which 
appeared to go beyond the original provisions of the Act. 101 
The intervening period witnessed yet more confusion. Some Volunteer officers 
enrolled men in Section B whose medical condition , according to their army 
classification, made them ineligible for the section . If the men complained against their 
classification they were told discharge was impossible because the terms of the 
condition required them to enrol for the duration. In other areas, tribunals ordered 
Special Constables to join the Volunteers without first releasing them from their police 
duties. The continuing legal uncertainties were discussed at a conference of all 
interested government departments and at a meeting between solicitors and lawyers 
practising before the Central Appeal Tribunal and Sir Donald Maclean, the Tribunal's 
Chairman. Maclean explained that his interpretation of the new regulation meant that 
unless a tribunal made a statement to the contrary, every applicant who was granted 
exemption passed automatically into the Volunteer Force. Those tribunals which had 
already begun to apply this interpretation of the condition without waiting for the issue of 
the Order in Council complained of the anomalous and incongruous practice of sending 
exempted men in their late 40s to drills while young men holding Protection Certificates 
99 Hansard Vol.1 05.19, 15/04/18; The debate in the Lords is covered in Hansard House of Lords 
Vol.29, 705-826. 
100 W070.42. LGB Regulations issued on 25/04/18. 
101 VF Gazette Vol. 7 No.178, 27/04/18, p.194. The Order received the Royal Assent on 25/06/18. See 
also Chapter XIII 
escaped any obligation. 102 
The movement was also deeply concerned with the War Office's attempts to force 
the merger of certain battalions. In the midst of the chaos surrounding the still 
unresolved issue of Section D, the ongoing confusion over the application of the 
Volunteer condition, the questionable competence of many of its senior officers and 
rumours that the Force had been all but mobilized in March , the auxiliary became 
engrossed in what it viewed as another attempt by the War Office to deprive it of its 
unique character and organization. 
Reports covering the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918 continue to show a 
steady if undramatic decline in the strength and , consequently, in the financial viability of 
most battalions.103 The Buckinghamshire Association, for example, noted that numbers 
were 'considerably decreased' , blaming the shrinkage on the protection afforded 
agricultural and munitions workers, the lack of power on the part of the authorities to 
enforce the Volunteer condition, the conflicting orders regarding Section D, the higher 
physical standard required for enrolment and the raising of the military age.104 
Nationally, Section A did show a small reduction from about 21% to 19% of strength as 
some elder men resigned in protest against the numbers of young men whom they 
accused of doing nothing for the nation's benefit. Despite the uncertainty over its future , 
Section D appears to have remained at about 25% of enrolled members. In those 
counties where tribunals were prepared to apply the Volunteer condition , Section B grew 
disproportionally but, in rural Wiltshire, for instance, where probably a majority of men of 
military age held a Protection Certificate, B remained untypically low at 39% instead of 
the more usual 50% of strength. 105 Nationally, Section C also remained fairly constant at 
about 10% of strength and local committees realized the need to put increasing 
emphasis on a policy of recruiting 17 year olds for one year's pre-call up drills. 106 
Incidental references to diminishing numbers, such as a notice in Battalion Orders 
wanting men for the tug-of-war team because 'the previous members have joined the 
Army', and a warning from an adjutant that unless his battalion could recruit more men it 
102 W071.42; VF GazetteVol.7 No.180, 11/05/18, p.217, No.183, 1/06/18, p.254, No.182, 25/05/1 8, 
p.242, No.185, 15/06/18, p.278, No.188, 6/07/18, p.314. Dursley Tribunal in Bristol was one of several 
which expressed concern about the number of protected men who escaped any commitment. 
103 The financial implications of falling roles could be very significant. The County of London 
Association claimed that in comparison with the previous year it had lost £6000 in grants. Lpndon 
Metropolitan Archives (LMA) A/T A/2 , 19/04/18. 
104 Buckinghamshire RO T/A/1/22, Annual Report 31/03/18. 
105 Wiltshire RO L 1/100/3, 28/02/18. All but 8 of the 97 enrolments of April 1918 to one battalion were 
sent by the local tribunals. All were enrolled in Section B. IWM Dept.of Printed Books, 316.338 
C.6051 , 4/05/18. 
106 National Archives of Scotland (NAS) MD8/19, 22/03/18; Liverpool RO 356WES/65, 12/03/1 8. 
would have to amalgamate with another, suggests a growing concern at local level over 
numbers who might be available.107 The loss of some experienced Volunteers in 
Sections A and D and a lack of fresh younger blood enrolling in Section C meant a 
growing burden of responsibility on those who were most reluctant to accept it, the 
tribunal men in Section B. 
A breakdown of one battalion's membership illustrates the difficulty of attracting 
new members voluntarily and of retaining a good proportion of the membership for a 
sufficient period of time to allow them to create unit esprit and, above all, efficiency. In 
1914 and 1915, 220 men enrolled in the 1/9th County of London Volunteers . By 1917, 
64 of those had joined the forces and another 115 had either been discharged , 
resigned, transferred or struck off. A mere 41 men, or 19% of the originals , had 
continued their membership to serve for at least two years . In 1917, the same battalion 
enrolled 164 new members: only 7 of those men were above military age , and thus 
joined Section A, and 56 were youths under military age who enrolled in Section C. That 
left 102 men, most of whom were probably sent by the tribunals, to join Section B. By the 
end of the year, 62% of the 1917 enrolments had either been struck off, enlisted in the 
armed forces, resigned or discharged. In addition to this substantial diminution in 
strength, it is likely that a good proportion of the 102 Section B men were not particularly 
regular drill attenders. Given this combination of huge turnover and sporadic 
commitment, efforts to establish and maintain a degree of consistency in skills and 
company and battalion training were fraught with difficulty. 108 It was predictable, 
therefore, that in 1918 the War Office continued to voice its concern about the Force's 
efficiency and organization. 
Affiliations and amalgamations of local corps had been a feature of the early 
years of the Volunteer movement. With official recognition and the creation of County 
Volunteer Regiments, it was widely assumed the number of battalions within a county 
would either remain constant or even increase. Amalgamations between companies 
within counties did occasionally occur, sometimes with an element of ill-feeling, 109 but 
the War Office's attempts to intervene, and in its view rationalize , some inter-county 
difficulties, raised the inevitable storm of protest. The experience of the Cambridgeshire 
Battalions seems to have been fairly typical. So many of their members were being 
. 
107 West Yorkshire Archives DB17 C43, 21st Bn Orders, 1/04/18; Shropshire RO 1681/198/6, 16/04/18. 
108 Figures calculated from Muster Roll of 1/9 Bn County of London Vol. Regiment. Hackney Archives 
D/S/49/1 . 
109 NAS MD9/1 , 20/03/17. Clydebank Town Council formally protested against the amalgamation of its 
company with the Milngavie Battalion. 
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called up that, in October 1917, the military authorities proposed to amalgamate the 
county's 1st and 2nd Battalions. The Territorial association protested and , by the 
geographical transfer of men from different companies, both battalions were allowed to 
remain . However, the very transfer of men was not without its own controversy. The CO 
of the 2nd Battalion agreed to the changes but complained that he and his men had 
been unfairly treated by the Army Council. The association supported his contention and 
wanted the authorities to acknowledge the 'sporting and patriotic spirit' with which Major 
Howard had accepted the decision of the Army Council. To increase the already 
inflamed passions, the War Office next proposed that the Cambridgeshire Battalions 
should be amalgamated with the Suffolk Volunteer Regiment and lose their county 
names. While the Cambridgeshire Association described the proposal as 'a distinct 
breach of faith', a local newspaper was less constrained in its condemnation : 
[The proposal is] as stupid as it is unfortunate. Anything more calculated to stop 
enrolments it would be difficult to imagine ... Even yet, apparently, the War Office do not 
appreciate the value of territorial patriotism.110 
The Herfordshire Volunteer Regiment underwent a similar experience of War Office 
insensitivity and, like the Cambridgeshire, eventually benefited from an official climb 
down. The authorities had wanted the Hertfordshire battalions to be absorbed by the 
Bedfordshire Volunteer Regiment but, following a protest (and possibly helped by an 
outburst in the Gazette which wondered 'how such a proposal could ever have been put 
forward') the Hertfordshire units were allowed to retain their name.111 
The Gazette also thundered against the authorities' 'undue precipitancy' over the 
'drastic merging' of battalions. It believed the Military Service (No.2) Act would swell 
rather than diminish numbers and predicted many of the amalgamations would in time, 
have to be reversed. It criticised not only the manner in which the War Office had gone 
about the business of mergers, but also the effect some amalgamations were having 
on the character and composition of battalions. Not least of the complaints was the 
accusation that the authorities were paying scant attention to the geographical and 
social divisions within merged battalionS.112 The War Office's conduct during this period 
did certainly reflect its traditional attitude to auxiliary forces. Its behaviour w~s often bull-
110 Unidentified newspaper article found in Cambridgeshire RO R.68/11 , 3/11/17 and 16/03/18. 
111 VF Gazette Vol. 7 No.175, 6/04/18, p.158. Hertfordshire RO TAF A/1 , 25/03/18. The decision by the 
War Office might have been made as a sop to the Hertfordshire Territorial Association which had seen 
all three of its war-raised battalions disbanded. 
112 VF Gazette Vol. 7 No.179, 4/05/18, p.206. 
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headed and frequency showed little compassion for provincial pride or interests. It had 
indeed shown similar disdain on may occasions during the Rifle Volunteer and 
Territorial periods and also in its treatment of the National Reserve. Its officials could 
argue their motives were attuned to the needs of the nation and that they could not afford 
the luxury of indulging petty or local prejudices. However, the Army Council was not, in 
fact, impervious to pressure. It could show compassion and was prepared , if it 
considered military efficiency would remain uncompromised , to back down. Its over-
riding concerns were always to restrict the number of possible Volunteers who might 
otherwise be liable for army service and to constrain the money required to finance the 
auxiliary. 
In contrast to the War Office's efforts in the early months of 1918 to reduce the 
number of Volunteer battalions, Lord Scarborough, the DGTVF, continued to press for 
the Force's further expansion. County Commandants played their part by haranguing 
their battalions with the need to recruit and in March, Lord Northcliffe, Honorary Colonel 
of the Ramsgate Volunteers, told his men that unless the Force did expand and thus 
allow the release of more Regulars, raising the age of compulsion would become an 
inevitability.113 In April, Scarborough wrote of the necessity of getting all suitable and 
sufficiently fit men under 50 years into the Volunteers and warned that if enough new 
men were not forthcoming, the age for applying the Volunteer condition would have to be 
increased to 55 years. 114 A few days later he pointed out that if as a consequence of the 
provisions of the forthcoming Military Service (No.2) Bill all Volunteer units were brought 
up to full strength, the Force would be over establishment by nearly 16,000 . In view of 
the recent 'very drastic reductions' in the numbers of Regulars and Territorials available 
for home defence and the consequent 'increasing importance' of the part-time force (as 
well as the expected increase in the number of men who would , under the new Bill , 
become liable for Volunteer service), Scarborough rejected the option of continuing to 
amalgamate battalions, urging instead a review of how far the Force should be allowed 
to expand. 115 Scarborough's memo and the altering military situation on the Western 
Front caused the War Office to suspend its intended abolition of Section D and 
reassess the possibile uses to which the Volunteer Force might be put. The German 
offensives in March and April had necessitated a huge outflow of men from the training 
. 
113 Ibid., No.172, 16/03/18. The Gazette's editor wanted Northcliffe's assertion that 'unless the 
Volunteer movement increases, the raising of the military age limit. .. will be necessary', to be widely 
disseminated. 
114 W070.42. WO letter 991604 of 10104/18. 
115 Ibid. WO letter 991626 of 23/04/18. 
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battalions at home, a situation which Percy Harris exploited both to criticise the military 
authorities and to promote the interests of the movement: 
[The authorities] who are too much inspired by German ideas and theory, do not view 
this kind of force in the light which they ought to do, and if they had been allowed to have 
their own way, this force would not have been in existence. Time after time obstacles 
have been put in its way, and the War Office has made it clear that it had only permitted 
this force to be organized because of political pressure. I can tell the House that during 
the last two or three weeks the military authorities were very thankful to have this 
Volunteer Force in existence ... lt was possible at short notice to rush every available 
battalion overseas to relieve the pressure on the Western Front.116 
Harris went on the speculate that with the right encouragement from the authorities and 
employers, instead of the extra 100,000 Volunteers the Government was said to be 
contemplating, between 500,000 and 1 million could be induced to join . Colonel Royds 
echoed Harris' words, declared that men were only waiting for the Government to tell 
them to join a corps and , with thousands of wounded officers at home available to train 
the Volunteers, there was an 'unrivalled opportunity' to expand the Force.117 
By early June, Scarborough was confident enough to inform the Treasury that the 
total establishment of the Volunteer Force was shortly to be raised from its existing 
285,900 to the symbolically significant 315,000.118 The disappearance of so many men 
overseas in March and April meant home defence forces were at their lowest level of the 
war. Harris was certainly correct in his assertion that the existence of the auxiliary had 
facilitated their departure and Edmund Royds was similarly correct in claiming the 
unprecedented number of wounded officers might be used to train the Volunteers . 
Scarborough's confidence in the expected growth of the Force was in part a 
consequence of the knowledge that despite their often alarming turnover rate , battalions 
were becoming more efficient. Although the number of grant earners remained below 
the anticipated level, the number of 'efficients' in many battalions was well over 50% 
and rising .119 He was also anticipating the time in the late summer when the expiration 
of a restrictive regulation would allow him to force the replacement of inefficient 
Commandants and COs. 
116 Hansard Vol.1 04.1429-31 , 9/04/18. 
111 /bid., and Vo1.105.139, 15/04/18. . 
118 W070.42. WO letter 99/688 F3 of 6/06/18. The prewar Territorial Force establishment was 315,000. 
119 The 4th Voi.Bn .Lincolnshire Regiment had 627 men passed as efficient between March 1917 and 
February 1918. The precise strength of the unit is unknown but incidental references suggest it was 
below establishment. IWM Dept.of Printed Books 316.338 C.6051 , 29/04/18. In contrast, Leicestershire 
reported a much slower rate of increase and only 17% of Durham's Volunteers were efficient in 
January 1918. Leicestershire RO DE819/2, 4/07/18, Durham RO D/TA3-1 4/3, 12/02/18. 
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The regulation had permitted the appointment of infantry COs for a period of two 
years, with the option of an extension for a further 12 months if the individual proved 
suitable. The intention had been to create stability and thus, it was hoped , efficiency. In 
practice, however, the measure was short-sighted because it was difficult to retire 
unsuitable officers before their two year term was up. It had originally been passed as 
another concession to local preference and as an acknowledgement that in many 
cases the COs were the men who had initially done much to raise the companies or 
battalions. 120 In 1918 a flurry of correspondence between Whitehall and the Lord 
Lieutenant of Devonshire addressed this problem of the county's inefficient senior 
officers. In July 1917, Major-General Sir Henry Sclater, GOC Southern Command , had 
written to Lord Fortescue, the Lord Lieutenant, indicating that several of the Devon units 
were not up to standard. 121 Nine months later, Sclater wrote to General Sir R. Harrison , 
the County Commandant of Devon, pointing out that the improved efficiency of the junior 
officers and the rank and file had outstripped the abilities of their COs. Sclater 
suggested Harrison should replace his COs who had until then done 'excellent 
patriotic' jobs, with retired or light duty officers who had seen overseas service. 122 
Fortescue went further and suggested to the DGTVF that in addition to the COs, General 
Harrison, who was 'wonderful' for his 80 years but 'useless except as a figure head', 
and several battalion adjutants should also be replaced. 123 The County Adjutant was a 
'highly esteemed solicitor' but 'innocent of any military experience', the 2nd Battalion 's 
Adjutant was a 'drunkard' and the 3rd's, 'lazy and inefficient' .124 Scarborough 
sympathized with Fortescue's difficulties but advised patience until September when it 
would be possible to undertake a 'drastic comb out'. Meanwhile: 
Our main trouble has been that we inherited a force which had been formed in a 
haphazard way, based on no military plan (and] raised without any regard to Home 
Defence requirements. The Force ought to have been stopped forthwith and 
reorganized on Territorial lines but at that time no one here took sufficient interest to get 
such a drastic move effective ... The difficulty of getting decisions on many Volunteer 
questions remains. 125 
The difficulty of retiring inefficient or unsuitable COs is illustrated by an incident which 
120 WO letter 991217 TV3 of 31/12/17. 
121 Devon RO 1262M/L 125. 
122 Ibid., letter of 2/04/18. 
123 General Sir Richard Harrison was a former Quartermaster-General to the Forces and Inspector 
General of Fortifications. 
124 Ibid., letter of 6/05/18. 
125 Ibid., letter of 14/05/18. 
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involved Liddell Hart when Adjutant of the 4th Volunteer Battalion Gloucestershire 
Regiment. Liddell Hart recorded that his CO, Major C.A.Hope, formerly 6/Dragoons, 
rarely attended parades, spent only 30 minutes a week at HQ, knew nothing of infantry 
drill and refused to go on courses to learn, claimed more petrol than he should have 
done and once reprimanded Liddell Hart in front of a junior officer. On reading a 
newspaper report of a German breakthrough on the Russian Front in July 1917 Hope, 
who had been drinking, ordered his battalion's mobilization. He sanctioned the issue of 
arms and gave a drunken harangue to his restive men before Liddell Hart dismissed 
them and packed Hope into a motorcycle sidecar. Hope disappeared and was last 
observed trying to pull his butler off the rider's seat. Liddell Hart persuaded the papers 
to suppress their intended lurid account but the authorities did not sack Hope, who later 
reported Liddell Hart for neglect of duty and carelessness with money. 126 
This may have been an untypical example but it is clear the War Office and Earl 
Scarborough were anxious about the quality and competence of battalion COs. They 
were also, of course, concerned about the efficiency of the junior officers and of the rank 
and file. The provision of adequate finance, which remained intimately linked to the 
number of men who could stay in battalions long enough to qualify as efficient, 
continued to be of crucial importance to county associations. The numbers of officers 
passing the Central Association Volunteer Regiments' courses were increasing , as 
was the number of grant earners. The appointment of experienced adjutants and 
warrant officers, the provision of modern arms and equipment and the attachment of 
many battalions to Regulars formations, increased the confidence and standing of the 
Force. Furthermore, as the Military Service (No.2) Act caught more men for the 
battalions, many of the proposed amalgamations were postponed and then cancelled . 
There is even some evidence to suggest not only the reprieve of some condemned 
units but also the creation of entirely new oneS.127 The exodus of trained men abroad 
following the German Spring offensive placed a growing responsibility on the Force, a 
reliance which even the doubters at the War Office began to consider significant. It was 
thus doubly unfortunate that when the Government gave the Volunteers an opportunity to 
demonstrate their commitment, progress and self-confidence, and asked for a return on 
its substantial political and financial investment, many within the movement. proved 
.. 
unable to meet the challenge. 
'
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,,, The Mayor of St Helens sought permission to raise a battalion In the town. Liverpool RO 
368WE8/85, 8/08/1 B. 
CHAPTER XII : EXPANSION 
The German onslaught on the Allied Front, which began with Operation Michael on 21 
March 1918, caused high consternation within both military and political circles. The 
attack was not unexpected but the initial German success against Fifth Army resulted in 
a frantic reassessment of the available manpower and how best it might be utilized . 
Lloyd George's policy of depriving Field Marshal (FM) Haig and the British Expeditionary 
Force (BEF) of what they considered to be adequate numbers of troops even to hold the 
line was, of necessity, reversed. The priority was now to despatch reinforcements to the 
beleaguered armies and stem the German flood. Boys from Graduated Battalions and 
the Training Reserve', experienced soldiers barely recovered from wounds, and long-
serving Instructors in Training and Reserve Battalions, were hurried overseas to make 
good the losses of March and April. FM French accepted the need for his Home Army to 
be further denuded for the sake of maintaining the Front but, as his Command 
continued to dwindle in size, attention once again turned to the feasibility of increasing 
the remit of the Volunteer Force by creating a full-time element with extended , non-
territorial deployment. 
At a War Cabinet meeting four days after the commencement of the German 
offensive, French suggested the mobilization of the Volunteer Force. Lieutenant-General 
Macready, the Ajutant-General (AG) who had long disparaged the existence and nature 
of the Force, stated that if the Army Council were allowed to have an entirely free hand in 
respect of the Volunteers, a significantly increased number of trained troops would be 
released for service in France. Macready was, presumably, contemplating compulsory 
call-out, but French emphasized that only about one third of all Volunteers had actually 
taken the oath of commitment and that legislation would be required before any of the 
remaining approximately 200,000 men could be compelled to serve in anything other 
than a national emergency. Sir Auckland Geddes, the Minister of National Service, 
suggested the Volunteers might be drawn upon either by instructing the tribunals to 
cancel the exemptions of all fit men of military age or by ~ringing in a short . 
Parliamentary Bill to cancel all exemptions, thereby doing away with the entire tribunal 
' W095.5459, War Diary of 1st Training Reserve Brigade. Boys under 19 years were rushed to France, 
the Young Soldier Battalions being practically denuded of recruits as the result. On 26 March the War 
Cabinet was told that about 20,000 troops per day would soon be crossing to the continent. CAB 23/5, 
26/03/18. 
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process.2 The Ministry of Reconstruction in particular, considered that abolish ing the 
tribunals , thereby leaving decisions on recruiting and manpower supply solely in the 
hands of the Ministry of National Service, would be a serious mistake. 3 The War Cabinet 
was similarly reluctant to endorse such drastic action and decided instead that Geddes 
should include provision within the draft Military Service Bill to allow for the call up of fit 
Volunteers. 4 It also agreed to include within Geddes' Draft Bill French's subsequent 
proposal to make it compulsory for 17 year old boys to be enrolled in Class C of the 
Volunteer Force.5 
On the grounds that they constituted the only available reinforcement for Ireland , 
French did persuade Lord Derby not to send additional Cyclist Brigades to France.6 
However, as part of Lloyd George's policy of restraining and containing Robertson 's and 
Haig's control over military affairs, the Commander-in-Chief's (C-in-C) tenure of office 
was about to end. He was appointed Lord Lieutenant of Ireland and was replaced as C-
in-C Home Forces (C-in-CH F) by Sir William Robertson, formerly the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff (CIGS). Immediately undertaking tours of his new Command , 
Robertson found fault with many of the coastal defences and with the quality of their 
garrisons: the men of one battalion of the Harwich Defences left 'much to be desired', 
those of another included 'many cripples' and those of a third belonged to 'all medical 
categories'. The defences themselves were in disrepair, the 9.2" guns were thought to 
have a life of only 25 rounds and there was an absence of any concept of defence in 
depth.7 In other places, men were 'very small' , 'indifferent', 'discontented ', dregs of 
other units' and 'unfit' . Many sites offered their men 'poor' facilities, their camps were 
sometimes 'bleak and uncomfortable', and too much land was being devoted to 
cultivation rather than defence. Some areas and units were thought to be satisfactory 
but too often defenders were stretched over too great a frontage and the defences 
lacked sufficient wire and good communications.8 A practice mobilization in May 
revealed poor staff work, the tardy arrival of battalions, a shortage of men and trenches 
and a disregard of the prepared plans.9 In June, Robertson wrote to Major-General Sir 
Henry Sclater, General Officer Commanding (GOC) Southern Command , complaining 
2 CAB 23/5, 25/03/18. 
3 CAB 23/5, 27/03/18. 
4 CAB 23/5, 25/03/18. 
5 CAB 23/5, 29/03/18. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Robertson mss 5/1/2. Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives. 
6 Ibid., 5/1/5, 5/1/6, 5/1/14, 5/1/31 , 5/1/15. 
9 Ibid., 5/1/36, 5/1/38. 5/1/41 . 
of an 'air of boredom' in one of Sclater's battalions and registering his surprise that the 
local Volunteers were not under the command of Portsmouth 's Garrison Commander. 
Robertson wanted the Volunteers to be brought into, or very close to , the defended port 
area and for them to come under the Garrison Commander for training and general 
guidance. 10 Sclater countered by claiming that when he had assumed command the 
poor state of the Volunteer units warranted immediate attention : he had put Lieutenant-
Colonels with overseas experience in command of the scattered battalions and 
suggested that as the units were now sufficiently trained they could , as Robertson 
wanted, be brought under the Garrison Commander. 11 
Robertson's concern at the quality of the East Coast's defences is also reflected 
in several personal reminiscences and unit War Diaries. One officer with considerable 
overseas experience was 'shocked' and 'appalled' at the training methods he saw 
employed in the 2/1 st Suffolk Yeomanry, a home defence cyclist unit: officers were 
ordered by the Commanding Officer (CO) to leave the training to the Instructors, the 
defence scheme was a 'curious mixture of careful planning ... and ignorance or idiocy', 
turn out was slack and the men deficient in skills .12 Home service units such as this 
generally experienced a very rapid turnover of personnel ; those who were old enough or 
fit enough to be posted overseas often being replaced by men of lower medical category 
and age. Alarmed at what he had observed on his tours of inspection , Robertson wrote 
a stinging paper to the War Office on the effects a further sudden withdrawal of troops 
from his new Command would have on home defence.13 
Robertson's interest in home defence had not, of course, begun with his 
appointment as C-in-C. As CIGS, he had been in close contact with Field Marshal (FM) 
French and the two had generally cooperated well. Both realized the necessity of 
maintaining a minimum number of men at home but there were occasionally times of 
friction as to what that minimum should be. A memo written by Robertson in January 
10 Ibid., 5/1/46. 
11 Ibid., 5/1/47. 
12 J.Nettleton, TheAngerofthe Guns, London: William Kimber, 1979, pp.124-27. 
13 W032.5274 (34A) , 7/06/18. 
1918 advocated a further reduction of four home defence divisions.14 In response, 
French was prepared to accept the loss of three divisions but again drew attention to the 
fact that areas of the East Coast were significantly short of men and that many units 
under his command were very young , untrained or unfit for prolonged exertion .15 
Although he sympathized with French's predicament, Robertson not unsurprisingly 
insisted the demands of the Western Front were of paramount importance. French did 
not disagree but was told that as some draft finding units could be attached to home 
defence within a few days of an emergency occurring and that the 288 ,000 Volunteers 
would be of 'considerable use', he would have to comply.16 
Both Robertson and French acknowledged that because the remainder would 
comprise only boys too young to be sent abroad, there was no point in breaking up 
more than four of the existing divisions. French was correct to express concern at the 
potential usefulness of these boys in the event of invasion but Robertson was looking to 
reduce further the number of men allocated to coast defence and the Mobile Force. The 
problem, as he viewed it, was the attitude of the Admiralty. The Navy continued to reject 
the Joint Conference's conclusion that the Germans were capable of only a raid with a 
maximum of 30,000 men, believing instead that the enemy remained capable of 
throwing 70,000 ashore. If the Admiralty could be persuaded to accept the lower figure , 
Robertson believed he could garner a further 20,000 men for France.17 The War Cabinet 
sided with Robertson and, informing French that four divisions were to be broken up, 
decided to risk reducing the home defence forces to a level commensurate with a raid 
by 30,000. French was instructed to report how he would redistribute the remaining 
forces and to release as many men of A and B category as possible.18 
Robertson's appointment as C-in-C HF had compelled him to view the needs of 
home defence from a different perspective and it was the information gained during his 
14 W032.5274 (16A) , 2/01/18. Robertson 's paper should be seen within the context of the 
contemporary manpower crisis and the struggle of wills between Lloyd George and the generals. In 
October 1917, Auckland Geddes had produced his immensely sobering assessment of available 
manpower. This had been followed by the creation of the Cabinet Committee on Manpower, which 
the PM himself chaired . The Committee's report of December 1917 placed the Army's requirements 
below those of the Navy, RFC, shipbuilding, aircraft and tank manufacture and food and timber 
production. The Army Council immediately rejected the conclusions and responded with a chilling 
memo which predicted dire consequences if they were adopted. Ignoring the protestations of the 
generals, Lloyd George accepted the Committee's recommendations .. as Government policy. See 
R.J .Adams & P.P.Poirier, The Conscription Controversy in Great Britain, 1900 - 1918, London : 
Macmillan, 1987, pp.212-224. 
15 W032.5274 (17A} , 3/01/18. 
16 W032.5274 (16A) , 7/06/18. 
11 Ibid. 
16 Minutes of War Cabinet 316, 7/01/18; W032.5274 (23A) , 8/01/18. 
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early tours of inspection which prompted him to draw the War Office's attention to the 
likely impact of any additional sudden reduction in the home forces . In the C-in-C's 
opinion the situation was now verging on the critical. In addition to the January decision 
to break up four divisions, the mobile troops had lost another 24 cyclist regiments, four 
cyclist battalions and two artillery batteries. Moreover, the four remaining infantry 
divisions had been converted from units of 19 year old boys with four months' training to 
those of raw, 18 year old recruits. The fixed defences for ports had been further reduced 
and it was intended to withdraw trained Bi and Bii men from Reserve Battalions, the 
Mixed Brigades and remaining cyclist units. The result of that policy would be to make 
the Mixed Brigades, essentially the first line of defence, units of largely untrained men of 
low category, and maintained at about 50% of establishment. In addition , cyclists ' coast 
watch would practically cease to operate and the Reserve and Training units, which had 
been hitherto available for home defence, would be at reduced strength . Robertson 
rejected as impracticable a Director of Military Operation's (DMO) memo which had 
proposed to despatch two divisions from France if an emergency occurred at home. He 
requested instead the return of those cyclist and artillery units recently sent to Ireland , 
that the Navy take increased responsibility for the protection of ports and , by the call up 
boys aged 17 years and 6 months, the reactivation of the previous system whereby boys 
with four months' training were allocated to home defence. Finally, Robertson wanted 
new powers to enable the Volunteer Force to be used more efficiently and responsibility. 
He had apparently been assured by County Commandants that if their battalions were 
given definite roles, war stations and programmes of specialized training, Volunteers 
would be able to made good some of his home defence problems and deficiencies.19 
Robertson was hardly encouraged by the replies to his memo. The Admiralty was 
reluctant to help, claiming that as circumstances had not changed since the December 
conference, there was no point in entering into discussions with the Army Council. 20 
Neither did the War Office reply offer much succour. It stated that the difficulties created 
by the withdrawal of troops since the German Offensive were understood but that there 
was no alternative and no reversal. Furthermore, if any troops could be spared from 
Ireland, they too would go to France. The Government was certainly not about to order 
the call up of 17 year old boys and, as for the Volunteers~ their use was still .being 
'looked into' .21 The only immediate measure the C-in-C could take was to redistribute 
19 W032.5274 (34A), 7/06/18. 
20 W032.5274 (41A), 18/06/18. 
21 W032.5274 (36A), 12/06/18. 
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some of his sparse forces to the most vulnerable areas.22 
The reappraisal hinted at in the War Office's response was shortly to emerge as 
a radical new proposal of the Volunteers' employment. The military authorities had 
already undertaken a significant reorganization of the Royal Defence Corps (ROC) , both 
with a view to releasing men for more demanding duties and others for munitions work, 
as well as an attempt to improve the efficiency and work of the corps. The corps had 
continued to receive poor publicity, often as a result of questions in Parliament which 
expressed concern at the conditions under which its men were utilized . There were still 
complaints about their employment in areas far from where the original Territorial Force 
(TF) Supernumerary Companies had been raised, of having to repay considerable 
sums of money awarded them in error and of losing the right to claim travelling 
expenses.23 There were also concerns that the alleged lack of a promotional structure 
militated against those officers who had served in the corps since its formation and of 
how troops, some of whom were in their 60s, were expected to carry the same weight of 
equipment and mount the same hours of guard as men several decades younger. 24 
Given the age and dubious fitness of many of the National Reservists who had served 
with the TF companies and then transferred to the ROC, it was likely they would find 
their tasks onerous. Similarly, the younger recruits of low medical category who had 
been drafted into the corps during 1917. These men were sent to the corps because 
they were not sufficiently fit or healthy to undertake more physically demanding duties. 
There were, however, still occasions in at least one battalion when men who were 
clearly unable to take the rigours of training were exposed to excessive treatment at the 
hands of their instructors.25 
In spite of the auxiliary's lowly status, during the summer of 1917 the War Office 
had given the ROC considerable attention. In its continuing search for reinforcements 
for the Western Front the authorities decided that the abolition of the 18 Home Service 
Garrison Battalions might release additional men. Most soldiers within these battalions, 
which were scattered around the coasts, were of low medical category and often over 
military age. Nevertheless, as some of them were capable of performing similar, fairly 
22 W032.5274 (42A}, 17/06/18. 
23 HansardVol.95 , 208-9, 26/06/17; Vol.100, 2146,20/12/17. .. 
24 /bid., Vol.1 00, 624-626, 6/12/17. The lax discipline and less than total dedication to work amongst 
the old soldiers of the ROC became almost legendary. See, for example, E.Potton (ed .), A Record of 
the United Arts Rifles 1914-1919, London: Alex Maring, 1920, pp.32-3. 
25 Hansard Vol.1 oo, 624, 6/12/17. This refers to a case of a wounded man in the 14th Bn .RDC who 
was sentenced to 6 months' imprisonment for refusing to work. He claimed his wounds and disabilities 
made it impossible to follow orders. 
sedentary duties, overseas, they could release men of slightly higher category for other 
work. Consequently, the War Office resolved to disband the battalions and replace them 
with ROC battalions.26 Much of the personnel of the Garrison Battalions was unsuitable 
for transfer to other duties and was thus incorporated within the new ROC units. Some 
officers of the former Garrison Battalions were similarly retained , but in proportion to the 
number of other ranks who were also kept. 27 
The 18 battalions of the ROC were to perform the same function as the Garrison 
Battalions and were in addition to the corps' existing Protection Companies. Colonel 
Douglas Dawson, the Inspector of Vulnerable Points and one of FM French's closest 
advisors, was intimately involved in the reorganization of the ROC. He wanted the 
Protection Companies to have an establishment of up to 300 all ranks and their 
Command Reserve Companies to have 250. These latter units were intended to 
provide drafts for the Protection Companies and to provide extra guards in 
emergencies. There was also a Central Reserve in London of three companies but, as 
permanent guards on some lines of communication had been withdrawn and 
emergency protection for them allocated to the Volunteers, Dawson suggested the three 
companies could be reduced to two. This would allow the redeployment of an additional 
250 men. By October 1917 the reorganization was complete and had resulted in a total 
of 19 ROC battalions, 78 Protection Companies and 12 Reserve Companies. 28 
A growth in the number of tasks the ROC were called upon to perform meant that 
further changes were inevitable. A scheme to reduce the number of Area Commandants 
in Eastern Command was abandoned owing both to the opening of additional prisoner 
of war camps and GOC Southern Command's vehement rejection of the War Office 
proposal to reduce the number of ROC officers within his Command . All existing 
officers, he insisted, were fully employed in prisoner of war camps, escorting prisoners 
from camp to camp and in assisting the repatriation of disabled prisoners via 
Switzerland .29 Dawson supported the pleas of the GOC Commands, describing the 
difficulties of executing the various duties with a limited and fixed number of ROC 
officers as 'almost insurmountable' .30 The War Office had refused permission to 
increase officer establishment in the Protection Companies but when it began to 
.. 
26 The ROC battalions were formed under W09/RDC/1835 (AG2) of 31/07/17 and ACI1217 of 1917. 
27 HansardVol.98 , 814, 24/10/17; W032.18622, The Reorganization of the ROC. A 19th Battal ion was 
also formed but it was intended exclusively for work on RFC aerodromes and landing grounds. 
28 lbid., (1A) , 15/09/17; Ibid. , (3A) , October 1917. 
29 lbid., C/4939A, 17/10/17, 21/11/17, 31/12/17. 
30 Ibid., (37A), 7/01/18. 
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consider the future of the ROC battalions,31 Dawson proposed that if they were to be 
disbanded, their officers should be made available for use by the Protection 
Companies.32 In yet another attempt to provide additional manpower, not on this 
occasion for overseas duty but to allow the substitution of younger munitions workers 
with older men of low medical category, and for the ROC itself, the War Office turned its 
attention to the recently-created ROC battalions. A conference in mid-January 1918 
decided that nearly 2000 ROC men currently guarding vulnerable points in garrisons 
could be replaced by men who had been wounded twice or more, and magazines, 
factories and essential sites outside garrisons should be guarded by the 'police 
system' - Special Constables or company guards armed with rifles rather than by 
military guards. The 1800 ROC troops working in the ports under the auspices of Ml5 
and in other special military areas were, however, to be retained . The greatest saving in 
manpower would be achieved by the abolition of all but the Royal Flying Corps-
employed ROC battalions. The abolition would release 13,000 men who could be 
disposed of by the Director of Organization either to the Protection Companies or to 
munitions. The removal of ROC men from many factories and other vulnerable points 
could certainly be justified because in over three years of war there had been no 
recorded attempts at sabotage on any such mainland site or installation .33 
The principal reasons behind the disbanding of the ROC battalions and the 
dispersal of their men to Protection Companies were those of cost and the 
contemporary critical shortage of ROC officers. By the end of January all ROC battalions 
had been withdrawn from their coast defence stations and also, with the exception of 
the 19th Battalion which remained working for the Royal Flying Corps, all other guard 
duties apart from those classified as vital to the war effort. 34 GHQ Home Forces was 
already considering where their personnel could be sent to best effect. Eastern 
Command bid for three companies from one battalion, claiming that in addition to its 
existing 42 agricultural and prisoner of war (POW) camps, 45 entirely new POW 
Ploughman Camps were in the process of formation. Furthermore, the Command was 
responsible for 36 hay stores. For some unrecorded reason local Volunteers had 
refused to supply guards for these stores and the ROC was detailed instead to provide 
31 9/RDC/2340 (AG2) of 16/12/17. 
32 W032.18622 (37 A), 7/01/18. 
33 W032.18622. Minutes 123 (SD2) of 14/01 /18 ; Ibid. , (448) , no date. 
34 /bid., (45A) , 26/01/18. 
for their protection.35 Faced with similar increases in its responsibilities , Scottish 
Command sought permission temporarily to retain over 150 men of Bi category who 
were over the military age and who were supposed to be discharged when their 
battalion was disbanded.36 In like manner, GOC Southern Command complained that 
as his Protection Companies were already considerably under strength he, too, would 
need substantial drafts if he was to release, as ordered, his Bi troops.37 Herein lay the 
problem. Unlike more conventional corps, the auxiliary had no established regular 
source of personnel supply, drafts and individuals being sent to it in haphazard and 
irregular fashion. This intermittent and unreliable system of reinforcement meant that 
Commands found it almost impossible to meet the growing demands to find guards for 
POW camps, agricultural depots, ploughing groups and vulnerable points. The 
increasing number of men discharged for munitions was further exacerbating these 
difficulties and, in March, the War Office bowed to pressure by allowing Bii men from the 
infantry who had been earmarked for transfer to the Labour Corps to be posted instead 
to the ROC. 38 
Between December 1917 and early April 1918, the corps had suffered a 
reduction in establishment of almost 9000 men. The abolition of six ROC Observer 
Companies and the reduction of yet more men on certain guards had released an 
additional few hundred troops for redeployment but Colonel Dawson believed that 
without a 'further considerable' supplement to its establishment, the ROC would find it 
'absolutely impossible' to meets its responsibilitieS. 39 The increasing expectation on 
the part of the War Office for more ROC soldiers to guard the growing number and 
variety of POW camps forced Dawson to seek an increase in the number of Protection 
Companies.40 Although all Commands were registering their problems with manpower 
shortages, the heaviest demands for additional ROC troops came from Ireland. The 
withdrawal of garrison personnel and of those in draft and training units had severely 
denuded the province of mainland troops. In consideration of Ireland's deteriorating 
political situation and the possibility of attempting to enforce conscription on the 
35 /bid., (47A) , 26/01/18. There are a few reports of Volunteers refusing to take on additional work: one 
company of the 2nd Bn. Shropshire Vol. Regiment said it would not accede to Western Command's 
request to provide more guards for prisoner of war camps and Aberdeen's Co.Commandant told 
Rawlinson of his difficulties in getting his men to undertake guard duties. Shropshire RO 1681/198/6, 
9/07/18, Rawlinson mss 5/1/6, interview of 25/09/18. 
36 W032.18622 (95A) , 9/02/18. 
37 Ibid., CRSC 114905!59A /!ROC of 6/03/18. 
38 W032.18622 (64A) , 18/03/18. 
39 /bid., (69A), 11/04/18; Ibid., (79a) , 20/04/18. 
40 Ibid., (67A), 5/04/18. 
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troubled isle, in early April seven extra ROC Protection Companies were sent to replace 
those troops posted to France during the German Offensive. This brought the total of 
ROC companies in Ireland to ten; by May, another three were under orders to go with a 
further five held in readiness. Despite these increases, French estimated that another 
3000 ROC might still be needed to protect naval wireless stations and , in the event of a 
general strike and civil unrest, to safeguard the flax industry and prevent widespread 
sabotage. 41 Approval to increase the number of non-Reserve Companies from 79 to 97 
was sanctioned in April and three weeks later the War Office agreed to the creation of 
eight Provisional Companies intended solely for duty in Ireland . The personnel for these 
eight companies was to be drawn from existing companies and would be returned to 
their original units once the 'emergency' was over.42 This decision stretched manpower 
resources even further and caused Dawson to agitate for an immediate increase in 
establishment of another three companies.43 
Shortages were eased during the early summer when the disbanding of the 18 
designated ROC battalions was finally completed and with the War Office's acceptance 
of Dawson's request for permission to form another three companies. 44 These 
measures brought the auxiliary's official establishment to almost 35,000 all ranks but 
its actual strength was some 2600 men fewer than the approved figure. Efforts to bridge 
this shortage involved the reduction of men on vulnerable points and those working for 
Ml5 by 2750 and 700 respectively, troops were retained on duty for longer periods and 
had their rest days cut drastically. Another 2000 were sent to Ireland between April and 
July, but during the summer the ROC's main problem was manning the POW camps, 
the number of which was 'growing almost daily'.45 Many of these camps were small and 
widely scattered, thus creating additional problems for finding and maintaining guards. 
There had been suggestions in Volunteer circles that local battalions might be able to 
replace ROC in some of these camps, in the same manner as they had replaced them 
in guarding some of the less important vulnerable points. In all the extant papers and 
memos of this period written by staff at GHQ HF or the War Office, there is no serious 
mention of replacing ROC personnel with Volunteers. With the steady substitution of the 
more expensive older, married troops of the ROC by younger soldiers, often with inferior 
41 Ibid., (84A), 4/05/18. The flax industry was vital for securing supplies of aircraft fabric . 
42 lbid., (91A), 15/05/18. 
43 Ibid., (95A) , 16/05/18. 
44 The battalions were disbanded under 9/RDC/2340 (AG2) of 28/01/18 but the last unit, the 16th 
Battalion, was not disbanded until31/08/18; W032.18622 (107A) , 20/06/18. 
45 W032.18622 (115A), 27/07/18. The paper was prepared by the DCIGS at the request of the Samuel 
Commission . 
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physiques but cheaper to employ, the authorities were probably less concerned about 
the cost of the ROC than they had been in 1917.46 Nevertheless, a more extensive use 
of the Volunteers could have proved beneficial both in terms of cost and in Volunteer 
morale. By continuing to ignore the potential of the part-time auxiliary, the War Office was 
once again seen as underlining its contempt for the Volunteers. In reality, the 
authorities' reluctance to employ them as substitutes for the ROC was understandable. 
Volunteer efficiency was improving but the increase in the number of exempted men 
sent by the tribunals meant that a large proportion of members were unable to 
undertake prolonged or even regular rostering. Unless they could provide reliable and 
efficient guards, the Volunteers were useless for military purposes. Should it have been 
needed, by July the authorities had received further proof of the unsuitability of 
Volunteers as would-be permanent troops. As most Volunteers had never imagined or 
intended they should assume the role of full-time soldiers, such a conclusion was 
hardly surprising . Nevertheless, still reeling from the German successes in March , April 
and May, and awaiting the tardy arrival of American troops on the Western Front, the War 
Office decided to raise a number of special service Volunteer companies to serve on the 
East Coast. Their purpose was to provide coastal security, to relieve Regular troops for 
France and, where possible, ROC troops for Ireland. 
Rumours that at least part of the Volunteer Force was to be mobilized spread 
through several units in the days following news of the German Offensive and were to 
persist in varying degrees of intensity until the end of June.47 An increased flow of official 
paperwork suggested something was about to happen and in April the Gazette 
announced it was only the dubious legality of the call which prevented the Government 
from announcing mobilization. 48 The Kent Territorial Association signalled its frustration 
at the absence of instructions during the critical period by pointedly demanding of the 
War Office whether it expected the associations to be anything more than mere 
providers of clothing and equipment. 49 In the Commons, Percy Harris asked the Under 
Secretary of State whether he would consider raising full-time battalions of Section A 
Volunteers. Macpherson avoided the issue by choosing to misinterpret Harris' question 
48 These points were made by Dawson in a memo to the War Office of 20/04/18. Ibid. , (79a). 
47 ln June the Gazette reported 'yet more rumours' of mobilization but advised members to disregard 
them . To call them out now, it wrote, would constitute a 'distinct breach of faith '. VF Gazette Vol. ? 
No.187, 29/06/18, p.301 . 
48 M.Yearsley, Home Front Diary 1914-1918, p.94, Imperial War Museum Dept.of Documents, 
DS/Misc/17; VF Gazette Vol. 7 No.176, 13/04/18, p.168; There were reports of 'very strong' rumours in 
Chester, F.Simpson, Chester Volunteers 1914-1920, Chester: Courant Press, nd., p.111 . 
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and the moment passed. 5° Nevertheless, the Government was concerned at the 
haemorrhage of men to France and decided to convene a conference of County 
Commandants and Territorial Association representatives to discuss a proposal to 
raise full-time companies to serve in cyclist units and relieve ROC companies. 
Robertson's replacement as the new GIGS, Sir Henry Wilson , concurred with the intent 
and informed Lord Derby that unless the required number of men could be secured by 
voluntary selection he would take immediate action to obtain the necessary legislation. 51 
A preliminary meeting on 22 May, attended by representatives of the War Office 
and GHQ HF, recommended that if such companies were to be raised , men from 
Sections A and C should be used in preference to those from Section B. If B men were 
to be used, there should be a guarantee that their service would not prejudice their 
liability for army call up. Brigadier-Generaii.L.Vesey, the Deputy Director of Organization , 
told the meeting that he intended to fill the existing Mixed Brigades with low category and 
largely untrained men from Reserve units; when trained , these could later be sent as 
drafts to B class divisions in France. If sufficient of these men were not forthcoming , 
Vesey wanted Volunteers to be employed within both the Mixed Brigades and the cyclist 
units. It was agreed that once the current recategorization of ROC men had been 
completed, those members higher than Biii should be combed out and replaced by 
Volunteers. There was less agreement on the number of hours part-time Volunteers 
should be expected to perform and whether Volunteers would be prepared , or legally 
able, to replace cyclists without the declaration of a national emergency and the 
subsequent necessary legislation. Some representatives doubted the willingness of 
Volunteers to offer themselves without the legal requirement. In contrast, Lieutenant-
Colonel Buchan representing Home Forces, argued that if the Volunteers were asked to 
form service companies on a county basis, sufficient men would be forthcoming . It was 
decided to leave that issue until after the full conference had met, but another potential ly 
contentious matter was resolved when the Ministry of National Service, which had 
originally opposed the scheme and wanted instead to fill the Mixed Brigades with 
15,000 low category men it could identify and supply itself, agreed to accept a figure of 
13,224 men, provided they were not drawn from a stipulated list of barred tradeS.52 
In his opening remarks from the Chair, Macpherso_r1, no doubt unaware that as 
he spoke, German divisions were pouring over the Chemin des Dames, explained : 'A 
50 Hansard Vol.1 05, 1684-5, 2/05/18. 
51 W032.5049, Special Service Companies of the Volunteer Force , (1A) , 22/05/18 and W070.43, 
991672 nd. 
52 W032.5049 (1A); W070.43. 
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difficult, if not dangerous, situation has been created by events in Ireland, and the 
imminent renewal of an offensive in France of a gigantic and colossal nature, could 
conceivably justify full mobilization under the invasion imminent clause'. He continued 
by admitting that it was proposed 'frankly and bluntly to denude, if not entirely, in any 
case to a very great extent', the Territorials currently tasked for home defence. In order to 
replace those troops, 'it behoves us to give the Volunteer Force a definite opportunity of 
making good a claim'.53 He went on to outline the ideas already discussed by the 
authorities whereby the General Staff required 15,000 men, preferably raised from 
battalions nearest the threatened areas and in companies of 114 all ranks , to serve for 
up to three months. Battalions might volunteer en bloc and guarantee numbers by 
running a 'commando' or rostering system in which men served for under two months 
and were replaced by members of equal efficiency. Macpherson stressed that as the 
army relied principally on Grade 1 men for its recruits, Volunteers must be of Grade 2, 
aged 35 years and above and fit enough to ride bicycles. Men in Grade 3 who were able 
to volunteer for full-time service were urged to join the RDC as guards for vulnerable 
points and POW camps. Volunteers accepted for service would receive full army pay 
and separation allowances. Having introduced the conference's purpose and stressed 
that the total number required amounted to a mere 5% of present Volunteer strength , 
Macpherson opened the discussion to the floor. 
A consensus which believed there would be no difficulty in securing the required 
number of men quickly emerged, but there were differing opinions over the terms by 
which the Volunteers should be utilized. There were some barbed comments about the 
length of time several Territorial units had been retained in India and of other previously 
hollow Government promises to auxiliary units, but most speakers accepted the 
challenge and professed their desire to cooperate . However, speaker after speaker 
criticised the proposal to have men sign on for two or three months. It was not a case of 
their men being unwilling to offer themselves, but more a predicted reluctance among 
employers to allow their men to go. Moreover, if a munitions or shipyard employer 
allowed a worker leave of absence for two months, a tribunal might well decide his 
services could be dispensed with permanently. Conversely, other speakers believed 
that the longer the period of service, the more likely the men were to volunteer. There 
was concern that as Grade 3 men were already being called up f-e>r home service, a'ny 
Section A men aged between 41 and 49 years who volunteered for company service 
might find themselves combed out for the army. There were questions about what 
53 W032.5049 (3A), 27/05/18. Minutes. 
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would happen to a Section 8 man whose exemption was about to expire if he was 
posted far away from his own tribunal , and there were fears that as those most likely to 
volunteer for full-time service would be the most dedicated and efficient members, their 
departure would throw battalions' mobilization plans into chaos. 
There was almost unanimity of opinion, however, for the belief that the fairest way 
to raise the companies would be through compulsion . The voluntary system was 
frequently declared to be 'played out' and it was widely assumed that men would not 
present themselves unless forced to do so. Again , it was not the reluctance of the men 
to commit themselves, one County Commandant even claimed his men had their bags 
packed in anticipation of mobilization , but the belief that those who remained behind 
would gain pecuniary and other advantages. Agricultural wages, for instance, were 
about almost to double and any businessman who did volunteer for service would , it 
was predicted, undoubtedly suffer from his 'unpatriotic' competitors. There were 
complaints that tribunals were lax in the application of the Volunteer condition and a 
belief that their powers should be reduced and be transferred directly to the War Office . 
Amidst calls that it was time for 'equality of sacrifice', several representatives wanted the 
word 'Volunteer' abandoned in favour of 'Soldiers of the Home Reserve Army', and their 
units renamed 'Home Service Battalions'. 54 
The Government was not prepared to suffer the inevitable opprobrium of citizens 
and employers by introducing compulsion for the sake of raising 15,000 men for a 
limited period . If it really needed to mobilize the bulk of the Volunteer Force, legislation 
would have been a prerequisite, but this was never a practical possibil ity. Neither did 
Macpherson want to accede to the floor's suggestions that by operating a 'commando 
system, men would need to serve for only one month . The resulting constant turnover of 
personnel would inevitably vitiate efficiency. Nevertheless, Macpherson did 
reemphasize his belief that the 15,000 men could be secured without the need of taking 
pivotal men, promised to investigate the status and legal position should exempted 
men be accepted, and closed the conference with a warning that if sufficient men were 
not enrolled, 'the whole voluntary system will have failed '. 55 
Two days after the conference, Scarbrough recommended that the Government 
attempt to raise the 15,000 men by voluntary means, and for a period of service of either 
two or three months. They should be drawn from non-essential trades, be in Grade 2 
medical category, aged 35 or above and be selected from widespread localities and a 
54 /bid., (3A). 
55 Ibid., (3A) . 
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variety of industries. The Director-General Territorial and Volunteer Force (DGTVF) also 
suggested that the Local Government Board (LGB) and Ministry of National Service 
should be asked to advise tribunals and officials to place a man's exemption in 
suspension while he served in what were to be known as Special Service Companies .56 
When approached for comments by the War Office,57 the Ministry of National Service 
accepted the proposals but pointed out that as the period of service by a Volunteer in the 
Special Service Company would retard his possible later enrolment in the army, the 
number of exemptions for men in similar occupations might increase to compensate for 
the the Volunteers' absence. Their departure might, therefore, materially affect both 
industrial production and army recruitment. Sir Auckland Geddes also insisted that men 
working in 27 specified key industries should not be allowed to volunteer and that the 
man's CO, and not the Volunteer himself, must discuss with his employer whether he 
could be spared. 58 Finally, Geddes drew up list of industries and professions from 
which men could be taken. 59 
The War Office accepted Geddes' qualifications and immediately circulated all 
Territorial Associations with the agreed conditions. In addition to those already 
discussed , the letter stated that the authorities anticipated each association would be 
able to offer one company of 114 men from every two of their battalions.6° Companies 
from adjoining counties would be linked together and preference was to be given to 
men signing for three months rather than two. With the intention of commencing the 
scheme in June, the authorities announced that men would be clothed and equipped by 
the War Office and that officers would qualify for an outfit grant. Men of the qualifying age 
had to be of Bi, Ci, or National Service Grade 2 category, and boys of 17 years in Section 
C could enrol with their parents' written permission . Finally, Volunteers were 
guaranteed their exemptions would be suspended with no detriment to their liability 
once their service was completed .61 With no acknowledgement to the Army Council 's 
earlier indifference to the Volunteer movement, the letter ended with an exhortation 
expressing the hope: 
... the response will be such as to ensure the complete success of the scheme and 
56 /bid., (2A), 29/05/18. 
57 Ibid., (7 A), 29/05/18. 
58 These included the railway, fishing and mining industries. 
59 W032.5049 (8A) , 30/05/18. 
60 W099/674 (TV2) of 8/06/18. Each company was to have one major or captain , 4 subalterns, one 
company sergeant major and company quartermaster sergeant, 4 sergeants, 8 corporals , 92 privates 
and 3 signallers . 
61 W032.5049 (9A) . 
justify the Council's confidence in the value and utility of the Force as an integral part of 
the Army.62 
Later circulars confirmed that with the exception of four units in Scottish Command , the 
Volunteers would be used to fill up the depleted cadres of Territorial Cyclist Battalions63 
and that as the essence of the scheme was speed and efficiency, neither compulsion 
nor the 'commando' system were feasible or acceptable. 64 County Commandants were 
urged to appeal to their officers and men for a swift response and to stress that the 
scheme was intended to have minimal impact on trade and industry. 65 
The rejection of a 'commando' concept and the War Office's insistence that men 
must serve for a minimum of two months marked a defeat for Scarbrough. He had 
argued that as the demand for overseas drafts might be as urgent in three months time 
as it was then, and thus demands on the Volunteers equally severe, it would , in the long 
run be advantageous to have as many men as possible with experience of full -time 
service. This could best be achieved either through a 'commando' scheme of 
continuous service of only one month or, alternatively, by securing the power to mobilize 
the required percentage from each county and choose who was to actually serve for an 
indefinite period by ballot. Scarbrough suggested that in either case, army call up of 
Grade 2 men over 35 years who might be liable for the Special Service Companies 
would have to be suspended . This would certainly work to the disadvantage of the 
Regular Army but it would be counterbalanced by the existence of a more dependable 
force for home defence and by causing only a minimum of industrial disruption. The 
Director of Staff Duties succinctly dismissed Scarbrough 's thesis by rejecting the 
implication that the Volunteer Force should be filled at the expense of the Regular Army 
and by arguing that while a 'commando' system might be adequate for guarding POW 
camps, it could not work for mobile formations opposing good quality enemy troops. 66 
In addition to the disagreements within various sections of the War Office, there 
were also inter-departmental difficulties. War Office assurances of future consultation in 
response to further hesitancy on the part of the Ministry of National Service and the Local 
62 Ibid. 
63 lbid., (158) . The Volunteers were, for example, used to fill up Territorial Force units such as the 1/5 
East Yorkshire and 2/6 Norfolk. • 
64 W070.43. A minute of 11/06/18 by the DSD rejected the 'commando' system. 
65 The County Commandant of Suffolk was so enthused by the scheme that he offered the permanent 
services of himself and of his entire HQ Staff. His offer was gently declined on the grounds that on ly 
company officers were being sought. Ibid. Letter of 4/06/18. 
66 W032.5049 (24) , 11/06/18 and ibid., (25) , 11/06/18. 
Government Board allayed some concerns,67 but relations between the War Office and 
the Ministry frayed when the latter's tardiness in issuing the required directives to its 
officials caused confusion in the regions.68 In particular, by objecting to the enrolment of 
men in some trades not on the banned list, local officials were accused by the military 
authorities of not adhering to the agreed terms. Compromises were made by which 
Territorial Associations were instructed to submit nominal rolls for scrutiny to Ministry 
officials before they were sent to the War Office. Lists were to be with the DGTVF by 19 
June and the revised figure of 13,224 men assembled for deployment by 29 June.69 
The first breakdown of the number of men who had volunteered was completed 
by the DGTVF on 20 June and made disappointing reading. Only 10,446 men had 
submitted their names and, what was of even greater concern, 1900 of those were 
employed in barred industries. These included 958 miners and 233 agricultural 
workers. The greatest proportion of men, over 3000, came from Northern Command, 
while London District offered only 561.70 Scarbrough and his officials concluded the 
poor response was principally a reluctance by employers to release their men and 
because the Ministry of National Service and the LGB had withheld instructions from 
their tribunal representatives. 71 This practice was thought to have caused 'bewilderment 
and suspicion' among men seeking confirmation that their exemptions would not be 
prejudiced. In addition, the general opinion among small businessmen held that they 
could not spare themselves for longer than one month . The widespread belief that the 
fairest way to raise the men would be to compel counties to furnish a quota and then 
maintain it by a rota system persisted .72 Adding to the problems were inconsistencies 
among employers as to which workers not on the barred list might be allowed to go: 
Liverpool Corporation offered leave of absence for two months to its teachers while the 
Suffolk and Lancashire Education Committees decided they could not afford to let their 
staff go. 73 The Treasury believed that if a man could be spared for three months he 
could be released for full military service. In contrast, the War Office and Board of Trade 
were prepared to let their personnel apply provided they did not have to employ a paid 
67 /bid., (16A), 1/06/18 and ibid., (168), 1/06/18 from the War Office to Ministry of National Service and 
Local Government Board respectively. 
66 /bid., (32A), June 1918. 
69 /bid., (238), 7/06/18. 
70 Ibid., (31A), 20/06/18. 
71 Macpherson also made a public appeal to employers to release men for the Special Service 
Companies. Hansard Vol.1 06, 17 46, 6/096/18. 
12 W032.5049 (31A) , 20/06/18. 
73 VF Gazette Vol.? No.185, 15/06/18, p.277; Vol.? No.188, 6/07/18, p.317; E.R.Cooper mss, p.10, 
IWM Dept.of Documents. 
substitute. 74 
Concern over the poor recruitment results did at least cause an improvement in 
inter-departmental relations . A hastily issued press statement gave reassuring official 
notice that exempted men had nothing to fear by volunteering , and the Ministry instructed 
its tribunal representatives not to emphasize at any exemption review that a man had 
been spared for voluntary duty. 75 There was also an assurance that boys whose 
eighteenth birthday fell during their period of service would not be called up until their 
two or three month term was completed. 76 
The analysis of those who had volunteered also revealed problems with 
composition . The undoubted patriotism and belief that they should lead by example 
caused more officers to volunteer than were required . However, the fact that they could 
be spared from their employment also reflects the largely commercial background and 
considerable age of many Volunteer officers. In some areas an excess number of 
warrant officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) also offered themselves. This 
led to questions about seniority and was resolved by allowing sergeants, provided they 
were prepared to take the lower rate of pay, to serve as junior NCOs.77 The War Office's 
acceptance that men who had volunteered but received their call up papers before 24 
June would have to withdraw in favour of the Regular Army, in addition to its having to 
disqualify for service those 1900 Volunteers on the barred list, meant a loss of yet more 
men. 78 Neither did the new spirit of cooperation with the Ministry of National Service 
extend to quarrels about when recruiting for the companies should cease . The Ministry 
was again accused of failing to issue adequate instructions to its local officials and , 
when it ordered that recruiting for the companies should end on 29 June, the War Office 
protested and talked of a breach of faith. 79 When, during a meeting of the War Cabinet 
on 1 July, R.E. Prothero, the President of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries , 
criticised the War Office for having accepted the services of farm labourers and other 
barred men, Geddes described the matter as 'the most serious thing that has 
happened for the Ministry of National Service' .80 Macpherson's absence from the 
meeting delayed further discussion until the following ·day. When it was resumed on 2 
74 BT 13/88/7. 
75 W032.5049, no number. Press statement dated 27/06/18; LGB Circular R.221 , July 1918. 
78 W032.5049, no number. The Ministry of National Service instructions were issued on 28/06/18. 
77 Ibid., (57 A) . There were several enquiries as to what level or rate of pension the widow of, for 
example, a sergeant who had agreed to serve at a lower rank would receive . The War Office dismissed 
the queries because it did not expect many casualties . 
76 Ibid., (378) , 26/06/18. 
79 Ibid., (39A), 29/06/18. 
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July, Cabinet members decided there had clearly been a 'misapprehension ' over the 
issue. They agreed that all men belonging to barred trades or professions were to be 
rejected and , owing to the scattered nature and poor communications of many 
Volunteer units, that recruiting for the companies should continue until 6 July.81 
By the time Macpherson gave the House details of what duties the companies 
were intended to perform, he would have been in possession of Robertson 's memo on 
the potentially drastic effects on mainland defence a further sudden withdrawal of home 
service troops for France would have. Aware of the concern at GHQ HF, the Under 
Secretary of State informed the Commons that the existing but severely depleted 25 
Cyclist Battalions spread across the various commands would be filled up by 
Volunteers . Certain of the battalions' NCOs were to be retained until the Volunteers 
became efficient, but the Government expressed its confidence that the Volunteer Force 
would be willing and able to supplement the now diminished number of troops at the 
disposal of the C-in-C HF.82 There were still some problems concerning the acceptance 
of men who should not have been allowed to volunteer but by the first week in July just 
under 10,000 men, 5000 fewer than had originally been agreed , were in training near 
the coast with remnants of the Territorial personnel. 83 
In early July, Macpherson was asked whether in view of the disappointing 
numbers who had offered themselves he would consider issuing an Order in Council to 
call up all Grade 2 Volunteers over 35. 84 Predicting an 'immediate and satisfactory' 
response, the Gazette had originally welcomed the announcement of the formation of 
the companies as 'just such a chance as many Volunteers have waited and wished 
for'. 85 It rejected the possible option of compulsion but as early as mid-June the editors 
had expressed regret that the call was not meeting with the 'desired ' enthusiasm. They 
blamed the reluctance not on a lack of willing Volunteers but on the length of service 
demanded, on the limitation of accepting only Grade 2 men over 35 , and on the difficulty 
of would-be volunteers securing release from their employment. Although there are no 
extant War Office papers to confirm that it was ever a major consideration on the part of 
the authorities, the journal explained the main argument against a 'commando' system 
was the army's diffi~ulty in working out how to pay the men. It wrote, too, of the 'odium of 
81 CAB 23/7 2/07/18. 
82 W070.43. Although the men were intended to coast watch , not all were to be provided with 
bicycles. 
83 Some Suffolk farm labourers were reported to have been erroneously accepted . These and others 
who should not have been taken were released under W099/Releases/89 (TV2) of 19/07/18. 
84 HansardVol.107, 1719-20, 3/07/18. 
85 VF Gazette Vol. 7 No.183, 1/06/18, p.253. 
failure' and , by the end of June, regretted that the small number volunteering provided 
'scoffers' with the opportunity to hurl 'shafts of ridicule' at the movement.86 In defence of 
its readership, the Gazette blamed the failure to raise more than two-thirds of the 
required personnel on past treatment of the movement: governments, it suggested , had 
never been fair to the auxiliary and trust was non-existent.87 
Some commanders were unsure how many men they might have under their 
command until they actually turned up for departure. For instance, the Suffolk 
Association was required to provide 330 men from a registered membership of 5800 
Volunteers : only 12 officers and 40 men from one battalion submitted their names and 
before mobilization this was further whittled down for unknown reasons to 6 and 30 
respectively. 88 To the frustrated company commander, there seemed no rationale 
behind the Corporation's decision to let the Town Clerk go whilst ruling against the 
enrolment of one of its several dustmen. 89 Similarly, 11 of Wiltshire's 46 volunteers 
were rejected and, of the 17 officers and 97 men in Bucking hamshire who offered 
themselves, only 5 officers and 63 men actually went. Some were called up by the army 
before their company service began and others were withdrawn on grounds of 
occupation shortly before departure.9° Cambridgeshire supplied an excess of officers 
but failed to secure its 160 other ranks from a membership of well over 3000. Surrey 
experienced similar problems. It raised too many officers but failed by over 80 men to 
achieve the target of 300 other ranks from its three battalions. 91 A colonel in the 
Leicestershire and Rutland Association thought raising only three-fifths of its quota was 
'satisfactory' but, conversely, the 2nd Shropshire Battalion raised so many men it sent 
its excess to serve with the Herefordshire Company.92 In addition to the difficulties over 
the number of men who might eventually present themselves for service, the actual 
mobilization procedure was not without incident and confusion . The Dumbarton and 
Nairn Associations complained of contradictions in War Office instructions and of the 
late arrival of several crucial telegrams.93 
Life in a Special Company for those Volunteers who had opted for service was 
86 Ibid., Vol. 7 No.185, 15/06/18, p.277; Vol. 7 No.187, 29/06/18, p.301 . 
87 1n a slight distortion of the truth the Central Association later recalled that the response had been 
'immediate and satisfact<;>ry' . CAVR, The Volunteer Force and the Volunteer Training Corps During the 
Great War, London: King & Sons, 1920, p.25. 
88 The Suffolk Volunteer Regiment administered 6 battalions. 
89 E.R.Cooper, mss Department of Documents, IWM, p.10. 
90 Wiltshire RO L 1/100/3, 19/09/18; Bucking hamshire RO T N1/1 , 4/07/18. 
91 Cambridgeshire RO R68/11, 8/06/18; Surrey RO 608/2/4, 8/07/18. 
92 Leicestershire RO, DE819/2, 4/07/18; Shropshire RO 1988/35, 27/07/18. 
93 NAS MD8/16, 4/06/18; MD9/1, 2/07/18. The Gazette later published a long article on the tria ls 
experienced by one company during the first days of its existence. Vol. 7 No.192, 3/08/18, p.370. 
34-b 
hard and not particularly exciting .94 They were scattered up and down the East Coast, 
usually based at the same locations as the cyclist units they had replaced . The greatest 
concentration of companies was in East Anglia but some were attached to the Humber 
and Tyne Garrisons and others operated in Scotland . There were occasional 
complaints about the food and accommodation at several camps but some compan ies 
had the use of Young Men's Christian Association huts and one detachment's officer 
hired a coastal cottage for the comfort of his men.95 Most companies spent the first 
month and sometimes a proportion of the second training and working up efficiency. 
They were issued with full kit, raised and trained Hotchkiss crews, eventually took 
responsibility for stretches of the coast and received orders on what to do with dead 
bodies, crashed aircraft and prisoners.96 As they came under military law, any potential 
absconders were warned they would be listed in the Police Gazette, but with their 
conduct described as 'exemplary' this was considered an unnecessary precaution .97 
There were occasional problems with those whose exemption hearing or medical fell 
during their period of service and youth did apparently 'return to men who had left it 
behind '.98 But, as the greatest problem for most was probably boredom , confirmation 
that the two month men would be allowed to go by the end of August was generally 
greeted with relief. Macpherson had twice reiterated the Government's intention to keep 
its promise but it was The Times which explained that as the recruiting and military 
situations had much improved, 'the temporary emergency can be considered as over' .99 
Nearly 50% of the original number had signed on for three months and by the time they 
were released , with the gift of a pair of boots and a letter of thanks, at least one of their 
commanders considered most to be the equal of general home service troops.100 An 
unknown but probably small number died during their tour and others are known to 
94 E.Potton (ed) , A Record of the United Arts Rifles 1914-1919, London: Alex Maring , 1920, p.24. 
95 W099/Inf/12 (TV1) of 27/08/18 declared complaints about the food and accommodation at a camp 
in Fife were unfounded; J.Tindall , The Sidmouth Volunteers 1914-1918, Exeter: Cu lverwell and Sons, 
nd ., p.47 ; E.R.Cooper mss, IWM op.cit., p.29 . . 
96 F. H. lock, Records of the East Yorkshire Volunteer Force 1914-1919, Hull: Eastern Morning & Hull 
News, 1922, p.52; Shropsrire RO 1681/198/6, Company Orders. 
97 W099/lnf/13 (TV1) of 10/09/18 gave notice that names of deserters would be publ ished ; E.R.Cooper 
mss, IWM, op. cit., p.11 . 
9e Pte. Earl of the 1/Royal West Surrey Volunteer Regiment could not attend his medical board. 
Discussions with the LGB resolved the issue and his exemption was renewed. W099/S/230 (TV1) of 
5/09/18; E.J.Disbrowe, A History of the Volunteer Movement in Cheshire 1914-1920, op.cit., p.74. 
99 Hansard Vol.1 09, 638, 1 /08/18 ; Vol.1 09, 1568, 8/08/18; Times 29/08/18. 
1oo W070.43. The letter of thanks was published as W099/674 (TV2) of 28/09/18; E.R.Cooper mss, 
IWM, op.cit., p.11 . 
have returned home on compassionate grounds.101 Scarbrough assessed their 
contribution as having 'enabled the Government to meet a critical situation and to tide 
over very difficult days in the history of the war'.102 Unsurprisingly this opin ion was 
endorsed by the Central Association: 
It is not unreasonable for the Volunteers to claim that their existence and efficiency 
contributed to the final victory. If there had been no such force it would not have been 
possible to send such large contingents over to France. 103 
The War Office thought differently. It considered the formation of the Special Compan ies 
had once again confirmed its long-held belief that many Volunteers were physically 
incapable of doing anything militarily useful. 104 
Fortunately for the War Office, by September 1918 the efficiency or otherwise of 
the Volunteer Force was of little importance. The military situation on the Western Front 
had so altered that on 3 September the CIGS reported to the War Cabinet that there was 
not the 'remotest prospect' of invasion. He proposed that with the exception of the 
coastal defence artillery, Royal Enginer, anti-aircraft units and the ROC, all troops within 
the UK should be embodied in draft finding units.105 The Director of Staff Duties (DSD) 
agreed , pointing out that the dual role of draft finding and home defence duty had 
militated against the efficiency of training recruits .106 Aimed at achieving manpower 
savings of between 80,000- 100,000 troops, supplementary proposals to reduce the 
number of different kinds of draft finding units and a further rationalization of existing 
home defence forces were also submitted. 107 The papers circulating within the War 
Office during this period make no reference to the possible use of the Volunteers to 
replace those battalions and men who were being withdrawn from home defence. 
Neither is there any evidence to suggest that Robertson protested against the changes. 
The authorities' declination to include a role for the Volunteers in their 
reassessment of home defence strategy was probably a consequence of their 
consistently held belief that the Force was barely worth consideration as a fighting body. 
101 Two Volunteers from Hertfordshire are known to have died wh ile serving with the compan ies. Herts 
RO TAFA/1 , 30/09/18. The War Office decided fatalities ' next-of-kin ·should receive a memorial 
plaque and scroll ( 45/Gen.,No/2153 of 3/06/20) and any man who fell ill or had an illness aggravated 
by his period of service should receive a Silver Badge. (991825 of 2111118) . 
102 Quoted in E.R.Cooper mss, IWM, op.cit. , p.3; The Kent Fencible Vol.3 No.10, October 191 8 
reported on the authorities' 'thorough satisfaction ' with the work of the companies. 
103 CAVR, The Volunteer Force and the Volunteer Training Corps During the Great War, op.cit., p.26. 
104 W070.41 . Letter 991786, no date. 
105 W032.5274. Draft paper dated 3/09/18. 
106 Ibid. Memo by DSD to DMO 4/09/18. 
107 Ibid. Memo: Proposals as regards the Reorganization of Home Defence, 25/09/1 8. 
This view was further reinforced by the contemporary turmoil within the Force's ranks . By 
June 1918 the application of the Military Service (No.2) Act had made a significant 
impact on the size and composition of unit membership but the consequences of the 
later Order in Council, which made the volunteer condition compulsory, were to exert 
even greater pressures on attempts by battalion officers and willing Volunteers to 
maintain a cohesion, esprit and acceptable level of efficiency. 
Battalion COs and adjutants continued to struggle with the volume of paperwork 
descending upon them from Adastral House. They coped with the introduction of a new 
numbering system, continued to accuse the War Office of awarding insufficient grants 
and of unnecessary delays in settling accounts, struggled to keep day to day 
expenditure within budget boundaries, and, in turn, received criticism of their own laxity 
in the care of Territorial equipment and premiseS. 108 They endured holdups in the 
receipt of clothing, attempted to absorb increases in manufacturers' prices for uniforms 
and were condemned for wearing their suits at inappropriate times and 
circumstances. 109 In addition to their normal guards and anti-aircraft duties, Volunteers 
replaced some home service ambulance orderlies, heard rumours that they were to 
replace striking prison wardens, thought they were to assist the police in keeping the 
railways working, provided guards of honour to repatriated POWs and converted cellars 
under Columbia Market in East London to an air raid shelter capable of accommodating 
several thousand people.110 In April 1918, the Kent Emergency Committee had 
continued to express its concern about the lack of preparations and plans to cope with 
the evacuation of civilians and looked to the local Volunteers to supplement what it 
108 99/684 {TV2) of 1/06/18 changed the system of regimental numbering in an effort to make it less 
confusing should Volunteers from different corps ever be called out. Herts Association complained of 
the 'great strain ' put on it by delays in Government payments. Herts RO TAF N1 , 24/06/18; Surrey 
regretted the 'considerable drain' on association funds through the lack of adequate grants. Surrey RO 
DDTA1/2, 30/07/18. The 21/West Yorkshire Vol. Regiment exceeded its monthly postage allowance. 
West Yorkshire Archive DB17 C43, Bn Orders, 13/05/18; When the Secretary of the East Lanes 
Association inspected a Volunteer unit, the CO failed to account for a significant amount of missing 
equipment. Manchester Central Library, M73/2/4, 2/08/18. 
109 Shropshire RO 1988/35, 27/07/18; One batch of uniforms· cost the East Lanes Association over £100 
more than the original estimate, Manchester Central Library M73/3/24, 31 /05/18 ; Following official 
complaints several COs reminded their members where and when they were permitted to wear 
uniform. For example, 4/lincs Voi.Bn ., IWM Department of Printed Books 316.338 C.6051 , 13/04/18. 
11 0 99/Medical/50 $02 of 19/02/18 reduced some Home Service Field Ambulances to skeleton units, to 
be made up to strength in an emergency by Volunteers. This released some 800 Regulars and 
Territorials for other duties; M.Yearsley, Home Front Diary 1914-1918, p.96, IWM, op.cit.; F.Simpson , 
Chester Volunteers, op.cit .. p.121 ; C. Gerring, A Record of the Early Volunteer Movement (The 
Sherwood Foresters) 1914- 1919, Nottingham: Sisson & Parker, 1920, p.35; E.J.Martin, 'VTC i1914-
1918' IWM, op.cit., notes on the Bethnal Green Battalion. 
considered to be a shortage of Specials. 111 
As the men in Sections D and R were gradually struck off strength , the need for 
more battalion amalgamations became apparent. 112 One aspect of this rationalization 
resulted in alterations to some battalion affiliations, a practice which did occasionally 
cause both resentment and difficulties. When, for example, it was proposed that the 2nd 
and 3rd Battalions of the Lanarkshire Volunteer Regiment should affiliate to the Scottish 
Rifles, their officers objected on the grounds that the change from 120 paces a minute 
to a rifle regiments's 160 would put a 'considerable strain' on its many members aged 
over 40.113 While structural change inevitably effected battalion composition, training had 
to continue. At least one regiment embarked upon an extended programme in the 
months following the German Offensive but attendance at the extra sessions amounted 
to between only 200 and 300 per battalion. 114 The irregular attendance of the tribunal 
men also continued to cause friction and impaired battalion efficiency.115 It is known that 
only 36% of the men from one of the more exclusive battalions turned out for a weekend 
route march but, as few drill registers have survived, precise attendance figures are 
hard to determine. 116 One such register, for a Shropshire platoon over a three month 
period, indicates that on average fewer than 25% of the unit failed to perform their 
necessary 1 0 drills. Despite this conscientious turn out, the County Commandant 
reported that the platoon had paid insufficient attention to bomb, bayonet and night work 
and that its members' boots were inadequate for their tasks.117 There were the regular 
harvest-time calls for rural Volunteers to perform a reduced number of drills, but 
Macpherson continued to insist enough concessions had already been made and 
restated his department's belief that men should be given sufficient opportunity to 
111 IWM Department of Documents Misc. Box 22/410. Letter of 22/04/18 from the Chairman of Thanet 
Emergency Committee to Chairman of Birchington Parish Council. 
112 Section R men were discharged under VR067/507 (TV2) of 12/04/18. For example, the 2/1 
Cumberland and the Westmorland Battalions amalgamated, Cumbria RO TTAF/2, and the Devon 
Volunteer Regiment reduced from 5 to 3 battalions, Devon RO 1715c/T A2 , 13/03/18. One history 
states that the 3 battalions of the Herts Vol. Regiment were saved from amalgamating into one by the 
demand to raise the Special Service Companies. J.D.Sainsbury, Hertfordshire 's Soldiers From 1757, 
Hitchin: Herts Local History Council , 1969, p.67. It is more probable it was the application of the 
Volunteer condition following the Military Service (No.2) Act ':'hich forestalled the proposal. 
113 NAS MD2/3, 24/05/18. The County of Lanarkshire Association voted instead to affiliate to the 
Highland Light Infantry. In July, the United Arts Rifles merged with the Kensington Companies of the 
19/County of London Vol. Regiment. The strength grew from 570 to 991 . E. Potton ( ed) , A Record of 
the United Arts Rifles 1914-1919, op.cit., p.25. 
114 G.Steppler, Britons, To Arms!, Stroud: Budding Books, 1997, p.129. 
115 Simpson recorded a 'little soreness' between the genuine Volunteers and the tribunal men . The 
battalion was paraded and told it must 'band together'. F.Simpson, Chester Volunteers 1914-1920, 
op.cit., p.119. 
11 6 E.Potton (ed) , A Record of the United Arts Rifles 1914-1919, op.cit., p.24. 
117 Shropshire RO 1681/198/13; 1681/198/5. 
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complete their drill requirement without having to attend on Sundays. 118 
Despite losing what was often a significant percentage of their most dedicated 
members to the Special Service Companies, summer camps continued. Accusations of 
excessive pressure on men to attend caused Macpherson once again to clarify the legal 
demands. 119 Financing the camp was another contentious issue. The War Office 
declined to pay for cartage to the site, allowed only the basic ration allotment and 
insisted that deficiencies in equipment had to be paid from local contingency funds .120 
Nevertheless, reflecting on the 1918 camp, one former Rifle Volunteer and South African 
War veteran believed the Volunteer was 'never so well trained and equipped [and] is a 
more important military asset than at any period in the history of the movement'. In 
contrast, the Hampshire Commandant's report on his regiment's August camp 
concluded that it had been a 'waste of time and public money': attendance was poor, 
the battalion was already under strength and, because men were continually arriving 
and departing, 'no regular system of instruction was possible' .121 Facilities in some 
camps remained woeful, the sanitary arrangements in one described as 'on a level with 
those of a second class railway station'. 122 No doubt some members did enjoy camp 
but even the presence of women typists and an emphasis on building esprit probably 
did little to endear the experience to the tribunal men whose presence was often a 
necessary obligation to complete their drill requirement. 123 
Precise and corroborating figures are difficult to find but it seems clear that during 
the first six months of 1918, membership declined. Over a three month period , the 1st 
Battalion City of London Volunteers gained 68 and lost 171 members , whilst between 
May and August the strength of the Liverpool Volunteers decreased by 300 .124 Section C, 
comprising the 17 year old boys, probably experienced the greatest net growth but, as 
tribunals sent new men to enrol and declined to renew many time-expired exemptions , 
116 Hansard Vol.1 08, 138, 9/07 /18 ; Vol.1 09, 59, 29/07 /18; W099!578 (TV2) of 23/07/18 released 
agricultural Volunteers from half of their drills during July, August and September, but W0991783 of 
3/09/18 refused to allow the National Farmers' Union of Scotland exemption for its members during 
the potato harvest. The War Office also rejected a petition from the Ministry of Food for a further 
relaxation . W070.41 . 
119 Hansard Vol.1 09, 638, 1/08/18. 
120 Manchester Central Library M73/3/24, 2/08/18. 
121 Northamptonshi~e RO ML 1540 Vol.lll, unidentified newspaper report on 2/Northampton 
Vol. Regiment; Hampshire RO 37M69/4, Commandant's Report on 1918 camp. 
122 J.Tindall, The Sidmouth Volunteers 1914-1918, op.cit., p.45. 
123 The Perthshire Association agreed to pay the hotel lodgings of 2 lady typists at the Blair Atholl 
camp. NAS MD7/38, 21/06/18; Battalion Orders for the 21/West Yorks Voi.Regiment camp at 
scarborough required all members to carry a swagger cane on leaving the site. Walking sticks were 
considered inappropriate. West Yorkshire Archive DB17 C.43. 
124 IWM Dept.of Printed Books 316.338 K876; Liverpool RO 356WES/65. 
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Section 8 suffered a continually disruptive turnover of personnel. There were 23 
discharges from the 4/Lincolnshire Volunteer Regiment during the first two weeks of 
June, 19 of whom joined the army, while the Liverpool Volunteer Reg iment released 31 
members, 22 on medical and six on business grounds. One battalion of the Shropshire 
Volunteers showed some slight gain, with 32 enrolments and 20 releases during April 
and May, 16 of whom joined the army. Unfortunately, half of the new members enrolled 
in Section C and were thus unlikely to serve for more than 12 months. The 4/West 
Yorkshire Volunteer Regiment did rather better by receiving 73 from the tribunal and 
losing 33 to the Services during July.125 
As many men failed to have their exemption renewed sometimes only weeks 
after becoming efficient, it is difficult to determine with any real accuracy the number of 
qualified men serving in a battalion. The 'snap and vim ' of one unit might have 
impressed some watching Australians , but it seems likely that in the early summer of 
1918, perhaps a total of only 40% of the national membership qualified for the efficiency 
grant. 126 This percentage was certainly to improve as the year progressed but the 
constant changes in personnel did little to add to War Office confidence in the Force's 
utility. 
Although the OGTVF continued to look forward to September when he would be in 
a position to dispense with those COs considered inadequate for the task, the quality of 
Volunteer officers does seem to have shown some improvement. Attendance and 
success rates at the Central Association 's courses increased but the question of 
whether officers aged between 45- 51 would be retained as Volunteers or be called up 
under the 1918 Act presented a further threat to efficiency.127 In April , Macpherson had 
told the House that Volunteer officers aged 35 - 45 called up for service and 
recommended for a commission could apply for admission to a Cadet Battalion or, if 
there were no vacancies, join one of the Officer Training Corps units (OTC) .128 Shortly 
afterwards he acknowledged that the position of those officers between 45 - 51 years 
had not yet been decided but the Minister of National Service refused to accept a 
suggestion that no Volunteer officer should be served with call up papers unless he had 
125 IWM Dept.of Printed Books 316.338 C.6051 , Bn . Orders 15/06/18; Liverpool RO 356WES/65, 
6/06/18; Shropshir~ RO 1681/198/7. 10/05/18; West Yorkshire Archive DB17 C.43, 4/Bn. Orders. 
126 Devon RO Z19/46/14, 24/05/18; NAS MD2/3, 19/07/18, 18/10/18. 
127 It is unknown whether any officers responded to W099/658 (TV3) of 11/05/1 8 which sought 
Volunteer officers under 48 years , who could ride and were fluent in Hindustan i, to serve in France 
with the Royal Artillery and Indian forces. 
128 Hansard Vol.1 05, 387, 17/04/18; W099/666 (TV3) of 2/07/18 confirmed that Volunteer officers 
could apply for commissions to Officer Cadet Bns or OTCs. If he was not recommended for a 
commission an officer would be called up into the Regular Army as a soldier. 
?>52. 
been recommended for a commission .129 A list of 169 COs who fell within the new 
military age was subsequently compiled by Major A. Boyd-Carpenter, the Deputy 
Assistant Director, and brought to the attention of the DGTVF. The majority of these men 
were aged between 47- 50, but 24 were only 40 years or under. In view of the probabil ity 
that many of these would be called up, officials from the various departments agreed 
that if a Volunteer CO was called, one month's prior notification to nominate a 
successor must be given. When representation was also made on behalf of non-
Regular and non-TF adjutants, it was decided that provided they were over 40 and not 
higher than Grade 2 medical category, they would be retained indefinitely in post.130 
References to Volunteer officers leaving their unit for military service are usually 
accompanied by expressions of regret but also of satisfaction that the man was 
commissioned into the Regular Army.131 As too many nominations for their 
replacements were reported to be below the required physical standard there was 
official concern about their quality.132 However, as the men from the Special Service 
Companies returned to their units, the most contentious issue affecting the Volunteer 
Force was the War Office's stated intention to replace unsuitable COs with Regular or 
Territorial officers. 
It is unclear when the county associations first became aware of the War Office's 
proposal to appoint COs with overseas experience at the expense of Volunteer officers. 
The ACI which confirmed the policy seems to have come after some counties had 
already complained about the move, and a subsequent War Office letter of September 
was an attempt to mollify the Volunteers by expressing the hope that any displaced CO 
would accept the position of second-in-command and retain his rank of Major. 133 In 
some quarters, the process was seen as a means by which Volunteers might replace 
129 Hansard Vol.1 05, 2128, 8/05/18; NATS1/1 006 Volunteer Officers: Position of under the new 
Military Service Act, 1918, (1A) and (2A) . 
130 NATS1/1006 (6A) , 8/06/18. The youngest CO was Major W .Henderson , aged 29, of the 3/City of 
Glasgow Vol. Regiment; W099!691 (TV3) of 29/06/18; R3/App/5632 of 25/07/18 concerned non-
Volunteer commissioned adjutants. 
131 For instance, F.Simpson , Chester Volunteers 1914-1920, r;>p .cit., p.114 records with pride the 
departure of officers for active service. Not all officers achieved their ambition of joining the Regular 
Army. One was passed fit for France but was rejected by both the Army and Navy. The Army Censor's 
Dept. also refused him. He considered applying to a Home Service Labour Bn., the route favoured by 
Macpherson (Hansard Vol.92 , 2310-1, 23/05/17), but thought better of it. T.Murray Ford, Memoirs of a 
Poor Devil, op.cit. , p.201 . 
132 W0991516 (TV3) of 25/08/18 complained that too many men below the physical standard were 
being nominated for commissions. In an effort to alleviate some of the shortages, W099/593 (TV3) of 
3/04/18 allowed officers to be attached to other Volunteer units if both COs agreed. 
133 The West Lancashire Association discussed the matter in October 1918 but had evidently made an 
earlier response to the ACI of 17/08/18. Liverpool RO 356WES/65, 16/10/18. 
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the ROC: the corps could then be reduced or disbanded and the ROC officers assume 
command of the Volunteer battalions. While at least one association appears to have 
accepted the idea with equanimity, others resented the proposal and protested. The 
Gazette argued that most battalions did not have enough work to do to justify any such 
move by the authorities yet, despite threats of questions in Parliament and accusations 
that it was 'nothing short of a scandal' and a betrayal of those men who had put much 
time, money and effort into raising their battalions, by November several Volunteer COs 
had been replaced .134 
The disappointment at failing to provide the required number of men for the 
Special Service Companies, as well as the discontent felt within sections of the 
movement at the War Office's desire to deprive it of its long-established COs, came at a 
time of yet more turmoil within the county battalions. The application of the Volunteer 
condition continued to arouse anger amongst those men sent by tribunals and 
resentment on the part of the original Volunteers who saw many of those directed to join 
later escape their obligations and receive either ineffective or minimal punishment. 
Moreover, an unexpected additional clause to the long-awaited June Order in Council, 
which continued the application of the condition on all exempted men unless some 
reason for non-application could be made, caused further anxiety and confusion . The 
Gazette decided that because the added clause gave the Army Council power to direct a 
man to perform up to 12 hours 'military duty' weekly, the Order amounted to conscription 
in all but name. It was unclear as to whether these 12 hours were in addition to the drill 
requirement and there was concern that the extra duties might involve work which 
Volunteers had not previously performed. The Birmingham Post took exception to the 
Order, criticising the 'almost surreptitious method' of increasing a man's commitment 
and called for a campaign to prevent its application. 135 
The contradictions evident in the way Volunteers and tribunals interpreted 
and adjected both the Volunteer condition and the subsequent Order reflected the 
tortuous process by which they had been conceived. Discussions between the Director-
General of Recruiting and the Local Government ·Board had begun in November 1917. 
Further consultations with both the Board of Agriculture and the War Office produced 
134 One association simply minuted the War Office's intention and recorded no comments . 
Nottinghamshire RO DDTA1/2, 29/10/18; 'Many' of Cheshire's COs tendered their resignations and the 
county association passed a resolution 'deprecating' the War Office move. F.Simpson, Chester 
Volunteers 1914-1920, op.cit., p.121 ; VFGazetteVol.7 No.201, 5/10/18, p.469; No.202, 12/10/18, 
p.481 ; No.203, 19/10/18, p.493; No.205, 2/11/18, p.518; No.207, 16/11/18, p.542. 
13s Ibid., No.188, 6/07/18, p.313; Birmingham Post, quoted in VF Gazette Vol. 7 No.189, 13/07/18, 
p.325. 
several draft proposals until eventually, in late February 19 18, final agreement about 
how and to whom the Volunteer condition should be applied had been secured .136 The 
Military Service (No.2) Act had, of course, complicated the issue and negotiations for an 
Order in Council commenced in May. Letters seeking clarification of whether an 
exempted man could be directed to enrol and , if that was the case whether the tribunal 
had the power to insist he join Section B, poured into the Ministry of National Service 
during this period of consultation . Until the talks were completed and an Order 
published, the Ministry replied that everything was under review: for the time being , any 
man exempted after 30 April1918 could not be required to enrol. Agreement between 
the various Ministries was eventually secured and the Volunteer Force (Tribunal 
Exemptions) Order, 1918 published . A few weeks later, after yet more correspondence, 
drafts and negotiations, an ACI which formalized the Order was finally approved .137 
The Order applied only to those men who appeared before a tribunal after 1 May 
1918. It did not, therefore, involve existing Volunteers unless or until their exemption 
came up for review. 138 While this was greeted with relief by those who still had a term of 
exemption to run, it meant that the Volunteer Force would not only be split into different 
classes, but into two separate sets of members: those who were compelled to perform 
their 12 hours in addition to or in substitution for their drills, and those who remained 
bound only to their drill obligation . Furthermore, the fact that tribunals could still allow a 
man to be exempted aroused the ire of those who had looked forward to seeing the 
capture of those who had previously escaped a commitment. 139 
The tribunals' response to the Order and ACI was to send an increased number 
of exempted men to their local Volunteer battalions. Within days some units were up to 
their official establishment, but men continued to arrive. Staff were overworked and 
because the establishment was fixed, supernumerary men could not be clothed or 
equipped. The City of Peterborough Tribunal detailed its dilemma to the Prime Minister 
in a letter endorsed by the County Association. The clerk complained that as the local 
battalions were up to strength, enrolment could not be made a condition of exemption . 
There were 400 cases outstanding and if the Northamptonshire Volunteer Regiment 
could not accept them they, as well as the 250 men from the same trades who had 
136 NATS1/947, Volunteer Force: Conditions imposed by Tribunals io Granting Exemption Certificates. 
ACI 228 of 1918 (VFO CLXI) consolidated the new regulations . 
137 ACI 913 of 16/08/18 (VFO CXCVIII) . The LGB issued it as Circular R224 and the Ministry of 
National Service as Instruction No. 150 of 23/08/18. 
138 HansardVol.108, 297-8, 10/07/18. 
139 NATS 1/94 7 ( 1 09B). Letter from a 'Gentleman of the City', 23/08/18. 
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already been sent and enrolled , would have to be released .140 There were problems too , 
particularly in scattered detachments in rural areas, where Volunteer NCOs were being 
called up for the army. The loss of these key men, whose age usually meant they were 
employed only as batmen in the army, was thought to be causing the disintegration of 
certain platoons.141 
It seems likely that many men took advantage of the existing confusion , chose to 
ignore their tribunal order and elected not enrol: 30 men in Oldham, for instance, were 
warned that if they did not present themselves their exemptions would be removed .142 
Tribunal men already in Section B also decided increasingly to absent themselves from 
drills, a decision which may have been facilitated by local circumstances or a weak 
commander.143 Action against Section B men could be taken under new guidelines 
published in September 1918 but defaulters in Section A and C were to be treated on 
merit. 144 While battalion orders of at least one unit made it clear that proceedings under 
either the Army Act or Corps Rules would invariably be taken against those not fulfilling 
their commitment, there is evidence that another regiment decided only to admonish 
rather than fine its offenders. 145 The sheer scale of numbers involved probably deterred 
drastic action: when almost 400 of 700 men in one Middlesbrough battalion failed to 
perform sufficient drills and refused to pay their fines, only 17 were hauled before the 
Bench to serve as examples. The defaulters claimed they were iron workers and had no 
time to put in their drills, a defence rejected by the Gazette which insisted that as 'most' 
of the munitions factories now closed on Sundays, badged men previously protected 
from having to enrol should also be compelled to join .146 The case of these men was 
dealt with quite quickly but the County Commandant of Lancashire complained in 
September of delays in the way tribunals were handling the cases of defaulters. 147 The 
huge and continually increasing number of circulars and orders dealing with the matter 
of exempted men undoubtedly added to the administrative problems of adjutants and 
tribunal chairmen and possibly served as an incentive not to proceed with some cases . 
140 Northamptonshire RO Ace. No.1968/129, 20/07/18. 
141 VF Gazette Vol. 7 No.192, 3/08/18, p.362. 
142 Oldham Standard, 12/07/18 
143 One platoon commander was constantly criticised by his battalion Adjutant for failing to send in 
returns and for regularly requesting leave of absence for himself. There were reported to be more 
breaches of agreement in his platoon than in the remainder of the battalion. Shropshire RO 
1681/198/6. • 
144 Action against Section B men could be taken under W0991732 (TV1) of 17/09/18. 
145 The 4/West Yorks. Vol. Regiment spelt out the implications of W099!732 in Bn Orders. West 
Yorkshire Archive 0817 C.43, 14/10/18; 5/Devon Voi.Regiment, Order Book, Devon RO Z19/46/14. 
148 VF Gazette Vol.? No.193, 10/08/18, p.380; No.194, 17/08/18, p.385. 
147 W070.43. Letter of 3/09/18. f 
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The wording of the more than 200 documents was frequently ambiguous, mislead ing 
and , in the absence of previous legal interpretation or examination , at times almost 
impossible to implement. 
Fear of public ridicule following several notorious cases brought before the 
courts also acted as a disincentive to action . On one occasion a Hull Volunteer, 
described as a 'physical wreck' and in possession of a medical certificate detailing his 
double rupture and chronic bronchitis, was brought before magistrates charged with 
non-attendance at drills and failure to pay his CO's fine of 14 shillings. The case was 
dismissed , the tribunal which sent him condemned for its stupidity and his CO accused 
of a lack of tact and judgement. 148 Another case which led to questions in the House 
concerned a man who 'boasted' he would be able to escape forcible enrolment by 
'wrangling ' the military authorities and the tribunal. An enquiry concluded that the local 
Volunteer Company Commander had acted improperly by asking the medical officer to 
give the man 'special attention' when he came before him. 149 
The difficulties experienced by the tribunals in deciding who should be forced to 
enrol extended to those men who believed they had a genuine case for exemption . 
Under the Volunteer Act, 1916, GOC Commands had the power to release a man from 
his agreement and an individual had the right to invoke a right of appeal to his 
employer.150 The employer could then seek a ruling from the Ministry of Munitions or 
other appropriate department. However, several Withdrawal Orders made under the 
Military Service (No.2) Act had resulted in exempted men occupied in a substantial 
number of trades losing their earlier protection from army service. This now rendered 
them liable for call up but, as most were working on Government contracts , it was to the 
national benefit for them to be retained as civilians. If they were forced to join the 
Volunteers as a condition of their continued exemption and could not, owing to their long 
hours at work put in the required drills, they fell liable to prosecution .151 The number of 
men involved was not thought to be significant but agreement was reached between the 
Director-General of Recruiting and the DGTVF whereby a man seeking exemption from 
the Volunteers could appeal to his local Assistant Director of National Service who 
148 VF Gazette Vol.? No.202, 12/10/18, p.481. 
149 The case of J.Rooke was raised in Parliament by Philip Snowden MP, Hansard Vol.1 05, 2162, 
8/05/18 and was investigated by the War Office. A report was prepared as W099/G/92. No dat e but 
probably May-June 1919. 
150 W070.42. The process could also be used by COs to get rid of men they did not want. A naturalized 
Britain had been ordered by a tribunal to enrol , but when his evident pro-German sympathies became 
a 'disturbing factor' within his battalion, he was released . 
151 NATS1/1027, Volunteer Force: Men released from Tribunals . 
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would , in turn , consult with the County Commandant. Evidence would then be sent to 
the GOC Command. If he was satisfied that the man's hours of employment prevented 
him from fulfilling the requirements of Section B, the GOC could recommend 
exemption .152 
Agreement was also reached over the vexed and sensitive question of Volunteers 
employed in agriculture. Amidst the annual calls for Volunteers to help with the harvest, 
and insistent complaints by some farm labourers whose tribunals had forced them to 
join the Volunteers against those in their industry whose tribunal had not, a degree of 
uniformity was achieved .153 War Agricultural Committees would still be permitted to 
issue exemption vouchers to those men who they considered were essential , and could 
advise tribunals not to impose the Volunteer condition on those labourers who did not 
hold a voucher (and who thus did not fall under the Committees' jurisdiction) , unless it 
was clear a man would be able to perform the drills. To appease further the sense of 
continuing inequality, the War Office confirmed that labourers would be required to do 
only 50% of their drills in the harvest months. 154 
The total of agricultural labourers forced to join the Volunteers during the summer 
of 1918 was probably less than significant but the number of tribunal men who were 
employed in other industries continued to grow and cause great difficulty to Volunteer 
units. Simultaneously as the men who had signed on for a two month term with the 
Special Service Companies returned to their battalions, the War Office announced yet 
another major reorganization of the Volunteer Force.155 Given the War Office's attitude 
towards the Force, it seems unlikely that the War Office itself should have advocated 
what virtually amounted to a 'revolution' in the way the Force was to be organized .156 The 
military authorities would have been content for the Volunteers to , if not melt away, at 
least be restricted to the establishment and financial outlay of early 1918. Unfortunately 
for them, the implications of the Military Service (No.2) Act and the concept of equality of 
\ 52 The agreement was embodied as part of W0991732 (TV1) of 17/09/18 and as Ministry of National 
Service Circular R3 No. 154 of 5/10/18. The issue seems to have been prompted by an enquiry from a 
London varnish manufacturer who feared the new conditions wo~ld cause him to lose three of his 
employees. NATS1/1027 (1A) . 
\53 Major-General Henry Mason, Indian Army (Rtd). , appealed for Volunteers to act immediately in 
assisting farmers, Times, 14/08/18; Regular and Special Constables had also been urged to offer 
themselves as temporary agricultural labourers and some from Nottinghamshire worked without wages 
during their annual holiday. As many Volunteers were also Specials it is likely they undertook similar 
work, whether officially or unofficially. H045/1 0838/331298. 
'
54 NATS1/987 Conditions for Agricultural Volunteers ; NATS1/1027; VF Gazette Vol.? No.196, 
7/09/18, p.425. 
'
55 ACis 912 and 913 of 16/08/18 (VFOs CLXXXXVII and CLXXXXVIII) . 
156 VF Gazette Vol. 7 No.196, 7/09/18, p.424. 
sacrifice meant that everyone who was physically able had to be seen to be making a 
contribution to 'total war'. The extension of military service to men of 51 , the tribunals' 
increasing practice of not renewing exemptions and the domestic mobilization of those 
who remained outside the Services, appeared to bring Haldane's prewar dream of a 
nation-in-arms one stage nearer reality. The War Office might argue that the threat of 
invasion was no longer a consideration but the Government was possibly looking 
ahead to the end of war and the potential of civil unrest. Volunteers under military law 
had already proved themselves useful during unofficial strikes and, when 
demobilization eventually began, might be so again . 
In the meantime, tribunal officials and staffs of Volunteer units faced intractable 
problems. These were exacerbated by the DGTVF's August decision to divide the Force 
into two sections: one section would , in the event of invasion , become full-time and the 
other, which was essentially supernumerary to the first, would provide part-time military 
support during the pre-emergency period . Every Volunteer was to sign an agreement 
either to undertake the drills laid down for Sections A, B and C or else to perform 12 
hours military duty each week. Sections A and B in each of the divisions would 
themselves be split into a Training and Service category, with the Service groups being 
supernumerary. The scheme was immensely complicated and immediately gave rise to 
fears that it would lead to territorial inequalities: counties in the threatened areas would 
possibly have to enrol all exempted men while those further inland would probably need 
only to fill their Training units. 157 Even the Gazette accepted that invasion was unlikely, 
argued against the need for a large number of men in the Training units and called for 
an urgent conference to address the issue.158 If tribunals continued to send exempted 
men to enrol, difficulties would reach 'overwhelming pr~portions '. Reports from 
Bradford and Manchester suggested battalions were already double their 
establishment and had thousands more tribunal men waiting to join .159 There were also 
reports that some COs were asking tribunals not to send them exempted men over 46 
years and that some were themselves illegally releasing existing members over that 
age. 160 In contrast to the chaos thrown up in many parts of the country by the excess 
numbers being ser)t to battalions, Surrey's County Commandant complained that by 
failing to compel their exempted men to join , Surrey's tribunals were flouting the 
157 Ibid., p.425. 
158 lbid., No.199, 21/09/18, p.444. 
159 Ibid., p.444. 
160 Ibid., No.200, 28/09/18, p.456. 
regulations .161 
Those officials attempting to administer the newly-divided burgeoning force 
hunted around for solutions. The War Office offered some assistance by issuing new 
and tougher regulations on the physical fitness to be demanded of Volunteers: any man 
not reaching the required level could now be discharged. 162 This might have allowed 
some reduction in numbers but a request by a Ministry of National Service official in 
Staffordshire to his superiors asking that they petition the War Office to sanction the 
creation of additional Volunteer battalions, met with a stony response. The Director-
General of Recruiting informed the desperate official that it was not 'proper or desirable' 
for his department to make suggestions to the War Office about military matters. 
Besides, he concluded, existing regulations allowed tribunals to direct men waiting to 
join the Volunteers to become members of the Red Cross, enrol as a Special 
Constable or work on the land .163 This suggestion inflamed a member of one Surrey 
tribunal who considered it 'manifestly unfair' to order men caught by the new military 
age to do unpaid work while others, including Government clerks protected by an 
Advisory Board, were at liberty to earn extra money or benefit from their leisure time. The 
Ministry's reply, which wrote of 'insurmountable' difficulties in attempting to make such a 
liability universal, elicited a sarcastic response from the aggrieved official. Another plea 
for Ministerial guidance from a tribunal clerk was met with the unhelpful reply that 
questions of exemption were at the discretion of the tribunal. 164 
After months of hesitation, decision and retraction, the August regulations which 
announced the reorganization of the Force also included confirmation that Section D 
was finally to be abolished . Men in that section could either transfer to A orB or, if they 
were not of military age, consider themselves discharged. The increasing number of 
men sent by the tribunals more than compensated for the loss of Section D members 
and meant that many battalions remained over establishment and deep in financial 
crisis. The Lincolnshire Association again complained that War Office grants were 
inadequate and Durham approached the authorities with a request to increase its grant 
so that the association could at least create a working balance. East Lancashire wanted 
help with the clericf:JI costs incurred by the impact of the Volunteer condition and an 
almost insolvent Nottinghamshire Association appealed for additional funds to pay for 
161 The County Commandant was Major-General F.C.8eatson. Surrey RO 608/1/2, 21/10/18. • 
162 NATS 1/947 (11 OA) . Letter from War Office to Ministry of National Service, 28/09/18. 
163 /bid., (114A) for Director-General of Recruiting, 14/10/18. 
1e• Ibid. , (118A). Letter from Chairman of Purley and Coulsdon Tribunal to Director of National Service , 
25/10/18. The reply is ( 119A) of 29/10/18. The query from the Hazel mere Tribunal is (1228) of 
25/10/18 and the reply is (1238) of 29/10/18. 
the increased demand for uniforms. 165 The County of Dumbarton suffered in the same 
way: having enrolled men over establishment, and with the cost of uniforms having 
recently been increased by over 25%, the association applied to the War Office for a 
larger grant to cover its extra costs . The authorities, reluctant as ever to allocate any 
more finance than was necessary to keep the Force in existence, instructed 
associations not to spend money on recruiting or on the hire or purchase of bands and 
instruments. 166 On the most mundane level, financial constraint meant that companies 
and platoons continued to rely on the benevolence of church trustees to allow them free 
use of local halls and struggled to pay caretakers' wages. 167 
The perception of a transition of the Volunteer Force from a body of patriotic 
enthusiasts to one of reluctant conscripts is not entirely born out by the available 
statistics. Although the several sets of figures rarely agree on the total number of 
enrolled men, or indeed of their categories, there are common traits within them. One 
source suggests that from March 1917, the percentage of tribunal men in its battalions 
fluctuated between 42% and 52%; official statistics indicate that in November 1918 the 
national figure was 41%. 168 Two associations recorded exceptionally high numbers in 
Section B, viz 78% and 93% of their enrolled members. As a proportion of these men 
could have been genuine volunteers of military age rejected by the army on medical 
grounds, not all men in that section had necessarily been sent by the tribunals .169 The 
increase in the age of conscription to 51 did undoubtedly caused both the expansion of 
Section Band the contraction of Section A, and it is probable that by late 1918 the 
proportion of men in Section A had fallen to a little under 1 0% of the total. 170 As the influx 
of the tribunal men took effect, and as Section A diminished , the average age of 
Volunteers would inevitably fall. By the time of the armistice therefore , perhaps only one 
in ten members was above the extended age of call up . 
Of greater disappointment to the authorities than the shrinkage in the number of 
genuine Volunteers, was the apparent reluctance of boys to enrol in Section C. 
Recruitment campaigns seem to have done nothing to prevent a decline in the 
165 Lincolnshire RO TA1/1 , 4/10/18; Durham RO D/TA Vol.lll , 15f10/18; Manchester Central Library 
M73/3/24, 23/1 0/18; Nottinghamshire RO DDTA 1/2, 30/07/18, 8/08/18. 
166 NAS MD9/5, 11/06/18, 18/1 0/18; W0991711 (TV1) of 3/09/18 instructed expenditure on recruiting to 
cease or be greatly curtailed ; Manchester Central Library M73/3/24, 2/08/18. Battalion bands were 
unofficial and thus had to be self-supporting . 
167 Stockport Archive 01697, DONO Minutes of AGM, October 1918; Essex RO 6E170/2, Build1ngs and 
Ranges Committee, 13/11/18. 
168 E.J.Disbrowe, A History of the Volunteer Movement in Cheshire 1914-1920, op.cit., p.65; W070.43. 
169 Liverpool RO 356WES/65, 16/1 0/18; Northamptonshire RO ML 1540, 2nd Bn. Orders, 30/11/18 . 
170 National Archives of Scotland (NAS) MD9/1 , 5/11/18; Shropshire RO 1681 /198/2; E.J.Marti n, 
op.cit., Muster Roll D Coy A/Lincolnshire Vol. Regiment. 
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proportion of these youths from almost 10% of national membership in 1917, to nearer 
5% in November 1918.171 Despite its abolition in August, another surprising statistic is 
the number of men who in late 1918 were still recorded as members of Section D: two 
associations recorded that 4% and 8% of their strength remained registered in what 
was by then the defunct section .172 This fact probably reflects administrative tardiness or 
oversight rather than a deliberate attempt by battalions to retain men on their registers 
in the hope they might eventually transfer to Section A or B. The number of D men who 
were struck off could be significant: one county claimed to have lost 2400 , and another 
about 20% of its membership between July and October 1918.173 
In addition to those men discharged for having failed to register in another 
section and those who were released by order of their tribunal , units continued to lose 
men to the army. 174 This drain not only affected the regiments' grant income but also unit 
efficiency. The Cheshire Volunteer Regiment estimated it lost approximately 1100 of its 
grant earners while, in contrast, the 2/Northamptonshire Volunteers, which probably 
contained a higher proportion of skilled men working in essential industries, believed 
only some 11% of its qualified men were called up. Although he gave no precise figure , 
Nottinghamshire's County Commandant ordered his battalions to pay particular 
attention to their 'large number' of unqualified men. Nottinghamshire's position may not 
have been typical for the extant evidence suggests that nationally in November 1918, 
about 75% of men were efficient. 175 The increase of the military age to 51 undoubtedly 
caused the expansion of Section B and the contraction of A, but it is probable that the 
exodus of the original , enthusiastic Volunteers, for reasons discussed elsewhere, had 
peaked in 1917. Only two unit registers for November 1918 appear to have survived and 
they indicate that respectively, 76% and 87% of their members enrolled after mid-
111 NAS MD9/1 , 5/11/18; Liverpool RO 356WES/65, 16/10/18. 
112 Herts RO TAF N1 , 30/11/18; Liverpool RO 356WES/65, 16/10/18. 
173 IWM Dept.of Printed Books 316. C.6051 , Bn . Orders; E.J.Disbrowe, A History of the Volunteer 
Movement in Cheshire 1914-1920, op.cit., p.65; NAS MD2/3, 18/10/18. 
m In one week alone the 4/West Yorks.Voi.Regiment lost 41 men released by the Bradford Tribunal 
' 
under ACI 228 of 1918. A further 11 were discharged for other re.asons, while only 15 were sent by the 
tribunal to enrol. West Yorkshire Archive, DB17 C43, Bn. Orders, 12/10/18. 
175 E.J.Disbrowe, A History of the Volunteer Movement in Cheshire 1914-1920, op.cit., p.65; 
Northamptonshire RO ML 1540, Bn. Orders, 30/11/18; Nottinghamshire RO DDTA4/4, 10/10/18. A post-
war account of Nottingham's Volunteers recorded that 3 of its battalions had 78%, 77% and 87% 
efficients respectively. The remaining battalion had only 37% but 2 of its "Companies were made up 
entirely of agricultural workers who had not taken the musketry test. C. Gerring, A Record of the Early 
Volunteer Movement (The Sherwood Foresters) 1914-19, op.cit., p.27. The Muster Roll of a company 
of the 4th Lines. Vol. Regiment, probably the most extensive extant, records 64%, while one platoon 
ofthe 1st Shropshire Vol. Regiment recorded 100%asefficient. E.J.Martin, 'VTC 1914-191 8', IWM, 
op.cit.; Shropshire RO 1681/198/2. 
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The growing number of tribunal men would also have impacted upon the 
occupational composition of battalions. The genuine volunteer Volunteers were drawn 
largely from the lower-middle and professional classes but those directed to the Force 
naturally tended to come from the artisan class. The composition of many rural 
companies would probably have remained fairly constant for, save for agricultural 
workers, the tribunals had little effect on country dwellers, their members continuing to 
represent a cross-section of early twentieth century rural society. On the other hand , 
urban-based companies would have experienced a changing composition in which the 
older, professional members resigned and the unskilled , white collar workers 
increasingly disappeared to the army, to be replaced by a growing number of not so 
enthusiastic conscript artisans. 177 Yet, although the number of tribunal men grew 
substantially as the Volunteer condition became more strictly enforced , and although 
the majority were men who had joined only since the transition of the Volunteer Train ing 
Corps to the Volunteer Force, in November 1918 slightly more than one in two of all the 
part-time auxiliaries appeared to have served of their own volition . 
In 1918, those full -time soldiers serving with the ROC were either former National 
Reservists who had volunteered to transfer to the auxiliary from the TF Supernumerary 
Companies two years earlier, conscripts of low medical category, or men whose 
wounds precluded their return to more active service. By start of the war's final year, the 
ROC Protection Companies had lost what few remaining links with the National 
Reserve they might have retained since formation . Once the companies had been sent 
to localities often far from their original counties of recruitment and once the Garrison 
and ROC Battalions had disbanded and their combed out A category men replaced by 
troops from any county or regiment, any remnants of the original Supernumerary 
Companies disappeared. The corps' discipline and performance were probably not of 
the highest order and as it still contained a proportion of married men claiming 
separation allowances it remained an expensive corps to operate.178 There were still 
problems with securing the correct rates of pay and allowances and those former 
National Reservists who had signed for home service in 1914 and 1915 but who now 
fell within the new military age could , if sufficiently fit, be transferred to foreign service 
176 Shropshire RO 1681/198/2; E.J.Martin , op.cit. 
177 Hampshire RO 205M85/1 ; Shropshire RO 1681/198/2. 
176 One member of the ROC wrote: 'The ROC is the most easy-going regiment I have ever met. We are 
not treated like soldiers .. . no one bothers us (and] there's a wonderful absence of red tape. 
H.Thompson mss IWM Dept.of Documents, no ref; AIR1/1190/204/5/2596, Demobilisation of ROC men 
working for the RFC, gives a brief history of the corps. No date but probably May-June 191 8. 
units. There were also yet more complaints about the lack of promotion prospects for 
junior officers.179 Some few of its tasks had been taken over by Volunteers but the corps 
remained below establishment. The position was improved in October 1918 with the 
transfer of 3000 other ranks of Bii category from Reserve Battalions in the Mixed 
Brigades, but the ROC continued to experience difficulties in finding sufficient personnel 
for its responsibilities. 
When the Admiralty did eventually agree to allow its representatives again to 
discuss the invasion issue, the military authorities hoped there might be the opportunity 
further to limit the number of ROC guards required for the protection of vulnerable 
points. In October, Sir Henry Wilson, the CIGS, drew up a scheme which intended to 
reduce the August totals for the number of troops retained at home by nearly 50% and 
the establishment of the ROC by almost 20%. 180 The Admiralty conceded that the most 
the enemy was probably capable of achieving was to raid the East Coast with a 
maximum of 5000 men. There was the possibility of smaller groups landing on the 
West and Scottish Coasts but even if the Germans did throw 5000 men ashore 
somewhere near the Thames estuary it was assumed they would be without transport 
and artillery. In view of the limited threat and the reduced numbers of troops available for 
the GOC-in-CHF, the CIGS proposed to abandon French's strategy of concentrating his 
forces on the beaches and opted instead to assemble mobile forces at inland centres . 
In this new scheme Wilson made no reference to the deployment of Volunteers and it is 
likely that apart from their continuing anti-aircraft duties, the Force had entirely ceased to 
figure in any calculations for active home defence.181 
There were also no references to the Volunteer Force in a series of post-
Armistice memos from the Army Council to Robertson during December 1918 and 
January 1919. On 3 December, the GOC-in-CHF was advised that all measures for the 
defence of Britain against attack from the sea, with certain exceptions on the East 
Coast, could be suspended .182 In late January 1919, Robertson told the Army Council 
that owing to the political situation in Ireland and the possibility of civil disorder on the 
mainland , he still needed perhaps 200,000 troops for home defence. This figure 
included Wilson's newly secured ROC establishment of 28,000. Robertson admitted 
that his estimate was necessarily vague but did insist that the current strength of the 
179 HansardVol.108, 721, 15/07/18; ibidVol.109 , 224-5, 30/07/18. 
180 W032.5274 (568) , 2/10/18. 
1e1 Ibid. The meeting with the Admiralty representatives is ibid. (58A) , 30/09/18. The outcome was 
discussed by the War Cabinet on 14/10/18. 
182 /bid., (63A) , 3/12/18. Army Council to GOC-in-C HF. 
ROC was only just sufficient to fulfil its tasks and , as long as there were POW camps 
and vulnerable points to guard , could not be reduced any further.183 A few days later 
Robertson also expressed concern at the possible ramifications of the suspension of 
Volunteer drills which had been announced in November. He argued that the 
suspension of military discipline was rapidly making the Force useless for home 
defence and equally ineffective for anything as mundane as guarding strategic points . 
What was required, he wrote , was an authoritative and definite statement about its 
future. 184 Preoccupied with demobilization and with the reorganization of the Regular 
and Territorial Armies, it was to be some time before the military and political authorities 
turned their considered attention to the destiny of the Volunteer Force. 
183 Ibid., (66A) , 26/01/18 for Robertson 's reply to the Army Council 's request (65A) of 24/01/19 for an 
estimate of the number of troops the GOC-in-CHF might need. 
184 W070.43. Letter from Robertson to Army Council of 31/01/19. 
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CHAPTER XIII : DEMISE 
The future of the Force was also exercising the minds of Volunteers themselves. Since 
the Volunteer Training Corps' inception in 1914, many members had looked forward to 
a permanent role for the auxiliary, whether it be in the guise of an expanded National 
Reserve or as a more explicit /andsturm.1 Correspondents to the Gazette regularly 
returned to the question of the movement's possible post-war shape form and a letter in 
the Medical Times suggested that as membership involved exercise, its continued 
existence was beneficial to the nation's health. 2 Some writers looked towards eventual 
parity with the Territorials by securing, for instance, exemption from jury service, others 
took comfort from Lord Ranksborough's 1916 comments that the Volunteers now 
constituted a permanent element in the defence of the country. 3 Even Lord Derby's 
remark at the January 1917 conference of Lords Lieutenant and Chairmen of the County 
Territorial Associations that the Force would inevitably disappear at the war's end was 
not regarded as irreversible: the Gazette believed the War Office had made so many 
'stupendous errors' during the war that its power and influence would in future be 
substantially curtailed.4 The Kent Fencible held a rather more pessimistic view, 
concluding that the future lay 'in the lap of the gods'. 5 This gloomy opinion was echoed 
by one member who predicted 'we shall probably just fizzle out in the same haphazard 
way that we came into existence' .6 
One early postwar suggestion wanted the compilation of a register of 
demobilized officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) willing to work with the 
movement, arrangements secured over recruiting areas, and adequate supplies of 
uniforms and arms to be kept in store.7 Having proved its 'public worth ', the Chairman 
of one association spoke confidently of the Force's reconstruction once the Territorial 
1 In December 1914 O'Moore Creagh had said he wanted to see. the VTC develop into something 
similar to a tandsturm and eventually have it organized permanently into brigades and divisions. 
'Otherwise' he said 'I should hardly be willing to take all the labour and trouble'. VTC Gazette Vol. 
I I 0 
No.4, 26/12/14, p.52. 
2 Quoted in VTC Gazette Vol.3 No.70, 1/04/16, p.275. 
3 Ibid., Vol.4 No. 90, 19/08/16, p.180; Leicester and Rutland Citizen Corps Gazette Vol.11 No.7: 
11/03/16. 
• Times, 27/01/17; VF Gazette Vol.? No.206, 9/11/18, p.529. 
5 Kent Fencible Vol.3 No.12, Dec.1918. 
6 E.Potton (ed) , A Record of the United Arts Rifles 1914-1919, London: Alex Maring , 1920, p.27. 
1 F.S.Bowring , 'The Passing of the Volunteer Force', Journal of the RUSt Vol.65 , 1920, pp.587-590. 
Force was reestablished .8 Other correspondents returned to the concept of the Force 
as an element within a progressive organization of part-time auxiliaries stretching in 
age range from the Boy Scouts to the Volunteers . The editors of the Gazette tentatively 
proposed the development of the Force into a Territorial Reserve, but, failing that, 
believed Scarbrough and the new Secretary of State, Winston Churchill , would 
eventually devise 'something generally acceptable'. Not wishing to witness a repetition 
of the poor support given to the prewar National Reserve, they did later criticise Church ill 
for his suggestion that the Volunteers might be used to reconstitute the Reserve.9 The 
Wiltshire and Cornwall Associations considered a proposal of combining the 
Volunteers with the National Reserve to form a second line Territorial Force, while the 
County of London Association concluded the War Office was already planning a third 
line force of trained men beyond military age.10 When the Northumberland Association 
offered its detailed plans for the reconstruction of the National Reserve , the War Office 
showed little interest, simply citing Churchill 's suggestion of reestablishing it on the 
existing Volunteer structure. The association then sent the proposed scheme for the 
consideration of the Council of County Territorial Associations , but the Council opted to 
take its traditional posture and sat on its handS.11 While serving as Adjutant to a 
Volunteer battalion, Liddell Hart had also suggested a model on which a postwar force 
could be built. He stressed that in addition to it being commanded by men with 
experience of modern training and warfare, the officers would need to have an 
understanding of the peculiar attitudes and conditions appertain ing to part-time, 
volunteer soldiers. Like Scarbrough, Liddell Hart believed that many of the problems 
and difficulties under which the movement had laboured were a direct consequence of 
the poor quality of its County Commandants and Commanding Officers (COs) .12 
Despite the Armistice , the General Officer Commanding (GOC) London District 
foresaw no grounds for relaxation and announced that Volunteer training and drills 
would continue as before. Within a week of the ceasfire, however, drills had nationally 
become voluntary, members under detention for non-attendance were released and all 
disciplinary actions were ordered to be dropped.13 There had already been calls for 
tribunal men to be released from their commitment and , in early December, Volunteers 
6 Hampshire RO 37M69/4, 20/06/19. 
9 VF Gazette Vol.8 No.210, 21/12/18, p.582; No.212 , 15/02/19, p.13; No ~214 , p.38. 
10 Wiltshire RO Ll/1 01/2, 12/04/19; Cornwall RO DDX.295/12, 5/04/19; London Metropolitan Archives 
NTN15, 11/11/18. 
11 Northumbria RO 408/8, 6/04/19. 
12 VF Gazette Vol.? No.209, 30/11/18 , p.570. Liddell Hart wrote under the pseudonym 'Gold Bars' . 
13 Hansard Vol.11 0, 3351 , 19/11/18. 
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were officially informed that for the time being there was no longer any compulsion to 
drill. 14 With an eye to keeping at least the Force's structure in being , Percy Harris had 
appealed for leave of absence rather than an order to standing down. His position was 
endorsed by the Gazette which argued that if tribunal men were released , the Force 
would completely collapse.15 
By Christmas 1918, most battalions appear to have abandoned drills, one 
commentator observing that with all enthusiasm and good will exhausted , nothing short 
of mobilization would ever resuscitate it. A clergyman described the entire Volunteer 
system as a 'complete wreck' and a county association ruefully admitted it was 'left 
practically to the individual. .. to decide his own attitude to the Force' .16 A few battalions 
and companies did organize weekly drills but it was only the diehards who turned out. 
The tribunal men, and often their equipment, disappeared. 
Although in the immediate post-Armistice period the primary concerns of the War 
Office were elsewhere, they did not entirely ignore the Volunteer Force. In the event of 
civil disorder COs were ordered surreptitiously to remove and hand to the police their 
men's rifle bolts, and the authorities were also obliged to reply to Robertson 's insistent 
complaints about the Force's state of suspension. The Commander-in-Chief 
Commanding Home Forces (GOC-in-CHF) was concerned that although they were no 
longer obliged to drill, members' agreements had not been cancelled . They might at 
any time be required to resume training and commence temporary duties but he 
foresaw serious difficulties in persuading them to turn out. He reported , too, a certain 
amount of internal discontent at the way the authorities were perceived to be 
maintaining their traditional disdain towards the movement. 17 When a newspaper 
commented on the 'absence of any real expression of satisfaction ' in the force 's work , 
Robertson seized on the criticism to remind the War Office just how valuable the 
Volunteers' work had been in digging London's defences, manning anti-aircraft guns , 
guarding vulnerable sites, supplementing the personnel of the London Fire Service and 
as a training ground for later army recruits. In addition to his call for a 'definite 
statement' about the Force's future, Robertson urged the Army Council to consider 
14 W099/837 (TV2) of 10/11/18 warned that even if drills did cease, Volunteers with a training 
agreement were not released from it. It was followed by W099/837 (TV2) of 10/12/18 which placed 
drills but not the agreements in suspension. 
15 VF Gazette Vol. 7 No.208, 23/11/18, p.553. 
16 E.R.Cooper mss p.12, Department of Documents IWM; J.Munson (ed}, Echoes of the Great War: The 
Diary of the Reverend Andrew Clark, Oxford , Oxford University Press, 1988, p.269; Leicester RO 
DE819/2 , 6/02/19. 
17 W032.5050. Memo from Robertson to Army Council , 30/12/18; W070.41 . W0991871 of 14/01/19 
announced that Volunteers would not be allowed to purchase rifles as a 'momenta'. 
some official recognition of its service.18 Scarbrough agreed with the need for an early 
statement but argued that the discontent would have been even more widespread had 
drills not been suspended .19 The Army Council, too, agreed with the proposal to 
compose a letter of thanks but contemptuously dismissed the idea of making any 
immediate definitive pronouncement about the movement's future .20 
The Army Council did not oppose a little pandering to postwar Volunteer 
aspirations and agreed that officers should be allowed to retain their uniforms and be 
given honorary rank.21 However, the later confusion over whether other ranks should be 
permitted to keep their uniform and mobilization boots was once again viewed as typical 
official indifference. Some battalion COs had interpreted a War Office letter of December 
1918 as an instruction to collect their men's uniforms. Many thousands of members 
returned them to stores but, in February, Churchill announced he was not yet ready to 
detail the circumstances in which other ranks might be allowed to retain them.22 By that 
time, Scarbrough had already issued a letter indicating that uniforms could be kept by 
the men. This decision was applauded as a 'wise and inexpensive gesture' by Lord 
lnverclyde and, in the following month, Scarbrough sent a circular to all county 
associations instructing them to return surrendered suits to their former owners. 23 
Some COs were reported to have been so disgruntled by the orders and counter-orders 
that they continued to collect uniforms and chose not to return those already handed in.24 
Yet, as late as May 1919, one association issued new suits to 75 men who had been 
waiting months for them and gave £1 each to members who had originally bought their 
own. 25 The official decision to allow the men to retain them had more to do with 
pragmatism than gratitude. The War Office had convinced the Treasury that recalling all 
18 Liverpool Daily Post, 28/02/19; W032.5050, 30/12/18. 
19 W032.5050. Scarbrough to Under Secretary of State, 2/01/19. 
20 Ibid., Army Council to GOC-in-C GB, 8/01/19. 
21 Hansard Vol.112 , 1751 -2, 26/02/19; The practice of awarding honorary rank could throw up 
problems. The Adjutant of the Bethnal Green Battalion , who already held substantive rank of Major in 
the Territorial Force, was granted the rank of Major in the Volunteer Force. He had served 20 years in 
the TF and had been second-in-command of the 4/Royal Fusiliers City of London Reg iment. The War 
Office said it could do nothing to resolve the anomaly. E.J.Martin., 'VTC 1914-1918', Dept.of Printed 
Books IWM. Hampshire's Co. Commandant asserted that COs of disbanded battalions should have 
been awarded a higher. rank on retirement as a reward for their gratuitous service. Hants RO 37M69/4, 
Commandant's Report, Dec.1919. 
22 W099/N/183 (TV1) of 5/12/18 instructed COs to collect 'arms and stores'; Hansard Vol.112, 1751 -2, 
26/02/19. 
23 Lord lnverclyde (Lord Lieutenant of Dumbartonshire) to Scarbrough . NAS MD9/1, 12/01 /19; 
W099/859 (TV1) of 25/02/19 authorized Volunteers to keep their uniforms and W099/867 (TV1) of 
21/03/19 instructed COs to return surrendered suits. 
24 VF Gazette Vol.8 No.212, 15/02/19, p.18. 
25 Nottinghamshire RO DDT A4/4, 8/05/19. 
uniforms would cause widespread discontent and , besides, would be virtually 
impossible to enforce.26 
The controversy over boots was even more protracted . In January 1919, the 
Cambridgeshire Association petitioned the War Office to allow its men to retain their 
boots, a suggestion dismissed by Churchill in March.27 In June, the authorities decided 
Volunteers would be permitted to purchase part worn pairs for 25 shillings or new ones 
at over 26 shillings. 28 The Government declared the offer to be 'very good value ' but 
declined to answer a question about why the prices were almost immediately increased 
by about 5%.29 The Gazette condemned the authorities for their 'petty cheesepairing' 
and one unit, similarly annoyed by the War Office's ingratitude, elected to use a 
proportion of battalion funds to purchase the boots for its men.30 
The uncertainty about what future if any the Force might have in the postwar 
world, and the way in which that uncertainty was being prolonged , caused Major-
General Sir Desmond O'Callaghan to accuse the authorities of 'skilful cruelty' by 
allowing the movement to 'die off by the slow process of inanition .. . [and] ... by official 
starvation'. 31 In fact , the War Office was still considering its options. Fearing that once 
the permanent staffs were demobilized there would be no one responsible to secure 
the weapons, the Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff (DCIGS) instructed the 
Director General Territorial and Volunteer Force (DGTVF) quickly to gather in all 
Volunteer arms and despatch them to the Army Ordnance Department. 32 Scarbrough 
countered by arguing that if the Volunteers' organization was to be effectively 
maintained , the partial demobilization of battalion adjutants and permanent staffs 
should immediately cease. The Adjutant-General 's (AG) Department acknowledged the 
logic within Scarbrough 's argument and instructed county associations to maintain their 
permanent staffs and to replace any adjutants already demobilized .33 The Secretary of 
State was also keeping his options open . He acknowledged that the Force should be 
kept in existence and that it should be 'encouraged ' to maintain its drills and remain 
fully equipped . 34 This pronouncement was followed in late February 1919 by a press 
26 W032.5050. Memo from Army Council to Treasury, 12105119. · 
27 Cambridgeshire RO R.68/11 , Vol.ll , 4/01/19; HansardVol.113, 41 , 3/03/19 . 
28 W099/901 (TV1) , 12/06/19. 
29 HansardVol.117, 1192, 3/07/19. 
30 VF Gazette Vol.? No.217, 19/07/19, p.73; Nottinghamshire RO DDTA1/2, 28/10/19. • 
31 Letter in the Daily Mail, 24/02/19. O'Callaghan had been on the Staff of the Director of Artillery at 
the War Office. 
32 W032.5050, DCIGS to DGTVF, 5/02/19. 
33 Ibid., W099/839 (AG 1) of 3/03/19 responded to Scarbrough's plea of 20/02/19 to maintain the 
permanent staffs. 
34 Ibid., Precis for the Army Council, No.987, July 1919. 
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release and a letter to the Lords Lieutenant which declared that, for now, the 
Government had no intention of dissolving the Volunteers' organization : until a final 
decision about whether to disband or to incorporate the Force within a home defence 
strategy was taken, the Government urged all ranks to maintain their cohesion and 
discipline. 35 This attempt at reassurance was welcomed by, among others, the Gazette. 
The journal had only recently expressed its belief that until a peace treaty was signed 
and a definition of what constituted 'duration' had been agreed , the Volunteers might be 
required to return to duty. It reported that some units were resuming their drills and the 
Chairman of His Majesty's Commissioners of the Lieutenancy of the City of London 
seized on the more optimistic Government comments by suggesting that all unit cadres 
should be retained as the basis for a future expansion .36 The state of limbo existed for a 
further three months when, with the imminent signing of the peace treaty , Scarbrough 
again urged the Secretary of State to come to a decision. The DGTVF believed the 
Government would choose to disband the Force- all arms were reported to be 
safeguarded and the DGTVF doubted the practicalities of ever reissuing them - but if the 
end was inevitable, Scarbrough wanted the announcement to be made after the 
proposed peace parades. 37 
Three days after the treaty was signed in the Hall of Mirrors, the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff concluded that the age and general unreliability of Volunteers 
would make them of limited value during civil disturbance. What little money the War 
Office was likely to receive from a bankrupt Treasury should not, Wilson believed , be 
spent on 'luxuries'. 38 Scarbrough, who was himself by now equally convinced the Force 
could not survive, also picked up on the theme of economy. Although the movement 
itself was, he told the Under Secretary of State disintegrating, the cost of maintaining its 
permanent staffs, clerical assistance and COs amounted to £393,800 per annum.39 
There was no justification in this expense but he did again suggest that the Force he 
had championed against consistent War Office hostility and indifference for over two 
years should at least be wound up with dignity and some formal , gracious recognition . 
35 Ibid. The press release and letter to the Lords Lieutenant were dated 25/02/19. 
36 VF Gazette Vol. 7 No.208, 23/11/18, p.553; Vol.8 No.213, 15/03/19, p.25; W032. 5050. Letter to 
DGTVF of 3/03/19 fror;n Chairman of HM Commissioners of Lieutenancy of the City of London . 
37 W032.5050. Scarbrough to the Under Secretary of State, 14/06/19. 
36 lbid., CIGS to Secretary of State, 1/07/19. In March 1919 the War Office had told Robertson that it 
had no intention of using the Volunteers during strikes or disturbances. W0651464 (TV2) of 26/03/19. 
39 W032.5050. An estimate of the costs involved in maintaining rather than disbanding the Volunteer 
Force was produced on 17/07/19. Percy Harris wrote of the 'irony' in the fact that the department which 
had 'refused a penny of public money' for the Volunteers was now being forced to spend on such a 
lavish scale. This, he believed, was the excuse used by the War Office to disband the Force. Daily 
Telegraph , 19/02/19. 
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He suggested to the Under Secretary of State that if a question was be tabled in the 
House, the answer could serve as an eulogy and valediction to the movement. 40 An 
unlikely request from the AG to keep the Force in being until October on the grounds that 
there were in effect virtually no Regulars or Territorials available at home, was opposed 
by Scarbrough. He suggested that economy and efficiency would be better served if the 
AG concentrated on the reconstruction of the Territorial Force.41 The final indignity came 
when the Secretary of State's proposed formal statement of dissolution was not 
delivered because Churchill had instead travelled to the Rhine. With the King 's approval 
and urged on by sections of the Press impatient for a proper burial of the Force, 42 in 
September the War Office despatched a letter announcing the disbanding of all but 
Motor Volunteer units. Lords Lieutenant and Commands were asked to pass on the 
Army Council's appreciation of the work of all ranks .43 
Most Volunteers had probably long before decided there was to be no future for 
the Force. The tribunal men would have shed no tears and the genuine Volunteers 
possibly realized that in a new world where war was about to be outlawed by 
international agreement, and with the shape and purpose of the Regular and Territorial 
Armies still far from resolved, there would be little room or indeed need , for a volunteer 
body of older men. At the start of the year, with the Force in suspension rather abject 
dissolution, there had been a degree of optimism: at least one county association 
advanced battalion grants for the coming financial year and recoiled from implementing 
a War Office stricture to vacate all premises hired specifically for Volunteers' use.44 
Locally, though, most units had soon begun to wind down. The Newent Company voted 
to sell its rifles, give its dummy ones to a local school and donate its financial balance 
to the Gloucester Infirmary. The 5/Devonshire Volunteers donated its shooting cups to a 
Territorial unit and resolved to sell its drums and bugles to defray liabilities; the Cheadle 
Hulme Company awarded its balance of £146 to the Parish Hall Trustees who had 
allowed the company to use their premises free for four years. 45 The pace of self-
disbandment and the apparent lack of interest shown by MPs in the demise of the 
40 Ibid. , Scarbrough to Under Secretary of State, 4/07/19 and 29107/19. 
41 Ibid. , AG to Scarbrough , 8/07/19; Reply by Scarbrough to AG , ibid., 21/07/19. 
42 The Daily Sketch , 25/09/19 urged Churchill to hurry on with the disbanding . 
43 W0991859 (AG1) of 25/09/19; E.Disbrowe, A History of the Volunteer Movement in Cheshire 1914-
1920, op.cit., p.82. • 
44 As early as 27/11/18, the War Office instructed associations to relinquish premises hired solely for the 
Volunteer Force. The CO of the 4th Voi.Bn. Manchester Regiment objected to terminating the lease 
on a building because he feared he would be unable to recover possession of equipment stored there . 
Manchester Central Library M73/2/4, 20/12/18. 
45 Gloucestershire RO 04277/6, January 1919; Devon RO Z19/46/14, 7/02/19; Stockport Archive 
01697, DDND, August 1919. 
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movement left the Gazette bemoaning that with 'enthusiasm ... growing cold ' even if the 
Government did sanction the movement's continuance, there would soon be nothing left 
to revive. 46 Hope had also been virtually abandoned for a resurrection of the National 
Reserve. Churchill had said in February 1919 that the matter must wait until weightier 
military issues had been resolved. He did give a hint of encouragement at a conference 
in April but a Surrey resolution pressing for a quick decision met with little response 
from the War Office. 47 In July, Frederick Guest stated that nothing had yet been decided 
and although supporters of the Reserve reminded themselves that in 1916 it had 
suspended rather than abolished, the financial and political constraints of the day 
precluded any revival of a body which, like the Volunteer Force, had been held in little 
esteem or regard by the military hierarchy.48 
The Royal Defence Corps (ROC), too, was also quickly disappearing . Despite 
Robertson's January insistence that the corps could only just meet its commitments ,49 it 
reduced rapidly in size. In April there remained in Britain a little under 100,000 prisoners 
of war, guarded mainly by ROC troops. Approximately 40% of the prisoners were 
working in scattered forestry and agricultural detachments, a problem which 
exacerbated the corps' manpower limitations and caused Western Command to report 
that it lacked sufficient troops to adhere to existing manning regulations . 5° Nevertheless, 
demobilization of the corps continued and in March each of the 48 Reserve Battalions in 
the UK was ordered to provide men to replace an identical number of ROC companies 
about to be disbanded. Later in the same month 20 Escort Companies were created for 
duty in Frabce, their personnel being drawn from volunteer ROC men transferred from 
the corps to a line regiment. 51 There were contemporary accusations that the corps' 
demobilization procedure was slow, inequitable and unfair to its more elderly soldiers 
but it appears that some ROC men in receipt of separation and additional allowances 
preferred to remain in uniform rather than accept a release. Administrators were , 
however, instructed to look favourably on former National Reservists who did seek a 
46 VF Gazette Vol.8 No.219, 20/09/19, p.97; No.218, 16/08/19, p.85. 
<1 Hansard Vol.113, 40, 3/03/19; 'Report of the Proceedings at a Conference between the Secretary of 
State and Representatives of the Territorial Force Associations',· (819117 4) 2000 4119 H&S. 7012-1 WO. 
The conference met at City Hall, Westminster on 1/04/19. Churchill said a reconstitution of the 
National Reserve 'should be considered'; Surrey RO 608/1/2, 28/04/19. 
46 captain Frederick Guest, MP for Dorset East, was Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury but 
as a former Private Secretary to Winston Churchill , the Secretary of State for War, also occasionally 
answered questions on military matters. 
49 W032 .5274 (66A), 26/01/19. See page-- (work it out from FN 5) 
50 Hansard Vol.115, 147, 30/04/19; Vol.115, 774, 6/05/19; W032 .18672. Letter CRWC 2165051195A of 
13/03/19 to War Office. 
5 1 W032.18622 (1258), March 1919; ibid., (125C) , 27/03/19. 
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quick return to civilian life. 52 Despite the complaints , the process was swift enough for 
Scottish Command to disband the last of its Protection Companies in September 1919 
and , although there were problems with tracing equipment and disputes with aud ito rs, 
those companies in Ireland had also gone by the end of the year.53 As the prisoner of 
war camps closed, the remaining Protection Companies and the sole ROC battalion 
(which had continued to work with the Royal Air Force) , were similarly despatched to 
oblivion. The work of the corps was gradually undertaken by parties of non-essential 
industrial men in Regimental Reserve units. 
The War Office letter of September 1919 which formally announced the official 
disbanding of the Volunteer Force merely concluded what had become an accepted 
inevitability. Although Volunteer Force adjutants were ordered to assist COs of returning 
Territorial battalions until their own unit was disbanded and they, in turn , were 
demobilized, there was discontent among some Territorial cadres who experienced 
difficulty in reclaiming their drill halls and stores. 54 When a Volunteer battalion had 
collected its stores and equipment, clearance certificates were audited and the COs 
gazetted out of their commands. When all their units had disappeared , the County 
Commandant and Group Adjutants were also gazetted out. 55 However, because the 
demobilization procedure did not run smoothly, the official disbanding of the Force had 
several times to be extended from the intended date of October 1919 until March 1920:56 
equipment had been lost or mislaid, there were serious difficulties in persuading men 
to part with their kit and, owing to a frequent lack of transport, stores from outlying 
detachments were slow to be returned.57 When Commands reported the difficulties and 
requested permission to retain one or more officers to assist with the winding down 
process, the War Office was generally unsympathetic. It refused to sanction the 
extension of pay to COs and adjutants and became increasingly impatient for 
52 Hansard Vol.114, 196, 25/03/19; AIR1/1190/204/5/2596. 
53 W032.18672 (131A); ibid., (154A) , 26/11/19. 
54 North umbria RO 408/8, 7 /02/19; One TF unit of the Durham Association recorded its 'strong feeling 
of discontent' at the delay in reclaiming its own drill hall. Durham RO D/TA3 Vol.lll , 18/02/19; 
W099/N/183 (TV1) of 4/06/19 instructed Volunteer units to make space available to returning TF 
cadres. 
55 W032.5050. Circular; no number, of 31/10/19. 
56 /bid., memos from Army Council to DGTVF, no numbers or dates. 
57 Entrenching tools were prized as gardening implements, E.J.Martin , 'VTC 1914-1918', IWM, C'p.cit; 
Hampshire Association refused to discharge 194 men of its 1st Vol. Battal ion until they had either 
returned their greatcoat or bought them for £1 each. Hampshire RO 37M69/4, Commandant's Report, 
Dec.1919; One company lost 9 rifles. Devon RO Z19/46/14, 31/03/19; Durham Association accepted 
that its losses were not 'unreasonable' and Shropshire decided to write off its deficiencies as a charge 
against the public purse. Durham RO D/TA3 Vol.lll , 3/02/20, Shropshire RO 1988/35, 14/02/20. 
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Commands to return their clearance certificates.58 COs had not only to struggle against 
the men's reluctance to hand in equipment but also cope with lost or destroyed records , 
certificates sent to wrong addresses, an inability, whether supposed or real , to 
understand the official forms and the nature of imprest accounts, and even a shortage 
of envelopes. 59 Scottish Command, which was probably the most efficient of any, 
reacted angrily when as a result of War Office incompetence it was accused of 
unnecessary delay.60 There were also problems in securing clearance certificates for 
certain Royal Army Medical Corps (Volunteer) units which had been created solely on 
paper for the purpose of gazetting battalion medical officers.61 By January 1920, 
certificates for only 62 of the 388 existing units had been returned but as the result of a 
torrent of chivvying and threatening telegrams, by March only 11 remained outstanding . 
A final submission was made to the King on 16 March and, with the exception of its 
motor squadrons, the Volunteer Force officially ceased to exist. 62 
Locally there remained some loose ends to tie up. County associations returned 
unspent portions of their grants to the awarding Corporation or Council, donated it to 
voluntary hospitals, or secured permission to transfer their National Reserve balance to 
the Cadets.63 While some associations wrote off debits on their Volunteer Account, 
others accused their battalions of irresponsible expenditure and insisted they resolve 
their own financial embarrassmentS.64 Old Comrades Associations and Volunteer 
Clubs were formed in many areas, a move welcomed by the Gazette which valiantly 
hoped the Government might allow them to perform occasional drills and award them 
grants as a means of maintaining a skeleton organization .65 Although at least one 
intended to serve as an information exchange for ex-servicemen seeking advice on 
jobs, pensions and welfare benefits, most clubs were created as social institutions to 
58 W032.5050. Telegrams to Commands, 5/01/20. 
59 Ibid. Letters from Southern and Western Commands, 4/11/19. 
60 Ibid. Letter from Scottish Command, 26/01/20. 
81 Ibid. Letter from OGTVF to Western Command, 4/11/19. 
62 Ibid. Telegrams to all Commands, 21/01 /20; As if to underline the finality , at the January 1920 
meeting where Churchill explained the purpose and nature of the new Territorial Army, there was no 
mention of the National Reserve or the Volunteer Force. 'Report of the Proceedings of a Meeting 
between the Secretary of State for War and Representatives of tlie Territorial Force Associations' , 
(820184) 2000 2120 H&S 7921 WO. 
63 VF Gazette Vol.8 No.212, 15/02/19, p.13; Lancashire RO DDX/11 /1 , 1 0/04/23; East Kent Archive 
U924/02 _the Deal Battalion donated its balance to finance a bed named after the corps in the 
Memorial Hospital ; It took some years for the War Office to agree to the transfer of funds to one 
association's Cadet Force. Kent RO MD/TA/1/3, 22/03/23. 
64 The City of London Association decided to give the 2nd Vol. Battalion £150 of the £400 it 
requested . A report had concluded the battalion's debts were a result of extravagance and deliberate 
contradictions of orders. Guildhall Library Ms12606/2 , 14/11/19. 
65 VF Gazette Vol.9 No.224, 21/02/20, p.13. 
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arrange 'smokers' and shooting competitions.66 A Volunteer Officers' Club was formed 
in 1919 but met only six times: enthusiasm waned because its members remained 
'indignant at. .. [the authorities']. .. singularly insulting behaviour' .67 Some clubs met 
regularly for 30 years until natural wastage and infirmity caused them to disband . Their 
remaining funds were generally given to local charities and their cups to Territorial 
battalions.68 
As most genuine Volunteers had probably anticipated and accepted the 
inevitability of the movement's demise, the War Office letter of September 1919 came as 
a disappointment but as no surprise. The Central Association, the organization created 
in late 1914 by Percy Harris, O'Moore Creagh and others to guide and advise the 
developing training corps, closed in November 1919. The Gazette, which had switched 
to a monthly publication from December 1918 and which since October 1919 had 
become little more than an extended obituary column for disbanding corps, ceased 
production in March 1920. Defiant until the last, the journal closed with a resounding 
condemnation of the Government's refusal to award what it considered to be an 
adequate recognition of the Force's work and urged its readers to exact revenge at the 
next general election .69 
This lack of official acknowledgement of the Force's utility and value kindled a 
resentment which long absorbed the genuine Volunteers. While older members might 
have recalled earlier War Office ambivalence towards auxiliary bodies, most were both 
surprised and repelled by the attitude of a democratic Government drawn from the 
same strata of society as many of the movement's most dedicated enthusiasts. 
Postwar reminiscences are replete with condemnation of the 'disgraceful blot on the 
escutcheon of wartime officialdom' and of the 'mean and little act of a mean War Office 
which could not get over its dislike of the Volunteers' .70 The 'cold indifference' of an 
'extravagant Government [which] suspected what was offered for nothing ', was used 
deliberately to allow the Force to lapse into 'obscurity, unacknowledged and unthanked' 
Having been 'messed about' and alternately 'flattered and snubbed', one member 
66 The 2nd Vol. Battalion Middlesex Regiment Old Comrades' Association developed an extensive 
social welfare scheme. This included paying court costs for a former Volunteer who had joined the 
Regular Army. While overseas his wife had entered a bigamous marriage. Richmond Local Stud ies 
Library L355.11506 DVK. 
87 M.Yearsley, Home Front Diary 1914-1918, op.cit., p.97. 
86 Having enjoyed very close cooperation with the depot staff during the war, the Deal Battalion 
eventually donated its cups to the Royal Marine Depot. East Kent Archive U924/02, Jan .1960. 
89 VF Gazette Vol.9 No.225, 20/03/20, p.26. 
70 M.Yearsley, Home Front Diary 1914-1918, op.cit., p.1 01 ; T.Murray Ford, Memoirs of a Poor Devil, 
London: A.M.Philpot, 1926, p.203. 
believed the wonder was that the Force had held together for so long. The majority, he 
thought, 'would hail their eventual release with thankfulness'. 71 The Pall Mall Gazette 
considered the movement had been 'slighted and sneered at' by the authorities; 
another paper thought it was 'slowly dismembered' and demobilized in 'something like 
ignominy'. 72 
Debate on how, and in what fashion, satisfactory recognition might be awarded 
had begun in mid-1917 and developed after the Armistice into an emotive and 
contentious issue. The initial spark had been provided in June 1917 when it was 
announced that Special Constables with two years' service were to be awarded a long 
service badge.73 Many Volunteers had continued contemptuously to disregard the 
Special Constabulary as merely an organization through which men could offer minimal 
commitment but still appear to be making a contribution. The proposal to award 
Specials a badge enraged many Volunteers and although the editors themselves did 
not at first support the idea of a badge or medal, correspondents to the Gazette 
generally wrote in favour of an award being made.74 By November 1918, the journal , too , 
was insisting the Central Association should agitate for a badge.75 Scarbrough was in 
favour of presenting a certificate and badge for efficient men who had enrolled in or after 
May 1916 and wanted the awards to be accompanied by a letter of thanks from the King . 
The War Office did not oppose the idea of a certificate but rejected the proposal of a 
badge.76 In the following months, Churchill repeatedly declared that the question of a 
badge remained under consideration but, until Scarbrough brought pressure upon the 
War Office and the Under Secretary of State for a decision , the Army Council was simply 
content to defer the issue.77 
There was similar prevarication over the request for a Royal Review of the Force. 
During the summer of 1919 members became so frustrated at the apparent lack of the 
King's appreciation that attendance at civic parades and local royal visits was often 
poor.78 Birmingham Corporation added to the humiliation when it requested the Boy 
Scouts and Specials to line the route for a visit by the King but 'studiously ignored ' the 
71 VF Gazette Vol.8 No.213, 15/03/19, p.25; Vol.? No.209, 30/11/1~ . p.573; M.Yearsley, Home Front 
Diary 1914-1918, op.cit., p.1. 
72 Letter in Pall Mall Gazette. Cutting in W032.5050; Ibid., unidentified newspaper cutting. 
73 VF Gazette Vol.6 No.1'32, 9/06/17, p.22. 
74 /bid., No.133, 16/06/17, p.35. 
75 /bid., Vol.? No.209, 30/11/18, p.565. 
76 W032.5050. Army Council to GOC-in-CGB, 8/01/19. 
77 HansardVol.112, 1751-2, 26/02/19; Vol.114, 1409, 3/04/19; Vol.116, 2013, 4/06/19. 
78 Only 61 men of the United Arts Rifles, one of the movement's most prestigious battalions, 
volunteered to line the route of the victory parade for London's TF units. E.Potton (ed) , A Record of 
the United Arts Rifles 1914-1919, op.cit., p.25. 
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Volunteers. 79 Some county associations did arrange parades where Volunteers were 
presented with their certificates but even when Volunteers were invited to attend 
ceremonies welcoming the return of Territorial battalions, the financial assistance 
offered was sometimes insufficient to provide transport for the dispersed 
detachments.80 The Gazette criticised a proposal to compile a national roll of service 
which intended to include Specials, Voluntary Aid Detachments and munitions workers 
but not the Volunteers and when, after several drafts the King 's letter was finally agreed 
and sent to Lords Lieutenant, it ignored the voluntary service of original members who 
had enrolled before May 1916.81 One disappointed recipient dismissed it as a 'printed 
letter of lukewarm thanks, signed with a facsimile of an indecipherable signature'. 
Conversely, Lord Harris, who had maintained an ambivalent attitude towards the 
movement throughout, told the Kent Volunteers that the 'gracious thanks of His 
Majesty ... [should] ... suffice as an assurance from the country that you have deserved well 
of the state' . 82 
As the close of 1919 approached, the Government continued to procrastinate 
over the issue of a Volunteer medal. Despite the Gazette's assertion that the award of a 
medal paid for by German reparations as a legitimate war expense was a 'foregone 
conclusion ', 83 the fundamental problem of who would be eligible for the award 
remained unresolved: it would be inequitable to give a medal to Volunteers if, as the 
regulations stood, those Regulars and Territorials who had served only at home were 
not to receive one.84 It was not until January 1921 that the Army Council decided there 
was to be no specific medal for home service and the matter of a Volunteer medal was 
thus dropped. 85 A resolution from the Essex Association proposing that anyone involved 
in home defence should receive a medal was not supported by all associations and , 
despite some initial backing from the Secretary of State, a resolution submitted by the 
79 VF Gazette Vol.8 No.216, 21/06/19, p.62. 
80 E.R.Cooper mss, IWM, op.cit., p.13; Devon RO Z19/46/14, 19/10/19; NAS MDS/16, 29/07/19. 
8 ' VF Gazette Vol.8 No.220, 18/10/19, p.113; W032.5050 contains several drafts of the King 's letter. 
An annotation by Scarbrough on one draft describes it as 'too bald '. Brade, the Secretary to the Army 
Council , wrote to Lord Stamfordham, the King 's Private Secretary, on 16/09/19 with the final draft for 
Royal approval. 
82 M.Yearsley, Home Front Diary 1914-1918, op.cit., p.100; Lord Harris, quoted in VF Gazette Vol.8 
No.221, 15/11/19, p.130'. 
83 Ibid., No.221 , 15/11/19, p.123; During November and December 1919 Churchill replied on three 
occasions that the matter was still under consideration. Hansard Vol.120 , A1139, 3/11 /19 ; Vol.121 , 520, 
13/11 /19 ; Vol.122 , 201 , 2/12/19. 
8• W032.5050. AG to Secretary of State, 13/08/19. 
8s W070.42. The Army Council made the decision to drop the idea of a Home Service Medal on 
27/01/21 . It was also announced that service in the Volunteer Force would not count towards the old 
Volunteer Medal. W0991859. 
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Surrey Association advocating a special medal for prewar Territorials and National 
Reservists who had opted for foreign service was not supported by the Council of 
County Territorial Associations. 86 Even those who had seen service with anti-aircraft 
batteries did not qualify for a gratuity but, following negotiations between the Ministry of 
Labour and the War Office, it was agreed that the 4000 Volunteers who spent the full 
three months in the Special Service Companies qualified as 'duly enlisted soldiers'. As 
such they were entitled to unemployment benefit and became eligible for the 
Government's scheme for overseas resettlement of ex-soldiers.87 Former National 
Reservists who later joined the ROC received a demobilization gratuity, so too did those 
National Reservists who served in the Territorial Rifle Brigade battalions. They at least 
had the chance to participate in official peace parades. Apart from their 'Sunday School 
certificate', 88 their uniform and, if they chose to buy them, their boots and greatcoat, 
demobilized Volunteers had few physical reminders of his unpaid and seemingly 
unappreciated period of service. 
66 Wiltshire Association let the resolution lie on the table. Wiltshire RO L 1/~ 01/2, 12/09/19; Surrey RO 
608/2/4, 16/06/19; Council of County Territorial Associations, Minutes 16/07/19, Duke of York's. 
67 The Ministry of Labour resisted the attempt to classify the Special Service Company men as 'ex-
servicemen' (W0991955 of 16/12/20) but gave way. BM6162/Mob5 of 26/08/20 had confirmed they 
were eligible for the Government Scheme for Overseas Settlement. 
66 VF Gazette Vol.9 No.225, 20/03/20, p.24. 
CONCLUSION 
The War Office decision to disband the Royal Defence Corps (ROC) and the Secretary 
of State's refusal to permit a reconstruction of the National Reserve and the Volunteer 
Force did not signal the irreversible end of the volunteer auxiliary movement. Trad ition , 
patriotism and the possible stigma as epigoni, ensured a future of sorts. Following 
prolonged and acrimonious debate, the newly-crafted Territorial Army was established 
as the nation's principal auxiliary and the ROC reemerged in 1922 as the National 
Defence Corps (NDC) .1 Its companies were attached to Territorial units and in an 
emergency were detailed, as their predecessors had been, to defend vulnerable points . 
In 1939, when war did again come, the NDC became Home Defence Battalions and 
were affiliated to the Regular Army. To the original members of the Volunteer Training 
Corps (VTC), however, the great lacuna in Britain's postwar system of defences was a 
force dedicated to protecting the coast and lines of communication . The military 
authorities' apparent insouciance over the matter, its previous doubts about volunteer 
auxiliaries in general and its traditional captiousness to spending on anything other 
than the Regular Army, precluded an immediate revival of the Volunteer Force or even 
the organizational skeleton of a National Reserve. 
Apart from the Territorial Force itself, Haldane's most significant contribution to 
the auxiliary movement for home defence was the creation of the National Reserve. 
Although not prepared to commit himself in advance to how it might be used , and 
determined to keep its organization and finance under tight control , Haldane sponsored 
a scheme which, when the call came, exceeded expectation .2 The movement caught 
the imagination of the public and much of the press. Many of the senior Reservists were 
no doubt frustrated at their inability to take a more active part in the prosecution of the 
war but, unspectacular as their work in the Protection Companies and the VTC might 
have been, by providing a reservoir of trained men at negligible cost, they did release 
younger men for foreign service. 
Absolute figures for the number of National Reservists who joined the various 
1 For a discussion of the difficulties and suspicions which had to be overcome before the Territorial 
Army was established, see I. Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition 1558; 1945, Manchester: • 
Manchester University Press, 1991 , pp.244-47 and P.Dennis, The Territorial Army 1907-1940, 
Woodbridge: Boydell Press for RHS, 1987, pp.190-215. 
z Important as the Reserve was, one VTC correspondent overstated the case when he accused it of 
being the barrier which prevented the introduction of universal conscription in 1915. VTC Gazette 
Vol.2 No.29 19/06/15, p.42. 
branches of the armed forces for home and foreign service by mid-1 916 will never be 
determined. Too many of them enlisted without being called and thus removed 
themselves from the registers . Few counties discovered or recorded the total of their 
Reservists who did enlist; there were probably more important, and possibly easier, 
sets of figures to compile. One extant report from the City of London Association does 
include a summary of its Reservists' enlistment and employment patterns. 3 It concluded 
that, from a registered strength in July 1914 of 1011 Class I and 6026 Class II , over 
2000 had rejoined the forces or were in some sort of government service by April 1916. 
Over 1 000 of the remainder were either aged 50 by the time they were called or had 
been declared to be medically unfit. As only 241 men had officially resigned from the 
Reserve, many of the missing 4000 were assumed to have either enlisted without 
waiting to be called and without informing the Organizing Officer, or to have enrolled in 
one of the City's six Volunteer battalions. 
A similar analysis can be made for the Hampshire Reserve. In June 1914 the 
county had 2038 men in Classes I and II and just over 8000 in Class Ill. At that time, 
54% of the 164 Class II men who had been asked if on mobilization they would join 
certain Territorial Force units had agreed . By March 1915, 2725 had joined the armed 
forces, another 1510 were in the county's eight Protection Companies, 792 were in 
government work and 425 had been refused for medical reasons . This suggests that 
53% of its June strength had either joined up or had a valid reason for not having done 
so. 4 
Figures from other counties also give an indication of the Reserve 's value to the 
first and second line armies. In Buckinghamshire, 633 Class I and II men had enlisted 
by the end of 1914, while in Yorkshire by late October over 300 of the Huddersfield 
Battalion had joined the Regulars and over 260 had gone into the Territorial Force. 
These enlistments had so depleted the battalion that only some 500 Class Ill men 
turned up for the annual church parade. Enlistment figures throughout the West Riding 
. as a whole were equally impressive. In May 1914, the registers contained a total of 
10,853 names, a figure which included 2404 who were· thought to be of no practical 
value; by January 1 ~15 over 7000, or at least 64% of them had rejoined the colours . 
Worcestershire recorded a lower enlistment rate but still believed 37% of its 
membership had enlisted by the end of 1915. In Surrey by November 1914, 942 
3 Guildhall MSS, 12,606 Vol.2 . Report by Captain Hansford, 13/04/16. Hansford was a long-time 
benefactor of the City of London Association and was eventually appointed its Organizing Officer. 
4 Calculated from Hants RO, 37M69/3, 19/06/14 and Report of the National Reserve Committee, 
March 1915. 
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Reservists were known to have joined the Special Reserve, 144 the Territorials and 354 
men and eight officers were protecting strategic sites. This total of almost 1450 
Reservists was taken from a declared strength of 2015 in June 1913. By January 1915 
the association recorded that 365 of its Class I and II officers had rejoined the army. In 
December 1914 the Sussex Association estimated that over 1000 of its men had 
rejoined the regulars or Territorials. Equally impressive figures were returned for the 
North Riding . In August, 800 Class II were immediately posted to local Territorial units 
and by September 1915 the county had contributed 43 officers and 1425 Reservists to 
regular or Territorial forces . Fife claimed that 74% and 42% of its Class I and II men had 
enlisted by February 1915, while Aberdeen reported a more modest total of 44%.5 In 
January The Times devoted a highly laudatory article to the work being performed by the 
Reserve which claimed that 'scarcely less' than 200,000 members, or 'five army corps', 
were currently on active service. This was a considerable over-embellishment but 
Strachey used the article to urge the Government to publish official figures and detail the 
tasks currently undertaken by Reservists. 6 One contemporary source claimed that by 
the end of 1915, nationally 80,000 Reservists were serving in some military capacity.7 
While a proportion of these reenlisted National Reservists were undoubtedly in 
relatively safe positions in home-based units, many of their comrades had already been 
killed or wounded overseas. By the end of 1914, 1012 of the Huddersfield National 
Reserve Battalion had joined up; 580 of them enlisted in the regular or New Army and 
432 in the Territorial Force. Three companies of the battalion came from the Pen nine 
community of Saddleworth, an area unrenowned for martial tradition . Nevertheless, 227 
men from a total population of 12,000 had registered as Reservists . Many of these 
immediately joined their local Territorial battalion , the 1/7th Duke of Wellington 's, while 
others were drafted out to the 2/Dukes.8 In mid-September, a first draft of 80 men , 
including several veterans of the South African War, travelled to Huddersfield to collect 
kit and equipment before posting . By May 1915, nine, or 11% of these men had been 
• 5 Buckinghamshire RO, T/N1/22, Annual Report 1913-14; Huddersfield Examiner 2111114 ; L.Magnus, 
The West Riding Territorials in the Great War, London: Kegan Pau1, 1920; Worcestershire RO, 
004:6BA5204/8; Surrey RO, 608/2/2, 9/11/14. The figure of 2015 excludes a large number of 
'unclassified'; Sussex Rq, TER 8/1 , 16/12/14; F. Reynard , A Brief History of the Territorial Force 
Association of the County of York (North Riding) 1908-1919, Northallerton : Joseph Walker, 1919, p.13; 
NAS, MD?/24, 19/02/15; NAS, MD4/2, 7/04/15. 
s Times, 11/01/15 and 13/01/15; Skilled Reservists were in particular demand from technical units. 
Almost 250 Reservists were transferred from the infantry to the 3rd Field Company Wessex RE. Others 
with suitable skills were similarly posted when the units second and third lines were formed . 
W .G.Fisher, A Historyofthe Somerset Territorial Units, Taunton , 1924, p.246. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Initially, only Reservists under 35 years were accepted . 
~8 2. 
killed and at least another 20 invalided home.9 Lanark recorded a total of 61 , or 5% of its 
enlisted members, dead by October 1915.10 
Most regiments did not distinguish between those men who died while training 
for overseas duty with their Territorial battalions from those who died while serving with 
the Supernumerary Companies attached to those battalions. The three exceptions are 
the London, Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) and Royal Sussex Regiments . These men 
are listed separately in Soldiers Died and are described in the rolls as National 
Reservists. They all died at home between 1914 and 1916, and were sometimes aged 
well into their 50s. The London Regiment lists 79 deaths, the Sussex eight and the 
Cameronians seven . It is probable that the latter figures could be taken as a rough 
average for a county regiment. 11 
It is possible that some National Reservists fought on the Marne in September 
1914 but many certainly took part in the First and Second Battles of Ypres. In March 
1916 it was reported that National Reservists over 50 years, with dependents who were 
'inadequately provided for', were serving in overseas units.12 These men were probably 
with the Rifle Brigade's Territorial battalions but although they were technically over the 
age limit for a combat zone, the Government felt no need to recall them on 
compassionate grounds. Reservists serving with Home Service Provisional Battalions 
also attracted the attention of several MPs who raised questions about the age and 
physical expectations of these men. In response to the queries, the Under Secretary of 
State stressed that these men were not doing excessive physical training and refuted 
allegations that some of them were aged over 60 .13 
Despite the incomplete nature of the figures for the number of Reservists who did 
eventually enlist in Regular and Territorial units, it is clear a considerable percentage 
9 K.W .Mitchinson, Saddleworth 1914-1919: The Experience of a Pennine Community During the Great 
War, Saddleworth: SHS, 1994, p.21. 
10 NAS, MD4/72, 15/10/15 . 
• 
11 Soldiers Died in the Great War, London: HMSO, 1921 , Parts 31 , 40 and 76. Private George Holland 
of the 23rd Supernumerary Company, a veteran of the Afghan War, was aged 60 , while Private Edwin 
Brown of the 36th Company was 61. The highest number of deaths in any one unit was eight. These 
men served with the 28th Company, most of whom came originally from the Blackheath and Woolwich 
Battalion. Twenty-four of the 79 fatalities in the London Regiment's companies were of men who had 
formerly served with the 24th Battalion (The Queen's). Most, but not all of these National Reservists , 
have graves registered by the CWGC. 
12 Hansard Vol.80.2060, 15/03/16. 
13 HansardVol.82.278, 8/05/16, Vol.82.441, 9/05/16, Vol.85.290, 2/08/16. Reservists in Eastcote 
camp were reported to be suffering from a different cause of discomfort: on one day each week the 
men were issued with biscuits rather than bread . There was concern that their elderly teeth or dentures 
were proving incapable of coping with the hard army issue squares 
did . Thousands more served until the end of the war in the Royal Defence Corps.14 The 
introduction of conscription and the raising of the age limit for active service resulted in 
the posting overseas of many Reservists serving in Provisional Battalions of the 
Territorial Force. Reservists in several of the Territorial Rifle Brigade battalions did not 
return to the United Kingdom until 1919, long after most wartime units had been 
disbanded. Although they did not enlist in the primary forces of the Crown, thousands of 
members eventually wore the uniform of the Volunteer Force and possibly served a two 
or three-month period in the auxiliary's Special Service companies. 
The other elements of Haldane's Territorial Force Reserve also made useful if 
not particularly high profile contributions. When war came, the failure of the Territorial 
Reserve to attract members proved to be of marginal consequence. No doubt it would 
have been useful for mobilizing Territorial units to have known they would receive an 
influx of trained men familiar with the system but, as both Seely and Haldane had 
predicted, so many ex-Territorials rejoined their former units on the outbreak that their 
lack of periodical training probably counted for little. They could put to good use their 
earlier experience in helping to train and advise the hordes of young men who had little 
if any previous knowledge of the army and its methods. As the war progressed , the 
Territorial Reserve became a convenient means by which civilians whose work in 
depots and administrative centres required them to be officers, could be granted 
commissions, and whereby wounded or over-age officers could be utilized on home 
service duty. 15 
The Voluntary Aid Detachments of the Technical Reserve were mobilized in 
August 1914 and were soon at work providing services and care for returning wounded . 
What little preparatory work had been done in discussion with technical boards and 
organizations before the war was superseded by the Defence of the Realm legislation . 
Government ministries and agencies were empowered to call upon and, where 
necessary, requisition their expertise. The Coastwatch continued until the former Class 
. 111 National Reservists and members of local VTC who had largely taken over the 
14 The ROC lost 31 officers and over 600 other ranks. Soldiers Died in the Great War, op.cit., Part 77 . 
Thirty-one of the men went down with the mail steamer Leinsterwhen she was torpedoed in the Irish 
Sea in October 1918. The date of death of two members, Pte J.Gambie arid Captain W.Curtis, 
actually predate the creation of the ROC. Cemetery and memorial registers record that many of the 
dead were former National Reservists. 
1s A war Office letter of 26/06/15 recommended that suitable staff of Territorial Associations should be 
commissioned as captains in the TF Reserve General List. Officers Died in the Great War, London : 
HMSO, 1919, lists four officers under this heading , two of whom were killed in action . 
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responsibility were discharged in January 1919. 16 The Corps of Guides was never 
required to conduct troops across country to an invasion site, but Surrey's members 
were attached to the county's VTC to provide expert local knowledge. Other members 
were sworn in as Special Constables and sections did undertake exercises in planning 
evacuation routes for cattle and mapping various public utilities in the county. Plans 
were also drawn up in conjunction with the General Officer Commanding London 
District to transport entrenching equipment in case of invasion.17 There is no record of 
how much effort other associations put into maintaining their corps during the war, but it 
is known that at least one county appointed new Chief Guides when earlier post-
holders died. 18 In 1920 the Army Council decided that the Guides had served their 
purpose and instructed associations to disband their corps. With an official letter 
expressing the appreciation of the police, naval and military authorities, Strachey's 
experiment ended .19 
One of the principal tenets of the Central Association Volunteer Regiments' 
(CAVR) philosophy was to encourage men to enlist in the Regular Army and Territorial 
Force. This policy was used as one of the chief arguments to justify official recognition 
and was to remain enshrined within the movement's creed .20 The CAVR claimed 
success in this endeavour and while it is difficult to assess how much influence on 
hesitant men's minds the recruiting campaign had , thousands of Volunteers did enlist. 
Many of those had originally been directed by tribunals to enrol , often against their will , 
in the Volunteers . If their exemption was not later renewed they probably displayed an 
equal reluctance when ordered to enlist in the Regular Army. Nevertheless , some of the 
figures are significant. Many men registered under the Derby Scheme enrolled in a 
corps of their own volition and undertook voluntary drills, 21 but many original members 
had enlisted long before the scheme was implemented. The United Arts Rifles lost 200 , 
15 Under the provisions of the Volunteer Force Regulations, 1916, the Admiralty was responsible for the 
pay and rationing of these men. The official estimated cost of the land patrol of the 5895 miles of UK 
coast in 1917 was 2 shillings per mile. HansardVol.93, 2650, 25105117. 
•
17 A.Strachey, St.Loe Strachey: His Life and his paper, London: Gollancz, 1930, p.286-9. 
18 National Archives of Scotland (NAS), MD5123, 16103115. 
19 Only one association, Nairn, seems to have minuted receipt of the Army Council 's letter. National 
Archives of Scotland , MD~116 , 8106120 . In July 1919 Strachey resigned from the position as Chief 
Guide of Surrey's Corps of Guides and suggested the county association should invite Colonel Watney 
to take the post. Watney declined pending a decision about the Corps' future. Surrey RO 6081214. 
14107119 and 6081112 , 21107119; The idea of a the Technical Reserve was revived in August 1924 
with the creation of the Supplementary Reserve. This was established to provide technical support in 
times of emergency. 
2o CAVR, The Volunteer Force and the Volunteer Training Corps During the Great War, London: King 
& Sons, 1920. See Appendix Ill , p.51 , which reproduces Leaflet A 1. 
21 Keighley Reference Library, Bk.34117. 
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mostly to the Artists Rifles by the close of 1914, and , by October 1915, the Sherwood 
Foresters battalions had sent 496 to enlist. 22 By November 1918, the same battal ions 
calculated a total of 1479 of their men had enlisted .23 and of the approximately 3000 
men who passed through the 1st Battalion East Yorkshire Volunteer Regiment between 
January 1915 to November 1918, about 26% were thought to have enl isted. 24 An almost 
identical proportion from the Suffolk Volunteer Regiment are also thought to have gone 
between May 1916 and the Armistice.25 One source suggested about a million 
Volunteers voluntarily joined the armf6 . This is an over-estimation but there is 
considerable contemporary evidence to suggest that Volunteers who did enlist were 
promoted more rapidly than non-Volunteer recruits and were sometimes excused 
preliminary drills. 
If the number of Volunteers who joined the Regular Army is ultimately 
undeterminable and distorted anyway by those caught by the various Military Service 
Acts, the total of hours worked by Volunteers is similarly impossible to compute. Yet, the 
amount of work done on the London defences alone ran to over one million man hours 
and when the time spent on anti-aircraft and London termini duties, work at munitions 
and transport facilities and the millions of hours spent by individuals or small parties 
patrolling reservoirs, railway lines, gas works and the like are added , the figure would 
represent an enormous total of unpaid work. Whether that work was either essential or 
even useful, or whether the utilization of the Volunteer Force on such schemes was 
merely a Government sop to the middle-aged, middle-class who considered it a 
citizen 's duty to contribute to the defence of his nation and to the new phenomenon of 
total war, are questions which strike at the heart of the very raison d'etre of the auxiliary. 
Enveloped by the popular spontaneity of August 1914, the founders of the 
Volunteer movement were swept along on the surging sentiments of duty and sacrifice. 
Undoubtedly this eudaemonic state sheltered them from the realities of modern 
warfare. If the Germans had landed in 1914 and if the VTC had streamed forth to 
·confront the invader, they would unintentionally have compounded the military's already 
severe operational and logistical difficulties. Many Volunteers might have fought bravely, 
22 E. Patton (ed) A Record of the United Arts Rifles 1914-1919, London : Alex Maring , 1920, p.15; 
C.Gerring , A Record of the Early Volunteer Movement (The Sherwood Forf:;.sters) 1914-19, 
Nottingham: Sisson & Parker, 1920, p.1 0. 
23 c .Gerring, A Record of the Early Volunteer Movement (Sherwood Foresters) , op.cit., p.27. 
2• F.Lock, Records of the East Yorkshire Volunteer Force, Hull: Eastern Morning & Hull News, 1920, 
pp.13-14. 
25 E.R.Cooper mss, Department of Documents, IWM, p.12. 
26 F.Lock, Records of the East Yorkshire Volunteer Force , op.cit. , p.7. 
but without organization, discipline and arms, they would have blocked the roads and 
hampered effective deployment of the Regular troops. Like their franc tireur counterparts 
in Belgium and France they would have met a futile death at the hands of German 
troops exacting revenge for whatever limited damage the Volunteers might have been 
unfortunate enough to inflict upon them. 27 
Early government obloquy towards the VTC should be seen in the context of the 
chaos within which the army recruiting campaign was conducted . Until 1915 there was 
little acceptance in official circles that a developed strategy for recruitment to the 
Services and the maintenance of industrial production was a prerequisite for an 
effective and successful means of fighting the war. The grant of official recognition to the 
VTC in November 1914 was conditional on the corps not accepting men who might 
otherwise be of use to the army. There is no evidence to suggest the authorities ever 
considered the growing attraction of the Volunteer movement might interfere with the 
industrial and commercial life of the country, yet they were certainly concerned that the 
financial support enjoyed by many Volunteer units might entice arms manufacturers to 
supply them rather than the New Armies. Laws to prevent this were quickly put in place 
and, once the controls were applied, the authorities were content to display a benign 
tolerance to the movement. The War Office chose, at times, to traduce the work and 
nature of the corps but while this occasional sophism caused some to lose faith , the 
bulk of the original Volunteers quietly dedicated themselves to acquiring arms and 
skills, dismissing the lack of encouragement as yet more evidence of official 
disparagement of the amateur soldier. 
As it grew increasingly apparent that manpower resources would have to be 
mobilized for both military and industrial purposes, the Government decided the 
Volunteers might be utilized in the contemporary clamour for equality of sacrifice. The 
decision to direct tribunal exempted men to join a local corps had less to do with 
producing a quality home defence army and more with calming the vociferous critics 
within Parliament who felt elements of the industrial workforce were avoiding their 
citizen duty. Government reluctance to clamp down heavily on those who failed to fulfil 
their drills reflected its developing philosophy that food and munitions production were 
27 Only one VTC was ever officially mobilized . While he was inspecting the Deal Company in February 
1916 a General apparently received intelligence that the Germans were about to land between 
Whitstable and Deal. He had possibly heard of orders transmitted to several Provisional Battalions 
warning them that parties of English-speaking Germans dressed in khaki were expected to land . 
(W095.5458) . The General ordered the immediate mobilization of the company, which then spent a 
bitterly cold night with the Royal Marines manning trenches on the beach . Orders from the Admiralty 
next morning stood them all down. Deal, Walmer and Sandwich Mercury, 25/10/19 and 5/03/21 . 
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of greater importance than teaching reluctant and perhaps exhausted workers the 
rudiments of military drill. 
The Government's decision to arm and equip the Volunteer Force (VF) was made 
with the reluctant acquiescence of the War Office. The military authorities could see little 
advantage in a force which was unlikely to be used and, even if ever it was called out, 
would always remain of dubious quality. The movement reaped the benefit of the 
consistent support afforded by Field Marshal French, particularly in the Spring of 1918 
when he was utilized as an element in Lloyd George's scheme to restrict Haig and 
Robertson's freedom of action . Yet, despite his public pronouncements French himself 
had little real faith in the Force's military potential and when the Government did opt to 
spend on the Volunteers, it did so with an eye to their political rather than military 
potential. There was little chance of an invasion or raid and even if one was mounted , 
only French had given any real thought to how the Volunteers might be deployed . His 
colleagues in the War Office had continued to show little interest in the Force's possible 
utilization but the knowledge that it did figure both in French's and the Government's 
plans served to mollify its supporters inside Parliament and out. 
In return for what was ultimately a paltry financial outlay, the Government secured 
the loyalty of the movement's leadership. The membership was not always quite so 
pliable but there was little risk of the county regiments creating anything other than 
entirely containable discomfort. When the German offensives brought the manpower 
crisis to its climax the War Office and the Government looked to the Volunteers to ease 
their difficulties. Resistance from employers to the release of their men and a 
reluctance of the men to commit themselves to a two or three month period away from 
home contrived to cause disappointment to the movement's leadership . To the 
authorities, the poor response confirmed the belief in the fecklessness of the amateur 
warrior. It really mattered little. There had been no attempts at sabotage and , if the 
Germans had launched a late raid against a harbour or a coastal munitions facility , the 
damage was unlikely to have done more than cause temporary embarrassment to the 
Admiralty. The Special Service Companies did give the movement a sense of purpose 
and did something to suggest that the Government was taking them seriously. For its 
part the Government secured a means by which additional troops could be posted 
abroad without appearing to jeopardize home security. In addition , it made good 
propaganda to illustrate how the front line land defence of the islands and its 
democratic traditions was being actively undertaken by largely middle-aged , part-time 
volunteer citizenry. These Volunteers of 1918 were the direct descendants of the Rifle 
Volunteers and although, like their predecessors, they were held to ridicule , their 
deployment in partnership with the few remaining Regulars and Territorials 
demonstrated both a sagacious degree of populism and a perceptive pragmatism . 
What is unclear is why after the war the Government chose to ignore the work of 
the Volunteer Force in such an arrogant manner. The attitude of the War Office is 
understandable: a system which for years had sustained little faith in the ability of fitter 
and younger auxiliaries was unlikely ever to become enthused with the military worth of 
this part-time force. It had, inevitably, always cast doubts upon the Force's existence and 
resented the money spent on it. If there was not to be a Home Service Medal for full-time 
soldiers, the award of one to occasional auxiliaries would have been iniquitous. The 
Government's attitude, however, is more abstruse. Although some of the Cabinet had 
often been dubious of the Force's utility they had been prepared to toss it the occasional 
carrot and, when they felt the need, to laud it publicly. To have snubbed it in quite the 
manner it did was unnecessary. The movement's leadership had at times criticised and 
condemned the authorities' policies but as none of these occasions had caused any of 
the postwar administration lasting political embarrassment, revenge was not a 
consideration . In general terms the movement had been compliant, cooperative and 
responsible. It had also proved useful in easing the manpower crisis . One bitter 
assertion that the Government suspected its motives because its labour was proffered 
without charge is understandable but inappropriate. 28 It is more likely that the postwar 
Government believed the Force no longer warranted political consideration . In 
comparison to those to whom the issue was of no consequence, the number of 
slighted and offended original Volunteers was trivial. The tribunal men probably cared 
little either way. The Home Office awarded medals to its Special Constables because 
they would be needed in the future; the War Office declined to follow suit because the 
Volunteer Force, save perhaps for its motor units, would not be required again. The 
military authorities were more concerned with securing funding and conditions of 
service for the new Regular and Territorial Armies . The Volunteer Force could be fobbed 
off with a worn uniform and a certificate. 
' 
Nevertheless, the Government's contemptuous postwar treatment of the 
Volunteers and its failure both to revive the National Reserve or maintain the Volunteer 
I 
Force's organization, cannot deny the auxiliaries' value and contribution to the national 
war effort. The enthusiasm with which nearly 200,000 Reservists and possibly 250 ,000 
28 M.Yearsley, Home Front Diary 1914-1918, Dept.of Documents, DS/Misc/17, IWM, p.72. 
genuine Volunteers registered and exhibited their willingness to serve in some capacity 
typified the Edwardian ideals of patriotic duty and self-sacrifice. These virtues perfectly 
exemplify the traditional role and object of the British amateur soldier. Twenty years after 
he had dismissed the idea, the same former Secretary of State concluded the 
exigencies of war again demanded the levying of a part-time, anti-invasion auxiliary. 
Although the Local Defence Volunteers (LDV) were officially instigated and 
sponsored, they were to suffer from similar equipment shortages and organizational 
uncertainties as the VTC and VF. Influenced by their experience in the Spanish Civil War, 
some leaders of the later auxiliary envisaged a more fundamentally democratic 
structure and character than the less exclusive battalions of the Great War Volunteers . 
Nonetheless, both organizations were regarded by many contemporaries as people's 
militia or citizen armies raised to oppose invasion and guard vulnerable points. They 
both eventually became accepted elements of the Crown's Forces, were ultimately 
equipped by the state, originally denied the use of formal military ranks, administered by 
the Territorial county associations and later confronted the difficulty of having their 
volunteer status diluted by the compulsory enlistment of sometimes reluctant 
conscripts . In the same manner as units of the Rifle Volunteers and the VTC had 
recruited from within towns, villages, industrial concerns and commercial businesses, 
the spontaneous growth of LDV and Home Guard companies was frequently the 
outcome of men in similar circumstances and areas electing to form a unit. Like their 
VTC and VF forerunners, the Home Guard raised specialist units, motor sections and 
anti-aircraft batteries, as well as providing for coastal defence and assisting the civil 
defences during air raids . The early VTC had often been swelled by the enrolment of 
former servicemen and National Reservists and , although perhaps chary of what official 
assistance might be afforded, it is possible that reasonably fit ex-National Reservists 
and former Volunteers once again availed themselves of the opportunity to evince their 
innate, yet previously only grudgingly acknowledged, patriotism in the new auxiliary. In 
. doing so they continued the long-established British tradition of the amateur military 
volunteer. 
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APPENDIX 1: THE TERRITORIAL BATTALIONS OF THE RIFLE BRIGADE 
The war diaries1 of the seven battalions which saw overseas service vary considerably 
in scope and depth . However, the overwhelming impression of the surviving evidence 
suggests that once the battalions had left the United Kingdom, life for the National 
Reservists who served in them was one of largely unrelieved boredom. 
The battalions sailed for Egypt and India in late 1915 or early 1916. In Egypt they 
performed endless guards at level crossings, stations, supply dumps, wireless 
stations and even the Commander-in-Chief's residence. A detachment of the 21st 
Battalion had a slightly more adventurous time as gunners on an armoured train which 
rattled up and down the track running parallel to the Suez Canal. Other companies 
guarded the Abbassia detention barracks, a mental asylum, several internment and 
prisoner of war camps and a local hospital. Two battalions were called out to protect 
vulnerable points during the demobilization riots by Scottish troops at Kantara and 
detachments were sometimes employed to quell violent disputes between convict 
labour and local people working at the coal quays at Alexandria . One detachment of the 
18th Battalion was sent to Basra and another was somewhat eccentrically employed as 
a minesweeping patrol off Bombay. 
Platoons of the battalions stationed in Egypt were also used to escort Turkish 
prisoners of war to India, occasional outbreaks of smallpox among the prisoners 
sometimes providing an unwanted diversion from routine during the long sea 
passages. On arrival, many of the Turks were forwarded to convict settlements on the 
Andaman Islands. National Reservists of the 18th Battalion provided guards for these 
camps. Despite the tedium endured by so many of the men, there does not seem to 
have been an excessive amount of crime. There are occasional references to Courts 
.Martial - for example, Private Price of the 19th Battalion was given nine months' 
imprisonment with hard labour for hitting a superior officer whilst under the influence -
and cap badges wer~ finally withdrawn after several warnings failed to dissuade men 
from selling their badges to Australians. Drunkenness was usually punished by 
'Confined to Barracks' and fines, but the majority of the references to Courts Martial 
1 The diaries of the 18th, 23rd and 24th Battalions have disappeared . The surviving diaries are 
W095.4719, 4732, 4443, 4456, 4410, 4719, 4465, 4924. The diary for the 25th Battalion , which 
remained at home, is W095.5460. The article in the Rifle Brigade Chronicle , 1928, London: Rifle 
Brigade Club & Association , partially compensates for the absence of certain diaries. 
involve the battalions' officers sitting in judgment on men from other regiments . 
Travelling medical boards were frequent visitors to the battalions. A regular flow 
of 'cripples and epileptics'2 departed for the UK, accompanied by a steady number of 
men returning home for munitions work. As the war progressed and manpower 
became more stretched, boards frequently upgraded men's medical categories with the 
result that they were sent away to more active units. They were replaced by men of even 
more dubious fitness and sometimes even by local recruits. Nevertheless, in 1918 the 
General Officer Commanding Kantara thought that the quality of the 19th Battalion was 
sufficient to describe it as a 'good battalion of steady old soldiers who did all they were 
required to do'.3 Many of these men were well into their sixth decade and not surprisingly 
found either the desert heat or the humidity of the sub-continent extremely onerous. 
Although never dramatic in number, fatalities from disease remained a constant drain 
on battalion strength. 
National Reservists serving in the 22nd Battalion were also required to endure 
the rigours of a Balkan winter. Apart from a few soldiers attached from the Army Supply 
Corps there were no specialist transport men to care for the 13 horses and 38 mules 
used to carry the battalion's tools and materials over the rugged terrain . Despite regular 
falls of snow and a howling wind whipping across the exposed mountains, the battalion 
generally had fewer than 3% of its strength sick. In February 1917 the battalion was 
incorporated within the newly-created 228 Brigade of the 28th Division, and in March it 
actually relieved the 1/King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry as front line troops. Armed 
with obsolete single-shot rifles, the battalion sent out patrols and manned listening 
posts in No Man's Land. The Bulgars were not disposed to provide excitement for the 
riflemen, but the disappearance of two men in May 1918 'cast a gloom over the whole 
battalion'. Like all units it suffered from the flu epidemic of 1918, but it did retain 
sufficient fit men to maintain a reasonable establishment. 4 
While civil servants and politicians in post-Armistice Whitehall began tentative 
.discussions on the possible future of a reconstituted National Reserve and other 
auxiliary formations, many of the organization's members were still serving in the 
2 W095.4465. 
3 W095.4732 . 
4 W095.4924. 
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Empire's outposts. 5 The Rifle Brigade battalions were brought back to the United 
Kingdom during 1919 and early 1920. The delay in their return was seen as merely a 
revival of the prewar attitude which had been the hallmark of authority's cavalier 
dealings with the Reserve.6 Their Territorial and New Army comrades serving in the 
European theatre had been demobilized months before and , not surprisingly, riflemen 
in India resented the seemingly undue length of time it was taking to get them home 
and thus join in the search for civilian occupation . 
During this perceived unnecessary hiatus, men continued to die. Before 
hostilities ceased, the seven Rifle Brigade Territorial battalions had sustained 205 
fatalities. 7 None of these men are recorded as having been killed in action and only two 
are listed as having died of wounds. A good proportion of the men died at sea : 39 were 
drowned when the transport ship /vernia was torpedoed on New Year's Day 1917 and 
another 24 went down with the Arcadian in the following April. The majority of the men, 
however, died of disease or of natural causes. The age of some of these ex-National 
Reserve riflemen is quite astounding . A survey of fatalities among reservists from South 
Yorkshire who served with the 20th Battalion reveals that most were well into their 
forties. The eldest fatalities were probably Rifleman George Fuggles of the 18th 
Battalion, who died in the Andaman Islands aged 6?, and Rifleman Smith and Corporal 
Taylor, both of the 24th Battalion, who were 59 and 57 respectively. 
The manner in which deaths were recorded suggests that the Rifle Brigade 
administrators were not entirely sure of the correct nomenclature of their adopted 
battalions. The Soldiers Died roll for several of the units is split into two sections. For 
example, the 20th Battalion has 14 fatalities listed under the 20th Garrison Battalion , 
and another 30 listed under the 20th (Northern) Battalion (Territorial) . There appears to 
be no obvious reason why they could not all have been entered together. Given the 
confusion apparent in the method of recording, it is perhaps predictable to discover that 
several men who died before the Armistice are not listed . There are at least another five 
men with known graves who do not appear in Soldiers Died. A trawl through the 
5 In November 1917 Mr Crooks asked why elderly reservists in the 1 ?th Battalion , some of whom were 
over 55, could not be brought home. They had apparently not, said Mr Crooks, expected to be sent so 
far away for so long in such an alien climate. Forster replied that there was no information the men 
were suffering and that there was no hope of exchanging them unless they were actually invalided 
home. Hansard Vol.99 .596, 15/11/17. In a rare show of concern for reservists who were no longer its 
responsibility, the Cumberland and Westmorland Association had enquired vvhether any of the 42 
troops who were reported to have died of heat in open cattle trucks in India had been members of its 
National Reserve. Cumbria RO, TTAF/2, 27/07/16. 
e For a discussion of the consequences of the delay in returning Territorial units to the UK see 
P.Dennis, The Territorial Army 1907-1940, Woodbridge: Boydell Press for RHS, 1987. 
7 Soldiers Died in the Great War, London: HMSO, 1921 , Part 74. 
registers of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission discloses that, for example, 
the 21st Battalion lost nine men in Faizabad in post-armistice November 1918, while 
the 18th Battalion in Burma, lost six through malaria in early 1919. In addition to the 205 
who died during the war, there are at least another 40 who died before their units 
returned home. 
APPENDIX II : THE VOLUNTEER FORCE SPECIALIST UNITS 
From their creation, several Volunteer Training Corps (VTC) intended only to enrol men 
of a particular profession or trade. These units developed unique characteristics but as 
' 
many of them failed to attract sufficient recruits to make them viable , they amalgamated 
with other corps and lost their identity. Some units did manage to retain their exclusivity 
and developed as specialist corps. These included several engineer corps and another 
unit comprised nearly 80 London pharmacists. Several specialist units, most notably 
the Station Companies of the London National Guard were acknowledged to be doing 
useful work, but until 1917 the War Office resolutely refused to recognize any units other 
than infantry. 
As the campaign for recognition of infantry units gathered momentum, a similar 
desire among specialist corps also developed . In June 1916, the Army Council began 
to consider whether it should recognize certain Volunteer engineering and artillery units. 
It concluded it had to be guided by utilitarian motives and decide whether there were 
sufficient specific duties to justify accepting the services of such corps., At the request 
of General Headquarters Home Forces (GHQ HF), the Central Association Volunteer 
Regiments supplied a list of those non-infantry units then in existence. These included 
five engineer corps and over 20 motor squadrons.2 As Commander-in-Chief Home 
Forces (C-in-CH F), Field Marshal French supported the idea of recognizing non-infantry 
units but suggested that as they would be the ones to use the corps, acceptance or 
refusal should be devolved to the General Officers Commanding Commands (GOC 
Commands).3 French's Inspector of Vulnerable Points, Douglas Dawson , also 
recommended acceptance of at least the engineer units and, in August 1916, a letter 
was despatched to Lords Lieutenant requesting them to submit offers of service from 
non-infantry corps within their counties. 4 
Several Lords Lieutenant replied that they had only infantry units and at least one 
argued that they shpuld confine themselves to such units. 5 The Commanders of the 
Tyne and Humber Garrisons, with the support of the GOC Northern Command , 
' W032.18554. Army Council to FM C-in-CHF, 9NF/43 (TF2) of 14/06/16. 
2 W032.18554. GHQ HF to War Office, HFCR 4954 (0) of 7/07/16. 
3 Ibid. 
• W032 .18554. Dawson to Bethune, 7/07/16. The letter to Lords Lieutenant was sent on 16/08/16. 
5 W032.18554. Letter from Lord Lieutenant of Lanarkshire. 
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recommended acceptance of the East Riding Volunteer Garrison Artillery and the 
Northumberland Engineer Company and, in November 1916, French also 
recommended that the War Office officially accept their offers of service.6 Early in 191 7, 
the various Commands were authorized to recognize some engineer units and it was 
generally believed that signalling companies would also soon be recognized .7 
Subsequently, the East Riding Garrison Artillery and Army Supply Corps companies , 
and several other similar units were recognized piecemeal during 1917. 8 Recognition 
did not automatically lead to a defined role . Five months after the War Office had 
accepted the services of the London Engineers, one disgruntled MP bemoaned the lack 
of official assistance and information on how the corps was to be used . In addition , he 
explained. the corps had as yet received no government grants, had lost its HQ, had all 
its requests for engineering stores refused , was still itself having to pay for two Regu lar 
instructors, had had to return its single loaned rifle and it still had no adjutant. 9 Things 
did gradually improve and, by the end of the war, seven counties ran between them 16 
Fortress, Signal and Electric Light Companies. Later proposals to raise three Railway 
Companies for telegraphic duties and to act as crew for an armoured train were 
abandoned in October 1918.10 
Volunteer ambulance corps were also recognized during the early summer of 
1917 but, like the engineer and artillery units, had faced an up hill struggle. On the 
advice of the Deputy Director Medical Services, who thought they would interfere with the 
work of the Red Cross and Voluntary Aid Detachments, the War Office had been 
reluctant to accept their services.,, When official recognition was awarded , many 
counties did organize sections but others used them as a paper exercise to gazette 
medical officers for their infantry battalions. By 1918, probably fewer than 20 counties , 
with a total of about 35 units, ran effective field ambulances. When , in 1918, Wiltsh ire 
raised two ambulances, the War Office told the county association the units were not 
required and ordered it to disband them.12 
Neither was the War Office much interested in the desire of some counties to 
raise mounted units. It was unenthusiastic about a unit of nearly 300 ex-cavalry men 
seeking recognition ,in the Leeds area , considered that the Glasgow Mounted 
6 W032.18554. Letters of 31/08/16, 19/09/16 and 26/09/16. French to War Office, 24/11/16. 
7 VF Gazette Vol.5 No.120, 17/03/17, p.186. 
8 W032.18554. Letters from Major-General R.Montgomery, Commander Tyne Garrison . 
9 Hansard Vol. 97, 1731 , 20/08/17. 
10 9NF/52, no date. W070.43. 
11 9NF/187, 12/04/17. W070.43. 
12 The VolunteerList 1918, London : HMSO, 1918; Wiltshire RO L1/100/3, 28/02/18. 
Squadron, which had no horses or arms, was entirely unnecessary and suggested that 
the British Colonial Horse Volunteers would be of more use if they enrolled as infantry in 
the Stoke Newington infantry battalion .13 It also vetoed a proposal by which the 
Pharmacists Corps was to become a company of the London Engineers, preferring 
instead that the corps should lose its specialist status, convert to infantry and merge 
with the United Arts RifleS.14 As the number of Regular and Territorial troops in the 
country declined, the authorities grew more amenable to Volunteer offers of assistance . 
They were, for instance, prepared to accept proposals from Aberdeen and Kent to ra ise 
Royal Garrison Artillery companies and man some of the coastal 15 pounder guns.15 
The City of London National Guard and the County of London Volunteers had 
begun the work of the high profile Station Companies in 1915. Nightly, uniformed 
volunteers over military age, driving their own vehicles , ran leave soldiers from one 
London terminus to another or to an overnight hostel. A pamphlet explained the 
companies' main object as preventing : 
... our brave soldiers falling into the hands of sharks and thieves who notoriously pester 
our Main Line Stations, and get them to where they want to be without interference of 
those "interested parties", particularly after "Tommy" has visited the pay office.'6 
By mid-1918 the National Guard Companies totalled about 250 men and were thought 
to have arranged the transportation or accommodation of over 2 million troops.17 
The work of the Station Companies had been initiated and organized on an 
entirely voluntary basis. The War Office had recoiled from encouraging the formation of 
Volunteer motor squadrons by individual corps in case they affected its relationship with 
the Royal Automobile Club and Automobile Association , both of which provided drivers 
for senior officers at home and overseas. Many corps and battal ions, especially those of 
a more socially exclusive nature, did form their own motor transport squadrons from the 
varied vehicles of their own members, but they frequently suffered from a lack of petrol. It 
was this lack of heterogeneity which worried the War Office and which delayed the 
13 W032.18554. 9NF/43 (TF2) of 14/06/16; Ibid, letter from GOC Scottish Command, 19/09/16; 
W070.42 .121/0verseas/3796, no date. 
14 1n a bid to gain official 'recognition , in October 1916 the corps had put on an exhibition , complete 
with incinerators, sterilizing equipment, refuse destructors and sanitation trenches, in Brockwell Park. 
The Daily Express christened it the 'Anti Microbe Corps'. R.Westlake, 'The Pharmacists Corps ', Stand 
To! No.36, pp.27-29 
1s National Archives of Scotland (NAS) MD4/2, 3/1 0/17; East Kent Archives , U924/06, 9/03/18. 
1a1WM Dept.of Printed Books, 316.338, K34585. See also Anon., 'An Excellent Auxiliary', Journal of 
the RUSt, Vol.62 , 1917, pp.812-815. 
17 Daily Telegraph 23/07/18. 
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squadrons' recognition . Nonetheless, repeatedly advised of how useful these units had 
been during training and in assisting with the digging of London 's defences, in 
September 1916 the Secretary of State created a committee to look into whether a 
Volunteer Transport Corps should be recognized. Among others, the committee 
comprised Bethune, the Director-General Territorial and Volunteer Force, (DGTVF) 
Major-General D.C. Macintyre, who combined his duties as Staff Lieutenant in 
Macpherson's department with being Commandant of the National Motor Volunteer 
Corps, Julian Orde, President of the Royal Automobile Club (RAC) , and William 
Joynson-Hicks, his counterpart in the Automobile Association (AA) .18 The committee 
recommended that a Royal Motor Volunteer Corps should be formed and that GHQ HF 
should devise a scheme whereby its units could be used. It warned that experience had 
already shown that 'Volunteers lose heart and become unreliable if they do not get work 
to do which is useful to the State and which justifies the sacrifices they make'. 19 On 
receipt of the report, the Adjutant-General accepted that if there was a proven need for 
such an organization it should be formed. However, he was concerned that as the 
Volunteers had already caused 'such trouble with no equivalent results ', he was loathe 
to agree to another organization which might prove useless. Brigadier-General Atkins , 
the Director of Supply and Transport, argued the Motor Volunteers were entirely 
unnecessary: the 'almost desperate position' of the motor industry would only be made 
worse. He was referring particularly to recent regulations brought in by the Ministry of 
Munitions under the Defence of the Realm Act which stipulated that repairs in any 
garage or workshop could only be performed under authority. Atkins believed the 
expense of providing free petrol , tyres and repairs to the Volunteers would be completely 
wasted .20 
When Atkins sent this disparaging note to Lieutenant-General Sir J.Cowans, the 
Quartermaster-General (QMG), he was not in possession of a paper written by Percy 
Harris. It is unlikely that Harris' paper would have altered Atkin 's opinion of Motor 
. Volunteers but it does seem to have impressed FM French. Harris detailed the largely 
unrecognized work already performed by the motor squadrons. This ranged from driving 
GOC Commands and finding transport for Volunteer guards attached to 39th Squadron 
Royal Flying Corps and for vulnerable points, to providing transport for digging parties 
1s Joynson-Hicks was the Unionist MP for Brentford and had been instrumental in ra ising the 17th and 
23rd (Service) Bns.Middlesex Regiment. 
10 W032.18565. Proceedings of a Committee appointed by the Secretary of State to look into Motor 
Transport on a voluntary basis. The committee sat on 25/09/16 and 5/10/16. Bethune sent its report to 
the Under Secretary of State on 6/10/16. 
20 W032.18565. Minute No.2 (AG) of 21/10/16 and DST to QMG. 
and hospital detachments. 21 Harris' submission was reinforced by letters to GHQ 
Home Forces from both the RAC and the AA. Despite continued qualms on the part of 
the QMG, French considered the squadrons would be of 'great value' and requested the 
question of their recognition be raised by the War Office before the Volunteer Bill was 
drafted.22 
The War Office was horrified at French's request, retorting that it would be 
'disastrous', just as the Bill was about to be passed, to arouse the opposition of 
Joynson Hicks and other MPs who were involved with the RAC and AA. Recognition of 
what was now to be known as the National Motor Volunteer Force, believed the War 
Office, would undoubtedly cause problems with the other motoring organizations wh ich 
were doing essential work with Commands.23 French agreed to concede delay in order 
to give Bethune time to offer placatory words to the two motoring organizations.24 In 
almost obsequious tone, the DGTVF explained that FM French wanted to recognize and 
use the Motor Volunteers but assured Joynson-Hicks and Orde that he had no wish to 
interfere with their organizations' work.25 Orde, who despite a belief that the War Office 
should have accepted his association's offer to organize a volunteer motor corps in 
August 1914, raised no objection to Bethune's proposal to recognize the Motor 
Volunteers provided they did not affect the existing work of the RAC. Joyson-Hicks also 
agreed to the proposal but, at a meeting which he did not attend , his committee reacted 
angrily. Its members spoke of their association's loyal work on behalf of the Army 
Council and of a 'grave breach of good faith' on the part of the War Office if it was now 
prepared to grant recognition to a 'body of unattached gentlemen which in justice 
should have been accorded this Association '.26 By this stage Bethune was not to be 
dissuaded and , in January 1917, an Army Council Instruction and Volunteer Force Order 
were published which allowed for the formation of County Motor Volunteer Corps.27 
Once recognition had been achieved, the county associations reorganized their 
existing squadrons on more formal bases. Owner-drivers were recruited and the more 
21 W032.18565. Paper by Harris, no title, dated 3/11/16. 
22 W032.18565. QMG to french , 8/11/16; W032.18568. French to War Office, 11/11/16. 
23 W032.18568. Unsigned mem from War Office to French , 22/11/16. 
2( W032.18568. French to Derby, 25/11/16. 
2s W032.18568. Letters from Bethune to Orde and Joynson Hicks, 14/12/16. Both replies were dated 
15/12/16. 
2e W0.32.18568. Automobile Association to Bethune, 28/12/16. 
21 Army Council Instruction (ACI) No.90 of 1917, Volunteer Force Order (VFO) No.XXXIII , Formation of 
County Motor Volunteer Corps. Following their initial outburst, the AA's committee soon came round 
and offered 'to help in any way possible .' W032 .18568, AA to Bethune, 19/01/17. 
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homogeneous vehicles grouped into Heavy or Light Squadrons. 28 At a meeting 
convened by Lord Desborough in his capacity as President of the London Chamber of 
Commerce, and Sir John Lister Kaye, President of the Motor Transport Volunteers , FM 
French addressed owners of commercial vehicles and urged them to reg ister with their 
local corps. 29 There was undoubted enthusiasm on the part of many vehicle owners , the 
Middlesex County Association even suggested that as they had so many members their 
drivers should be transporting sick and wounded troops overseas.30 But, there were 
also disappointments: the Somerset Association intended to raise six squadrons but 
managed only two.31 Squadron Commanders qualified as efficient once they had 
attended and passed a week's course in workshop and road skills with a Regular Army 
Supply Corps company. The officers were invariably reported to have shown great 
keenness, satisfaction at having been attached to a Regular unit and frequently to have 
paid their own expenses. 32 One battalion commander, however, believed the motor 
squadrons were detrimental to efficiency because they sometimes attracted trained 
men from the infantry.33 
The Royal Army Supply Corps Motor Transport (Volunteers) (RASC MT(V)) , as the 
Motor Volunteers were eventually known, were not put into suspension along with their 
infantry colleagues in 1919 because the authorities considered they would be useful in 
the event of civil unrest. The editors of the VF Gazette had pointed out in November 
1918 that as many of the Motor Volunteers belonged to trade unions, there might be 
difficulties if they were called upon to drive during strikes. Despite this, several 
squadrons did assist the authorities during the rail strike in September 191934 but, in 
November, the Army Council decided it wanted to disband the corps. It wrote to the 
Home Office, Ministry of Transport and Ministry of Food and suggested one of those 
departments should take over this 'inexpensive organization ' and reform it on a civil 
basis. A protracted series of proposals and counter-proposals followed : the War Office 
wished to get the corps off the Army Estimates vote and believed it could never be used 
. in uniform to break strikes; the Home Office argued that it should be kept under War 
Office authority, and the Food Controller wanted to keep it in existence at least until April 
2e The most extensive extant record of a Volunteer Motor Squadron is probably that of Preston, dated 
9/03/17. It gives a detailed breakdown of its vehicles, drivers and their drill attendance. Lancashire 
RO DDX 1372/1. 
29 Liverpool Daily Post 7/11/17. 
30 121/Medical/3141 (TF2) of 3/05/17. W070.42. 
31 w .Fisher, A History of the Somerset Territorial Units, Taunton , 1924, p.248. 
32 For example, reports from 274th and 978th Motor Transport Companies. W095.5460. 
33 E.R.Cooper Mss, IWM Deptartment of Documents, p.9. 
34 Circular letter 99/Motors/215 (TV2) of 8/10/19 thanked the RASC MT(V) for their help. 
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1920 when, he hoped, the industrial situation might have improved . He wanted the 
corps to be retained by the War Office and for it to keep its military character; if it were 
disbanded, he thought the men would never be persuaded to reenlist. 
Churchill announced he was prepared to reconsider the matter but numerous 
letters from county associations and Commanding Officers units urging disbanding -
one association hoped that its corps might be transferred en bloc to the Territorials .35 -
poured onto his desk. In May 1920 it was arranged by the Cabinet's Supply and 
Transport Committee that the War Office would continue to administer the corps for a 
further six months, with the Ministry of Food meeting any costs . The political situation 
was such that, in July, mobilization stores were ordered to be withdrawn and in March 
1921 the Ministry of Food consented to the disbanding of the auxiliary.36 
35 Hampshire RO 37M69/4. Commandant's Report 1919. 
36 This summary is taken from 99/Motors/218 (TV2), no date. W070.42. 
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APPENDIX Ill: THE VOLUNTEER TRAINING CORPS IN IRELAND 
Westminster governments have traditionally shied away from encouraging the Irish to 
bear arms upon their own soil. In recent times, Section 53 of the Volunteer Act, 1863 
had specifically prevented the formation of Irish Rifle Volunteers and the Territorial and 
Reserve Forces Act, 1907, did not extend the Territorial system to the province. Similarly, 
and despite some prolonged prevarication, the National Reserve was not raised in 
lreland. 1 When war broke out in 1914, Irish politics was already over-burdened with 
armed Volunteer groups, both Nationalist and Unionist. This did not dissuade others 
from emulating events on the mainland and several Volunteer Training Corps (VTC) 
came into existence. An Irish Association of VTC was formed in 1915 to coordinate 
efforts but, by early 1916, some of the corps, like their British counterparts, had 
dissolved or merged. There remained about 15 corps of varying size and efficiency.2 
Early moves to gain recognition for mainland corps fell partly because the movement's 
supporters sought blanket acceptance. When the proposal to include the Irish VTC in 
any Parliamentary Bill was finally abandoned, the British Government agreed to grant 
recognition to the British corps. 
Little is known of the individual groups except for the City of Cork VTC and the 1st 
(Dublin) Battalion. The former corps, formed by members of the teaching staff of 
University College, had been given encouragement when Lieutenant-Colonel Lord 
Frederick Fitzgerald, aide-de-camp to the General Officer Commanding Ireland, 
inspected it in March 1916 and expressed his hope that the corps would be recognized .3 
But it was the Dublin Battalion which sprang to prominence in the following month when 
it became caught up in the Easter Rising . About 90 of its members were marching to 
Beggars Bush Barracks from a training scheme to store their ancient Russian made 
. rifles, for which they possessed neither ammunition nor bayonets, when the column 
was fired upon by Sinn Fein rebels. Three Volunteers were killed outright and several 
wounded . The remair:~der gained the sanctuary of the barracks and for the next eight 
days withstood a siege in company with about 80 Royal Irish Fusiliers. By the time the 
siege was ended, the Volunteers had lost a total of five killed and seven wounded . A 
1 See Chapter V. 
2 VTC Gazette Vol.3 No.68, 18/03/16, p.243. 
3 E.J.Martin, 'The VTC 1914-1918', IWM Dept. of Printed Books; VTC Gazette Vol.3 No.69, 25/03/16, 
p.258. 
4-02. 
little later, the auxiliaries' tenacity was recognized in the House of Lords by the Secretary 
of State for War himself.4 
The Dublin Battalion's Easter activity galvanised the Volunteer movement. Percy 
Harris sought assurances from Tennant, the Under Secretary of State, that the 
Volunteers would be paid and granted allowances for their period of service, the VTC 
Gazette loudly praised the corps' work, the Central Association announced it was 
donating £100 for a dependents' fund and the Spectator suggested every Volunteer 
should contribute 1d to the fund .5 R.A.Anderson , the Secretary of the Irish Association of 
VTC who had been himself wounded during the siege, wrote to Lieutenant-General Sir 
John Maxwell, General Officer Commanding Ireland , requesting him to consider the 
question of compensation. Maxwell supported the claim but because those killed 
outside the barracks were not acting under military orders, the War Office denied any 
responsibility . Maxwell retorted that awarding compensation would have an 'excellent 
effect upon the loyal population of Ireland' but it was not until late August that the War 
Office agreed to pay compensation to the widows, wives, orphans and children of the 
casualties. 6 
The award pleased the movement but did little to promote the cause of 
recognition for the Irish VTC. In view of the political situation and an Order of August 
1916 which prevented any other than Regulars and Territorials in Ireland from carrying 
arms, the Irish Association advised its members to suspend drills.7 This led to 
premature rumours that the corps had disbanded but the Gazette offered some hope 
when it announced that the Chief Secretary for Ireland , Henry Duke, had expressed the 
wish they should not disband.8 The decision did not, in reality, lie with Duke. When a 
Unionist MP, Major John Newman asked him why recognition of the Irish VTC was not 
forthcoming, Duke replied that the matter did not fall under the auspices of Irish 
administration but lay in the hands of the Secretary of State for War.9 The exclusion of 
Ireland from the Volunteer Acts made the position of the Irish corps anomalous; given 
the lack of official encouragement, there was no real alternative to disbanding. The Cork 
VTC 'died solely from disuse atrophy ... lt withstood menace, contempt, ridicule , 
4 W035.69.4. Pensions to dependents of members of the VTC; Hansard House of Lords Vol.22, 212, 
30/05/16. 
s Harris asked the same question on 10/05/16 and 17/05/16. HansardVol.82 , 628, Vol.82 , 1503; VTC 
Gazette Vol.3 No.7?, 20/05/16, p.387, 392-93, Vol.4 No.80, 10/06/16, p.30, No.82, 24/06/16, p.51 . 
s Correspondence between Maxwell and War Office, no numbers, in W035.69.4. 
7 VTC Gazette Vol.4 No.89, 12/08/16, p.164; E.J.Martin, 'VTC 1914-1918', op.cit. 
8 VTC Gazette Vol.4 No.1 01, 4/11/16, p.326. 
9 Hansard Vol.88 , 463, 30/11/16. 
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obstacles and opposition of all sorts ... until it was condemned to a slow and painful 
death by the British politicians of the day'. 10 
A loose organization of sorts might have been retained , for in April 1917 there 
was a suggestion that members of the Belfast Volunteer Defence Corps, working 
entirely in a civilian capacity, might be used in place of Regular troops in what were 
probably labouring or clerical dutieS.11 Nothing seems to have come from the proposal 
but the Irish Coastwatch was kept in existence after its counterpart on the mainland had 
been stood down. In the absence of Volunteers , the Irish coast was patrolled by paid , 
full-time watchers, with an average age of 45 years , to supplement the shortage of 
official Coastguards. An alleged lack of security in the selection of watchers had caused 
Colonel Ashley to claim that some of them were 'very doubtful characters' .12 The 
organization appears to have been phased out during 1919. 
10 E.J.Martin , 'VTC 1914-1918', op.cit. 
11 W070.43. Note 99/26 (TF2) of 19/04/17. 
12 HansardVol.107, 1692, 3/07/18. 
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